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Abstract 
 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (ca. 16th century CE), one of the seminal figures in post-
Śaṃkara Advaita Vedānta, authored various works, including the Advaitasiddhi, a 
polemic of the highest kind against theistic dualism. It is considered to be one of the 
influential works of the Advaita Vedānta (i.e. non-dualism) school of Śaṃkara. In 
addition, his Bhaktirasāyana is the only extant independent exposition on the nature 
of devotion written by a staunch exponent of Advaita. In his work, we see a 
remarkable attempt to accommodate two apparently incompatible concepts, viz. 
non-dualism and devotion.  
           Building on the Bhaktirasāyana, Madhusūdana has given a running 
commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, viz. the Gūḍhārthadīpikā, in which the doctrine 
of Advaita is expounded with a special emphasis on bhakti. In this work he 
occasionally disagrees with Śaṃkara’s interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā. He also 
treats some rival views that developed in post-Śaṃkara Vedānta (e.g. concerning 
whether the individual self is one or many) as viable alternatives within Advaita 
Vedānta. 
While the Gūḍhārthadīpikā is considered to be an original and independent 
commentary on the Bhagavadgītā written from the Advaita point of view, some of 
the later commentators belonging to the same school did not accept it in toto. They 
even expressed the view that as compared to the Gūḍhārthadīpikā, Śaṃkara’s 
commentary exhibits better the true import of the Bhagavadgītā. Ironically, a few 
later commentators belonging to the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school (who are generally 
opposed to Advaita) have found the Gūḍhārthadīpikā impressive. This dissertation 
attempts to establish that the Gūḍhārthadīpikā succeeds to a considerable extent in 
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accommodating devotion as an aid to the means of attaining liberation, a fact that 
has been overlooked in some contemporary works on Madhusūdana. 
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Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction:- Apart from the scope and methodology of this thesis and 
the principal questions that are addressed therein, the introductory chapter gives 
some general idea about the monastic lineage of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a 
chronological account of his principal works, the intellectual background of 
Advaita Vedānta, including the development of post-Śaṃkara schools, the 
commentarial tradition of the Bhagavadgītā before Madhusūdana and the available 
editions, commentaries and translations of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā together with its 
mutual references in other works of Madhusūdana, as also mutual references to 
other commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā and a note to consider the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā as a perfect example of good exposition (vyākhyā). 
 
Chapter 2: Available Modern Scholarship on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī:- A 
comprehensive review of the existing scholarly work regarding the works of 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in general, and the Gūḍhārthadīpikā in particular, is 
undertaken in the second chapter. The objective here is to identify the limits of 
previous scholarship on the Guḍhārthadīpikā, thereby justifying the need for 
undertaking the present venture. 
 
Chapter 3: Madhusūdana’s Introduction (upodghāta) to the Gūḍhārthadīpikā as a 
Summary of the Bhagavadgīta:- This chapter aims at dealing critically and in more 
depth with the unique treatment of the Bhagavadgītā as laid down in the forty six 
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verses of the introduction to the Gūḍhārthadīpikā, in order to determine what 
Madhusūdana focuses on throughout his long commentary on the Bhagavadgītā.   
 
Chapter 4: Realities (tattva-s): the Supreme Self (brahman), the Individual Self 
(jīva), and the Universe (jagat):- In this chapter we discuss Madhusūdana’s 
treatment of the three important doctrines of the Vedānta philosophy concerning the 
supreme self (paramātman) or brahman, the individual self (jīva) and the cosmic 
universe (jagat), as well as his view of these principles as forming the metaphysical 
ground of the Bhagavadgītā.  
 
Chapter 5: Liberation (mokṣa) and the Means (sādhana) of Attaining It:- This 
chapter aims at exploring how Madhusūdana, with his distinctive philosophical 
approach, handles the state of liberation and the process of attaining it. The goal of 
this chapter is to show how Madhusūdana explains the Bhagavadgītā as a śāstra 
presenting a coherent philosophical teaching, leading to its ultimate goal of guiding 
seekers in the process of attaining liberation or emancipation (mokṣa/mukti). 
 
Chapter 6: The Gūḍhārthadīpikā of Madhusūdana and the Commentarial 
Tradition of the Bhagavadgītā:- While Madhusūdana himself has referred to the 
views of many other commentators of the Bhagavadgītā, a number of subsequent 
commentators have also made use of Madhusūdana’s Gūḍhārthadīpikā or adversely 
criticised it. A comparative analysis pertaining to the Gūḍhārthadīpikā of 
Madhusūdana and other traditional commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā will be 
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made in this chapter in order to assess what influence prior commentators had on 
Madhusūdana, and how subsequent commentators have reacted to him. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion:- The concluding and seventh chapter makes a critical 
evaluation of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā on the basis of issues discussed in earlier 
chapters. The question of the ways in which Madhusūdana follows Śaṃkara’s 
tradition, as compared to the way in which he innovates (i) in terms of 
interpretation of the text, (ii) in terms of authority used, and (iii) in terms of method 
of exposition will be reviewed in this chapter. Thus, this chapter will point out the 
fact that the Gūḍhārthadīpikā makes a successful attempt to provide room for 
devotion as an aid to the means of attaining liberation, thereby indicating 
Madhusūdana’s place within and influence upon the intellectual and religious 
discourse prevalent in India.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Scope and methodology of the study 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (MS) (ca. 16th century CE) was a preeminent post-Śaṃkara 
Advaita thinker from Bengal.1 An uncompromising defender of Śaṃkara’s non-
dualistic Vedānta with vast erudition and amazing polemical skills, MS produced 
works like Advaitasiddhi (AdS), Siddhāntabindu (SB) and Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 
(AdRR). At the same time, his emphasis on devotion (bhakti) is especially 
noteworthy when compared to other exponents of non-dualistic Vedānta. This can 
be seen in works such as Bhaktirasāyana (BhR), Gūḍhārthadīpikā (GD), a 
commentary on the Bhagvadgītā (BhG), Mahimnastotraṭīkā (MSṬ), 
Bhāgavatapurāṇaprathamaślokavyākhyā (BPPŚV) and Harilīlāvyākhyā (HLV). Most 
of the avowed critics of Advaita, especially the Vaiṣṇavite founders of theistic 
Vedānta schools, including Rāmānuja (11th century CE), Madhva (13th century CE) 
and Vallabha (15th century CE), had already claimed that Advaita is incompatible 
with the sentiment of devotion, which entails a total surrender by the devotee to a 
personal Godhead like Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa or Hari, whom these thinkers identify with 
brahman. They also claim that the highest reality is saguṇa brahman (qualified 
brahman), and not nirguṇa brahman (unqualified brahman) as claimed by the 
Advaita Vedāntins. The BhR and GD vary greatly in subject-matter and approach, 
but in both texts, MS took up the challenging task of giving bhakti a prominent 
                                                 
1 Refer to Appendix II for a detailed account. 
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place within the fundamental tenets of non-dualism and renunciation that are the 
hallmark of the Advaita Vedānta.  Thus, in order to evaluate his contribution to the 
debate on the place of bhakti in the Advaita Vedānta, the GD and BhR are the 
principal texts that should be studied intensively. The speciality of the GD is that 
here, unlike in his other devotional works, MS summarises the basic non-dualistic 
principles that are defended in detail in works like the AdS and SB. He also asserts 
in the GD and AdS that he knows no other higher reality but Lord Kṛṣṇa. Thus, MS, 
while being an ardent follower of Śaṃkara, has formulated a remarkable synthesis 
of the paths of knowledge (jñāna-mārga) and devotion (bhakti-mārga), for realizing 
the highest reality and attaining liberation, the highest end. Most scholars hold that 
MS’s emphasis on bhakti is meant to counter the criticisms of theistic Vedāntins 
that adherents of the Advaita Vedānta cannot give a convincing account of the path 
of devotion recommended in the BhG. The current study has been undertaken with 
a view to examine how MS successfully combines the path of devotion with the 
basic tenets of the Advaita Vedānta in his commentary on the BhG, namely the GD.  
MS begins the GD with a proclamation of allegiance to his great predecessor 
Śaṃkara, whose BhG commentary established the superiority of renunciation 
(saṃnyāsa) and the path of knowledge. While in large measure endorsing 
Śaṃkara’s views, MS uses subtle reasoning and copious scriptural citations to 
accommodate the path of bhakti within the Advaita tradition. At the same time, he 
resolutely defends the Advaita Vedānta from the attacks of Vyāsa Tīrtha (15th 
century CE), an adherent to Madhva’s dualistic school of Vedānta. MS’s strong 
allegiance to Advaita indicates that his ideas of bhakti are significantly different 
from those of theistic Vedāntins like Rāmānuja, Madhva and Caitanya (15th century 
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CE). Significantly, apart from Śaṃkara and his annotator Ānandagiri (14th century 
CE), the only other commentator whom MS refers to by name is Śrīdhara Svāmin 
(14th century CE). Though Śrīdhara adhered to Śaṃkara’s non-dualism while 
describing the nature of reality (tattva) in the BhG, he admitted the superiority of 
devotion as a means to liberation, making his work acceptable to the Vaiṣṇava 
groups like the followers of Caitanya in Bengal.2   
Thus, the principal question that will be addressed in this dissertation is: how 
does MS’s commitment to bhakti in the GD influence the way he interprets basic 
Advaitic concepts and their interrelations? Several related issues will be studied in 
detail, including, (i) What is distinctive and unique about the interpretations 
provided by MS as compared to other commentators of the Advaita tradition? How 
successfully does MS achieve his objective of integrating the path of bhakti with the 
basic tenets of Advaita Vedānta? (ii) Does MS’s attempt at incorporating bhakti in 
the larger Advaitic framework alter the traditional and popular understanding of 
Advaita? (iii) How does he utilise the works and thoughts of previous scholars, 
Advaitins as well as non-Advaitins, as he seeks to present a comprehensive and 
persuasive reading of the famous text of the BhG? 
This task has been undertaken with occasional reference to the 
Gūḍḥārthatattvāloka (GTL), a sub-commentary on the GD by Baccā Jhā (early 20th 
century CE) that has so far been neither studied nor translated. In explaining 
philosophical concepts in the main body of the thesis, references to the BhG 
commentaries of Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīdhara will be made in order to trace 
                                                 
2 In the antyalīlā of chapter seven of the Caitanyacaritāmṛita, Caitanya himself is said to have paid 
high regard to Śrīdhara Svāmin and his commentary on the Bhāgavata (Mukhopādhyāya 1997: p. 
321).  
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MS’s indebtedness to them, if and when it is found. In addition, mention will be 
made of the BhG commentators who have been cited by MS, either explicitly or 
implicitly, and later commentators who have referred to MS, in order to assess the 
importance of MS’s own views in the wider tradition of BhG commentary. This 
study will review MS’s philosophical stances in the GD in relation to his other 
works, as also the extent to which he is in agreement with Śaṃkara’s positions as 
understood by the tradition. Thus, the present study will focus primarily on textual 
analysis, with minimal reliance upon historical or hagiographical accounts. The 
next section provides a brief biographical detail of the author in order to understand 
better the place of this text in its historical context and within the author’s own 
oeuvre. 
 
1.2. The author and his works 
Like most writers from traditional Indian philosophical schools, MS has not given 
any significant autobiographical details in any of his works other than his name and 
the names of his preceptors, which appear in colophons and salutary verses. 
References to MS in later literature are the only sources upon which a biography of 
the author may be based, but these are often hagiographical in nature. Leaving aside 
these secondary references, we will depend here on the first-hand information 
available from the extant works of our author. 
The fact that MS is the author of the GD can be substantiated with ample 
internal textual evidence. Apart from colophons at the end of each chapter, giving 
the name of the author, one of the concluding verses of the GD clearly mentions 
that the author of the GD is Madhusūdana and that he is a member of a monastic 
 
 
 16
order.3 The Catalogus Catalogorum of Theodor Aufrecht mentions nearly twenty 
authors named Madhusūdana. However, only one of them carries the ‘Sarasvatī’ 
suffix and is named as the author of a Bhagavadgītāgūḍhārthadīpikā among other 
works.4 In the New Catalogus Catalogorum, ten authors are named Madhusūdana, 
one of whom is also a ‘Sarasvatī’ and is identified as the author of the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā and other works.5 Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, in his introduction 
to a commentary on the SB of MS, mentions that twenty five authors in the history 
of Sanskrit literature are named Madhusūdana, and that five of them have 
‘Sarasvatī’ affixed to their names. One of these is the author of the Advaitasiddhi 
and Siddhāntabindu, a disciple of Viśeśvara Sarasvatī and teacher of Puruṣottama 
Sarasvatī, who lived in the 17th century. This is the same as our author MS,6 whose 
GD forms the focus of this thesis. 
That Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara and Mādhava are his preceptors, and that he 
belongs to the monastic order, are stated by MS at the beginning of his AdS.7 MS 
has dedicated both the AdS and GD to these three teachers, using almost the same 
expression in both works.8 The second benedictory verse of the 
Saṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha (SŚSS), which bears the name of the same three 
teachers, corresponds to the second benedictory verse of the AdS and the 
                                                 
3 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, colophons at the end of each chapter and the 3rd 
concluding  
verse at the end of chapter 18, p. 775. 
4 Aufrecht 1962: Part 1, pp. 426-7.  
5 Dash 2007: Vol. XVIII, pp. 148-51. 
6 Siddhāntabindu 1986: Upodghātaḥ, p. 27 (Also see Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. II). 
7Advaitasiddhi 2005: Introductory verses 2 and 4 of chapter 1, p. 8. 
8 Compare the last concluding verse at the end of the GD with the second introductory verse of the 
first chapter of the AdS (Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 775 and Advaitasiddhi 2005: 
p. 8). 
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concluding verse of the GD.9 One of MS’s commentators Brahmānanda Sarasvatī 
(17th century CE), while commenting on the second benedictory verse of the AdS, 
refers to Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara and Mādhava as MS’s parama-guru (teacher’s 
teacher), guru and vidyā-guru respectively.10 
MS dedicates his AdRR to Viśveśvara Sarasvatī,11 his preceptor, as attested 
in the colophons at the end of each chapter of his other works, including the GD, 
SŚSS and SB.12 The beginning of the SB, the second introductory verse of the 
Vedāntakalpalatikā (VKL) and the beginning and the colophon of the MSṬ, all pay 
obeisance to Viśveśvara Sarasvatī.13 Puruṣottama Sarasvatī, while commenting on 
the SB, describes Viśveśvara as the preceptor of MS.14 At the third concluding verse 
of the AdS, MS salutes Mādhava Sarasvatī as among the finest self-controlled ones 
(yamināṃ varāḥ), with high proficiency in the scriptures (śāstrārthe pariniṣṭhitāḥ). 
In the course of commenting upon this verse, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī describes 
Mādhava Sarasvatī as MS’s teacher of the śāstra (vidyā-guru), and, while 
explaining the fifth concluding verse of the same work, he refers to Viśeśvara 
Sarasvatī as MS’s guru, i.e. preceptor.15 On the basis of these textual references, we 
can draw a guru lineage for MS that includes Śrīrāma, Viśeśvara and Mādhava 
Sarasvatī-s.16 Furthermore, as MS quotes Śaṃkara in several occasions throughout 
                                                 
9 Compare Giri 2007: Pt. 1, Sārasaṃgraha, p. 3 with Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 8 and Bhagavadgītā 
1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 775 respectively. 
10 Advaitasiddhi 2005: Gauḍabrahmānandī, p. 8. 
11Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 46. 
12 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, colophons at the end of each chapter, and compare it 
with Giri 2007: Pts. 1 and 2, Sārasaṃgraha, colophons at the end of each chapter, pp. 803, 1132, 
1614, and 1704; Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: Colophon, p. 46; Siddhāntabindu 1986:  p. 154. 
13 Siddhāntabindu 1986: Introductory verse, p. 1; Karmarkar 1962: p. 1; Śivamahimnaḥstotra 1996: 
Madhusūdanī, pp. 1 and 135. 
14 Divānji 1933: Sanskrit section, p. 1. 
15 Advaitasiddhi 2005: 3rd concluding verse and Gauḍabrahmānandī thereon, p. 900. 
16 Though the appellation ‘Sarasvatī’ is clearly found in the case of Viśeśvara Sarasvatī and 
Mādhava Sarasvatī in MS’s own works, the same appellation may be appropriate in the case of 
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his commentary on the BhG17 to be an authority, his identity as a monk belonging to 
the Śaṃkarite tradition is confirmed. 
Among the disciples of MS, we have already mentioned Puruṣottama 
Sarasvatī, who wrote a commentary on the SB, called the Bindusandīpana, wherein 
he pays homage to MS as his vidyā-guru, eulogising him as a Bṛhaspati, the 
preceptor of the gods.18 Puruṣottama also pays homage to MS in the concluding 
verses and colophon of the Bindusandīpana.19 In his commentary on the 
Sarvasiddhāntarahasya of Śaṃkara, Śeṣagovinda pays tribute to MS by describing 
him as one by whose grace the four goals of human life (puruṣārtha-catuṣṭaya) are 
attained, who is an incarnation of goddess Sarasvatī, and who has compassionately 
instructed him (Śeṣagovinda) [karuṇā-pūrita-cetasopadiṣṭa].20 In the concluding 
verse of the SB, MS mentions that he has made this short composition for the sake 
of Balabhadra,21 who requested him earnestly. Brahmānanda Sarasvatī describes 
Balabhadra as a celibate disciple of MS,22 while Puruṣottama says Balabhadra 
Bhaṭṭācārya was a devoted disciple of MS, who was also well-versed in Vedāntic 
                                                                                                                                               
Śrīrāma as well if we follow Brahmānanda Sarasvatī’s view (Advaitasiddhi 2005: 
Gauḍabrahmānandī, p. 8) that Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara and Mādhava were MS’s parama-guru, guru and 
vidyā-guru respectively, which also finds support by the tradition that both the guru and parama-
guru should be from the same sampradāya. 
17 See chapter 6.2-3 infra.  
18 Though Puruṣottama Sarasvatī is said to have written a commentary on MS’s AdS as well, named 
the Siddhisādhaka, it is not extant (Divānji 1933: Sanskrit section, pp. 20 and 70). 
19 Siddhāntabindu 1986a: Bindusandīpana, introductory verse 4, concluding verses 1 and 3, and 
colophon, pp. 2 and 146). 
20 Cf. Modi 1985: Introduction, footnote 11, p. 25, Ghoṣa 1931: Advaitasiddhibhūmikā, p. 109, 
Thangaswami 1980: p. 285. 
21 Balabhadra also wrote a commentary on the AdS, called the Siddhivyākhyā which refutes the 
Nyāyāmṛtataraṅginī of Rāmatīrtha or Rāmācārya - 16th/17th century CE and the Nyāyāmṛtaprakāśa 
of Śrīnivāsatīrtha - 13th century CE). Besides, he is said to have written the Advaitasiddhisaṃgraha 
(See Nyāyāmṛtādvaitasiddhī 1984 and Ghoṣa 1931: Advaitasiddhibhūmikā, p. 179). 
22 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Last concluding verse and Nyāyaratnāvalī thereon, p. 462. 
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lore.23 These textual sources help us determine the community of teachers and 
disciples of our author MS with some degree of certainty.  
Despite the lack of concrete evidence regarding the precise date and 
biographical details of MS’s life, it is safe to accept the general agreement of 
scholars that MS flourished in Bengal sometime between the 15th and 17th 
centuries.24 As in the case of his biographical details, concrete details of other works 
of our author are uncertain. In the Catalogus Catalogorum, Theodor Aufrecht, has 
mentioned the following works under the heading of MS: Advaitabrahmasiddhi,25 
Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa, Ātmabodhaṭīkā, Ānandamandākinī, 
Ṛgvedajaṭādyāṣṭavikṛitivivaraṇa, Kṛṣṇakutūhalanāṭaka, Prasthānabheda, 
Bhaktisāmānyanirūpaṇa, Bhagavadgītāguḍhārthadīpikā, Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana, 
Bhāgavatapurāṇaprathmaślokavyākhyā, Mahimnastotraṭīkā, Rājñāmpratibodha, 
Vedastutiṭīkā, Vedāntakalpalatikā, Śāṇḍilyasūtraṭīkā, Śāstrasiddhāntaleśaṭīkā, 
Śaṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha, Sarvavidyāsiddhāntavarṇaṇa (Prasthānabheda?), 
Siddhāntatattvabindu, Harilīlāvyākhyā, and 
Bhāgavtapurāṇādyaślokatrayavyākhyā.26  
Though some of the works contain internal evidence suggesting identical 
authorship, it is difficult to accept all the works mentioned by Aufrecht as the works 
of the same author, and Aufrecht himself was doubtful about it. However, on the 
basis of primary evidence such as references to MS’s teachers and/or to his name in 
                                                 
23 Divānji 1933: Sanskrit section, p. 83. 
24 For a detailed and critical analysis of it, refer to Modi 1985: Introduction, Divānji 1933: 
Introduction, and chapter 2 infra. 
25 The first work mentioned in the list, called the Advaitabrahmasiddhi is probably the mistaken form 
of the AdS of MS. We find a separate work called the Advaitabrahmasiddhi, written by Kāśmīri 
Sadānanda Svāmin or Sadānanda Yati (17th century CE) [See also Advaita-Brahmasiddhi 1993]. 
26 Aufrecht 1962:  pp. 426-7 (See also Potter 1995: Vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 583-5; Dash 2007: Vol. XVIII, 
pp. 148-51; and Thangaswami 1980: pp. 286-8 for alternative lists).  
 
 
 20
the colophons and the internal references among these works, we can list the works 
of which MS’s authorship is more likely. 
The Saṃkṣepaśārīraka (SŚ) is a summary of the commentary on the 
Brahmasūtra (BS) of Śaṃkara by Sarvajñātmamuni (8th century CE) in versified 
form. Though MS’s commentary on it, called the SŚSS, does not have any reference 
to any of his other works and none of his other works refer to it, this text can be 
placed among the works of our author on the grounds of other evidence we find in 
different works of MS.27 Besides, the colophons at the end of each chapter of this 
commentary confirm MS’s authorship.28 
The VKL is one of his earliest works, as it seems to have referred to no other 
work of MS but the SB.29 Though his teacher is not named in the colophon of this 
work, there are expressions in it that are similar to expressions in his other works, 
which authenticate its authorship by MS.30 The SB is a commentary by MS on the 
Daśaślokī of Śaṃkara. This is also called the Cidānandadaśaślokī.31 The reason for 
undertaking this work has been mentioned by the author himself at the end. The 
colophon also mentions MS’s authorship and there are references to the VKL in it.32 
The AdS is considered to be the magnum opus of MS. Its authorship can 
easily be ascertained by the colophon of each of the four chapters, which runs ‘Thus 
ends the …in the Advaitasiddhi, composed by the renowned Madhusūdana 
Sarasvatī, a disciple at the illustrious feet of the renowned Viśveśvara Sarasvatī, a 
                                                 
27 Refer to the notes on MS’s teachers’ lineage in this section above. 
28 Giri 2007: Pts. 1and 2, Sārasaṃgraha, pp. 803, 1132, 1614, and 1704. 
29 Karmarkar 1962:  p. 164. 
30 Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. vi (Also see colophons of his AdS, GD etc. along with the colophon 
of the VKL - Karmarkar 1962:  p. 176). 
31 Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 33.             
32
 Siddhāntabindu 1986: Last concluding verse, pp. 154, 133, 141. 
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peripatetic teacher of the highest order of  monkhood.’33 It refers to other works of 
the author like the GD, SB, and the VKL.34 The AdRR, like the AdS, is a dialectical 
work containing twenty different topics and is intended as a refutation of the 
Naiyāyika Śaṃkara Miśra’s Bhedaratna (1442 -1542 CE).35 Its authorship can be 
attributed to MS from its reference to his other works like the AdS, VKL, and the 
SB.36 
MS also wrote a number of devotional works. The MSṬ is a commentary on 
the Mahimnastotra of Puṣpadantācārya, which is apparently a eulogy of Lord Śiva 
(Hara). Being an ardent devotee of Lord Viṣṇu (Hari) MS, interpreted the original 
verse to praise both Lord Śiva and Lord Viṣṇu. The colophon at the end of the work 
supports MS’s authorship of it. Moreover, the VKL37 is referred to in this work. The 
colophon of each of the three divisions of the BhR confirms the authorship of MS.38 
Besides this, the work refers to the SB and VKL.39 
The colophons at the end of each chapter of the GD stating that its author is 
MS contain almost the same wording as those of the chapters of his SŚSS, AdRR and 
SB.40 Moreover, his commentary on the Gītā (i.e. the GD) refers to his other works 
                                                 
33 iti śrīmatparamahaṃsaparivrājakācāryaśrīviśveśvarasarasvatīśrīcaraṇaśiṣya 
śrīmadhusūdanasarasvatīviracitayām advaitasiddhau (Advaitasiddhi 2005: Colophons of each of 
four chapters). 
34 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 750 (The same verse is also found as the first concluding verse of chapters 
15 and 18 of his BhG commentary, Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 632 and 775); pp. 
490, 537, 546, and 579 (Also see Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 34); and pp. 524, 537, 678, and 866 
(Also see Gupta 2006: p. 8). 
35 Bhedaratna 2003. 
36 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: pp. 24, 26, 28, 37, and 44 (Also see Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 54). 
37 Śivamahimnaḥstotra 1996: Madhusūdanī, colophon at the end of the text, p. 135; Madhusūdanī, 
pp. 103 and 107 (Also see Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. VIII).  
38  Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era and Pāṇḍeya 1998. 
39  Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.24, p. 43; BhR 1.19, p. 39. 
40  Compare Bhagavadgītā 1999: Colophon of each chapter on Madhusūdanīvyākhyā with Giri 2007: 
Pts. 1-2. pp. 807, 1132, 1614, and 1704; Advaitaranarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 46; Siddhāntabindu 1986:  p. 
154 (Also see Gupta 2006:  p. 8). 
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like the SB,41 BhR,42 and AdS.43 Like the GD, the BPPŚV, a commentary on only the 
first verse of the BP, is another theological work of MS. The only work of MS 
referred to here is the BhR. The colophon at the end of the text also attributes its 
authorship to MS.44 The HLV is a commentary on the Harilīlamṛta, a summary of 
the BP by Vopadeva (13th century CE). In this work, there is only reference to his 
BPPŚV (the Paramahaṃsapriyā).45 There is no reference to any of his teachers in 
this work, but the colophons of all its twelve chapters name MS as the author.46  
Among the works to which authenticity of authorship of MS is less certain, 
the following may be referred to. The Ānandamanākinī (ĀM) is a work praising 
Lord Kṛṣṇa and is composed on the legends as depicted in the BP. The last two 
verses of the work bear the title and the name of its author. There is no reference to 
this work in any other work of MS and vice versa, nor does it refer to any of his 
teachers referred to in his other major works. The colophon of the ĀM also is 
distinctly different from those of his other works, though it is stated that MS is the 
author.47 
The Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa (ĪPP) is a short text with a summary of various 
theories of God both in the orthodox and heterodox schools. There is no mention of 
any of the teachers of our author in the ĪPP, nor does it have any of common 
                                                 
41 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 2.18, p. 64 (Also see Modi 1985: Introduction, 
footnote 41, p. 49).  
42 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 7.16, 18.65, and 18.66; pp. 363, 751, and 754. 
43  Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 2.16, 2.18, and 5.16; pp. 59, 64, and 263. 
44 Harilīlāmṛta 1933: Paramahaṃsapriyā, p. 73. 
45 Harilīlāmṛta 1933: Harilīlāmṛte prathamaskandhakathāsāraḥ 3, p. 2. 
While P. C. Devānji (Devānji 1933: Introduction, pp. VIII-IX) is doubtful about its authorship, and 
P. M. Modi (Modi 1985: Introduction, pp. 14, 37-8) deems it the work of MS; Sanjukta Gupta 
(Gupta 2006: p. 9) holds it to be one composed by our author and says that the author refers to his 
commentary on the 1st verse of the Bhāgavata in this work too.  
46 Harilīlāmṛta 1933: Harilīlāmṛta (The work is divided into twelve chapters corresponding to those 
of the BP). 
47 Kāvyamālā 1987: Ānandamandākinī 101-2 and colophon, p. 154 (Also see Modi 1985: 
Introduction, p. 31). 
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colophons we find in his other works, excepting that MS is the author of the work.48 
The Bhāgavatapurāṇādyaślokatrayavyākhyā (BPĀŚTV), that is, a commentary on 
the first three verses of the BP is also said to have written by MS. Unlike the 
BPPŚV, MS’s commentary on the second and third verse of the BP does not refer to 
any of his other works, but his own name occurs at the colophon of the work.49 The 
Kṛṣṇakutūhalanāṭaka (KKN) is a devotional work written in the form of a dialogue 
(drama) in seven acts. It has no reference to any of his other works, nor does it 
mention any of his teachers known to us. It is mentioned in the colophon that the 
illustrious monk MS is the author of the work.50 
In summary, based on internal textual references, we find that the VKL and 
SB refer to each other; the BhR refers to both the SB and VKL; the MSṬ refers to the 
VKL; the BPPŚV refers to the BhR and the HLV refers to the BPPŚV. The magnum 
opus, the AdS refers to the SB, VKL and GD; while the GD refers to the SB, BhR, 
and AdS. Finally, the AdRR refers to the AdS and VKL. We may therefore 
tentatively arrange MS’s major works chronologically as, the SŚSS, VKL, SB, AdS, 
GD and the AdRR. Other texts, i.e. the MSṬ, BhR, BPPŚV and the HLV were 
composed after the VKL and SB. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa 1921: Colophon, p. 10. 
49 Bhāgavata 1815 Śakābda: Colophon, p. 20 (This printed version contains the author’s commentary 
on the first three verses of the Bhāgavata with a clear colophon like those in his other works). 
P. C. Divānji and P. M. Modi think that, as it is stated at the end of the BPPŚV that all the varieties of 
emotional sentiment of devotion has also been mentioned in the BhR and that some of them will be 
dealt with here also, it seems that the author had the intention to write a commentary either on the 
whole work or on a greater part of it than on only one verse of the same (Harilīlāmṛta 1933: 
Paramahaṃsapriyā, p. 73) [Also see Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. VI and Modi 1985: Introduction, 
pp. 44-5].  
50 Kṛṣṇakutūhala 1990: Colophon at the end of the seventh act, p. 146. 
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1.3. Vedānta with special reference to Advaita and its post-Śaṃkara 
development 
The Vedānta is an orthodox (āstika)51 philosophical school in Indian philosophy. 
The etymological derivation of the word vedānta is veda (the Vedas) + anta (end), 
and thus refers to the concluding part of the Vedas (ca. 1500 – 500 BCE), i.e., the 
Upaniṣads.52 By extension, the word vedānta has come to refer to the philosophy of 
the Upaniṣads53 and, more particularly, to the methodological study of the 
Upaniṣadic teaching. Again, the word mīmāṃsā is understood as meaning the 
critical examination of statements of sacred texts that are objects of veneration 
(pūjitavacanavicāraḥ mīmāṃsā).54 
According to tradition, the discipline of Mīmāṃsā is effectively divided into 
two schools, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. The former, also called the 
Karmamīmāṃsā, Dharmamīmāṃsā, or, simply Mīmāṃsā, concerns itself with the 
portion of the Veda (karma-kāṇḍa) dealing with rituals and is associated with 
Jaimini (2nd century BCE). The latter, also called the Śārīrakamīmāṃsā, 
Jñānamīmāṃsā, Brahmamīmāṃsā or Vedānta, concerns itself with the portion of 
the Veda dealing with soteriological knowledge (jñāna-kāṇḍa), particularly the 
knowledge of brahman,55 and is associated with Bādarāyaṇa (BCE). 
                                                 
51 Thus the ancient law maker Manu explains the terms ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ in a clear term. 
He holds that those who accept the Vedas as the authority are regarded as orthodox and the 
opponents are called heterodox (nāstika) [nāstiko vedanindakaḥ] (Manusmṛti 1920: Verse 2.11). 
52 Karl. H. Potter holds ‘Upaniṣad’ to be ‘a term of doubtful etymology’ (Potter1998: p. 3).  
53 Roodurmun 2002: p. 9.  
54  For details, see Prakaraṇapañcikā 1961: Bhūmikā, p. 9 and Mīmāṃśādarśana 1984-86: Vol. 1, 
prastāvanā, pp. 1-2. 
55 MS too, in his Prasthānabheda (PB), classifies Mīmāṃsā into Karmamīmāṃsā and 
Śārīrakamīmāṃsā (Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 1977: Prasthānabheda, p. 6). 
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Some modern scholars, such as Karl H. Potter and Asko Parpola,56 have 
suggested that, originally, the Mīmāṃsā was a single hermeneutic discipline dealing 
holistically with the Veda as a whole, and was only later split into different and 
competing schools as the subject matter of the two sections of the Veda led in 
different directions and began to seem mutually exclusive. Indeed, certain thinkers 
in the extant tradition ascribe a similar view to what is known as the jñāna-karma-
samuccaya-vāda, according to which the two disciplines are complementary in their 
aims.57 Indeed, many of the maxims (nyāya-s) for interpreting the Vedic injunctions 
that were formulated in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā were employed for explaining the 
import of the Upaniṣadic statements by the followers of the Vedānta school. 
The Vedānta philosophy is born from the critical interpretation of the 
Upaniṣads. However, because of the multifaceted nature of the Upaniṣadic teaching, 
many divergent interpretations were possible, leading to radically different schools 
of thought within the Vedānta itself.58 Some schools, like the non-dualistic school of 
Śaṃkara, hold that the individual self (jīva) has no reality apart from that of 
brahman, while the world (jagat) is an unreal transformation (vivarta) of brahman, 
and also a genuine transformation (pariṇāma) of nescience (avidyā) of the 
individual-self about the nature of brahman. So they accept only one reality,59 i.e. 
brahman/ātman, which is pure consciousness (śuddha-caitanya) and impersonal, 
devoid of any quality (nirguṇa) and a unitary whole (akhaṇḍa). According to this 
school, jīva attains liberation (mokṣa) when the knowledge of non-difference 
(abheda) between the supreme reality and the individual self dawns. 
                                                 
56 See Potter 2006: pp. 4-5, Potter 1998: p. 11 and Parpola 1981: pp. 152-3. 
57 See Sharma 1976: p. 211. 
58 See Potter1998: pp. 3-4.  
59 See Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 150 for a proper account of this view.  
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By contrast, the qualified non-dualistic school of Rāmānuja (i.e. the 
Viśiṣṭādvaita school)60 admits the absolute reality as something that is qualified by 
dependent matter (acit) and individual-souls (cit), viewing it as personal Godhead 
(īśvara). With divine grace (prasāda) accessed through worship or meditation 
(upāsanā) and self-surrender (prapatti) to God (īśvara), the individual self realizes 
itself as the body of brahman and attains liberation, but does not become identical 
with brahman. The Dvaita school of Madhva holds that the individual self and 
brahman are completely different from each other. Other than these, we also have 
the school of Dualism cum non-dualism (Dvaitādvaita) of Nimbārka (ca. 12th 
century CE), Pure non-dualism (Śuddhādvaita) of  Vallabha (15th century CE); and 
Acintyabhedābheda of Caitanya (1486-1533 CE), which admits identity-in-
difference that obtains between brahman, jīva and jagat, and the nature of which is 
essentially indescribable and unthinkable due to the unthinkable power of God. 
Despite the importance of Śaṃkara’s Advaita system, the origins of the 
Advaita viewpoint cannot be traced exclusively to him.61 Advaita teachings are also 
found in the epics and Purāṇas, as also, of course, in the Upaṇiṣads.62 We find 
mention of some teachers and schools supporting the non-dualistic positions 
anterior to Śaṃkara63 and Bādarāyaṇa64 in their respective works. There is however 
no doubt that Śaṃkara’s thought was a watershed in Advaita theory, so that the 
development of the Advaita tradition can be divided into pre-Śaṃkara and post-
Śaṃkara periods. Bādarāyaṇa, Upavarṣa (BCE), Gauḍapāda (6th century CE), and 
                                                 
60 See Buitenen 1968: Foot note 1, p. 1 for etymology of this term, the Sanskrit equivalent for which 
is viśiṣṭādvaita.  
61 See Potter 1998: p. 6.  
62 See Balasubramanian 2004: Introduction, p. xlv.  
63  For example, BSB 3.5.53 (Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 850) [Also see Potter 1998: p. 9 ff.].   
64  For example, BS 1.2. 29, 1.2.30, 1.4.21, 1.4.22, 3.1.9, 3.4.44 etc. (Also see Parpola 1981: pp. 156-
7 and Potter 1998: p. 10).  
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Bhaṛtṛhari (7th century CE) have been named by some as pre-Śaṃkara Advaitins.65 
Sureśvara (7th century CE), Padmapāda (7th century CE), Vācaspati Miśra (9th 
century CE), Prakāśtman (11th century CE), Citsukha (13th century CE), and MS are 
the most notable figures of the later Śaṃkarite tradition.66 Furthermore, Maṇḍana 
Miśra (7th century CE), the author of the Brahmasiddhi, and Sarvajñātman are two 
seminal figures in the pre-Śaṃkarite67 and post-Śaṃkarite traditions respectively. 
As our aim is to evaluate the degree to which MS was influenced by the 
thought of the different post-Śaṃkara schools, we must first discuss the basic tenets 
of these schools. In the history of the development of Advaita since Śaṃkara’s time, 
three lines68 or schools have come into prominence (i) Sureśvara and his follower 
Sarvajñātmamuni, (ii) Padmapāda and his commentator Prakāśātmayati, and (iii) 
Vācaspati Miśra and his followers.69 
Sureśvara,70 a direct disciple of Śaṃkara, is known in the tradition as the 
Vārtika-kāra71 (an author of the critical treatment of a commentary) and the 
tradition initiated with him is called the Vārtika-kāra-prasthāna. His famous works 
are Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika, Taittirīyabhāṣyavārtika and Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. 
Though brahman, the only reality (sat), is the substratum (āśraya) and the material 
                                                 
65 See Balasubramanian 2004: Introduction, p. xlv. 
66 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 255. 
67 There is debate about whether Maṇḍana Miśra was before, after, or contemporaneous with 
Śaṃkara (See Thrasher 1993: Appendix A etc.). 
68 Though the schools followed by Padmapāda and Vācaspati respectively are considered to be the 
twofold division of post-Śaṃkara Advaita, the views held by Sureśvara are considered by some in 
the tradition as well as the modern scholars to constitute a separate school of thought in post-
Śaṃkara era. Some modern scholars are of the view that only Sureśvara had the proper 
understanding of Śaṃkara’s intent (See Potter 2006: p. 6).  
69 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 257. 
70 It has been a matter of debate whether Sureśvara is identical with Maṇḍana Miśra, the famous 
author of the Brahmasiddhi (For details, see Hiriyana 1923 and 1924, Kane 1928, Brahmasiddhi 
1994, Balasubramanian 1962, Sastri 1936-37 etc.).  
71 A vārtika has been defined as a work which explains what is said (ukta), what is left unsaid 
(anukta), and what is imperfectly said (durukta) in the original [uktānuktaduruktārthavyakti (cintā) 
kāri tu vārtikam)] (vārttika changed to vārtika) [Apte 1998: p. 845].  
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cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the world, Sureśvara holds, māyā (illusion) or avidyā 
(nescience) is its mediate cause (dvāra-kāraṇa). It is through māyā that the 
unalterable (avikārin) brahman appears as the multiple world of existence. Whereas 
from the standpoint of supreme reality (pāramārthika-sattā) neither māyā nor its 
creation exists, the practical (vyāvahārika) standpoint of the ignorant jīva-s makes 
māyā appear in brahman.72 Thus, brahman is both the locus (āśraya) and the object 
(viṣaya) of avidyā.73 The Vedic texts like ‘tattvamasi’ (CU 6.8.7) etc. produce the 
immediate knowledge (aparokṣa-jñāna) of ātman as brahman by removing 
avidyā.74 This theory is known as the śābdāparokṣa-vāda. According to Sureśvara, 
avidyā cannot be twofold; it must be one, the supreme-self, brahman, being both its 
support and its object.75 The individual self (jīva), Sureśvara holds, is but the 
reflection of brahman (cidābhāsa) in the mind (antaḥkaraṇa), a product of avidyā, 
whereas its reflection on avidyā is called God (īśvara). This reflection (pratibimba), 
being different from the original (bimba), is an illusory appearance (ābhāsa) of the 
absolute brahman; thus, it is known as the theory of appearance (ābhāsa-vāda).76 
For Sureśvara, action (karma) is necessary until the desire for knowledge 
(vividiṣā) arises. Knowledge which gets the self liberated is not produced, as it 
already exists (siddha).77 Having supported the doctrine of liberation while living 
(jīvanmukti) held by Śaṃkara, Sureśvara thinks that the body need not fall off as 
soon as one realizes one’s unity with the supreme self.78 Sarvajñātmamuni has 
                                                 
72 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 258. 
73 Mahadevan 1972: Verse 183a, p. 94 (Also see Deutsch and Buitenen 1971: pp. 227-8). 
74 Mahadevan 1972: Verse 178a, p. 91.  
75 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika1892-94: Vol. 2, 2.4.199, p. 1065. 
76  Also see Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 42-6. 
77 Balasubramanian 1974: Verse 1.1, p. 1. 
78 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika1892-94: Vol. 2, 1.4.1546, p. 739. 
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followed many of Sureśvara’s views.79 Thus, having differed from Maṇḍana Miśra 
in many respects, Sureśvara’s interpretation of Advaita had immense bearing on the 
later Śaṃkara schools, particularly on that which is known as the Vivaraṇa. 
The later disagreements regarding the interpretation of Śaṃkara’s 
commentary on the BS,80 specially the conflicting views regarding the support 
(āśraya) and object (viṣaya) of nescience (avidyā), gave rise to two other lines of 
thought (prasthāna) soon after Śaṃkara. These are the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna, 
initiated by Padmapāda and developed by Prakāśātmayati, and the Bhāmatī-
prasthāna, initiated by Vācaspati Miśra and developed by Amalānanda Sarasvatī 
(13th century CE). The followers of both the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna and the Bhāmatī-
prasthāna cite the authority of Śaṃkara in support of their respective and mutually 
conflicting views.81 
Padmapāda, a direct disciple of Śaṃkara, wrote a sub-commentary on the 
master’s BSB, called the Pañcapādikā, the oldest gloss (ṭīkā) on it.82 Besides this, 
Padmapāda is said to have composed the Ātmabodhavyākhyā or the Vedāntasāra.83 
Though several commentaries84 and sub-commentaries have come to be written on 
the Pañcapādikā, the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa by Prakāśātmayati stands foremost 
among them, lending its name to the Vivaraṇa school. Padmapāda holds that 
indefinable nescience (anirvacanīyāvidyā) is both the material cause of 
                                                 
79 Veezhinathan 1985: Verse 1.20, pp. 9-10; 2.132, pp. 315-6 (For details, see Bhattacharya 1975: 
pp. 259-61; Deutsch and Buitenen 1971: p. 267 ff.; and Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 46). 
80 Though unlike Padmapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, Sureśvara did not write any commentary on 
Śaṃkara’s BSB, his vārtika-s on Śaṃkara’s work justifies him to initiate a new line of interpretation.    
81 For example, see Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 1.4.3, p. 378; BS 2.3.41, pp. 619-20. 
82 The very name of the work indicates that it consists of five explanatory parts (pāda-s), i.e. 
padaccheda, padārthokti, vigraha, vākya-yojana, ākṣepa-samādhāna. Though only first four 
aphorisms including the introductory adhyāsa-bhṣya portion of Śaṃkara are only available, there 
has been a tradition to indicate that the author commented on the whole (Also see Pañcapādikā 
1958; Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 200; and Potter 1998: p. 563).  
83 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 103.  
84 For other commentaries on Pañcapādikā, see Roodurmun 2002: p. 40 and Pañcapādikā 1958.  
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superimposition (adhyāsa) and the appearance of the world.85 This point is further 
elaborated by Prakāśātmayati who holds avidyā to be a positive entity (bhāva-
rūpa).86 And being so, it becomes the material cause of superimposition and the 
concealment of the true nature of reality, viz. brahman.87 Though avidyā exists in 
pure-consciousness (śuddha-caitanya or brahman), it affects the individual selves 
through its power of concealment (āvaraṇa-śakti). Thus, brahman becomes both the 
substratum and the object of avidyā,88 which shows the allegiance of the Vivaraṇa-
prasthāna to the line of Sureśvara discussed above. 
Unlike Sureśvara, both Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati hold the reflected 
images (pratibimba) to be as real as the original (bimba). Thus the jīva-s, which are 
the reflected images of brahman in the mind, are as real as brahman.89 Just as bimba 
and pratibimba are essentially identical, so too are brahman and the jīva-s. Since 
the manifest world (prapañca) cannot be treated either as existent (sat) or as non-
existent (asat), and is destroyed with the emergence of true knowledge of the self 
(brahma-jñāna), and is sublated (bādhita) in its own locus (brahman),90 its falsity 
(mithyātva) is evident. 
Regarding the relation of action to liberation and the role of the Vedic 
sentences in the generation of immediate knowledge of brahman-ātman, the 
Vivaraṇa school follows what we find in the works of Sureśvara.91 Interpreting the 
                                                 
85 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 263. 
86 See Balasubramanian 2004: p. 253.   
87 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 263. 
88 See Balasubramanian 2004: p. 246.  
89 Also see Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 46. 
90 A rope appears to be a snake in darkness, but the existence of snake, which we know can never be 
existent in the rope, is negated as soon as the rope is brought in light. See Bhattacharya 1975: pp. 
264-5. 
91  See Balasubramanian 2004: pp. 279-80.  
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text ‘ātman should be realized’ etc.,92 Vivaraṇa-kāra holds the injunction 
‘śrotavyaḥ’ to be a restrictive one (niyama-vidhi),93 i.e. one should endeavor to hold 
discussion on brahman. Thus, according to this school, śravaṇa stands foremost 
among the three means for the direct realization of brahman [i.e. Vedāntic study 
(śravaṇa), reflection (manana), and contemplation (nididhyāsana)].94 
The Bhāmatī-prasthāna of Vācaspati Miśra also had considerable influence 
on the later Advaitins.  Vācaspati was an independent commentator on almost all of 
classical systems of Indian philosophy (sarva-tantra-svatantra). Apart from the 
Bhāmatī, his famous sub-commentary on the BSB of Śaṃkara,95 Vācaspati authored 
a number of important commentaries and independent works on various systems, 
which have been listed at the end of the Bhāmatī,96 including the Tātparyaṭīka (on 
the Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara), Nyāyasūcīnibandha, Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī (on 
the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa), Tattvavaiśāradī (on the Vyāsabhāṣya of the 
Yogasūtra-s), Tattvabindu (an independent treatise on the Mīmāṃsā school), 
Nyāyakaṇikā (on the Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra) and Brahmatattvasamīkṣā.97 
                                                 
92 ‘You see, Maitreyi- it is one’s self (ātman) which one should see and hear, and on which one 
should reflect and concentrate’ (ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ 
maitreyi, BU 2.4.5). 
93 Pañcapādikā 1958: Pañcapādikā, dvitīyavarṇakam, p. 196; Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, 
prathamavarṇakam, pp. 33-8; dvitīyavarṇakam, p. 451: 195-10; navamavarṇaka, p. 773: 354-1 
(Vedic texts conveying injunctions are known as vidhi-vākya-s which are generally classified into 
three kinds; apūrva-vidhi which is found in the Vedas, and not anywhere else, niyama-vidhi which is 
concerned with controlling activity, and parisaṃkhyā-vidhi which excludes others means in order to 
follow a particular way).  
94 For details, see Pañcapādikā 1958: Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, prathamavarṇakam, pp. 29-30, p. 33, p. 
38,  pp. 410-3: 172-8  (Also see Balasubramanian 2004: p. 274).  
95 Tradition holds that Vācaspati named the work after his wife Bhāmatī (Bhattacharya and 
Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83:  Vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 209).  
For a list of the important commentaries and sub-commentaries on the Bhāmatī, see Roodurmun 
2002: pp. 36-7 and Brahmasūtra 2000. 
96 Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī, concluding verse 3, p. 1020. 
97 The Brahmatattvasamīkṣā, long thought to be lost, has recently been discovered in a Nepal 
manuscript. It has been critically edited in 2006 by Diwakar Acharya, as part of the Nepal Research 
Centre series from Stuttgart. Except Vaiśeṣika, Vācaspati wrote on the other five of the six orthodox 
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In contrast to the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna, Vācaspati Miśra holds that brahman 
is the material cause of the world but not the locus of nescience, because it is of the 
nature of knowledge (vidyā).98 Rather, jīva is the locus of avidyā and as jīva-s are 
many, there must be a plurality of nesciences held by different jīva-s. With regard 
to the appearance of jīva-s, he maintains that even though avidyā in one individual 
self is negated by the realization of the supreme reality brahman, it remains in other 
selves to limit the infinite self in them, giving them a feeling that separate 
individuals are moving in bondage. In contrast, the consciousness transcending the 
limiting adjunct is called īśvara. This view, known as the theory of limitation 
(avaccheda-vāda) is upheld in Vācaspati’s notions of jīva and brahman.99 
Despite his acceptance, in agreement with Sureśvara and Padmapāda, of 
karma as a remote cause (ārādupakāraka) of liberation, his disagreement with them 
is conspicuous when he denies the claim that the Vedic texts can produce the 
immediate knowledge of brahman. Vācaspati, following Maṇḍana, holds that the 
mind (antaḥkaraṇa) is a sense-organ, which, when purified by meditation 
(nididhyāsana), produces the final intuition, i.e. the immediate knowledge of 
brahman-ātman, though śabda may be a help to cleanse the mind.100 Unlike 
Sureśvara, Vācaspati does not accept ‘śrotavyaḥ’ as an injunction, but only as a 
restatement (anuvāda) of what we are capable of knowing with our ordinary 
senses.101 Moreover, for him, meditation (nididhyāsana) carries a higher value than 
                                                                                                                                               
systems (ṣaḍ-darśana). His last work seems to be Bhāmatī, as it lists all his other compositions 
(Tattvasamīkṣā 2006 and Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 1020).   
98  Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī, 1.4.3, pp. 377-81. 
99 See Bhattacharya 1975: p. 267 and Balasubramanian 2004: p. 321 (Also see Siddhāntabindu 1986: 
p. 47). 
100 Brahmasūtra 2000: BS 1.1.1, Bhāmatī, pp. 55-8 (Also see Bhattacharya 1975: pp. 267-8). 
101  Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī on BS 1.1.4, 1.4.6, 3.2.5, 3.4.6, 3.4.8, 4.1.1, 3.4.14 etc. (Order in the 
BS cited here seems to be in the order of adhyāya, pāda, and adhikaraṇa, not in the order of 
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the Vedāntic study (śravaṇa) and reflection (manana).102 Thus, Vācaspati’s views 
mark a departure from Śaṃkara’s disciples, owing much to Maṇḍana Miśra.103 
 
1.4. The influence of post-Śaṃkara Advaita on Madhusūdana’s thought 
Having familiarized ourselves with the basic tenets of the post-Śaṃkara schools of 
Advaita and their followers, we may discuss the influence that they had upon MS’s 
works. MS often refers to Sureśvara with great respect, referring to his work as 
vārtikāmṛta (vārtika, the nectar).104 Following Sureśvara’s theory of appearance or 
semblance (ābhāsa-vāda), MS argues that the same brahman could be both the 
individual self (jīva) and God (īśvara).105 In reply to an objection that one should 
attain immediate liberation when knowledge of an object covered with ignorance is 
produced, MS says in the SB that ignorance is not completely destroyed but is only 
overpowered by the mental modifications (vṛtti-s), and that final absolution is 
possible only when complete obliteration of ignorance is made. He also says that 
avidyā, which is destroyed by the knowledge produced by the Upaniṣadic great 
sentences (mahāvākya-s), has brahman as its object (viṣaya). Since ignorance of an 
object presupposes the antecedent non-existence of its knowledge (jñāna-
                                                                                                                                               
adhyāya, pāda, and sūtra) [cf. Pañcapādikā 1958: Bhūmikā, pp. 120-2]. Also see Bhattacharya 1975: 
p. 268. 
102 Brahmasūtra 2000: BS 3.4.26, Bhāmatī, p. 898 (Also see Roodurmun 2002: p. 37).  
For a fuller discussion of the basic points of difference between the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools, 
refer to Pañcapādikā 1958: Sanskrit introduction and Pañcapādikā 2009: English introduction, pp. 
iii-viii ff. 
103 Anubhūti Svarūpācārya (13th century CE), in his sub-commentary on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of 
Śaṃkara, called the Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa, referred to Vācaspati Miśra’s dependence on Maṇḍana 
Miśra  derogatorily as ‘maṇḍanapṛṣṭhasevī’ (Also see Bhattacharyya 1974: pp. 344-7, Mahadevan 
1961: p. 292 and Roodurmun 2002: p. 35).  
104 Advaitaratnarakṣana 1917: p. 5, Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 40, 43, 53, 90, 150; Advaitasiddhi 
2005: pp. 556 and 558, and Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 676 (Also see Divānji 
1933: Introduction, p. XCIII and Gupta 2006: p. 3). 
105 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 42-5. 
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prāgabhāva),106 it has to be accepted that there are as many ignorances as there are 
knowledges.107  Thus, this view is a clear case of admitting the view of the Vārtika-
kāra.108 His reverence for Sureśvara is such that he places him on equal footing with 
Śaṃkara as the true systematisers of the Vedāntasūtra-s.109 
Sarvajñātman, a follower of the Vārtika-prasthāna, has also been referred to 
by MS. In his commentary on Sarvajñātman’s SŚ, MS identifies his teacher 
Deveśvara as Sureśvarācārya.110 In the SB, MS quotes Sarvajñātman’s view 
regarding the identity between brahman and jīva, which is inherited from Sureśvara 
and developed in the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna.111 Sarvajñātman is again referred to as an 
authoritative writer in his other works, such as the AdRR,112 AdS113 etc. Following 
the view of Sarvajñātman that indivisible consciousness is both the locus and 
content of ignorance,114 MS accepts that brahman is both the substratum (āśraya) 
and the object (viṣaya) of avidyā.115 Even in explaining the Upaniṣadic great 
sentences (mahāvākya-s), MS follows Sarvajñātman’s manner of exposition.116 The 
theory of one-self (ekajīva-vāda) is also discussed in agreement with 
Sarvajñātman.117 Thus, the Vārtika-prasthāna of post-Śaṃkara Advaita is attested in 
MS’s writing as he develops his own view. 
                                                 
106 This is a kind of non-existence (abhāva) attributed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, which implies 
the non-existence of an object before its production.  
107 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 62-4 (Also see Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 467). 
108 See Gupta 2006: p. 3.  
109 Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 153 (Also see Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 900). 
110 Giri 2007: Pt. 1, p. 31.  
111 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 44-6.  
112 Advaitaratnarakṣana 1917: p. 5.  
113 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 577. 
114 āśrayatvaviṣayatvabhāginī nirvibhāga citireva kevalā (Veezhinathan 1985: Verse 1.319, pp. 305-
6). 
115 avidyāyā āśrayastu śuddhaṃ brahmaiva… (Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 577) and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 356 (Sarvajñātman is also referred to by MS in the GD on BhG 18.2 --- 
Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 676). 
116 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 3-10 and Divānji 1933: Explanatory and critical notes, pp. 9-15. 
117 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 46-49. 
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Padmapāda is also referred to in the AdS118 and GD119 of MS. The views of 
Prakāśātmayati, better known as the Vivaraṇa-kāra in post-Śaṃkara Advaita 
Vedānta, is also supported by MS in various respects.120 He is referred to in the AdS 
of MS several times.121 In order to establish (siddhi) non-dualism, MS first tries to 
falsify the existence of the multiple-universe (jagat-prapañca) which is the product 
of avidyā. In order to do so, he has given five different definitions of falsity 
(mithyātva). Among them, the first three are based on the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna and 
the remaining two seem to have a likeness with those provided by Citsukha (13th 
century CE) and Ānandabodha (12th century CE) respectively.122 
In order to explain how brahman gives rise to God and the individual self, 
MS supports the reflection theory (pratibimba-vāda) of the Vivaraṇa-kāra. While 
supporting the view that inference removes only the notion of non-existence 
(abhāva) of an object, and that direct awareness, i.e. perception alone, can destroy 
its non-manifestation (abhānatva), MS quotes Vidyāraṇyamuni,123 a follower of the 
Vivaraṇa-prasthāna. Vidyāraṇya is also implicitly cited when MS talks about yoga 
and jñāna as two distinct ways of liberation.124 In line with yogic ideas, MS holds 
that the self in the dream state (svapnāvasthā) possesses a special modification 
(vṛtti) of avidyā, called sleep (nidrā), a stance supported by the Vivaraṇa-kāra.125 
                                                 
118
 Cf. Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. XCII (He has also made use of Vivaraṇa-kāra’s doctrines, 
Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 486-7) [See Gupta 1966: Introduction, p. Xvii]. 
119 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 379.  
120 Cf. Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. CVII (Also see Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 
743).  
121 Cf. Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. CVIII. 
122 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 48-51, 94-100, 160, 182-183 and 195-203 (For details, see Gupta 2006: p. 
28 ff.).  
123 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 46, 66. 
124 Compare PD 12.83 of Vidyāraṇya (Pañcadaśī 2008: p. 446) with Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 6.29, pp. 316-20.  
125 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 558-9 (Also see Gupta 2006: pp. 97-8). 
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The views of Vācaspati Miśra, the exponent of the Bhāmatī school, are also 
referred to in MS’s AdS.126 Having  stated Sarvajñātman’s view that pure 
consciousness is both the substratum and object of avidyā, MS goes on to state 
Vācaspati’s contention that brahman is the content of avidyā supported by the 
individual selves, for, being beginningless (anādi), avidyā and jīva are not 
interdependent (anyonyāśrita).127 In the AdRR, MS’s view that the Vedic texts can 
generate only mediate (parokṣa) knowledge of brahman, and that the mind alone, 
prepared through different means of liberation, i.e. śravaṇa, manana, and 
nididhyāsana, can produce the immediate knowledge of the supreme reality, clearly 
support the prasaṃkhyāna theory held by Maṇḍana Miśra etc., which is upheld by 
Vācaspati as well.128 MS again mentions the limitation theory (avaccheda-vāda) 
attributed to Vācaspati and his followers as an explanation of the relation of pure 
consciousness and the individual self.129 The corollary of this doctrine, i.e., that 
there are as many ignorances as there are individual selves, is upheld by MS when 
he says that only that individual self whose ignorance is dispelled gets liberated.130 
In another context, the role of a modification of the mind (vṛtti) in generating 
knowledge is also supported by the theory of limitation.131 
Summing up, we find the influence of the Vārtika-prasthāna on the Vivaraṇa 
prasthāna and the influence of Maṇḍana on the Bhāmatī-prasthāna. As far as MS is 
concerned, we find that he makes frequent reference to the views of Sureśvara, 
Sarvajñātman, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman etc., and is generally considered to be a 
                                                 
126 Cf. Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. XCIX. 
127 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 585 and Brahmasūtra 2000: Vedāntakalpataruḥ, pp. 2-3 (Also see Gupta 
2006: p. 26).  
128 Cf. Divānji 1933: Introduction, p. XCIX. 
129 Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 47. 
130 Advaitaratnarakṣana 1917: p. 6. 
131 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 58-61. 
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follower of the Vivaraṇa-prasthāna.132 In the GD of MS, we may point out his 
preference for the views of the Vārtika-prasthāna (e.g. references to the Vārtika-
kāra in the GD on BhG 2.29, 2.40, 3.20, 3.29, 3.27, 4.24, 5.1, 5.21, 12.20; and the 
views of Sarvajñātman in his SŚ that brahman is both the substratum and object of 
nescience on BhG 8.3 and 18.2). While asserting verbal testimony (śabda-pramāṇa) 
to be the cause of the immediate knowledge of brahman/ātman in introductory 
verse eighteen of the GD, he accepts an important doctrine of the Vivaraṇa-
prasthāna. In addition, the view that MS has largely followed the doctrines of the 
Vivaraṇa-prasthāna in his GD is substantiated by the following: References in the 
GD to the dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda (on BhG 2.28, 5.22 and 18.14); the eka-jīva-vāda (on 
BhG 4.5); brahman as  the substratum (āśraya) and object (viṣaya) of ignorance (on 
BhG 5.16 and 7.6); the arising of brahman-knowledge on maturity of nididhyāsana 
(on BhG 5.17, 25); citations of the JMV of Vidyāraṇya (on BhG 6.36); the 
pratibimba-vāda as a Vedāntic theory for explaining the relation between brahman 
and jīva (on BhG 2.15, 7.14, 14.6 and 15.7); the Pañcapādikā of Padmapādācārya 
(on BhG 8.3); and the Vivaraṇa-kāra (on BhG 18.56). Nevertheless, he is not totally 
opposed to Vācaspati and his Bhāmatī line of interpretation, and makes use of it at 
certain points (e.g. references to the śabda-parokṣa-vāda on BhG 2.29 and 5.16, the 
avacheda-vāda on BhG 15.7, Maṇḍana Miśra on BhG 18.18). In short, MS made 
use of building blocks from all the major Advaitic systems prevalent in his time to 
construct his own philosophical edifice. 
As noted above, the Vedānta philosophy has its roots in the hermeneutics of 
scriptural sources. Specifically, there are three canonical texts (prasthāna-trayī) 
                                                 
132 Gupta 2006: pp. 3-4. 
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upon which all Vedāntic thinkers rely. These are the Upaniṣads (śruti-prasthāna), 
BS by Bādarāyaṇa (nyāya-prasthāna), and the BhG (smṛti-prasthāna).133 As MS’s 
GD is a commentary on the last of these, it will be useful to say a few words about 
the text our author was working with, together with a brief note on the tradition of 
the BhG commentary that preceded MS.  
 
1.5. The Bhagavadgītā and its commentarial tradition 
The BhG is contained within Book 6, the Bhīṣmaparvan, of the Mahābhārata 
(MBh), the great Sanskrit epic of ancient India. It covers eighteen chapters (23-40) 
and runs to seven hundred verses both in anuṣṭubh (generally of thirty two 
syllables) and tṛṣṭubh (of forty four syllables usually) metre. The BhG consists of a 
dialogue (saṃvāda) between Arjuna and Lord Kṛṣṇa as recounted by Sañjaya to 
Dhṛtarāṣṭra (MBh 6.23.1).134 One of the principal teachings of the BhG is that it does 
not ask all seekers to abstain from action but to perform it without having a desire 
for its fruit (niskāma-karma). It considers Lord Kṛṣṇa as the supreme puruṣa,135 to 
whom the seekers are asked to surrender completely with utmost devotion. 
Throughout the text, the Lord teaches Arjuna the means for attainment of liberation 
(mokṣa), the supreme goal of human kind, and accords a pre-eminent place to 
devotion to the Lord as a means to liberation. 
There are many opinions regarding the date, authorship, structure and 
philosophy of the BhG, and its relation to the MBh. As we are concerned here only 
                                                 
133 Some scholars hold that the BhG is not treated as important as the other two foundational sources 
by the Advaitins; for despite its Advaitic element, it represents a profound theistic orientation (See 
Deutsch 1973: Footnote 1, p. 3). 
134 Mahābhārata 1947: Bhīṣmaparva 6.23-6.40, pp. 114-88.                                      
135 See Malinar 2007: p. 207.  
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with how MS understood the text, however, these various views need not detain us 
here.136 However, before discussing the commentarial tradition of the BhG, let us 
briefly say a few words about the place and utility of the commentarial method 
(bhāṣya-prakriyā), one of the fundamental characteristics of Indian philosophical 
tradition. Commentary is intended to analyse the texts and maintain their continuity 
intact. All texts, whether terse philosophical sūtra-s,137 the Vedic lore, literary epics, 
texts on grammar, ethics, law and drama, are subject to commentary and sub-
commentary. This tradition provides exegesis to reveal the true import of a text, 
which may be too obscure for most readers. This presumes, of course, that the text 
contains a coherent and unified, if hidden, inner meaning (gūḍhārtha) that an able 
commentator can convey to the reader in its full integrity.  
There are several different kinds of commentary corresponding to the type 
and extent of exegesis needed. As Karl H. Potter writes, ‘Various sorts of 
commentaries are composed on sūtras, and then sub-commentaries and further 
commentaries on those. Traditionally, a bhāṣya is an extensive explanation of the 
meaning of the sūtras, a vṛtti is a brief explanation, a vārtika a critical treatment of a 
bhāṣya, and so on.’138 
Of course, a commentator does not always slavishly follow the author whose 
work he is explaining; sometimes he points out the author’s shortcomings and tries 
                                                 
136  See Appendix I for a detailed note on the historical background, formation, and teaching of the 
BhG. 
137 The Parāśara Upapurāṇa defines ‘bhāṣyam’ as that which explains aphorism (sūtra-s) word by 
word with comments of its own and what is called such by the wise (sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ 
sūtrānusāribhiḥ / svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṃ bhāṣyavido viduḥ //) [Śāstrī 2005: Foot note 3, p. 
543; added ‘yatra padaiḥ’ instead of ‘yatra vākyaiḥ’]. A sūtra is a short sentence or an aphoristic 
rule providing the strings or the threads that bind a subject together. It is often described as being 
composed of few letters, concise, suggestive of its claim and meaningful in every way (alpākṣaram 
asandigdham sāravat viśvatomukham / astobham anavadyaṃ ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ //) [Deva 
1967: Pt. 5, p. 394].      
138 Potter 1998: pp. 4-5. 
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to find a remedy for them by formulating his own views. However, even when a 
commentator disagrees with one or another point of the main author, his overall 
goal is generally to defend the author’s broader argument or viewpoint. This may, 
at times, require the commentator to make adjustments to the traditional 
argumentation, even to alter it and reject certain points within it. 
The commentator is often a creative thinker in his own right. Though he may 
avoid claiming credit for original thinking, he is often responsible for great 
innovations of thought. Remarking on the function of commentary within the 
Sanskrit tradition, Daniel H. H. Ingalls observes as follows: 
In the West we think of commentators as dull creatures, lacking in imagination, who take 
some one else’s text to furnish themselves with ideas. And it is true that most Western 
commentators, when they go beyond the writings of footnotes, are dull. But the Indian 
tradition is different. The most original and imaginative products of the Indian intellect are 
given us in the form of commentaries. The Indian authors may try to hide their originality, 
borrowing from tradition as much as they can, attributing their new ideas to some ancient 
sage, but the originality is still there.139  
 
Charles Wilkins, the first translator of the Gītā into English (1784 CE), 
regarded commentary as essential for understanding the text. He observes; 
            …the commentators of India are not less fond of searching for mystery, and wandering 
from the simple path of their author into a labyrinth of scholastic jargon … the comment 
written upon it by one Sree-dhara Swamee, whose notes upon the whole are held in as much 
esteem as the text, which at this day, they say, is unintelligible without them (sic).140  
 
It should be noted that in the vast literature of ancient Gītā commentaries 
prior to MS’s time we find mainly the followers of various schools of the Vedānta 
philosophy, viz. Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śuddhādvaita and 
Bhedābheda, while the Kasmirian commentators on the BhG represent a distinct 
philosophical outlook.141 Except for the Advaita and Kasmirian traditions, the 
                                                 
139 Ingalls: 1952, p. 3.   
140 Wilkins: 1902, p. 134. 
141 As noted earlier, though barring Śaṃkara, Ānandagiri, and Śrīdhara Svāmin, MS did not refer to 
any of his earlier commentators of the BhG explicitly while commenting on the BhG, he must have 
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commentators are mostly supporters of the jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda. These 
commentaries are now listed below in chronological order and in accordance with 
the respective schools of thought to which they belong. Following Karl H. Potter,142 
we have cited mainly those commentaries on the BhG which seem to have been 
written up to the probable period of our author, MS. Theodor Aufrecht143 has also 
mentioned a number of commentaries on the BhG, but we have restricted ourselves 
to the list given by Potter. On the same ground, the detailed BhG literature 
mentioned in the New Catalogus Catalogorum,144 the Epic and Purāṇic 
Bibliography (upto 1985) annoted and with indexes145 has likewise not been cited 
below. 
Commentators before Śaṃkara: The Gītābhāṣya of Śaṃkara is the earliest 
extant commentary on the BhG available. Earlier commentaries had, however, been 
written, as is evident from Śaṃkara’s own remarks: 
This well-known Gītā scripture is the quintessence of the teaching of the Vedic lore, but its 
meaning is difficult to grasp. Even though many have tried to bring out its import by 
constructing the meaning of its words and sentences with the aid of logical arguments, I 
have observed that it has been grasped by the common people as a collection of self-
contradictory and divergent ideas. I shall, therefore, write a brief commentary in order to 
bring out its contents with due discrimination.146  
 
Though Śaṃkara does not mention the names of the commentators 
preceding him, his passing criticism suggests that they must have adhered to the 
                                                                                                                                               
been aware of the views of such earlier commentators of the BhG, as is evident throughout his 
comments.  
142 Potter 1995: Pt. 2, pp.1464-6. 
143  Aufrecht 1962: pp. 391-3. 
144 Dash 2007: pp. 191-236. 
145 Stietencron, H. V. et al. 1992. 
146 tad idaṃ gītāśāstraṃ samastavedārthasārasaṃgrahabhūtaṃ durvijñeyārthaṃ 
tadarthāviṣkaraṇāya anekair vivṛtapadārthavākyārthanyāyam api atyanta-viruddhānekārthatvena 
laukikair gṛhyamāṇam upalabhya ahaṃ vivekato’rthanirdhāraṇārthaṃ saṃkṣepato vivaraṇaṃ 
kariṣyāmi (Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 5-6).  
 
 
 42
doctrine of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya.147 Among these, mention may be made of the 
Vṛtti-kāra referred to by Ānandagiri148 and Bodhāyana, referred to by Rāmānuja,149 
and Bhartṛprapañca, a Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vādin, as possible authors of lost 
pre-Śaṃkara commentaries.150 
Advaita commentators: Śaṃkara, Anubhūtisvarūpācārya (1270 CE, a 
commentator of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya), Śaṃkarānanda (1290 CE), Piśāca 
(Hanumān, before 13/14th century CE), Ānandagiri (14th century CE, a commentator 
of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya), Śrīdhara Svāmin (14th century CE), Rāmānanda (ca. 14th 
century CE, a commentator of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya and the author of an 
independent commentary on the BhG, called the Gītāśaya), Daivajña Paṇḍita Sūrya 
(ca. 1440 CE, a commentator of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya), Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri (ca. 16th 
century CE), and Sadānanda Yogīndra (16th century CE) are the adherents to the 
Advaita school of Vedānta.151    
Viśiṣṭādvaita commentators: In this group, one may place Yāmuna (10th 
century CE), Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha (13/14th century CE, a commentator of 
Yāmuna and Rāmānuja’s Gītābhāṣya), Varavaramuni (14th century CE, on 
                                                 
147 According to this doctrine, liberation is attained through the knowledge of brahman along with 
the performance of duties recommended by the scriptures. Śaṃkara’s vehement criticism against this 
view is found in his bhāṣya on BhG 2.21, 3.1, 4.18, 24, 13.12 and 18.6. (See Sarma 1932-33: p. 46, 
Buitenen 1965: p. 109 and Mainkar 1969: p. 58).     
148 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānandagirivyākhyā, p. 5; on BhG 3.1, pp. 134-9; on BhG 4.18, pp. 200-9 etc. 
(See also Radhakrishnan 2009: Vol. I, footnote 39, p. 452 and Ingalls 1952: pp. 10-11).  
149 Mainkar thinks that this Vṛtti-kāra and Bodhāyana, the author of a gloss on the BS of Bādarāyaṇa, 
are the one and same person whom Rāmānuja mentions in his Śrībhāṣya (See Mainkar 1969: p. 3). 
150 See Callewaert and Hemraj 1983:  p.99.  
151
 Dates for authors are taken from Raghavan 1949: Manuscript citation, p. 442; Potter 1995: Vol. 
1, pt. 2, pp. 1464-5; Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 439; Callewaert and Hemraj 1983: List 20, p. 99 
(Also refer to Bhagavadgītā 1999, 2000, 2001 etc. for the BhG commentaries cited here). 
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Yāmuna’s Gītābhāṣya), and Pratyakṣadevayathācārya (on Yāmuna’s 
Gītābhāṣya).152 
Dvaita commentators: Madhva, Padmanābha Tīrtha (1320 CE), Narahari 
Tīrtha (1330 CE), Jaya Tīrtha (1370 CE), Kṛṣṇa Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha, Vidyādhirāja 
Tīrtha (1388-1412 CE), and Śrīnivāsa belong to this group.153 
Śuddhādvaita commentators: Vallabha (15th century CE) has made no 
explicit explanation on the BhG but has written an independent work, called the 
Tattvārthadīpa or Tattvadīpanibandha (with his own gloss, the Prakāśa). 
Viṭṭhalanātha Dīkṣīta (1518 -1588 CE), Kalyāṇa Bhaṭta (16th century CE), Vallabha 
(1617 CE, the fifth grand son of the founder Vallabha), and Puruṣottamajī (1668 -
1764 CE) are other commentators from this school.154 
Other commentators: The only notable commentators from the early 
Bhedābheda and the later Dvaitādvaita schools are Bhāskara (ca. 750 CE) and 
Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa (1510 CE) respectively. Vasugupta (ca. 9th century CE), 
Ānandavardhana (ca. 9th century CE), Rāmakaṇṭha (970 CE), and Abhinavagupta 
(1014 CE) belong to the Kashmirian group.155  
                                                 
152
 There are two prose commentaries on the BhG along the Viśiṣṭādvaita lines, by people named 
Yāmuna, only one of whom is Rāmānuja’s predecessor (Also see Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II p. 439 
and Callewaert and Hemraj 1983: p. 91, 109-10, Aufrecht 1962: Pt. I, p. 393, and Bhagavadgītā 
2000).  
153
 D. Srinivasachar (1928: pp. 1009-23) assigns authorship of an unpublished manuscript of a ṭīkā 
on the Gitābhāṣya of Madhva, called the ‘Bhāvapradīpikā or Bhāvaprakāśikā or Bhāvadīpikā, to 
Padmanābhatīrtha. For details, see Sharma 1960-61: Vol. 1, p. 295 and Vol 2, p. 240 for manuscript 
citations; Callewaert and Hemraj 1983: List 71, p. 101, list 27, p. 99 and list 173, p. 107; as also 
Bhagavadgītā 2000 and 2007.  
154
 Callewaert and Hemraj 1983: p. 93, list 197, p. 109, list 49, p. 100; and Bhatt 1949: pp. 131-4 for 
manuscript citations, as also Bhagavadgītā 1968: Editorial note, p. xiv and Bhagavadgītā 2000. 
The Tattvadīpikā is generally held to be a work of Vallabha, the proponent of the Śuddhadvaita 
school, and the Amṛtataraṅginī as a sub-commentary on it by Puruṣottamajī (See Bhatt 1949: 
Footnote 1, pp. 131and 134). 
 
155 See Bhagavadgītā 1965, 2001, 1941, 1941a, and 1999. 
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1.6. A bird’s eye-view of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
The title of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā means, literally, ‘the illuminator of the hidden 
meaning’. It is evident that for MS, the text of the BhG is not always transparent, 
and that he considers his work to reveal the true import of the text which, it may be 
implied, has been missed by other interpreters. However, as will be discussed in 
due course, MS’s decision to name his commentary ‘Gūḍhārthadīpikā’ after an 
assiduous study of Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG may also mean that MS 
wants to illuminate the hidden meaning of Śaṃkara’s BhG commentary. In his own 
work, MS affirms a philosophy which recognises other means of self-realisation, 
such as yoga, devotion to God (bhakti) and the analytical approach of the 
Sāṃkhya.156 In spite of being an ardent follower of Śaṃkara Vedānta, MS’s 
principal aim in commenting on the BhG seems to have been to give a philosophical 
justification for the way of devotion (bhakti-mārga) that he followed himself.157  
MS divides the BhG into three sections of six chapters each, offering a 
unique justification for it. According to him, the first six chapters deal with the 
means relating to the path of sacrifice and social duty (karma-yoga). This, however, 
is considered merely as a means to the final goal, which is liberation (mokṣa). MS 
seeks to establish logically the essence of the pure self, indicated by the term ’thou’ 
(tvam) of the Upaniṣadic dictum ‘That thou art’ (tattvamasi). The middle six 
chapters deal with the means, relating to the yoga of devotion (bhakti-yoga), 
making a transition from action (karma) to knowledge (jñāna) feasible. It 
determines the concept of ‘that’ (tat), the principle of supreme reality, through 
                                                                                                                                               
J. C. Chatterji refers to manuscripts containing Vasugupta’s commentary called the Vāsaviṭīkā along 
with another commentary called the Lāsakī by Rājanaka Lasakāka. He also holds that the first six 
chapters of the former are incorporated in the latter (Chatterji 1986: p. 166). 
156 See Gambhirananda 2000a: Front flap.  
157 See Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 49.  
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instructions of devotion to and worship of the deity. The last six chapters expound 
the yoga of knowledge (jñāna-yoga), leading to the great equation made in 
tattvamasi.158  
Among the remarkable features of this commentary, one may highlight from 
the start its attempted synthesis of the paths of knowledge (jñāna) and devotion 
(bhakti), as well as its attempt to reconcile, as much as possible, the other Vedic 
schools of philosophy with the main tenets of Advaitic thought.159 Unlike other 
commentaries on the BhG, it deals with almost every single word of the text, 
attributing to each a most nuanced connotation.160 MS’s unique style in the 
commentary can be seen in his expressions of abundant devotion to God coupled 
with the firm adherence to Śaṃkara’s Advaita, evident in his original verses at the 
beginning and at the end of the chapters.161 MS points out variant readings of the 
text of the BhG, even where they do not substantially impact his understanding of 
the text.162 
As noted earlier, Patañjali’s system of Yoga has been explained extensively 
in the GD, and the YV has also been frequently referred to.163Amidst all these 
remarkable features, the sole idea of complete surrender to God (śaraṇāgati), a total 
union of the individual with the absolute and a merger of the unqualified (nirguṇa) 
with the qualified (saguṇa) through love and devotion (bhakti), occupy the central 
                                                 
158 GD, introductory verses 8-10. 
159 Gupta 1977: Translator’s preface,  p. x.  
160  GD, introductory verse 1 (Also see Gambhirananda 2000a: Introduction, p. 17). 
161 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 521, 465 and 632. 
162 See Appendix III. 
163  Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 156-8, 262-340. 
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place in the text of the GD.164 In the concluding part of the book, the author justifies 
the synthesis of devotion (bhakti), action (karma), and knowledge (jñāna).165  
In spite of disagreements at times with Śaṃkara’s explanation of the BhG, 
MS does not deviate from the fundamental Advaitic tenets of Śaṃkara.166 Thus, it 
would seem that MS was willing to differ from Śaṃkara’s interpretation of the BhG 
but not from his formulation of Advaita doctrine (advaita-siddhānta). In a few 
important instances, however, MS does offer an independent understanding of basic 
doctrine, such as when he argues that, by the knowledge of the Vedāntic great 
sentences (mahāvākya-s), we realise none but the supreme reality Vāsudeva 
Kṛṣṇa.167 This is in sharp contrast to Śaṃkara, for whom the absolute (brahman) is 
devoid of any personal characteristics.  
The main editions of MS’s GD are those of Kāśīnāthaśāstrī Āgāśe 
(Bhagavadgītā 1912), Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī Paṇsīkar (Bhagavadgītā 1999), and 
Jivaram Lallurama Shastri (Bhagavadgītā 2001). Variant readings (pāṭhabheda) of 
MS’s commentary are found in all three editions.168 The present study is based 
primarily on Paṇsīkar’s edition, which includes the only available sub-commentary 
on MS’s GD, the Gūḍḥārthatattvāloka (GTL) of Baccā Jhā (1860-1918 CE), also 
known as Dharmadattaśarmā or Baccāśarmā.169 Another sub-commentary on the 
GD by one Hariyaśomiśra (18th century CE) is not extant.170 Baccā Jhā’s work is not 
a complete commentary on the GD and is heavily technical, revealing the high 
                                                 
164 Gupta 1977: Translator’s preface, p. X.  
165 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 270-3, 298-303, 322-5, 326-8. 
166 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 85-9, 95-7, 298, 752-5.  
167  Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p.751.  
168  See Appendix VI. 
169 Bhagavadgītā 1999.  
170 Reference in Rājendralal Mitra’s Notices of Sansskrit Manuscripts, Calcutta, 1871-90 (Cf. 
Callewaert and Hemraj 1983: p. 101) [Also see Potter 1995: Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 1465, and Aufrecht 
1962: p. 393]. 
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Navya-nyāya scholarship of the author, but is nevertheless very original in nature. 
Thus, though of limited use, it may not be ignored in our study of how MS 
understands the BhG. 
An author’s references to his own works indicate not only the chronological 
order of his writings, but also trace the path of his inner journey towards 
establishing his own philosophical outlook.171 Therefore, the other works of MS 
referred to in his commentary on the BhG may be cited. The references here are 
both explicit (where the author names the works referred to or quotes the same line 
occurring therein) and implicit (repeating the same ideas expressed elsewhere). 
Thus, the SB is referred to while MS argues about the nature of mind,172 BhR in the 
course of discussing the nature and means of devotion,173 and AdS with regard to 
naming his preceptors, expressing his heart’s joy to Lord Kṛṣṇa and examining the 
nature of mind.174 On the other hand, though the AdS does not refer to the GD by 
name, there are similar verses in both the works.175 
With regard to the available translations of the work, we have found two in 
English; one by Swami Gambhirananada (Gambhirananda 2000a) and another by 
Sisir Kumar Gupta (Gupta 1977). In addition, there are Hindi translations by Svāmī 
Sanātanadeva (Sanātanadeva 2005), Harihara Kṛpalu Dvivedī (Dvivedī 1975), and 
Madan Mohan Agrawal (Agrawal 2005) and a Bengali translation by Bhūtanātha 
                                                 
171 Pandey 1978: p. 87.  
172 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 64 [Also see Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 2.13, 
2.15 and 2.28 in comparison to Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 11-2 (cf. Modi 1929: Introduction, 
footnote 41, p. 49)].  
173 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 363, 751, and 754.  
174 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 59, 64, and 263. 
175 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 750 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 632 and 775 (Also 
see  Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, the fifth concluding verse of chapter 18, p. 775; and Advaitasiddhi, first 
line, introductory verse 2, p. 8).  
 
 
 48
Saptatīrtha (Brahma 1986). This thesis has profited extensively from all these, but 
has relied mostly on Gambhirananda’s translation.176  
As mentioned earlier, the GD explicitly names only Śaṃkara,177 
Ānandagiri178 and Śrīdhara179 as earlier commentators of the BhG. Among the BhG 
commentators cited implicitly, Rāmānuja180 and Jaya Tīrtha181 (a commentator of 
Madhva) are noteworthy. In later commentarial literature on the BhG, we find 
explicit references to the GD in the commentaries of Veṅkaṭanātha182 (16th century 
CE, teacher of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra), Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri (16th century CE, the 
famous commentator of the Mahābhārata and an Advaitin),183 Vallabhācārya184 (17th 
century CE, grandson of Vallabhācārya, the founder of the Śuddhādvaita school), 
Puruṣottamajī (18th century CE, a proponent of Śuddhādvaita)185 and Viśvanātha 
                                                 
176 For a detailed note on these translations, refer to chapter 2.4.4 infra. 
177 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā: pp. 1, 81, 83, 100, 108, 117, 141, 160, 188, 208, 212-
213, 219, 298, 319, 326, 531, 554, 660, 664, 671, 682, 691, 695, 718-719, 755, 761, 772, and 775 
[References to the comments on the BS and the Upaniṣads by Śaṃkara: pp. 61(BS 1.1.4), 63 (BS, 
implicit), 171 (BU 1.3.1), 232 (MU 1.2.12), 235 (BS 3.3.12), 405 (BS 4.3.2), and 691 (BS 3.1.8, 
implicit)].  
178 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā: ‘vyākhyātṛbhiścoktaṃ’, p. 188 and ‘tadvyākhyātāraḥ’, 
p. 772.  
179 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā: p. 314.  
Śrīdhara is also referred to indirectly by MS by ‘anye tu’, p. 100; ‘kecidicchanti’, p. 550; ‘kecittu’, p. 
628; ‘mathitadugdhādītyanye’, p. 660; ‘atrakaścidāha’, p. 691; ‘na niradhāri bhavateti’, p. 691, 
Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā (Also refer to Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 
100, 552, 628, 660 and 690-92). 
180 Compare ‘kecittu nityasya’, p. 190, Bagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā (‘kaṃcittu nityasya’ 
is a typographical error in this edition) and Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyam, pp. 366-
8. 
181 Compare ‘ahaṃ vāsudevākhyā parāśaktiryasyeti tvapavyākhyānam’, p. 550, Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Mdhusūdanīvyākhyā and p. 50, Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 3, Prameyadīpikā of Jaya Tīrtha. 
182 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, pp. 47-8, 69, 81, 95, 107, 118, 170, 322, 379, 476-7; vol. 2, p. 68.  
183 Compare introductory verses 2, 3 and 5, pp. 2-5; ‘kecidevamāḥu’, p. 70; ‘Madhusūdanastu 
guṇāḥ…ahaṃkārāspadāni’, p. 164; ‘vyākhyāturapi me nāsti bhāṣyakāreṇa tulyatā’, p. 207; ‘...yo vā 
sarvatra samadarśanaḥ...tanna’, pp. 317-8; pp. 445-6; pp. 455-6; p. 657; ‘anyetu tu 
phalābhisandhiviśiṣṭasya’, p. 688; and p. 712, Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā (Caturdharī) 
with introductory verses 3 and 4, p. 2; ‘atra najāyate…tadupasaṃhāra…’, p. 68; ‘…gunā… 
ahaṃkārāspadāni’, p. 164; ‘vyākhyātṛtve’pi me nātra bhāṣyakāreṇa tulyatā’, p. 298; ‘...yo vā 
sarvatra samadarśanaḥ...evāpekṣitaḥ’, p. 318; pp. 445-6; p. 455; p. 657; ‘… phalābhisandhityāgaḥ 
sa…pūrvāparavirodhaḥ’, pp. 685-6; and p. 712, Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā.    
184 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 2, p. 38. 
185 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Puruṣottamajīkṛtā’mṛtataraṅgiṇyupodghātaḥ, p. 18. 
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Cakravartin186 (18th century CE, an exponent of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism). Baladeva 
Vidyābhūṣaṇa (18th century CE, an adherent to the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism)187 and 
Dhanapati Sūri (1750-1850 CE, a proponent of the Advaita school of Śaṃkara)188 
do not refer to the GD by name in their respective commentaries on the BhG, but 
copious anonymous citations confirm their awareness of the views expressed in the 
GD. 
 
1.7. Distinctiveness of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā as a commentary on the 
Bhagavadgītā 
Source texts of Indian philosophy may be classified into two types, in accordance 
with their method of presentation, viz. the systematic definition of truth (tattva-
nirūpaṇa) or a general instruction of truth (tattvopadeśa). The BhG may be placed 
under the latter category. In the same way, we find two types of works in 
commentarial literature,189 the topical (adhikaraṇa-prasthāna)190 and polemical 
                                                 
186 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārārthavarṣiṇī, pp. 120, 122, 123, 142, 199, 254, 385, 387, and 
404. 
187 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 6, 121, 204, and 207-8; and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 9, 186, 357, and 362-3. 
188 The editor of Bhagavadgītā 1999 mentions the following pages where the GD is referred to in 
Dhanapati’s commentary on the Gītā: pp. 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 47, 48, 51, 52, 56, 60, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 79, 82, 83, 88, 90, 97, 
103, 114, 116, 126, 130, 131, 132, 142, 149, 142, 156, 158 (footnote seems to be missing as 
typographical error), 159, 161, 164, 167, 183, 185, 187, 190, 193, 196, 206, 209, 210, 218, 221, 222, 
225, 231, 232, 239, 247, 253, 254, 258, 262, 274, 290, 292, 305, 306, 309, 316, 320, 343, 344, 351, 
366, 367, 374, 382, 383, 400, 404, 424, 425, 426, 428, 431, 436, 440, 446, 450, 455, 489, 500 
(though not mentioned, p. 500 bears concrete evidence), 513, 539, 541, 546, 547, 561, 562, 593, 594, 
607, 610, 612, 618, 620, 634, 635, 636, 657, 664, 666, 686, 698, 707, 709, 715, 717, 718, and 743. 
189 See Nair 1990: p. 27. 
190 ‘Adhikaraṇa’ generally means a topic, subject, section, a complete argument treating a particular 
subject etc.  Sūtra-s of Vyāsa and Jaimini are divided into the adhyāya-s, adhyāya-s into the pāda-s 
and pāda-s into the adhikaraṇa-s or sections. The general adhikaraṇa-s consist of five limbs:- the 
subject or matter to be explained (viṣaya), the doubt or question arising upon that subject-matter 
(viśaya or saṃśaya), the view taken by the opponent (pūrvapakṣa) and the rejoinder or demonstrated 
conclusion (uttara) by the siddhāntin (uttarapakṣa), and the final conclusion (nirṇaya) arrived at 
after judging the two views of arguments for and against  or relevancy (saṃgati) [viṣayo 
viśayaścaiva pūrvapakṣastathottaraṃ / nirṇayaśceti siddhāntaḥ śāstre’dhikaraṇaṃ smṛtam //]. The 
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(vāda-prasthāna).191 The commentaries on the BhG can be brought under the 
former head.  
While commenting on the BhG, MS has taken into consideration many other 
commentaries on it, criticizing them whenever he found them antagonistic to his 
own views. He has also discussed various doctrines of other Indian philosophical 
schools.192 In the GD, MS does not indulge in hair-splitting argumentation and a 
dialectical method of presentation as in the AdS and AdRR. The commentary rather 
follows the adhikaraṇa-prasthāna style to convey the author’s catholic outlook, 
where he takes note of the views held by different sub-schools of the Advaita 
Vedānta.  
MS’s GD is basically an exposition (vyākhyā) of the BhG. In order to 
examine how far the GD satisfies the basic criteria to be fulfilled by a proper 
exposition, it is pertinent to mention some views of reliable authorities in this 
connection, and judge the GD in the light of them.  
The Abhinavabhāratī, a famous commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra of 
Bharatamuni by Abhinavagupta, describes ten principles that a good commentary 
must satisfy, (i) declaring the correct reading as the desirable one, (ii) mentioning 
the readings that are not proper, (iii) explanation of the text commented upon in a 
clear manner, (iv) solution of (apparent) contradictions, (v) complete and 
exhaustive elucidation, (vi) following definitions in a proper manner, (vii) 
consideration of statements that are ambiguous, (viii) indication of relevance, (ix) 
                                                                                                                                               
Vedāntins put saṃgati in the third place and siddhānta in the last (tatra ekaikamadhikaraṇaṃ 
pañcāvayavaṃ, viṣayaḥ sandehaḥ saṃgatiḥ pūrvapakṣaḥ siddhāntaśca) [Apte 1965: pp. 43-4]. 
191 ‘Debate’ (vāda) is one of the sixteen subjects held by the Naiyāyikas (e.g. means of right 
knowledge, object of right knowledge etc.). It is a kind of polemical discussion aiming at obtaining 
the truth (See Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. I, p. 294).  
192 See chapters 6.2-6.5 infra. 
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justification of (apparent) repetition, and (x) summing up in brief the result of such 
analysis.193 Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍe (ca. 18th century CE), the author of the Chāyā, a 
gloss on Nāgeśa’s Uddyota, which is a sub-commentary on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, 
quotes the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, and says that any commentary must (i) isolate the 
individual terms after disjoining the euphonic combination (sandhi), (ii) expound 
word-meanings, (iii) explain compound words (samāsa), (iv) state the meaning of 
the complete sentence, (v) anticipate possible objections and (vi) provide the 
solutions and answers to these.194 
MS’s commentary meets all of these criteria for a well-executed and 
effective commentary. While commenting on the BhG, MS mentions a number of 
different readings of the text, often explaining the existing one as consistent with 
them or giving his own explanation for them (the GD on BhG 1.46, 8.16. 9.21, 11.8, 
11.17, 11.37, 11.40, 13.20, 14.25, 15.5 etc.). He also declares the correct or 
different reading of the text as the desirable one (the GD on BhG 11.21, 14.23 etc.). 
In some places, he has pointed out the redundancy of the word employed in the 
verse, as the idea sought to be conveyed is already contained in another word 
employed in the same verse (the GD on BhG 18.55 etc.). MS often explains the 
terms employed in the verse clearly to explicate the intent of the verse (the GD on 
BhG 1.2, 1.3, 1.7, 6.2, 6.40, 11.46 etc.). He also gives the etymological meaning and 
grammatical nuances of the word employed in the verses of the text (the GD on 
BhG 3.18, 6.48, 11.8 etc.). MS often sums up the intent of the verses at the end of 
their explanation (the GD on BhG 1.11, 16.17 etc.). In some places, MS justifies his 
                                                 
193 upādeyasya sampāṭhastadanyasya pratīkanam / sphūṭavyākhyā virodhānāṃ parihāraḥ supūrṇatā 
// lakṣānusaraṇaṃ śliṣṭavaktavyānaṃ vivecanam /  saṅgatiḥ paunaruktyānāṃ samādhānasamākulam 
// saṅgrahaścetyaḥ vyākhyāprakāro’tra samāśritaḥ // (Nāṭyaśāstra 1956: Verses 5-7a, pp. 1-2). 
194 padachedaḥ padārthaśca vigraho vākyayojanā / ākṣepaśca samādhānaṃ vyākhyānaṃ ṣaḍvidhaṃ 
matam // (Mahābhāṣya 1938: Vol. 1, introductory verse 11, Chāyā,  p. 2). 
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own explanation to the preference of the prevailing one (the GD on BhG 2.39 etc.), 
and in others, he gives a complete and exhaustive explanation (the GD on BhG 6.15, 
6.25, 6.26, 6.28 etc.). He defines the terms employed in the verses (the GD on BhG 
7.11, 8.1, 9.22, 10.40, 11.5, 11.36, 11.38, 14.27 etc.). He mentions the relevance of 
the explanation of a particular expression in a certain verse, so as not to contradict 
the remaining part of that verse or the following verse (the GD on BhG 2.48, 10.4, 
13.19 etc.). He also gives explanation why the euphonic combination (sandhi) is 
maintained in a verse where it may not be necessary and vice versa (the GD on BhG 
11.44, 12.8 etc.). He also anticipates why some other term or expression is not used 
in the verse instead of the one employed therein, and gives reason for that (the GD 
on BhG 10.18 etc.). In some places, MS gives reason for using (or not using) the 
compound (samāsa) in the text (the GD on BhG 13.12 etc.), anticipates the probable 
objections, and replies to them (the GD on BhG 2.13. 2.15, 2.16, 2.18 etc.). 
Thus, we may conclude that the GD exhibits all the above-mentioned classic 
features that are the hallmarks of a proper commentary. A commentator of high 
calibre always wants to provide some novel explanation of the text that he is 
commenting on, and perhaps this is why he has differed from Śaṃkara in some 
cases, or even construed the text of the BhG in a different way in some cases (e.g. 
reading ‘hi mahānubhavān’ in BhG 2.5 as ‘himahānubhāvān’). 
            Dharamarāja Adhvarīndra (16th century CE) in his Vedāntaparibhāṣā (VP) 
points out that two types of word-meaning (padārtha) are generally admitted in 
Advaita, viz. denotative or primary meaning (vācyārtha or mukhyārtha) and implied 
or secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha or gauṇārtha).195 In addition, there is the third 
                                                 
195 See Mādhavānanda 1997: p. 93 ff.  
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type called suggested meaning (vyaṅgyārtha), which is admitted by some 
grammarians and rhetoricians (ālaṅkārika-s), and which is supposed to be present 
in the works of great poets. In the VKL, while describing various functions of the 
word (śabda-vṛtti), and in his interpretation of the BhG, MS has hinted at the 
admissibility of this third type of word-meaning.196 
Throughout the BhG, Lord Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna have addressed each other 
using different names [for Lord Kṛṣṇa, ‘Mahābāho’ in BhG, 6.35, 6.38, 11.23, 18.1 
etc.; ‘Kṛṣṇa’ in BhG 17.1 etc.; ‘Keśiniṣūdana’ in BhG 18.1 etc.; ‘Hṛṣikeṣa’ in BhG 
18.1 etc.; and for Arjuna, ‘Paraṃtapa’ in BhG 4.5 etc.; ‘Arjuna’ in BhG 4.5 etc.; 
‘Bharatasattama’ in BhG 18.4 etc.; ‘Puruṣavyāghra’ in BhG 18.4 etc.]. In the GD, 
MS not only explains the role played by conjunction like ‘but’ (tu), ‘and’ (ca), but 
also explains the appropriateness of these different names in their context. For 
example, in BhG 4.5, Arjuna has been addressed both as ‘Arjuna’ and ‘Paraṃtapa’. 
MS comments that as ‘Arjuna’ is also the name of a tree, which is covered by bark, 
so also Arjuna’s power of understanding is covered by nescience, while he is called 
‘the slayer of enemies’ (paraṃtapa) because he is deluded by the sense of 
difference (bheda-dṛṣṭi) to kill others as his foes. Thus, these two words convey two 
aspects of nescience, covering (āvaraṇa) and distorting or projecting (vikṣepa) 
respectively.197 As we have discussed earlier, nescience is said to possess both 
powers: concealment (āvaraṇa-śakti), which covers the real nature of the object 
(i.e. brahman), and projection (vikṣepa-śakti), which creates the illusion of multiple 
objects, whereas in fact there is only one undivided entity (brahman). These two 
kinds of power of nescience are obviously not the primary meanings of the terms 
                                                 
196 Karmarkar 1962: pp. 77-9. 
197 See Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 186 and chapter 4.2.1 infra.  
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‘Arjuna’ and ‘Paraṃtapa’ respectively. They are not also the implied meanings of 
these two terms (i.e. ‘Arjuna’ and ‘Paraṃtapa’), since the implied meaning of an 
expression is admitted only when there is any inconsistency (anupapatti) in 
understanding the relevant expression, and that is not the case here. It is a 
distinctive approach on MS’s part to make a philosophical point using the suggested 
meaning (vyāṅgyārtha) of the word, as distinct from its denotative or primary 
meaning (vācyārtha or mukhyārtha) and implied or secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha 
or gauṇārtha). It may be kept in mind that the BhG is a part of the MBh, the great 
epic of India, and admitting suggested meanings in its verses seems perfectly 
appropriate.   
Regarding the method of exposition of the BhG, MS has shown some 
novelty as well. It has been a tradition among the traditional commentators of the 
BhG to divide the text into three parts taking six chapters each. Prior commentators 
such as Yāmuna and Rāmānuja, as well later ones like Keśava Kāśmīri Bhaṭṭa and 
Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri, have divided the BhG into three parts (kāṇḍa-s), dealing with 
karma, bhakti, and jñāna respectively. MS has also divided the BhG in the same 
manner, but what is novel is that he sees an Advaita message even in this structure, 
by taking these three parts of the text as representing the three words of the 
Upaniṣadic great sentence ‘That thou art’ (‘tattvamasi’, CU 6.8.7) [while viewing 
the BhG, this Upaniṣadic text should be in the form of ‘Thou art that’]. As we have 
pointed out earlier, this idea of explaining the BhG as an explanation of this 
Upaniṣadic text has been pointed out also by Ānandagiri in one of the concluding 
verses of his commentary on the BhG. Thus, while we find Ānandagiri’s influence 
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on MS in this connection, it is to be noted that a detailed exposition of the BhG in 
accordance with this Upaniṣadic text is MS’s own idea.198 
 
1.8. Note on translation 
Unless otherwise specified, all translations and summaries are our own. We have 
translated MS literally only on few occasions, though we have paraphrased him 
when required. Furthermore, all quotations from the Upaniṣads, BhG, and the BS 
are from the translations of Patrick Olivelle, J. A. B. van Buitenen, and Swami 
Gambhirananda respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 See chapters 3.1.2, 3.1.4 infra. 
 
 
 56
2 
Available Modern Scholarship on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
  
2.1. General overview 
Due to his immense contribution to the development of Advaita Vedānta, MS’s 
works have received some degree of scholarly attention. Encyclopaedic surveys of 
Indian philosophies, anthologies, translations and scholarly articles provide some 
general information on the life and philosophy of MS, with varying levels of detail, 
in introductory chapters and footnotes. 
The present study is primarily concerned with philosophical rather than 
historical issues. That is, MS’s treatment of basic Advaitic concepts and of devotion 
(within those Advaitic parameters) in his GD. Accordingly, the criterion for our 
review of prior scholarship on MS will be its relevance for the study of the GD. 
Thus, instead of organising the review chronologically, we will organise them by 
theme and text. As many works available in Indian languages (e.g. Sanskrit, Hindi 
and Bengali) contribute significantly to our understanding, we have included some 
of them. 
With regard to the determination of MS’s date, his works, and his biography 
within its socio-historical context, there have been various efforts since the second 
quarter of the last century. Scholars such as Telang (1886), Shastri (1912), Farquhar 
(1925), Divanji (1927, 1928), Chattopadhyaya (1927, 1928), Tadpatrikar (1927), 
Sastri (1928), Chakravarti (1928, 1930), Bhattacharya (1937), Ray (1938-39), 
Sarma (1941), Jagadiswarananda (1941), Nachane (1949),  Kātre (1950),  K. H. 
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Potter (2001), Rajagopalan (2003), and Nelson (2007) may be mentioned in this 
connection. 
In the second volume of his great work on Indian philosophy, Dasgupta 
(2000-07) states that MS may have been born in the first half of the 16th century CE, 
and provides a list of works that may be ascribed to him with a high degree of 
probability. In the course of evaluating MS’s philosophical views, he writes, ‘It is, 
however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed monist in his 
philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of bhakti, or 
devotion, as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed.’ 
While reviewing MS’s VKL, which compares doctrines of other Indian 
philosophical schools with those of the Vedānta in more detail than his other works, 
Dasgupta concludes that MS is guilty of misinterpretation when he asserts that the 
Advaita Vedāntic notion of salvation supersedes all other views.199 In his fourth 
volume, Dasgupta offers a lengthy discussion of issues such as the falsity of the 
world, the nature of knowledge and the world as illusion, as discussed in the AdS, 
Nyāyāmṛta of Vyāsa Tīrtha (15th century CE) and the Taraṅginī  of Rāma Tīrtha (ca. 
16th century CE).200 
Radhakrishnan (2009), in the second volume of Indian Philosophy, includes 
MS as an important post-Śaṃkara Advaitin, belonging to the 16th century.201 Banerji 
(2004) presents an anthology on Sanskrit works and their authors, especially of 
those which were either written in Bengal or influenced its cultural history. In the 
context of prominent Vedānta philosophers, a brief biographical note on MS and a 
                                                 
199 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, pp. 226-7. 
200 MS’s AdS contains a word-by-word criticism of the Nyāyāmṛta, while the Taraṅginī is a word-by-
word criticism of the AdS (See Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. IV, chapters XXIX and XXX, pp. 204-319). 
201 Radhakrishnan 2009: Vol. II, footnote 15, pp. 419-20. 
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discussion of his magnum opus the AdS has been provided. MS is said to have 
flourished in the first half of the 16th century CE. 
Nachane (2000) offers an extensive survey of major post-Śāṃkara Advaita 
writers up to 18th century CE and treats MS’s biography and works. The date of 
MS, according to the author, is ca. 1540-1645 CE. After giving a short summary of 
each of MS’s important works, Nachane states the doctrinal conclusions as set forth 
in the SB and VKL respectively. This author affirms that MS’s treatment of bhakti 
does not contradict Advaita views, supporting this conclusion with copious 
quotations from MS’s VKL, GD and SŚSS.202 
Mahadevan (1938), while giving a systematic exposition of the Advaita 
philosophy with special reference to Bhāratītīrtha Vidyāraṇya (15thcentury CE), 
mentions that Bhāratītīrtha recommended a moderate means towards attainment of 
liberation. Mahadevan refers to MS in this context briefly to show that 
Bhāratītīrtha’s point finds support in MS’s treatment of devotion. He observes:  
                The tendency to liberalise Advaita reached another stage in Madhusūdana who was the 
first to claim that the path of devotion (bhakti) leads to non-dual realization. …He accepts 
the Bhāgavata view that of the two paths, jñāna and bhakti, the latter is superior, since it 
leads to the goal more quickly than the other. …Whether we agree with him or not in 
bestowing on bhakti the importance which he gives it, we cannot but admire the catholicity 
of spirit which animates his exposition of Advaita (sic).203  
 
 
Rao (1980) has devoted a brief chapter on MS entitled ‘Sri Madhusudana 
Saraswathi & Advaita Bhakti,’ in connection with the discussion of different 
Vedāntic issues in his Advaita Vedanta: Problems and Perspectives. The author 
holds that though a synthesis of monistic philosophy with devotion is not generally 
found in works of the Advaita Vedānta, there is no intrinsic contradiction in the 
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acceptance of the path of devotion by the Advaitins; for Śaṃkara’s acceptance of 
bhakti as a purificatory means is also consistent with the presence of this element in 
his personal life. Rao provides a short biographical detail of MS, dating him to the 
middle of the 16th century CE, and highlights the uniqueness of how MS synthesizes 
philosophizing about bhakti with the Advaita doctrines. Following the BP, MS 
terms bhakti a mental mode (manogati) of a devotee, which is like a constant flow 
towards the Lord. When the mind is melted, the bhagavān becomes reflected in it 
like a reflection in a mirror, thereby assuming the form of the bhagavān. Thus, Rao 
concludes that, ‘What  Madhusūdana did for the thinking world was to remove the 
misconception that Advaita is opposed to bhakti, for the internal and essential 
spring of bhakti is drawing together and not repelling, and if openness is not the 
basic truth this would not happen (sic).’204 
Kattackal (1982) in his Religion and ethics in Advaita has devoted a short 
chapter on MS. Following the views of modern scholars such as S. N. Dasgupta, V. 
Rajagopalan, P. M. Modi, Eliot Deutsch, J. A. B. van Buitenen, and Sanjukta 
Gupta, the author highlights MS’s attempt at showing (i) the effectiveness of the 
path of devotion (bhakti-mārga) to be on a par with that of knowledge (jñāna-
mārga), (ii) the nature of liberation (mokṣa) and the means to its attainment, (iii) the 
utility of the Upaniṣadic great sentences (mahāvākya-s) in relation to the process of 
hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and contemplation (nididhyāsana) as the 
means to liberation, (iv) various stages towards the attainment of liberation and its 
grades with special reference to the YV, (v) the nature and stages of devotion  with 
special reference to the BP, (vi) the notion of devotion as depicted in the BhG in 
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contrast to that of Śaṃkara, (vii) amalgamation of the way of knowledge with that 
of devotion etc.205 He also fixes MS’s time as the first half of the 16th century CE. In 
short, Kattackal’s assessments of MS as stated above are solely based on those of 
the modern scholars mentioned above. 
In his Whither Indian Philosophy: Essays on Indian and Western 
Epistemology, Pandey (1978) has emphasised the importance of identifying an 
author’s references to his own works throughout his corpus. Pandey calls this the 
method of self-reference. And in order to explain this method, Pandey has chosen 
MS and cited in a tabular form as many as twenty nine passages from his (MS’s) 
various works together with the work/s mentioned in those passages, and the topic 
referred to therein. After examining the important topics referred to by MS in his 
various works, Pandeya enumerates fourteen doctrines as the principal 
contributions of MS.206 These touch upon all the most important tenets of Advaita, 
such as distinction between reality and unreality, the falsity of the world and the 
reality of brahman, along with a refutation of dualism, the nature, scope and inter-
relationships of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, as well as a reconciliation of 
bhakti and jñāna.  Pandey discusses how all these doctrines developed in MS’s 
personal journey as a devotee, a debater and a philosopher of the highest caliber. 
Pandey has then shown the utility of this method of self-reference as a research 
method in exploring the development of philosophers of ancient times, particularly 
for those with multiple works to their credit.207     
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The only extensive monograph on MS available to us is that of Gupta 
(2006).208 In addition to a short biographical detail and works of MS in the 
introductory chapter, the author discusses all the major philosophical issues -- 
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical -- on the basis of a thorough study of 
MS’s works. Having given a short but solid account of the philosophical and 
religious milieu of MS and its influence on his distinctive philosophical stance, the 
author provides a tentative biography and bibliography based on the views of 
various scholars and textual sources. Since the AdS is the masterpiece of MS, Gupta 
takes it as the basis for determining the authenticity of his other works and 
presenting his general philosophical standpoint. 
The various aspects of the Advaita theory of nescience (avidyā/ajñāna), as 
formulated in MS’s AdS, are discussed in the second chapter of Gupta’s work. In 
the third chapter, MS’s views on epistemology are discussed. The nature, types and 
origination of valid knowledge are described here in detail with the answers to the 
opponents’ objections. In chapter four, the nature of brahman and the establishment 
of the supremacy of the unqualified brahman (as opposed to the contention of the 
dualist Vedāntins that the qualified brahman is the highest reality) have been argued 
by Gupta with evidence from MS’s works, thereby showing how MS refutes the 
rival views of Madhva, Rāmānuja etc. Gupta has analysed, in Chapter Five, MS’s 
examination of various causal theories, as well as his exposition of the Advaita 
views on jīva, īśvara, and sākṣin, in relation to brahman and the primordial 
ignorance. The status of the created world, different opposing causal theories that 
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have been discussed and refuted by MS, the nature of liberation and the different 
stages leading to it have been taken up in chapters six and seven of Gupta’s work.  
Having given a detailed exposition of MS’s basic philosophical stance, 
Gupta discusses in the final chapter of her work, MS’s notion of bhakti. The factors 
that may have been important in shaping MS’s view in this regard become explicit 
in Gupta’s following observations: 
                He obviously knew Śrī Caitanya’s teachings as well as the teachings of the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa (BhP). In his exposition on bhakti in the Bhakti-rasāyana he used the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa as his scriptural source and illustrated each of his views with extensive quotations 
from the text…Probably he was familiar with the exposition of bhakti in the Muktāphala by 
Vopadeva along with Hemādri’s commentary…he still followed Rāmānuja’s bhakti-yoga or 
upāsanā in his attempt to define bhakti. However, his personal feeling was clearly always 
closer to the passionate love for Gopāla Kṛṣṇa than to the sedate bhakti-yoga of the earlier 
Pāñcarātra tradition.209   
 
In order to substantiate this, Gupta sketches a brief historical development of 
bhakti according to the BP, Bhaktisūtra-s, and the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava thought, 
leading to the conclusion that MS’s notions of bhakti, which are largely found in his 
BhR, are based mainly on the BP. Sporadic references to MS’s GD, SB, AdS and 
VKL have also been made in this context in order to delineate a comprehensive 
view of devotion as described by MS. 
In this connection, Gupta’s positive assessment of MS’s attempt at 
synchronizing devotionalism with the non-dualistic views is noteworthy. She 
maintains: 
                So to gain a complete picture of Madhusūdana’s achievement it is imperative to discuss 
both these aspects. He proves that monistic metaphysics and devotionalism go hand in hand 
in the search for perfection and unlimited bliss…His originality is most advantageously 
expressed in his exposition of the BhG…That is why, in spite of being a great non-dualist 
Vedāntin, Madhusūdana admits the paradox of his personality.210 
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2.2. Early works of Madhusūdana 
2.2.1.  Saṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha 
Giri (2007) contains Hindi translations of both the SŚ and MS’s exposition on it 
called the SŚSS, along with the Sanskrit originals. Apart from a detailed 
introduction to both works, the translator has added his own explanations in the 
body of the translation. 
 
2.2.2. Vedāntakalpalatikā 
This work has been edited and translated by Karmarkar (1962). The detailed 
introduction describes MS’s biographical details and his works, a summary of the 
VKL and its critical appreciation. Deutsch and Buitenen (1971), in A Source Book of 
Advaita Vedānta, have selected some portions from this work, observing that, 
‘Madhusūdana is often credited with being the first to reconcile fully the 
metaphysical principles of Advaita with the path of bhakti, of devotion to a personal 
deity.’211 
Panicker (1995) has made a study of the VKL. His introduction clearly states 
why a study of MS is relevant in present-day discussion of Indian philosophies. 
In the 16th century, the influence of the bhakti movement became very decisive among the 
scholars and laymen alike. The absolutistic philosophy of Śaṅkara did not satisfy the theistic 
thirst of the people. Some sort of philosophic compromise was the need of the hour to 
uphold Absolute Monism. Madhusūdana Sarasavati comes to the scene in this historical 
juncture. With his subtle reasoning and logical arguments he resisted the theistic attack on 
Advaita of Śaṅkara effectively. But to keep up the absolutistic theory intact without 
deviating from the main track, Madhusūdana boldly introduced the element of bhakti within 
the monistic thinking. It is not at all surrender to the theistic schools, but a bold attempt to 
uphold the individuality of Advaita Vedānta. The concept of bhakti introduced by 
Madhusūdana is also different from the one propagated by Rāmānuja, Madhva and 
Caitanya. It has its roots in the theoretical Advaita. …Here rests the importance of 
Madhusūdana who had cut a new path within Advaita, the path of jñāna-bhakti synthesis 
(sic).212  
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Part I of the work introduces MS, his works, and the VKL in detail, while the 
author makes a thorough textual analysis of the VKL in part II of this work, which 
also discusses the concept of liberation in Advaita Vedānta (the central topic of the 
VKL) and its establishment by discarding opposing views, along with other related 
concepts [namely, knowledge and nescience, inability of the significative force of a 
word (śabda-vṛtti) for producing the realisation of brahman and correct 
understanding of the Upaniṣadic passages as the means of attaining liberation]. Part 
III of this work contains general observations based on the previous discussions. 
 
2.2.3. Siddhāntabindu 
Modi (1985) is a reprint of a 1929 English translation of the SB. In his introduction, 
Modi has critically analysed the date and works of MS with support from various 
textual sources. He assumes the time of MS to be from about 1490 to 1580 CE.213 
MS’s special contribution to Śaṃkara’s Advaita philosophy is described, based 
especially on the GD, BhR and other devotional works. Modi’s observations in this 
regard may be cited below.            
            As regards the special contribution of Madhusudana to the Sankara Vedanta, it may be 
noted that inspite of his being a follower of Sankara’s monism, he was an ardent devotee of 
Sri Krishna. To Madhusudana, this was neither self-contradictory nor surprising. He could 
show by a careful examination of the Bhagavata Purana that the metaphysics of Sankara and 
the ethics of Vallabha can be combined together to form a religio-philosophical system. … 
Just as in the days of Kumarila Bhatta and Sankara the most important problem was the 
reconciliation of Karma and Jnana, so in the days of Madhusudana and Vallabha the 
greatest problem was that of Jnana and Bhakti. The question had already drawn the attention 
of Bopadeva, Vidyaranya and Sridhara but it was left to Madhusudana to solve thoroughly 
and inculcate a new line of thought in the Sankara Vedanta (sic).214   
 
Critical analysis of all the available works of MS in the introduction of this 
work throws light on MS’s literary acumen. Besides the translation of the SB, Modi 
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has added, in the Appendices, some very informative, if uncritical, discussion on 
the devotional sentiment of MS.215 Modi’s conclusion at the end of Appendix III on 
‘Madhusudana and Sankara on Bhaktimarga in Gita’ is pertinent to the 
ascertainment of the influence of Śaṃkara’s Gītā commentary on that of MS; 
Thus although Madhusudana was a disciple of Śankara, he differed widely from Śankara 
and his followers. As distinguished from the latter, Madhusudana re-established the exact 
meaning of certain verses of the Bhagavad Gīta, inspite of the fact that he was bound down 
by Śankara’s interpretation which he always kept before him when he wrote his own 
commentary on the Gīta, that according to Śankara there are only two Paths mentioned in 
the B.G. but Madhusudana emphatically stated that there are three Paths to absolution 
discussed in the B.G. and that in his opinion the Path of Devotion was as good as that of 
Knowledge and as such he himself followed that Path, though he did not adversely criticise 
the Jnānamarga (sic).216 
      
Divānji (1933) has critically edited and translated the SB into English with 
critical notes and explanations, as also a detailed biographical account, including a 
genealogical chart217 provided by someone who seems to have belonged to MS’s 
family lineage. Divānji concludes that MS flourished during 1540-1647 CE and 
provides an account of the historical development of the Advaita Vedānta prior to 
this time. This edition also contains a Sanskrit commentary on the SB by 
Puruṣottama Sarasvatī, called the Bindusandīpana. 
Acalānanda (1981), Subramanian (1989) and Sastri (2006) are the more 
notable recent English translations of the SB, including the Sanskrit original. 
Explanatory notes by all these translators contain much useful material about MS 
and his thought. Pant (1932) is a Hindi translation of the SB by an anonymous 
translator, with a lengthy introduction and notes, recently re-edited by Giri (2002). 
Śāstri (1334 Bengali Era) is a Bengali translation of the SB that also contains one of 
the original Sanskrit commentaries on it called the Nyāyaratnāvalī by Brahmānanda 
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Sarasvatī. Cidghanānanda (1995) is a critical edition of the SB along with a Bengali 
translation and explanations based on Sanskrit commentaries on the SB.    
 
2.3. Dialectical works against Nyāya and Dvaita Vedānta 
2.3.1. Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 
Yogendrānandagiri (1977) has translated the AdRR of MS into Hindi. Besides the 
translation, explanatory notes on intricate passages are of immense help in 
understanding the import of the text, which is as technically polemic in nature as 
the AdS. 
2.3.2. Advaitasiddhi 
Compared to other works of MS, his AdS has been studied in greater detail and 
translated often in modern scholarship. Ghoṣa (1931) is a valuable translation into 
Bengali of the latest commentary on the AdS (up to the section on ‘falsity of falsity’ 
of its 1st chapter), called the Bālabodhinī, composed in the early 20th century by 
Mm. Yogendranātha Tarkasāṃkhyavedāntatīrtha. The introduction gives a detailed 
account of MS with the support of different legends against the socio-historical 
background, suggesting the period between 1525/30-1632/37 CE as his probable 
date.218 Though the introduction does not separate history from legend, it points to 
reliable sources for obtaining biographical details of MS. Apart from the translation 
and notes on the first definition of falsity by the translator together with the text, the 
editor has provided a detailed introduction with a historical development of the 
Advaita Vedānta from the Vedic period down to the time of publication. The text of 
the Nyāyāmṛta, up to the refutation of first definition of falsity in the AdS is also 
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given in the appendix. Thus, this work has made this portion of the AdS more 
accessible to scholars. 
Jha (1990) provides an English translation of the first chapter of the AdS. 
Though the language is dated, this translation is of immense help in understanding 
the textual part covered here. Besides, the translator has provided a synopsis at the 
beginning of each topic, following the Advaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra of Sadānanda 
Vyāsa (16th Century CE). Bhattacharya (1992) has translated into English five 
definitions of falsity together with the concept of the falsity of falsity (named 
Mithyātvasāmānyopapatti), from the first chapter of the AdS. The preface pinpoints 
what the word ‘falsity’ really means for the Advaitins, in contrast to Western 
philosophy and the Nyāya. Translations are followed by the Sanskrit texts and 
detailed explanatory notes on each of the six topics.219 Pereira (1991) has a partial 
English translation of the AdS, as part of an anthology of important Hindu texts. 
Swaminathan (2001) has paraphrased the entire AdS by mentioning the core textual 
statements from each of the hundred and eight topics, besides giving their English 
translations. Apart from a brief introduction to the AdS and its author in the 
introduction and sporadic notes next to the translations, Swaminathan has also 
given notes on Indian Logic (Nyāya) and Sanskrit Grammar in his appendices. 
Raychaudhuri (1955) has made a study of the concept of falsity following the AdS 
of MS. This author delineates the views about the self as held in the Nyāya, 
Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita philosophies as well as the concept of falsity. Out of the 
five definitions of falsity described in the AdS, three have been discussed by this 
author. 
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Śāstrī (1963) in his Vedāntadarśana-Advaitavāda, has devoted a section on 
MS. Apart from giving biographical details and an account of MS’s works, the 
author has summarised the basic philosophical stance of MS, as found in AdS. He 
also thinks that the period from the last quarter of the sixteenth century to the 
middle of the seventeenth century may be the life period of MS. Singh (1966) has 
written a doctoral dissertation on MS’s justification for Advaita metaphysics, 
mainly following the discussion in the AdS, with occasional references to his other 
works. A table of cross references found in various works of MS and his 
enumeration of as many as fourteen principal doctrines of MS are useful scholarly 
aids. Chakraborty (1967) refers to the concept of falsity based on the AdS and its 
commentary by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī. Besides a detailed introduction on why and 
how the concept of falsity is necessary for the Advaitic discourse, the author has 
examined in the rest of the work all the five definitions of falsity and also the notion 
of the falsity of falsity. 
Nair (1990) has prepared a brief but very coherent and systematic study of 
the AdS. Apart from a bird’s eye view on Indian philosophical schools, especially 
the Vedānta system, the author gives biographical details of MS, based on textual 
evidence and the views of other scholars. Nair holds that MS flourished between the 
second half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th centuries CE. The discussion 
provides an introduction to the Siddhi literature in the Advaita tradition, in which 
the AdS occupies a central place, and the historical development of controversy 
between the dualist and non-dualist Vedāntic thought, from the time of Bādarāyaṇa 
to that of Madhva and his followers. After a critical study of the AdS and its 
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available commentaries, Nair concludes that MS is mainly a follower of the 
Vivaraṇa-prasthāna, who initiated a branch of monistic theism within this school. 
Mishra (1990) has studied Advaita epistemology with special reference to 
the AdS. The Advaita Vedānta, unlike other systems of philosophy, accepts a 
method of knowledge in so far as empirical truth is concerned, but also tries to 
transcend all methods. After a survey of how epistemological problems are handled 
in Advaita, Mishra critically examines all five definitions of falsity and that of the 
falsity of falsity in the AdS, which invariably proves the falsity of the world. He 
touches upon Western views as well whenever necessary in the course of his 
discussion, quoting copiously from MS and other Advaitic writers, noting that 
                From the survey of Advaita epistemology as given by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and 
supported by other preceptors of Advaita, it may be concluded that the primary aim of 
Advaita epistemology is to prove the falsity of the world. It does not aim at devising 
methods to comprehend Reality but tries to transcend them. Thus, the problem of the world 
are not solved but are dissolved. It leads us to a point where the problems of the world are 
no more pertinent but become utterly meaningless. They are only discussed by way of 
establishing the truth of non-duality.220 
 
Devī (1994) has made a study in Hindi on the AdS. In addition to 
biographical details and the discussions on falsity, the author highlights the place of 
reasoning (tarka) in the works of Śaṃkara and post-Śaṃkara writers, with special 
reference to the AdS as compared to other authors before MS, along with a detailed 
note on the treatment of bhakti in MS’s works.   
Sharma (1994-99) has made a critical analysis based on passages from the 
Nyāyāmṛta and AdS. While the first part of it deals with textual sources from both 
these texts, the second part is concerned with Upaniṣadic sentences like ‘tattvamasi’ 
and other Advaita śruti-s in relation to the views of the Mādhva school. Sharma’s 
re-appraisal makes clearer the presentation of the AdS as a criticism of the dualistic 
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school of Madhva, of which Sharma himself is an authority.221 Similarly, 
Anantakrishna Sastri’s Nyāyāmṛtādvaitasiddhī (1984) provides a lengthy 
introduction in English, with a detailed account of MS, the AdS and all its related 
texts and their authors.222 
Fort (1998), in the course of discussing the concept of living liberation 
(jīvanmukti) as admitted in traditional Advaita Vedānta, has discussed views 
expressed in the AdS. According to MS, jīvanmukti is due to the continuity of some 
trace of ignorance, even though ignorance itself has been destroyed. Nelson (1996) 
may also be consulted in this connection. 
Pellegrini (2011) has analysed the second and fourth definitions of falsity 
given in the AdS, which initially appear to be mere reiterations of one another. After 
a thorough textual analysis of both the definitions following MS and his 
commentators and subcommentators, the author has concluded that, as all five 
definitions of falsity in the AdS convey the same ontological status of falsity, they 
are to be treated as equal in their literal sense (vācyārtha) but different in intended 
senses (tātparya). Pellegrini asserts that MS, while responding to his opponents in 
this regard, has kept this distinction in mind.223 
 
2.4. Devotional works of Madhusūdana  
2.4.1. Kṛṣṇakutūhalanāṭaka 
Diwanji (1931-32) has written an article on the KKN of MS. After scrutinizing a 
manuscript of it, the author felt the urgent need of its publication and appealed to 
other scholars for preparing a critical edition of the text in order to validate its 
                                                 
221 Sharma 1994-99. 
222 Nyāyāmṛtādvaitasiddhī 1984: Introduction, pp. 1-95. 
223 Pellegrini 2011: pp. 441-2 and 457-8. 
 
 
 71
authorship,224 though Diwanji himself left no stone unturned to substantiate his view 
in the article. A short summary of the entire text has also been provided by the 
author. 
 
2.4.2. Mahimnastotraṭīkā including Prasthānabheda 
A portion of MS’s ṭīkā on the seventh verse of the Mahimnastotra is called the 
Prasthānabheda (PB) and is often discussed independently. Max Müller (2008) in 
The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy has made an appraisal of the PB, with extracts 
of MS’s views on the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. Müller bases 
much of his discussion of these schools on his paraphrase of the concluding ideas of 
the PB,225 observing that 
What the Brāhmanas themselves thought of their philosophical literature we may learn even 
from such modern treatises as the Prasthāna-bheda… But it shows at all events a certain 
freedom of thought, which we see now and then in other writers also, such as 
Vijñānabhikṣu, who are bent on showing that there is behind the diversity of Vedānta, 
Sāṃkhya, and Nyāya one and the same truth, though differently expressed; that 
philosophers, in fact, may be many, but truth is one (sic).226 
  
MS says at the beginning of the PB that all śāstra-s, directly or indirectly, 
have the Lord as their purport. The conclusion of the PB asserts that all the 
prasthāna-s (lines of thought) that have been discussed are meant to establish the 
non-dual supreme God. Hanneder (1999) has taken this as a guide in showing the 
unique character of Hinduism in accommodating both rigidity and flexibility in 
doctrine, highlighting its mechanisms of adaptation and conservatism. He observes; 
One work that is often mentioned in this context is Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s (16th century) 
Prasthānabheda, which addresses the issue of integrating various religious and 
philosophical systems within the framework of Vedism and would therefore hold as a 
forerunner for a modern conceptualisation of Hinduism. Moreover this brief tract on the 
scriptural sources of knowledge (prasthāna), has been one of the first texts known to 
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Western Sanskritists to present a conspectus of the religious and philosophical literature of 
the ‘‘Great Tradition’’ within Hinduism.227  
 
Hanneder discusses whether the PB is an independent work of MS inserted 
into the MSṬ or an extract from it, but does not provide a concrete answer to this 
issue. 
Śarmā (2001) has made a translation of the MSṬ into Hindi that also seeks to 
explicate the intent of particular words and sentences as parenthetical comments. 
Sengupta (1339 Bengali Era) is a translation of the PB into Bengali. The preface of 
the translator gives brief biographical details of MS, along with a discussion of how 
this text came to light and influenced western scholars to undertake studies of 
Hinduism and its texts.228 Informative footnotes in the translation, together with 
information in appendices about source books on the eighteen kinds of learning 
(aṣṭādaśa-vidyā) cited by MS open a window to a wide Vedic literary lore. Śarmā 
(1989) has published the text of the PB with a simple Hindi explanation. The 
foreword throws some general light on MS and his work. 
 
2.4.3. Bhaktirasāyana 
This is the only available independent treatise on devotion by a staunch Advaitin. It 
has been edited and translated into Bengali by Sāṃkhya-Vedāntatīrtha (1404 
Bengali Era). The bhakti-sūtra-s, i.e. aphorisms on the nature of devotion, ascribed 
to sages like Śāṇḍilya and Nārada discuss the nature of bhakti or devotion, but the 
doctrines upheld in such texts have been stated very briefly, without adequate and 
sophisticated philosophical argument in favour of these doctrines. In contrast, the 
treatment of bhakti in the BhR is highly philosophical, since MS has tried to 
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substantiate his claims with the help of arguments and copious quotations from 
scriptural texts. In his brief introduction to MS and the BhR, Sāṃkhya-
Vedāntatīrtha has beautifully outlined this idea. In addition to the translation of each 
kārikā and MS’s commentary thereon, in the first ullāsa, there are numerous 
footnotes in Sanskrit. As MS’s commentary on the second and third ullāsa-s is not 
available, the translator has provided his own Sanskrit commentary along with its 
translation into Bengali. 
Pāṇḍeya (1998) has translated the BhR into Hindi. The prefatory remarks 
(prāstāvikam) in this edition discuss MS’s understanding of bhakti as presented in 
the BhR, apart from giving an account of life and works of MS.229 Further, while 
Pāṇḍeya has given his translations of and notes on MS’s commentary on the first 
ullāsa, his own explanations of the second and third ullāsa-s of the BhR together 
with notes are found in this work.  
In an article on devotional sentiment (bhakti-rasa) as discussed in the BhR, 
Kar (2006) has shown how the mind in its different modifications gives rise to 
devotion. She has paraphrased a few kārikā-s from the BhR along with MS’s 
commentary on them. A distinction between devotion and knowledge is drawn 
here. Devotion (bhakti) is the transformation of the mind in its melted state into the 
form of God (bhagavān), while knowledge of brahman (brahma-vidyā) is the mode 
of the mind in the form of attrributeless non-dual brahman in its (mind’s) non-
melted state.230  
Śāstrī (1940), in the course of discussing Indian philosophical views of 
aesthetics, makes numerous references to the BhR. MS’s understanding of worldly 
                                                 
229 Pāṇḍeya 1998: Prāstāvikam, pp. 1-11.  
230 Kar 2006: p. 232. 
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(laukika) and transcendental (alaukika) pleasures and sorrows,231 his arguments in 
favour of categorising bhakti as a rasa, like grief or love and his emphasis on the 
fact that pleasure brought forth from bhakti-rasa is inherently supreme, are but a 
few examples given by Śāstrī. Chatterjee (1972) in a critical study in Bengali of the 
development of bhakti-rasa in its historical and theoretical milieu has discussed 
many topics found in the BhR. Thus, MS’s view that bhakti-rasa is superior to all 
other rasa-s, his opinion that pleasure obtained from worldly rasa-s is limited and 
incomplete, while that of bhakti-rasa is impartite and complete, his classification of 
bhakti-rasa into pure (śuddha) and mixed (miśra) have all been examined by 
Chatterjee, comparing them to the views of the rhetoricians (Ālaṃkārikas) and the 
Bengal Vaiṣṇavas.232 
A profound study of the BhR has been made by Nelson (1986) in his PhD 
dissertation entitled Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s 
Bhaktirasāyana. The thesis includes an annotated translation of the first ullāsa 
together with MS’s commentary on it. Nelson demonstrates how the concept of 
bhakti, rather than concepts of a personal or impersonal Godhead, gave rise to the 
dualistic schools of Vedānta that are opposed to Śaṃkra’s Advaita Vedānta. He 
asserts the importance of MS’s position in unequivocal terms: ‘He was one of the 
few traditional writers that sought to integrate bhakti and non-dualism in a way that 
remained true to the strict boundaries to Śaṃkara’s system, and the only one to 
work at this problem systematically.’233 Nelson quotes various works of MS bearing 
evidence of his staunch adherence to Advaita in combination with an outlook that 
gives great efficacy to devotion. Perhaps the most striking reference is in MS’s AdS 
                                                 
231 Śāstrī 1940: pp. 199-200, 289-91,  
232 Chatterjee 1972: pp. 62-3, 85-6, 116-7 and 150-53. 
233 Nelson 1986: pp. 7-8. 
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(2.7), which is a eulogy to the personal God, placed in a context where MS is 
primarily engaged in showing the tenability of attributeless brahman.234 Given the 
attitude taken by MS in his various works, this does not appear as an inconsistency 
on his part. In order to have a more critical assessment of MS’s thought on 
devotion, Nelson has made an attempt to explore the true import of the BhR in its 
social, historical, philosophical, and religious background. Keeping in mind the 
view of MS on what he was really seeking to establish in the BhR, Nelson follows a 
historical and preliminary analysis with his translations of the first ullāsa of the 
BhR and his critical observations. Nelson highlights the considerable theoretical 
difficulties that MS had to face in presenting his views in the BhR, observing that, 
‘No matter how convincing Madhusūdana’s efforts to establish the experiential 
superiority of devotion, it is not at all clear that he is successful in demonstrating 
that it has a greater ontological value than mokṣa, or indeed even an equal 
ontological value.’235 
Nelson also discusses the notion of bhakti as found in the GD of MS, 
concluding that as compared to the BhR, the final philosophical stance and intent of 
MS comes through better in the GD. The following concluding observations of 
Nelson are noteworthy while undertaking any critical research on MS.236 
Madhusūdana’s writings on bhakti represent an important phase of Advaitic thought, one 
that strains the limits of the system to their utmost, and in the process, raises important 
questions for the tradition as a whole. It is my feeling that a careful and creative 
consideration of the problem that Madhusūdana’s works raises would make a significant 
contribution to the ongoing vitality of Advaita in its modern context.237 
 
Nelson (1989) observes on MS’s somewhat paradoxical attitude towards 
ascetic renunciation and sentimental bhakti-rasa: ‘A more ascetic, contemplative 
                                                 
234 Nelson 1986: p. 11 ff (The same verse is also found at the end of chapters 15 and 18 of the GD). 
235 Nelson 1986: p. 309. 
236 Nelson 1986: pp. 354-5, 
237 Nelson 1986: p. 367. 
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and essentially unitive style of devotion supersedes them as Madhusūdana’s highest 
goal. No doubt, it is one more appropriate to the emotional life of a sophisticated 
non-dualist renunciate.’238 Nelson (2004) shows that the transition of bhakti from 
the psychological to its ontological aspect runs parallel both in the Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavism (especially in the works of Rūpa Gosvāmī) and MS, but finds the effort 
of the former more convincing than that of the latter. Nelson also opines that MS 
was perhaps aware of Rūpa Gosvāmī’s works, but his treatment of bhakti was 
influenced more by other predecessors like Śrīdhara. 
 
2.4.4. Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
Coming to the GD of MS, the subject matter of our thesis, the following significant 
scholarly works are available to us. Gupta (1977) has made probably the first 
English translation of the GD of MS. The translator’s preface to the work 
introduces the reader not only to the basic features of the GD but also to the textual 
formation and relevance of the BhG itself in the modern context. A short 
biographical note on MS is followed by this preface. Apart from the translation, this 
work contains the original Sanskrit text of the BhG together with its translation, 
though the translation of verses expressing devotional sentiment of MS found in 
beginning or end of many of the chapters of the GD is not found therein. An 
alphabetical index of the verses of the BhG is also added to the work. In judging 
this work, we can quote here Nelson (1989), ‘Sisir Kumar Gupta’s translation … 
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 77
while perhaps helpful for the general reader, is often seriously inaccurate, tending 
to make the text’s presentation of devotion appear more liberal than it is.’239 
Gambhirananda (2000a) is another translation of the GD of MS into English 
that is more accurate and useful than that of Gupta. The Introduction of the work 
contains a short account of the biography and the works of MS, based on available 
scholarly works available to the translator, besides a brief estimate of MS’s views 
expressed in the GD. The work also contains original Sanskrit texts of the BhG and 
their translations. Exhaustive footnotes are also given at important instances, along 
with a few variant readings of the GD. A detailed glossary of philosophical terms 
and concepts, and the index of verses of the BhG in alphabetical order have made it 
easy for the English speaking reader to study this valuable text of MS.  
Dvivedī (1975) is a Hindi translation of the GD, including the text of both 
the BhG and GD. Explanations are added by the translator with a view to make the 
import of the GD more explicit. An index of the BhG verses in alphabetical order is 
also given. Sanātanadeva (2005) and Agrawal (2005) are other Hindi translations of 
the GD, both containing copious footnotes and the original texts of the BhG and 
GD. Both translations also provide detailed accounts of MS’s life and much 
additional useful material. Sanātanadeva (2005) compares MS’s distinctive 
approach to the BhG as compared to those of Śaṃkara and Dhanapati Sūri (a critic 
of MS, 19th century CE), while Agrawal (2005) carries alphabetical indices of the 
BhG verses, a glossary of important proper nouns and technical terms, an extensive 
bibliography and also identifies sources of the quotations cited in the GD.    
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Brahma (1986) has edited Bhūtanātha Saptatīrtha’s Bengali translation of the 
GD, with a brief introduction containing a bird’s eye view of MS’s treatment of the 
BhG. The work contains the original Sanskrit texts both of the BhG and GD, besides 
their Bengali renderings. The prose order exhibiting the syntactic relation (anvaya) 
between the constituent words of each the BhG verse is also given. As one of the 
basic features of the GD is that MS often deals with other views extensively to the 
extent they are in conformity with and helpful in reaching his own philosophical 
consideration on a firm basis, additional explanatory notes on important passages 
along with the translations have been provided that are helpful for understanding 
the text. A discussion on the true import and essence of the BhG, and an account of 
its merits (Gītā-māhātmya) are appended to the work.  
Three articles by Nelson (1988, 1989a, 1998) are based on different chapters 
of his doctoral thesis (Nelson 1986). While both the BhR and GD have a devotional 
dimension, MS’s peculiar philosophical stance of being simultaneously a non-
dualist and a devotee can be understood by considering the teaching of the BhR is 
preliminary to the understanding of the purport of the GD. Nelson (1988) highlights 
that while Śaṃkara took renunciation (saṃnyāsa) to be the main objective of the 
BhG, MS considered it to be the complete surrender to God (bhagavad-eka-
śaraṇatā).240 MS’s final Advaitic outlook is expressed more in the GD where, 
notwithstanding a prominent place given to bhakti, it is subordinated to the path of 
knowledge and accommodated within a traditional Vedāntic discipline through the 
mahāvākya-s, whereas in the BhR, bhakti presents itself as an independent path to 
the ultimate goal, independent of the Vedic path of knowledge. Nelson therefore 
                                                 
240 Nelson 1988: p. 78. 
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suggests that in the BhR, MS is addressing a general audience consisting of learned 
lay devotees of Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta, whereas the GD is mainly meant to 
advocate devotion to the renunciates of that tradition. Nelson’s critical analysis of 
the devotion in both these texts will be examined again in this thesis when dealing 
with the handling of various philosophical concepts in the GD. 
Sharma (1967) has made a critical and comparative study of the western 
ethical outlook of Butler and the Advaitic outlook towards action (karma) with 
special reference to the GD of MS. Sharma finds considerable accord between MS 
and Butler with respect to duty, virtue and the relation between ethics and religion. 
Sharma opines that in the GD, MS especially distinguishes himself from other BhG 
commentators by combining spiritual knowledge and works together with the help 
of bhakti or devotion to God. Having discussed Butler’s moral philosophy in the 
first five chapters, Sharma devotes the next four chapters delineating MS’s ethical 
considerations and their contrast with those of Butler; before drawing a general 
conclusion at the end of the work. 
Siṃha (1994) presents a critical study of the GD in Hindi, comparing MS’s 
approach to liberation and its various means of attainment as popularly understood 
(karma, jñāna, and bhakti yoga-s) with that of Śaṃkara. Referring to the comments 
on BhG 18.66 where, in sharp contrast to Śaṃkara’s assertion that the BhG teaches 
jñāna-niṣṭhā as preceded by the renunciation of all actions, MS advocates bhakti-
niṣṭhā as the conclusion of the BhG, viewing the other two means, i.e. karma-niṣṭhā 
and jñāna-niṣṭhā, as the means and fruit of bhakti-niṣṭhā. Siṃha concludes that this 
is a bold step on MS’s part, making this one of his most noteworthy contributions to 
the Advaita Vedānta. 
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In the context of discussing the concept of liberation while living 
(jīvanmukti) in later scholastic Advaita, Fort (1998) points out the influence of the 
devotional and yogic works on the GD. From the copious references to the JMV and 
YV, and MS’s own treatment of jīvanmukti and the means to its attainment in the 
GD, Fort comes to the conclusion that the GD is influenced by the Yogic Advaita, 
which is rather uncommon in most other Advaita works, including the AdS.241 
Marcaurelle (2000), in the course of an extensive study of renunciation in 
the tradition of Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta, has critically analysed several passages 
from the GD together with other post-Śaṃkara writers on the subject. With the help 
of copious textual references to the works of both Śaṃkara and MS, Marcaurelle 
assesses the role of physical renunciation and of renunciation of all actions 
(sarvakarmasaṃnyāsa) in attaining liberation. He concludes that although MS tried 
to provide a complete understanding of the path to liberation, he was inconsistent 
and misunderstood Śaṃkara in many places as well.242 
In an essay that draws mainly from the BhR and GD, Gupta Gombrich 
(1991) has reflected on how MS reconciles his devotional attitude to Kṛṣṇa with his 
own Advaitic philosophy, and whether MS can accept the doctrines of both 
Rāmānuja and the YV in some manner. In this analysis, the author takes into 
consideration MS’s overarching allegiance to the Advaita Vedānta in combination 
with his usage of the literary theory of aesthetic experience, which owes much to 
Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Śaiva school and his reliance on the BP, which 
presupposes a very different current of thought derived from the southern 
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Vaiṣṇavism, a movement inspired by the Tamil poet-saints, the Ālvārs, who cared 
more for a certain religious attitude and pure soteriology, rather than philosophy.   
After a detailed examination of various points pertaining to MS, Rāmānuja 
and Abhinavagupta, Gupta Gombrich shows that MS was influenced by both these 
predecessors,243 in addition to Caitanya and the YV (e.g. GD 3.18 follows the YV 
scheme of levels of yogic development).244 Discussing MS’s delineation of the 
eleven stages of spiritual development of a devotee in the BhR, Gupta Gombrich 
concludes that his attempt to reconcile bhakti with Advaita tenets remains 
unconvincing and problematic 
One glance at these stages reveals Madhusūdana’s basic problem of being a strictly rational 
philosopher of Advaita Vedāntic affiliation and at the same time swept off his feet by the 
passionate Kṛṣṇa-bhakti taught by Caitanya and his followers in Bengal. His attempt to 
reconcile these two contradictory streams remains unsuccessful. Still his scheme of a 
devotee’s spiritual development remains unique. All his inspiration comes from the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa, where various levels of experience are illustrated by citing examples 
from the myths about Kṛṣṇa contained in the text. Thus like Rāmānuja he too depends on 
the purāṇic authority to justify his personal views on bhakti. As a clear thinking 
philosopher, Madhusūdana was keenly aware of the contradictions in his theory of bhakti 
experience. He repeatedly admitted this ambivalence in charming verses scattered in his 
various works.245 
 
 
Sitamahalakshmi (1972) however points out that there is a legitimate place 
of bhakti in the Advaita Vedānta. This is evident from the following words of this 
author: 
An elaborate discussion on the concept of bhakti, beginning with Śrī Śaṅkara and 
culminating in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s famous treatise Bhaktirasāyana and his 
commentary Gūḍhārthadīpikā on the Bhagavadgītā, proves that bhakti is not only possible 
but also necessary in Advaita. …We may here state in passing that bhakti has its legitimate 
place on the practical side of Advaita. The conception of Īśvara who is a complex of 
nirguṇa Brahman and avidyā as the material and efficient cause of the phenomenal world 
has been there in Advaita allowing room for devotion to Īśvara by jīva who also is viewed 
as a complex of nirguṇa Brahman and avidyā and its product-mind. The world is illusory 
only from the stand-point of the ultimate reality. 
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Having given the basic philosophical stance of Advaita in a nutshell, the 
author now discusses how bhakti plays a role in attaining liberation. While pointing 
out various proximate means (antraṅga-sādhana) of the intuitive knowledge of 
brahman, as attested by the tradition, she provides textual support from Śaṃkara 
and other early authors that bhakti is indeed well attested as one of these means.246 
The author goes on to discuss the nature, means, and classifications of devotion, 
mainly following the BP and MS’s BhR, and with sporadic references to the GD, 
concluding that relying on the Gītā, both Śaṃkara and MS accept bhakti as an 
important and helpful means to knowledge, which leads to self realisation.247 
            Mishra (2009) provides a survey of bhakti in Vedānta, from the Ṛgvedic 
times to the 16th-17th centuries. He describes MS, along with others such as 
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (17th Century CE), Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (17th century CE) and 
Kāśmīraka Sadānanda (17th century CE) as representatives of an era of neo-bhakti in 
the Advaita Vedānta, who admit the role of bhakti even in the state of jīvanmukti 
and also its (bhakti’s) independent status, like  knowledge, as a path of liberation.248 
With copious references to the BhR and GD, and to Brahmānanda Sarasvatī and 
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, both of whom wrote commentaries on MS’s works, Mishra 
concludes that MS’s notable contribution to the place of bhakti in the Śaṃkara 
Vedānta tradition lies in establishing the compatibility and interdependency of the 
paths of knowledge and devotion towards attaining liberation.249 Thus, the following 
observations of Mishra may be cited in this context. 
According to the Bhāgavata, Premabhakti is essential for a Jñāna-yogin aspiring for the 
highest knowledge which it produces, and at the same time highest Jñāna is essential for a 
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Bhaktiyogin aspiring for the highest Premabhakti, which it achieves in this case. … The 
views of Śrīdhara, Bopadeva, Hemādri, Madhusūdana and Nārāyaṇa are the same as those 
of the author of the Bhāgavata. It is in fact, these views of the last two of the five great 
stalwarts of Bhakti which, as repeatedly remarked, constitute the newest and the finest 
contribution to the concept of Bhakti in Śāṅkara Vedānta.250  
 
Though Mishra (2009) may be viewed as one of the early attempts in 
modern times (first published in 1967) to give a thorough exposition of the 
development of bhakti in the tradition of Śaṃkara’s Advaita, it has come to be 
adversely reviewed by modern scholars such as Nelson (1986) and Hirst (1993). 
Other than the studies discussed above, Chakravarti (2004: pp. 190-1), Dazey 
(1993: pp. 155-7, 167), Iyer (1966: p. 482), Minkowski (2011), Mishra (2006), 
Mitra (1930: p. 453), Nelson (2007a), Smarananda (1974: pp. 304-5) and 
Veezhinathan (2001) also deal with and refer to MS, his works, and his 
philosophical contributions to bhakti and Advaita.  
 
2.5. Room for further research on the Gūḍhārthadīpikā  
As already mentioned earlier, MS’s commentary on the BhG has not been approved 
on all issues by later commentators, including Nīlakaṇtha Sūri, Veṅkaṭanātha and 
Dhanapati Sūri, who are, like MS, adherents to the Advaita Vedānta. Besides, MS’s 
efforts to place bhakti within the parameters of Advaita doctrine – a fact considered 
to be the unique contribution of MS to the tradition of Advaita – is not unanimously 
regarded as successful by modern scholarship. Two modern scholars, Lance Nelson 
and Sanjukta Gupta, who have studied MS’s views in the BhR and GD, seem to 
hold divergent views, while Marcaurelle asserts that MS occasionally failed to 
understand the intent of Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG.  
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Therefore, on the basis of modern research available on MS in general, we 
can state with confidence that while there have been some studies of the GD of MS, 
none of them is fully exhaustive in its treatment of the text, as proposed in this 
thesis. Though the GD is a widely available complete commentary on the BhG, this 
thesis, in its modest way, will be the first extensive and critical study of this text, in 
the process of which it will try to fill some gaps in the available research on MS. 
Moreover, this thesis places the GD in the context of the history of the 
commentarial tradition of the BhG and discusses the views of post-Madhusūdana 
commentators on his work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85
3 
Madhusūdana’s Introduction (upodghāta) to the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā as Summary of the Bhagavadgītā 
 
‘The Lord has divulged all this in the scripture Gītā. 
So my mind is very much keen to explain it.’ 
                                                                                                         -- GD, introductory verse 40251 
 
MS’s introduction (upodghāta) gives not only an excellent summary of his own 
commentary on the text of the BhG, but also of the teaching of the Gītā itself. As 
one of the English translators of MS’s commentary on the BhG rightly remarks, 
‘His introduction gives the essence and the evolution of the Gītā with a brilliant 
perspicuity.’252 It also propounds explicitly a resume of the means of liberation253 
and the role of devotion in it. Therefore, it will be useful to examine the 
introduction in some detail as a means of comprehending what MS aims at 
throughout the rest of the lenghty text. 
In the discourse of Indian philosophical texts, the introduction often 
contextualises what follows and foreshadows its purport.254 A classical description 
of upodghāta is as an introduction that sets out the suitable place (sthāna) or 
occasion for the study of a text, the reason (nimitta) for it, the speaker (vaktā), the 
listener (śrotā), the use it offers for the listener (śrotṛ-prayojana) and an 
explanation of the relationship (sambandha) of all these to the discourse proper.255 
Prakāśātmayati, in his Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, defines an upodghāta as an 
                                                 
251 etat sarvaṃ bhagavatā gītāśāstre prakāśitam / ato vyākhyātum etanme mana utsahate bhṛśam // 
252 Gupta 1977: Translator’s preface, p. x (italics added). 
253 Gambhirananda 2000a: p. 16. 
254 cintāṃ prakṛtasidhyarthām upodghātaṃ pracakṣate (Quoted in Panoli 2003: p. 6). 
255 sthānaṃ nimittaṃ vaktā ca śrotā śrotṛprayojanam / sambandhādyabhidhāñca upodghātaḥ sa 
ucyate // (quoted in Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 3). 
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introductory consideration of alternative meanings to better explicate the goal that 
is sought to be established.256 Such introductory passages often contain the four 
unifying factors necessary for beginning the study of a philosophical work, namely 
the person for whom the work is meant (adhikārin), the topic or subject-matter of 
the text (viṣaya), the relation of the subject-matter to the text (sambandha), and the 
purpose served by studying it (prayojana). These four unifying factors are 
technically known as anubandha-catuṣṭaya, as explained systematically in the 
Vedāntasāra (VS) of Sadānanda Yogīndra (16th century CE).257 The knowledge of 
these four factors produces the inclination (pravṛtti) of the person concerned to 
engage with the text.258 
In Advaita, the typical person with eligibility for the knowledge of brahman 
(adhikārin) is one whose mind has been purified through prior performance of 
prescribed actions and the fourfold inner disciplines (sādhana-catuṣṭaya).259 The 
non-difference between the supreme reality and the individual self is the topic for 
discussion (viṣaya) in the text, the connection between this knowledge and the text 
that establishes it is the relation (sambandha) and the dispelling of nescience with 
the rise of non-dual knowledge, thereby attaining the highest bliss is the purpose of 
                                                 
256 pratipādyam arthaṃ buddhau saṃgṛhya prāg eva tadartham arthāntara-varṇanam upodghātaḥ 
(Pañcapādikā 1958: Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, p. 46). 
257  Nikhilananda 1997: VS 1.5, p. 3. 
258 Also see Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 10.  
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th century CE), the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, emphasises this too 
in the Ślokavārtika that a listener listens to a śāstra only when its purpose and its relation to its 
subject- matter are already known (siddhārthaṃ jñātasambandhaṃ śrotuṃ śrotā pavartate / 
śāstrādau tena vaktavyaṃ sambandhaḥ saprayojanaḥ // )[Shastri 1978: Pratijñā-sūtra, śloka 17, p. 
6]. 
259 Nikhilananda 1997: VS 1.6, p. 3 (Also refer to Brahmasūtra 2000:  BSB 1.1.1, pp. 71-5; 
Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 1, p. 1; Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 3, VC 17-8, p. 5 etc.). 
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its study (prayojana).260 A proper introduction provides the full orientation to the 
text, touching upon all these aspects. 
MS’s introduction to his commentary on the BhG consists of forty six 
verses, which form the focus of this chapter. This study will critically compare this 
with the introductions to the BhG commentaries of Śaṃkara, Ānandagiri (on 
Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG), Rāmānuja and Śrīdhara on distinct issues, in 
order to explore how these earlier authors may have influenced theoretical 
considerations in MS’s BhG commentary. Other works of MS and Śaṃkara, as also 
texts that are traditionally accepted as authoritative and may have shaped MS’s 
thought, will also be taken into consideration.  
 
3.1. Structure of the introduction to the Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
The versified introduction to the GD can be divided into thematic units. Verses 1-3a 
provide an invocation, and set out the author’s reason for undertaking a 
commentary on the Gītā. Verses 3b-7 describe both the Vedas and the BhG as being 
similarly tripartite in structure and serving the same purpose, concluding with the 
predominance of bhakti-niṣṭhā. The threefold division of the BhG as the means of 
establishing the unity of jīva and brahman, as stated by the Upanisadic dictum ‘That 
thou art’ (tattvamasi) is described in verses 8-10. The means of liberation (mukti-
sādhana-parvan) with special reference to Pātañjala Yoga are covered in verses 11-
27, while the next two verses described the one who is liberated while living 
(jīvanmukta). Verses 30-40 touch upon the importance of devotion to God 
(bhagavadbhakti) for the liberated while living in attaining the final emancipation 
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 88
(videha-mukti). The last six verses eulogize the Gītā as the eminent means of 
eradicating hindrances to liberation (mokṣa), the supreme attainment of human life 
(parama-puruṣārtha).  
 
3.1.1. Verses 1-3a: The invocation, the purpose of Bhagavadgītā and 
Madhusūdana’s commentary 
MS begins his commentary with a traditional verse offering salutations 
(maṅgalācaraṇa) to Lord Rāmacandra, who is worshipped by the highest order of 
mendicants (parama-haṃsa-s) and who resides in the hearts of devotees.261 Note 
that Śaṃkara also begins his commentary on the BhG with obeisances to Lord 
Nārāyaṇa, but by quoting a Purāṇic verse, rather than composing an invocation of 
his own. Ānandagiri, who starts his gloss on the BhG commentary with a salutation 
to Lord Vāsudeva (Hari) and Śaṃkara,262 explains that Nārāyaṇa is Śaṃkara’s 
chosen deity (iṣṭa-devatā), with a popularly cited cosmic significance as given in 
the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. The primordial waters are created by the supreme person (nara) 
and are therefore called nāra. They also become his abode (ayana) at the time of 
dissolution, so that this supreme person is called Nārāyaṇa.263 Ānandagiri also 
provides a subtler conception, whereby the word nara refers to all bodies, moving 
and unmoving, so that ‘nārā’ means the individual embodied selves, which are the 
reflections of the supreme consciousness, while Nārāyaṇa is the inner controller 
                                                 
261 oṃ namaḥ paramahaṃsāsvādita caraṇakamala cinmakarandāya bhaktajanamānasanivāsāya 
śṛīrāmacandrāya// (Bhagavadgītā 1999:  Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, maṅgalācaraṇam, p. 1). 
262 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānandagirivyākhyā, introductory verses 2-3, p. 1. 
263 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā and Ānandagirivyākhyā, p. 1-2 (Also 
see Aiyar 1988: p. 1, Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 3, Gambhirananda 2010: Footnote 1, pp. 1-2 and 
Sastry 2004: p. 1).  
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(antaryāmin), the substratum of all embodied selves.264 Śaṃkara’s introduction also 
describes Nārāyaṇa as Viṣṇu, the original creator (ādikartā), who incarnated as 
Kṛṣṇa, the son of Vasudeva and Devakī, for the protection of the earthly brahman 
(the spiritual order of the world) and the spiritual life (brāhmaṇatva) and gave the 
BhG to teach the ultimate reality called Lord Vāsudeva, the supreme brahman.265 
Rāmānuja’s invocation to his BhG commentary salutes his great predecessor 
Yāmunācārya and lists numerous attributes of Lord Nārāyaṇa, who is also of the 
nature of infinite knowledge and bliss (ananta-jñānānandaika-svarūpa), and 
narrates his (Nārāyaṇa’s) advent on earth as Lord Kṛṣṇa and his subsequent 
appearance in the battle field of Kurukṣetra.266 Śrīdhara Svāmin at the beginning of 
his commentary on the BhG pays homage to Lord Mādhava (Śrīkṛṣṇa), who is of 
the nature of supreme bliss (paramānanda), and Lord Viśeśvara (Śiva).267 We may 
note in this context that Śaṃkara’s BSB too describes devotion to God (īśvara-
praṇidhāna) as well-established in the Vedas and the Smṛti texts.268 MS’s homage 
to Lord Rāmacandra as the qualified (saguṇa) brahman in his invocatory verse is in 
consonance with both the theistic Vedānta of Rāmānuja and his own predecessors 
in the Advaita school. 
MS then points out his purpose in undertaking a commentary on the BhG 
and justifies his naming it ‘Gūḍhārthadīpikā’. While staying faithful to his 
predecessor Śaṃkarabhagavatpāda in interpreting the text, MS proposes to deal 
with almost each and every word of the BhG. All this is conveyed in the 1st verse of 
                                                 
264 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānandagirivyākhyā, p. 2 (Also see Gambhirananda 2010: Footnote 1, pp. 1-2 
and Sastry 2004: p. 1).  
265 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 4-7. 
266 Bhagavadgītā 1992: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, pp. 5-6. 
267 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, introductory verses 1 and 2, pp. 1-2. 
268 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 2.2.42, p. 573 (Also see Sitamahalakshmi 1972: p. 4). 
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the introduction; ‘After having discussed the meaning of the commentary of the 
revered one (bhagavatpāda) with great care, I will render, almost word for word, 
the illumination of the hidden meaning of the Gītā (i.e., the 
Gītāgūḍhārthadīpikā).’269 In the tradition of Vedānta philosophy, the relation 
between the master and his disciples in a monastic order is of utmost importance, 
and the disciples are often regarded as the successors of their masters. MS’s 
reference to bhagavatpāda in his introductory verses in the GD is clearly to 
Śaṃkara.270 While other commentators of the BhG may have overlooked the 
unintelligible portions in it, MS proposes to deal with them in detail. MS intends to 
explain even the words (terms) or pada-s that are known as particles (nipāta), 
including ‘but’ (tu), ‘and’ (ca), ‘or’ (vā) etc. in the BhG, that other commentators 
would have typically passed over without explanation. This is the implication of the 
expression ‘almost word for word’ in the verse. Thus, while keeping the non-
dualistic doctrine of Śaṃkara centrestage in his interpretation, MS intends to make 
clear all the intricacies that his predecessors may have overlooked. Indeed, MS 
gives some indication that he wishes to explicate even the intricacies of Śaṃkara’s 
BhGB in minute detail. Some scholars think that, since the commentators in their 
work often do not reveal their sectarian doctrines that are kept secret 
(sāmpradāyika-rahasya) to the readers, MS wants to bring those secrets to light in 
his commentary.271 
                                                 
269 bhagavatpādabhāṣyārtham ālocyātiprayatnataḥ / prāyaḥ pratyakṣaraṃ kurve 
gītāgūḍhārthadīpikām //,  GD, introductory verse 1 (‘pratipadaṃ’, Bhagavadgītā 1912).  
270 śrutismṛtipurāṇānām ālayaṃ karuṇālayam / namāmi bhagavatpādaṃ śaṃkaraṃ lokaśaṃkaram // 
(Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvaliḥ 1999: Saṃpradāya paraṃparā ślokāni 4). This is an oft-cited verse in the 
Advaita tradition that identifies Śaṃkara as bhagavatpāda. 
271 See Dvivedī 1975: Vol. 1, upodghāta, p. 3 and Sanātanadeva 2005: Upodghāta, footnotes 2 and 4, 
pp. 1-2. 
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Having paid obeisance to both the Lord and his predecessor in the tradition, 
MS lays down the philosophical foundation of his commentary. By terming the 
BhG, in verse 2, a scripture (śāstra), and identifying its purpose (prayojana) as the 
highest good (paraṃ niḥśreyasam), i.e. liberation or salvation (mokṣa), MS makes it 
clear that he regards the BhG on par with the Upaniṣads, which also aim to teach 
the means of obtaining the complete termination of transmigratory life and its 
cause. To quote MS; ‘It has been said that the purpose of the scripture of the Gītā is 
the highest good, which is of the nature of final cessation of transmigration 
(saṃsāra) together with its cause (nescience).’272 In the same vein, Śaṃkara’s 
introduction to his BhGB had also referred to the text as a scripture whose purpose 
is to teach liberation, characterized by the complete termination of transmigration 
and its cause.273 
In his commentary on verse seven of the Mahimnastotra, MS had held that 
the expression, ‘all scriptural sources of knowledge’ (śāstra-prasthāna-s) referred 
to the ‘three’ (trayī), which include the eighteen vidyā-s: four Vedas (the Ṛk, Yajuḥ, 
Sāma, and Atharva) six Vedāṅgas (the Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chandas, 
and Jyotiṣa), four Upāṅgas (the Purāṇas, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Dharmaśāstras), 
and four Upavedas (the Āyurveda, Dhanurveda, Gāndharvaveda, and Arthaśāstra). 
MS adds that the Upapurāṇas are included in the Purāṇas, Vaiśeṣika in Nyāya, 
Vedānta in Mīmāṃsā, while Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala (Yoga), 
Pāśupata, and Vaiṣṇava texts are included in the category of Dharmaśāstras.274 
                                                 
272 sahetukasya saṃsārasyātyantoparamātmakam / paraṃ niḥśreyasaṃ gītāśāstrasyoktaṃ 
prayojanam //, GD,  introductory verse 2. 
273 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 6-7. 
274 Śivamahimnaḥstotraṃ 1996: Madhusūdanī, pp. 21-2. 
The Viṣṇu Purāṇa too cites all these eighteen vidyā-s (Cf. Sengupta 1389 Bengali Era: Anuvāda, 
footnote 3, p. 12). 
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Heterodox schools like the Cārvāka, Bauddha and Jaina have their separate 
scriptural sources of knowledge, but MS holds that these are non-Vedic and not 
even indirectly helpful in obtaining puruṣārtha-s, so that they are to be ignored.275 
In the GD as well, by the word śāstra, MS means the Vedas, and the related texts 
like the Smṛtis, Purāṇas etc. that can be considered Vedic.276 For Śaṃkara too, the 
BhG represents the quintessence of the entire teaching of the Vedas.277 
MS holds that the BhG, rendered in the form of a dialogue between the Lord 
and Arjuna, is meant to extol the knowledge of brahman (brahma-vidyā), as found 
in different Upaniṣadic dialogues like those between Janaka and Yājñavalkya (BU), 
Naciketā and Yamarāja (KU) etc.278 Considering the BhG to be on a par with the 
Upaniṣadic expositions, MS quotes the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Jābala Upaniṣad etc. 
which bear references to Kurukṣetra.279 This idea is also supported in one of the 
customary verses of meditation (dhyāna-śloka) on the BhG, where all the Upaniṣads 
are called cows, the son of Nanda (Kṛṣṇa) is the milkman, the BhG is the supreme 
milk (dugdha) akin to nectar (amṛta) and Arjuna (Pārtha) is the calf, and the wise 
(sudhī) are the enjoyer (bhoktā).280 While the Upaniṣadic dialogues convey lofty 
philosophical doctrines, the BhG explains the essentials (sāra) of those 
philosophical principles in an abbreviated form. Furthermore, there are several 
                                                 
275 Śivamahimnaḥstotraṃ 1996: Madhusūdanī, p. 22. 
276 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 650 (Also see Hanneder 1999: p. 578). 
277 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 5. 
278 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p.8. 
279 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 9.  
Some scholars hold that, since the BhG is treated to be an explanatory part of the Upaniṣads, it could 
be a part of any of the Vedas. As the text of the BhG is not found in the Vedas, it seems to be an 
extinct part of the Vedas at the time of Vedavyāsa, who composed the MBh on the basis of the 
historical truth of the Vedas (See Brahma 1986: Footnote, pp. 10-11). 
280 sarvopaniṣado gāvo dogdhā gopālanandanaḥ / pārtho vatsaḥ sudhīrbhoktā dugdhaṃ gītāmṛtaṃ 
mahat // (Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmadbhagavadgītāmaṅgalācaraṇam 4 ).  
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Upaniṣadic texts found quoted in the BhG, with minor variations.281 Thus, the BhG, 
considered as an explanatory part of the Upaniṣads, is regarded as an authoritative 
scripture.  
We may note that Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī quotes the Ślokavārtika 
(śabda-pariccheda, śloka 4) of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, according to which that which 
advises one to engage in obligatory duties and to abstain from the prohibited actions 
is known as scripture, be it eternal or non-eternal.282 From this traditional 
consideration as well, the BhG, which prompts Arjuna to undertake his own duty 
(svadharma) and dissuades him from others’ duty (para-dharma), is certainly a 
scripture. Kumārila also says in his Ślokavārtika that; ‘It is true of all śāstra-s as 
well as of all courses of actions that none of them is adopted by any one as long as 
the purpose (served by it) is not mentioned.’283 By setting its purpose (viz. liberation 
or salvation that entails the total obliteration of saṃsāra and its cause) in view, BhG 
fulfils this criterion as well.284 Thus, for both MS and Śaṃkara, BhG is an eminent 
śāśtra teaching liberation, a fact that finds support not only within their own works, 
but also broadly from the commentarial tradition that they represent. 
For MS, the supreme reality, i.e. the unqualified brahman, is none other than 
the qualified brahman (Lord Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa).285 The word Viṣṇu is used in the MBh 
in the sense of all-pervading brahman.286 The Vedas aim at attaining the supreme 
state of Lord Viṣṇu (viṣṇoḥ paraṃ padam). As part of describing the nature of 
                                                 
281 For details, refer to Sastrigal 1990. 
282 Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī on BS 1.1.4, p. 109. 
283  Shastri 1978: Pratijñā-sūtra, śloka 12, p. 5. 
284  See Sanātanadeva 2005: Upodghāta, p. 2 and Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnotes 5. (iv) and (v), p. 
2. 
285 He says that he does not know any of the realities higher than Lord Kṛṣṇa (Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 
750 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, 1st concluding verse of chapters 15 and 18, pp. 
632 and 775). 
286 ‘bṛhattvāt viṣṇurucyate’ MBh 5.70.3 [quoted in Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnote 6. (i), p. 2]. 
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salvation or liberation, the second introductory verse of the GD shows the first step, 
i.e. getting rid of transmigration along with its cause (avidyā/ajñāna), while the 
third begins with delineating the final stage, which is attainment of the supreme 
state of the Lord (paramānanda-prāpti), thereby explaining the complete nature 
(pūrṇa-svarūpa) of salvation. Thus MS says, ‘That supreme state of Lord Viṣṇu is 
in the nature of existence, knowledge, and bliss; and is absolute.’287 
In the third verse, the term ‘sat’ refers to that which is true, not sublated in 
all three periods of time (trīkālābādhita), i.e. eternal (nitya), ‘cit’ refers to 
knowledge that is self-manifest (svayaṃ-prakāśa), and ‘ānanda’ refers to unending 
bliss (niratiśaya-premāspada). The Vākyasudhā, a topical text (prakaraṇa-grantha) 
of the Advaita tradition, says that all physical entities partake of five characteristics, 
namely existence (asti), appearance (bhāti), value as ‘it is blissful’ (priyam), as also 
name (nāma) and form (rūpa). The first three are the essential nature (svarūpa) of 
brahman and the last two are attributed to the physical world. While all physical 
entities exist, shine and become blissful or favorable (anukūla) on account of their 
being superimposed on brahman characterized as existence, consciousness and bliss 
(saccidānanda-lakṣaṇa), the last two characteristics in the group are only 
momentarily real in terms of the first three.288 Therefore, it follows that Lord Viṣṇu 
who, according to MS, is nothing but existence-consciousness-bliss (saccidānanda) 
by nature, is alone the subject-matter (viṣaya) of the text of the BhG. Śaṃkara too 
says that Lord Vāsudeva, in the nature of supreme brahman, is set forth as the 
subject-matter of the BhG.289 With this, in agreement with Śaṃkara, the second 
                                                 
287 saccidānandarūpaṃ tatpurṇaṃ viṣṇoḥ paraṃ padam /, GD, introductory verse 3a. 
288 asti bhāti priyaṃ rūpaṃ nāma cetyaṃśapañcakam / ādyaṃ trayaṃ brahmarūpaṃ jagadrūpaṃ tato 
dvayam // (Cidghanānanda 1995: Vākyasudhā 20 and the explanation of it by Ānandagiri, pp. 355-6). 
289 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 7. 
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factor of anubandha-catuṣṭaya, namely viṣaya, is established in MS’s introduction 
to the GD. 
Thus, according to MS, the  attainment of the supreme state or abode of 
Lord Viṣṇu (brahman) having the essential nature of existence, knowledge and bliss 
and being the absolute, preceded by the complete cessation of transmigration with 
its cause, is the purpose (prayojana) of the BhG.290 Though Śaṃkara, as noted 
above, explicitly mentions the complete cessation of transmigration with its cause 
to be the purpose of the BhG, his explicit statement that attaining the state of Lord 
Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇū or Vāsudeva is the subject-matter of the BhG also agrees with  
the view of MS in question.  
 
3.1.2. Verses 3b-7a: Vedas and Bhagavatgītā are similar in structure and 
identical in purpose 
Having defined the nature of mokṣa, which is the purpose (prayojana) of the BhG, 
MS states the relation (sambandha) between the BhG and liberation (mokṣa) in the 
second half of verse 3 by saying that the tripartite Vedas containing karma, jñāna, 
and upāsanā kāṇḍa-s are the means for obtaining that mokṣa. To quote MS; ‘The 
tripartite Vedas have been commenced for the attainment of that (highest 
state)….’291 
As stated earlier, Śaṃkara views the BhG as the essence of the whole 
teaching of the Vedas. While the Mīmāṃsakas accept the Veda as not having any 
human authorship (apauruṣeya) and consider it beginningless (anādi), the Advaita 
Vedāntins, following Śaṃkara, treat the Veda as having its source in brahman and 
                                                 
290  See Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnote 6.(iv), pp. 2-3. 
291 yatprāptaye samārabdhā vedāḥ kāṇḍatrayātmakāḥ //, GD, introductory verse 3b. 
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in turn being the source of brahman knowledge (śāstrayoni).292 After describing 
Lord Viṣṇu, whose essential nature is existence-consciousness-bliss, as the subject-
matter of the BhG, MS defines the content of the text with greater philosophical 
precision. In his unique way of establishing similarity in structure between the Veda 
and BhG, MS draws functional equivalences between the three sections of the 
Vedas and three sections of the BhG, focusing on action (karma), meditation or 
worship (upāsanā) and knowledge (jñāna) respectively. Thus, he argues in verse 4; 
‘Just as the tripartite Vedas have the parts that deal with action, meditation or 
worship, and knowledge, the Gītā, consisting of eighteen chapters, also has three 
sections.’293 How MS justifies and interprets this similarity in structure will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
In the traditional Indian philosophical systems, we find mainly two distinct 
parts of the Vedic texts, dealing with two separate things, viz. i.e., action (karma) 
and knowledge (jñāna), ultimately giving rise to the systems of Mīmāṃsā and 
Vedānta respectively.294 Śaṃkara too, in an introduction to his BhG commentary, 
talks about two principal laws of the Vedas (vaidika-dharma). According to him, 
the Lord, after creating this cosmos (jagat) and for the sake of ensuring its 
existence, promulgates two principal Vedic laws. One is the law of embracing 
action (pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma), which ensures the continued existence of the 
order of creation, leading to worldly accomplishment (abhyudaya). The other is the 
                                                 
292 See Sanātanadeva 2005: Upodghāta, footnote 3, p. 2 and Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.3, pp. 99-
100. 
293 karmopāstis tathā jñānam iti kāṇḍatrayaṃ kramāt / tadrūpāṣṭādaśādhyāyairgītā kāṇḍatrayātmikā 
// (‘tadrūpāṣṭādaśādhyāyī gītā’, Bhagavadgītā 1912), GD, introductory verse  4. 
294 The Mīmāṃsā deals with the earlier portion of the Vedas, i.e., the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa, 
called the part dealing with action, rituals and the sacrifices (karma-kāṇḍa), they are regarded as the 
Pūrvamīmāṃsā or the Karmamīmāṃsā; whereas the Vedānta is regarded as the Uttaramīmāṃsā or 
the Jñānamīmāṃsā due to their acceptance of the later portion of the Vedas, i.e., the Upaniṣads, 
being called the part dealing with the knowledge of reality (jñāna-kāṇḍa) [See also chapter 1.3 
supra]. 
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law of cessation of works (nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma), which ensures preservation of 
the Vedic truth (knowledge), leading to salvation (niḥśreyasa).295 This would 
indicate that Śaṃkara mainly accepts a two-fold division of the Veda, and perhaps a 
similarly two-fold division in the BhG, since according to him; the BhG is the 
essence of the entire Vedic teaching.296 Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG does not 
actually support a textual division of the BhG into two sections, but the theme of 
pravṛtti versus nivṛtti occurs repeatedly throughout the text. Also note that there has 
always been a current of Vedāntic thought advocating a theory that knowledge-
cum-action (jñāna-karma-samuccaya) is the means to liberation. 
However, there are many places in Śaṃkara’s writing where meditation or 
worship (upāsanā) is mentioned. In his commentary on the BS, a traditional 
opponent’s view is that though the jñāna portion of the Veda teaching the identity 
of the individual self with brahman, is different from the karma portion presenting 
rites and sacrifices, the Upaniṣads are actually meant for enjoining actions like 
worship and meditation.297 In this manner, the third subject, namely upāsanā, can 
indeed be considered an important topic taught in the Veda. The BhG, being a text 
of Vedānta, also discusses all these three topics. The karma-kāṇḍa and jñāna-kāṇḍa 
of the Vedas lead to the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools correspondingly, but the 
Vedānta, which also speaks of the saguṇa traits of brahman, also expounds various 
forms of upāsanā or bhakti, thereby resulting in the three parts of the Vedas dealing 
with karma, upāsanā/bhakti, and jñāna respectively. Here lies the justification of 
                                                 
295 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 2-3.  
But for him, the latter has the supremacy to the former being opposed to the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka view 
(See Hirst 1993: pp. 124-5). 
296 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 5. 
297 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.4, p. 100. 
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MS for dividing the BhG into three parts corresponding to the three divisions of the 
Vedas.298 
For MS, the Vedic teaching and, consequently, the teaching of the BhG 
(through their corresponding three sections) delineate three ways of achieving what 
is to be accomplished, viz. steadfastness in action (karma-niṣṭhā), steadfastness in 
loving devotion to God (bhagavadbhakti-niṣṭhā), and steadfastness in knowledge 
(jñāna-niṣṭhā). MS also gives philosophical justification for this chronological 
order. MS holds that action and knowledge, being opposed to each other, cannot be 
co-related, i.e. they cannot be present simultaneously in the same self. Devotion, not 
being a contradiction of either action or knowledge, is placed in the middle and 
mediates between them.299 Action presumes an agent (kartṛ) and is occasioned by 
the quality of activities (rajo-guṇa). Knowledge of brahman is dependent on its 
object (viṣaya) and is occasioned by the quality of truth (sattva-guṇa). As both these 
qualities cannot be present in one’s mind at the same time, steadfastness in action 
and steadfastness in knowledge are mutually opposed and cannot be simultaneously 
present in the same mind. This calls for mediation, so the Lord does not mention 
them successively in the BhG, but places devotion in the middle.300 
                                                 
298 It has been a tradition, particularly among the Vedāntins, to divide the BhG into three parts taking 
six chapters each and considering their respective subject-matters. Though Śaṃkara has not made 
such explicit division in his commentary, later commentators such as Yāmuna, Rāmānuja etc. have 
mentioned this division clearly according to their philosophical considerations (Bhagavadgītā 2000: 
Vol. 1, Gītārthasaṃgrahopodghātaḥ 2-4, pp. 21-2 and Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 2, 
Rāmānujabhāṣyam, p. 4; vol. 3, Rāmānujabhāṣyam, p. 5). Besides, Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa also 
describes the Gītā in his commentary on it, called the Tattvaprakāśikā, as having three kāṇḍa-s of 
jñāna, karma and upāsanā, and as the essence of the entire Vedic lore (Bhagavadgītā 2001: Vol. 1, 
Tattvaprakāśikā, p. 2). 
299 yataḥ samuccayo nāsti tayor ativirodhataḥ / bhagavadbhaktiniṣthā tu madhyame parikīrtitā //, 
GD, introductory verse 6.  
There is a traditional maxim in this context, known as the dehalī-dīpa-nyāya: a lamp placed on the 
threshold of a house is lit from a lamp hanging outside the threshold, but illumines both inside and 
outside the threshold, thus serving two purposes at one time (See Apte 1998: p. 574).  
300 See Sanātanadeva 2005: Upodghāta, footnote 1, p. 3, and Dvivedī 1975: Vol. 1, upodghāta, p. 5. 
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The views of other philosophical streams contrast with that of MS in this 
regard. According to the followers of the doctrine that knowledge-cum-action leads 
to liberation (jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda), the cause of liberation is not just 
knowledge conveyed through the texts, but knowledge gained through meditative 
practice and insight (upāsanātmaka-jñāna). To this way of thinking, there is no 
contradiction between knowledge and action. On the other hand, Rāmānujācārya 
does not accept this theory of combining action and knowledge. Rather, he holds 
that though knowledge and action do not contradict each other, they are not of equal 
importance in giving rise to liberation. Only knowledge, which comes from 
devotion to the Lord, leads to liberation, while action helps merely as preparatory to 
attaining the knowledge of brahman, by purifying the mind.301 By contrast, and in 
agreement with Śaṃkara, MS sees karma and jñāna as opposed to each other, but he 
also gives great importance to devotion as mediating between the two. 
 
3.1.3. Verse 7b: The predominance of steadfastness in devotion (bhakti-niṣṭhā) 
MS maintains that devotion to God is intimately connected with both action and 
knowledge, and is effective in removing obstacles to bringing them together: ‘Since 
(steadfastness in devotion) is inherent in both (steadfastness in action and 
steadfastness in knowledge), it removes all obstacles. It is of three types: mixed 
with rites and duties (karma-miśrā), pure (śuddhā), and mixed with knowledge 
(jñāna-miśrā).’302    
                                                 
301 The view is also echoed in the introduction to the BhG commentary of Śaṃkara (Bhagavadgītā 
1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 7). 
302 ubhayānugatā sā hi sarvavighnāpanodinī / karmamiśrā ca śuddhā ca jñānamiśrā ca sā tridhā //, 
GD, introductory verse 7. 
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There are many natural obstacles to accomplishing action. In order to 
remove the obstacles to the primary scriptural (śrauta) and the secondary scriptural 
(smārta) actions, rituals like chanting hymns, recitation of the name (japa) and 
worshipping (pūjā) of Lord Gaṇeśa etc. are performed. It is an established view that 
such obstacles are removed by devotion to God (īśvara-praṇidhāna).303 Likewise, as 
Advaita views steadfastness in knowledge to be synonymous with desisting from all 
action, there are numerous obstacles to accomplishing that as well. MS already 
indicates in his introduction that steadfastness in devotion helps remove those 
obstacles as well. Unlike MS, Śaṃkara does not explicitly mention bhakti at his 
introduction to the BhGB, though he refers to pravṛtti (i.e. karma and bhakti) and 
nivṛtti (i.e. jñāna), and considers the former to be of help in purifying the mind 
when performed with a sense of dedication to God, thereby leading to the latter.304 
MS may have been influenced by the theistic Vaiṣṇava thinking while making this 
threefold division of bhakti.305 However, note that while MS says the BhG has three 
sections devoted to karma, bhakti, and jñāna, he also speaks of three types of 
bhakti, viz.  karma-miśrā, śuddhā, and jñāna-miśrā. The word anugata in verse 7 
also means that bhakti is also at work in the two other paths, i.e. those of karma and 
jñāna as formulated in the BhG.306 It would seem that in his opinion, bhakti has been 
expounded throughout the entire BhG. 
                                                 
303 See Dvivedī 1975: Vol. 1, upodghāta, p. 5. 
304 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 7. 
305  Viśvanātha Cakravartin, too, following the tradition of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, has classified bhakti 
into two types: kevalā-bhakti (pure devotion) and pradhānī-bhūtā-bhakti (a process outweighed by 
bhakti) in the introduction to his commentary on the BhG. While he holds that the former is 
independent, staunch, and bereft of the mixture of karma and jñāna; the latter is mixed with karma 
and jñāna (Bhagavadgītā: date not known, p. 2). 
306 See Das 2008. 
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3.1.4. Verses 8-10: The threefold division of Bhagavadgītā as corresponding to 
‘tat tvam asi’ 
Having pointed out the similarity between the Vedas and BhG, MS now shows that 
there is a fundamental identity between the teaching of the BhG and the Upaniṣads 
and that the BhG expounds, in its own way, the key of the Upaniṣadic dictum, 
tattvamasi (CU 6.8.7). In order to justify the three-fold structure of the BhG, MS 
devotes verses 8-10 to describe the terms tat, tvam and asi, the constituent words of 
this sentence. The individual self (jīva) is denoted by the term ‘thou’ (tvam) and is 
‘established’ through performance of rites and duties as well as their renunciation 
(karma-tyāga), the supreme self (paramātmā) is denoted by the term ‘that’ (tat) and 
‘determined’ through devotion to God (bhagavadbhakti), while the identity of 
‘thou’ and ‘that’, denoted by the term ‘are’ (asi), is grasped through steadfastness of 
knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā). Hence in verse 10, MS says, ‘In the third section, the 
meaning of the Upaniṣadic dictum (‘That thou art’) as a unity of the referents of 
those two terms (i.e. ‘that’ and ‘thou’) has again been explained explicitly. Thus, 
here (in the BhG) as well, all the sections are mutually related.’307 
 ‘Great sentences’ (mahāvākya-s) indicate the Upaniṣadic statements which 
refer to the non-difference between the individual self (jīva) and the supreme self 
(brahman). ‘Consciousness is brahman’ (‘prajñānaṃ brahma’ – Ṛg Veda, AU 3.3), 
‘That thou art’ (‘tattvamasi’ – Sāma Veda, CU 6.8.7), ‘I am brahman’ (‘ahaṃ 
brahmāsmi’ – Yajur Veda, BU 1.4.10), and ‘Brahman is this self’ (‘ayam ātmā 
brahma’ – Atharva Veda, MāU 2) are regarded as the principal great sentences in 
                                                 
307 tṛtīye tu tayoraikyaṃ vākyārtho varṇyate sphuṭam / evam apyatra kāṇḍānāṃ sambandho’sti 
parasparam // , GD, introductory verse 10. 
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the four Vedas respectively.308 Whereas in the CU the sequence is ‘tat’ (that) 
followed by ‘tvam’ (thou), the other three sentences have those two terms in the 
opposite order.309 On the other hand, statements referring only to the nature 
(svarūpa) of God or only to the individual self are called subsidiary sentences 
(avāntara-vākya-s). In the AdS, MS says that realization of the ‘pure consciousness’ 
(svarūpa-caitanya) in the ‘great purport’ (mahā-tātparya) is reached with the help 
of the subsidiary purport (avāntara-tātparya), as in ‘One without second’ (‘ekam 
evādvitīyam’) etc.310   
The primary meaning (mukhyārtha) of the statement ‘That thou art’ can be 
shown in the following way. ‘That’ (tat) is the supreme self (brahman), viewed as 
the source of the universe, while ‘thou’ (tvam) is the individual self (jīva), the 
ātman conditioned by the body-mind complex. The secondary sense (gauṇārtha) of 
the sentence is that ‘that’ means pure consciousness, which is by nature existence, 
consciousness and bliss; and ‘thou’ denotes pure consciousness, which is the 
witness (sākṣī) of the states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep.311 As the term tat 
refers to remote consciousness (parokṣa-caitanya) and the term tvam refers to 
immediate or direct consciousness (aparokṣa-caitanya), they lack the fitness 
(yogyatā) to express the identity (abheda) of their respective referents. So, for the 
Advaitins, the identity between the referents of these two terms can be conveyed 
through what is called ‘exclusive-cum-non-exclusive implication’ 
                                                 
308 See Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, part 1, p. 102.  
Works like Svārājyasiddhi by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (1792 CE) are written solely for explaining 
the Upaniṣadic great sentences (See Maṅgalahari Muni 1934 and Acharya 2004: p. 395). 
309 This is also the order in which the BhG conveys this identity, as per MS (See Sanātanadeva 2005: 
Upodghāta, footnote 2, p. 3). 
310 Advaitasiddhi 2005: Advaitasiddhḥi 1.32, p. 510 (Also see Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 
1978-83: Vol. 3, pt. 1, p 21). 
311 See Mishra 2006: p. 67.  
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(jahadajahallakṣaṇā or bhāga-lakṣaṇā). In this kind of implication, the direct 
meaning of a word constituting the sentence is partially omitted, but partially 
retained. Thus, both the terms in this sentence imply consciousness as such, but the 
immediacy and the remoteness associated with consciousness, which are denoted by 
them respectively, are left out. Thus, having accepted the common and compatible 
meanings and omitted the different and incompatible ones, the statement refers to 
non-difference between what is signified by these two terms (viz. tat and tvam).312  
There is some dispute among the Advaita Vedāntins about the type of 
lakṣaṇā that has to be admitted while interpreting the sentence ‘tattvamasi’. Some 
modern scholars are of the opinion that Śaṃkara does not speak of any specific kind 
of lakṣaṇā in this case. Some post-Śaṃkara Advaita Vedāntins like 
Sarvajñātmamuni admit jahallakṣaṇā, where the primary meaning of a term is 
totally discarded and a secondary meaning is adopted, in order to make sense of the 
identity expressed in the sentence. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra (16th century CE) 
maintains that one does not require any type of lakṣaṇā for getting the desired 
meaning of the sentence ‘tattvamasi’.313 Nevertheless, while the Upaniṣadic great 
sayings directly advocate the unitary knowledge of jīva and brahman, the purpose 
of the BhG is seen as a restatement and interpretation of the Upaniṣads. MS’s view 
of the text has been partly anticipated by Ānandagiri, a commentator on Śaṃkara’s 
                                                 
312 See Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, part 1, pp. 102-3.  
313
 See Rambachan 1991: pp. 76-8 (For a detailed view of Śaṃkara on this Upaniṣadic dictum, see 
Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvaliḥ 1999: Vol. 9, CUB 6.8.7, pp. 384-5; CUB 6.16.3, pp. 407-12 and 
Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 4.1.3, p. 938). Also refer to Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 41 ff., Bhattacharya 
and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, part 1, p. 87 for a detailed account of it. 
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BhGB, who holds that the text can be classified into three parts, jīvakāṇḍa, 
brahmakāṇḍa, and aikyakāṇḍa, each of them containing six chapters.314  
Thus, MS’s assertion that the structure of the BhG aims to establish the unity 
of the meanings of tat and tvam, thereby itself becoming an explanation of the 
meaning of the Upaniṣadic mahāvākya, is quite commensurate with the general 
trend of Advaita Vedānta. However, this attempt has been questioned by later 
commentators, including Puruṣottamajī (1668 -1764 CE), a proponent of the 
Śuddhādvaita Vedānta school, who criticises MS on this count. This critic asserts 
that there is no real textual support for attempting to divide the BhG into karma, 
upāsanā, and jñāna kāṇda-s and for then, drawing an equivalence between this 
structure and the Advaitic explanation of the Upaniṣadic great sentence (e.g. 
‘tattvamasi’).315  
 
3.1.5. Verses 11-27: Pātañjala Yoga and the means to liberation (mukti-sādhana-
parva) 
Each chapter of the BhG describes various aspects of the means to liberation 
(mukti/mokṣa), which is considered the highest good in Vedānta. As the Advaitic 
tradition generally considers yogic practices to be of practical help in the process, 
MS’s introduction gives a detailed account of the yogic steps involved: ‘The 
subject-matter of each chapter will be discussed in the respective chapters 
themselves. However, as the purpose of the BhG is liberation, the steps in the means 
                                                 
314 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānandagirivyākhyā, 1st concluding verse, p. 775 (Also see Sastrigal 1990: p. 
2). 
315 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Puruṣottamajīkṛtā’mṛtataraṅgiṇyupodghātaḥ, p. 18. 
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of liberation are now described.’316 In this manner, MS addresses the relation 
(sambandha), the third factor of anubandha-catuṣṭaya, demonstrating how 
liberation, the goal of the BhG, is addressed in the text, by describing the means to 
the goal. 
Śaṃkara also holds the purpose of the BhG to be the attainment of liberation, 
which is the final cessation of transmigration along with ignorance, its cause; but he 
doesn’t provide much detail of the steps leading to liberation, quickly declaring 
knowledge of the self (ātma-jñāna), preceded by renunciation of all actions 
(sarvakarma-saṃnyāsa) to be its means.317 MS takes up the first requisite, i.e. an 
eligible person or a qualified aspirant after liberation (adhikārin), in order to show 
the steps that an aspirant needs to undergo for attaining emancipation. Thus, the 
first step, he holds, is ‘to undertake disinterested action after discarding both the 
desire-prompted action and forbidden action. Furthermore, the utmost merit reposes 
in reciting the name of and praising Lord Hari, and so on.’318 
The performance of disinterested actions, i.e. actions performed after 
renouncing its fruits (niṣkāma-karma), is combined with the forsaking of both those 
Vedic rituals that are performed solely out of desire for some personal gain (kāmya-
karma)319 and those that are forbidden in the Vedas (niṣiddha-karma).320 
Subsequently, disinterested action includes actions like japa (recitation), stuti 
                                                 
316 pratyadhyāyaṃ viśeṣastu tatra tatraiva vakṣyate / muktisādhana parvedaṃ śāstrārthena kathyate 
//, GD, introductory verse 11. 
317 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 6. 
318 niṣkāma-karmānuṣṭhānaṃ tyāgāt kāmya-niṣiddhayoḥ / tatrāpi paramo dharmo japastutyādikaṃ 
hareḥ //, GD, introductory verse 12. 
319 These are: performance of the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice in order to attain the heaven (jyotiṣṭomena 
svargakāmo yajeta), performance of the putreṣṭi sacrifice in order to have a son (putrakāmaḥ 
putreṣṭyā yajeta), performance of the kārīrī sacrifice to have rainfall (vṛṣṭikāmaḥ kārīryā yajeta) etc. 
(See Nikhilananda 1997: VS 1.7, p. 4 and Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, part 
1, p. 43).  
320 Like killing a Brahmin (brahma-hatyā), taking liquor (surā-pāna), etc. which cause suffering 
leading to the hell as well (See Nikhilananda 1997: VS 1.8, p. 5).  
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(praising) etc. of the Lord.321 Thus, by describing recitation of the name of and the 
praising of the Lord as activities that yield the highest merit, MS demonstrates the 
superiority of meditation/worship to other means of liberation. This is in 
consonance with his equation of the qualified brahman (which, according to him, is 
no other than Lord Kṛṣṇa, the supreme reality) with the Advaitic unqualified 
brahman. 
Śaṃkara’s introduction to his commentary on the BhG also says that the 
performance of actions prescribed by the Vedas, when performed in accordance 
with one’s caste and life-stage, leads to the attainment of heaven, but if done with a 
sense of dedication to God and without desire for its fruits, results in purification of 
the mind. This, in turn, is conducive to the highest good by leading to the 
knowledge of reality. Thus, actions prescribed by the Vedas are of indirect help in 
attaining emancipation.322 In his Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (VC) too, Śaṃkara reiterates the 
view that disinterested actions only purify one’s mind and that they do not have any 
direct role in the realisation of reality. It is through the discriminative analysis or 
enquiry (vicāra) that the reality is known.323 Since devotion to God is an affirmative 
engagement of the senses, body and mind, it can very well be put within the realm 
of actions recommended by the Vedas (pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma) as admitted by 
Śaṃkara. However, being a purificatory cause, devotion distinguishes itself from 
actions as such, and even from actions performed with renunciation of their fruits.324 
The mind, being rid of defilements on account of the performance of 
disinterested action etc., becomes fit for undergoing the fourfold mental disciplines 
                                                 
321 See Das 2008. 
322 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 7. 
323 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 3, VC 11, p. 5.  
324 See Das 2008. 
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aimed at achieving the knowledge of brahman and for the enquiry into brahman 
(brahma-jijñāsā). These fourfold mental disciplines consist of discernment between 
things eternal and transient (nityānitya-vastu-viveka), renunciation of desire for 
fruits of actions here and hereafter (ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāga), six-fold inner 
virtues of calmness, temperance etc. (śamadamādi-sādhana-saṃpat), and intense 
desire for liberation (mumukṣutva). Accordingly, MS says, ‘When the mind, being 
free of impurities, has the capacity for discrimination, then arises the firm 
discrimination between the eternal and the transient.'325 
In his commentary on the first aphorism of the BS, Śaṃkara says that 
virtuous deeds (dharma-jñāna) resulting in prosperity (abhyudaya-phala) depend 
on the performance of Vedic enjoined actions, whereas knowledge of brahman 
(brahma-vijñāna) alone, bereft of any accessory action, results in liberation 
(niḥśreyasa-phala). While virtuous deeds are to be accomplished through human 
effort, the realization of brahman does not result from any human endeavour as 
brahman is an eternal and pre-existing entity. Vedic statements imparting the 
knowledge of virtuous deeds impel people to perform prescribed deeds, while 
statements communicating brahman are the primary valid means of knowing 
brahman, without enjoining action. The prerequisites to be met by the aspirant 
before undertaking reflection on brahman, i.e. sādhana-catuṣṭaya, are established 
by Śaṃkara in this context.326 MS in the VK refers to BS 1.1.1 and also indicates that 
                                                 
325 kṣīṇapāpasya cittasya viveke yogyatā yadā / nityānityavivekaḥ tu jāyate sudṛḍhaḥ tadā //, GD, 
introductory verse 13. 
326 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.1, pp. 69-75 (and Gambhirananda 2000: pp. 8-9). Also refer to 
Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 3, VC 17-20, pp. 5-6 and UŚ, gadyaprabandhaḥ, 1.2, p. 115 and 
padyaprabandhaḥ, 17.53, 17.87, pp. 206, 211; Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 2, p. 1 for the 
reference to sādhana-catuṣṭaya cited by Śaṃkara. 
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the word ‘then’ (atha) in this aphorism refers to the seeker possessed with the 
fourfold qualifications.327 
Discernment, or nityānitya-vastu-viveka, is the first step in the fourfold 
disciplines, i.e. sādhana-catuṣṭaya. Śaṃkara holds that this discernment lies in the 
firm conviction that brahman alone is permanent (nitya), and all else other than it is 
transient (anitya). This is what is meant by nityānitya-vastu-viveka.328 Thereafter, 
the aspirant acquires the ability to acquire the other three prerequisites included 
under sādhana-catuṣṭaya. However, some scholars think that, alhough nityānitya-
vastu-viveka is a pre-requisite of the enquiry into brahman, it cannot be considered 
as something that has been accomplished. It is rather to be treated as a capacity for 
rational investigation into the permanent and the impermanent that helps in 
knowing the ultimate reality, i.e. brahman.329 
Now, although the aspirant may know brahman to be the only reality, he 
may as yet be unable to identify it as his own essential nature, because of being 
attached to objects of enjoyment, both visible (dṛṣṭa) ones like kingdom, progeny 
and sensory pleasure, and invisible (adṛṣṭa) ones like heaven and immortality. He 
must therefore disengage from these and cultivate a spirit of indifference (ihāmutra-
phala-bhoga-virāga) to them, forsaking totally what seems to be other than 
brahman. Thus, MS says; ‘Indifference towards things of this world and after is 
called control; after that, in sequence, renunciation should be established through 
the accomplishment of calmness (and the five other virtues).’330 
                                                 
327 See Karmarkar 1962: pp. 12-3. 
328 Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 3, p. 1. 
329 See Rambachan 1991: p. 88, Malkovsky: 2001, p. 79. 
 330 ihāmutrārthavairāgyaṃ vaśīkārābhidhaṃ kramāt / tataḥ śamādisaṃpattyā saṃnyāso niṣṭhito 
bhavet //, GD,  introductory verse 14. 
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By affirming the utility of renunciation (saṃnyāsa) in this context, MS 
agrees with Śaṃkara, who quotes several passages from the Anugītā (in MBh 14) 
and BhG 18.66 and considers renunciation to be the primary requisite for attaining 
liberation.331 However, it is noteworthy that MS equates the state of the mind 
forsaking the objects of this world and beyond with vaśīkāra-vairāgya cited in 
Patañjali’s Yogasūtra (YS),332 where the craving of the enjoyment of objects is 
completely done away with. As will be seen, MS’s extensive references to Pātañjala 
Yoga throughout the GD not only indicate an important feature of his commentary 
on the BhG, but also have bearing on how he thinks about bhakti.333 This dispassion 
and attendant renunciation is not a departure from the world, out of disgust and 
aversion, but a conviction towards understanding the nature of what ultimately 
leaves the aspirant dissatisfied.334 MS also says that when one acquires the third 
factor of sādhana-catuṣṭaya, i.e. the six-fold inner virtues or treasures (śamādi-
ṣaṭka-sampatti) [calmness (śama), self-control (dama), restraining of the external 
senses (uparati), fortitude (titikṣā), concentration with the mind thus restrained 
(samādhāna) and faith (śraddhā)],335 one becomes established in renunciation 
(saṃnyāsa). Thus, with emphasis on saṃnyāsa, MS here agrees with Śaṃkara to 
whom, as we will see, the central teaching of the BhG is saṃnyāsa. Besides, in the 
                                                 
331 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 6-7 (Also see Das 2008). 
332 Mukerji 2000: YS 1.15 and 1.40, pp. 37, 87. 
Vairāgya is of two kinds - para and apara. Apara again, according to Vācaspati Miśra’s 
Tattvavaiśāradī is of four types – yatamāna, vyatireka, ekendriya and vaśīkāra (For details of 
Vācaspati’s explanation, see Yogasūtra 1963: Tattvavaiśāradī on YS 1.15, pp. 17-8) [Also see 
Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnote 8, pp. 4-5 and Brahma 1986: Footnote, p. 3].  
333  See Das 2008. 
334 See Rambachan 2006: p. 22. 
335 For Śaṃkara’s understanding of all these six factors, though they are almost in conformity with 
what we have meant here, refer to Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 5-6, pp. 1-2 and 
Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 3, VC 23-27, pp. 6-7. 
Besides, some scholars think that these six-fold treasures may be found correspondingly to BhG 6.3, 
2.58, 18.66, 2.14, 2.53, and 4.39 (See Amṛtatvānanda 1998: p. 19). 
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BSB, Śaṃkara describes these six-fold inner virtues as the proximate means 
(antaraṅga-sādhana) for attaining knowledge of brahman, and therefore to be 
cultivated by the aspirant.336 
According to MS, as a result of mastering the first three qualifications, 
renunciation of all worldly objects (saṃnyāsa) is established and an intense desire 
for liberation (mumukṣutva), the last step in sādhana-catuṣṭaya, arises, thereby 
completing the sādhana-catuṣṭaya. The last discipline, the intense desire for 
liberation, is of utmost importance, as this step alone leads an aspirant to the 
enquiry into brahman.337 The aspirant who is endowed with this fourfold means of 
liberation acquires then the fitness to approach a competent teacher to be instructed 
about the Upaniṣadic truth, i.e. the absolute knowledge. To quote MS; ‘Thus, from 
total renunciation arises a strong longing for liberation. Then follow approaching a 
teacher and receiving (scriptural) instructions from him.’338 
The qualified seeker now follows another set of triple proximate process to 
liberation, consisting of hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana), and contemplation 
(nididhyāsana),339 under the guidance of a learned teacher. This is referred to by MS 
in the next two verses, i.e. 16 and 17. In verse 16, MS says, ‘Then in order to dispel 
doubt, listening to Vedāntic teaching etc. (reflection on it and contemplation 
                                                 
336 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 3.4.27, pp. 899-900. 
337 Control of the senses etc. and acquiring of six qualities cause intense desire for liberation, 
indifference to the fruits of actions here and hereafter causes control of the senses etc. and acquiring 
of six qualities, and discrimination between permanent and impermanent entities causes indifference 
to the fruits of actions here and hereafter.  
338 evaṃ sarvaparityāgān mumukṣā jāyate dṛḍhā / tato gurūpasadanam upadeśagrahastataḥ //, GD, 
introductory verse 15. 
339 The triple process is described in the BU in the course of a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and 
Maitreyī; ‘You see, Maitreyī--  it is one’s self (ātman) which one should see and hear, and on which 
one should reflect and concentrate’ (BU 2.4.5, 4.5.6). 
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thereafter) are followed. In this context, the entire lore of Uttaramīmāṃsā 
(Vedānta) scripture is employed.’’340 
Listening to Vedānta scriptures (śravaṇa) is not just hearing about the truth 
from the teacher or the scriptures. Śravaṇa is the investigation into the meaning of 
the Upaniṣadic texts.341 Thus, listening to the Vedāntic scriptures from the teacher is 
an investigation of its purport (tātparya) in order to know the non-dual reality, 
brahman/ātman. Śravaṇa includes the whole method of Vedāntic teaching and all 
the traditional methods like adhyāropa-apavāda (the theory of prior 
superimposition and subsequent denial),342 neti, neti (not this, not this)343 etc. under 
the guidance of a competent teacher. 
Hearing about brahman is followed by reflection (manana) on the non-dual 
reality that the aspirant has heard about from the teacher.344 Reflection is a mental 
action involving argumentation towards refuting the possible contradictions from 
other means of knowledge (perception, inference etc.) about the meaning 
ascertained through scriptures (i.e. Upaniṣadic texts).345 This process removes the 
doubt of an aspirant about the nature of the object (prameya) to be contemplated, 
brahman, and disperses all the misgivings about the Advaita system, giving rise to a 
tranquil state of mind that is needed for the last process, i.e. nididhyāsana.346 In 
short, manana is not mere reasoning (tarka) but reasoning that is in conformity with 
Śruti (śrutyanugṛhīta-tarka). It is subsidiary to śravaṇa, being of help in removing 
                                                 
340 tataḥ sandehahānāya vedānta śravaṇādikam / sarvam uttaramīmāṃsāśāstram atropayujyate //, 
GD, introductory verse 16. 
341 Pañcapādikā 1958: Navamavarṇakam, p. 352. 
342 It is a method followed by the Advaitins to lead a seeker to the knowledge of reality by 
superimposing attributes to an attributeless entity and subsequently denying them.  
343 Advaita holds that since any conceptualisation is limited in nature, it cannot be applied in the case 
of brahman. So, the best suitable means to describe it is to say, not such, not such’.  
344 Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī on BS 1.1.4, pp. 108-9. 
345  Pañcapādikā 1958: Navamavarṇakam, p. 352. 
346 See Malkovsky 2001: p. 86. 
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the obstacles towards grasping direct knowledge.347 Thus, while Advaita recognises 
the utility of analytical reflection, it also holds that the process of reflection must be 
rooted in the Vedas and also harmonious with them.348 MS’s assertion that the entire 
Vedāntic scripture becomes useful and meaningful through the process of śravaṇa, 
manana and nididhyāsana is reiterated in the VK as well, with the support of Śruti 
citations.349 
MS holds that, as the process of śravaṇa and manana matures, one becomes 
fixed in nididhyāsana, the constant dwelling on or contemplation on the learning 
obtained through the earlier two stages (i.e. śravaṇa and manana). The entire 
meditative apparatus prescribed in Pātañjala Yoga is to be used at this stage. 
Accordingly, he shows in the following verse (i.e. verse 17) the utility of yogic 
practices towards obtaining the knowledge of self.350 To quote him; ‘Then, with the 
maturity of that (listening to Vedāntic teaching and its reflection), contemplation on 
it (nididhyāsana) is followed. The entire Yoga scripture, in fact, gets its purpose 
accomplished at this stage.’351 Constant contemplation or nididhyāsana is a steady 
state of the mind about the meaning of the scriptural texts augmented by 
reflection.352  
                                                 
347 See Rambachan 1991: pp. 101-8. 
348 For details of Śaṃkara’s views on reflection, see BSB 1.1.1; 2.1.6, 2.1.11; BUB 3.1.1--Intro., 
1.4.6; KUB 1.2.8, MāUKB 3.1-- Intro. etc. (cf. Rambachan 1991: pp. 101-8).        
349 See Karmarkar 1962: pp. 12-3.  
350 In contrast with the assertion made by MS, Śaṃkara’s acceptance of nididhyāsana to be identical 
with brahma-jñāna and rejection of yogic discipline to be an independent means to it is noteworthy. 
Being dualists, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools fail to grasp the unity of the self, which, according to 
Advaita, brings forth liberation. Yogic practices mere help in bringing about concentration and 
purification of the mind towards attainment of liberation (For details of Śaṃkara’s views in this 
regard, see BSB 1.3.33, 2.1.1, 2.1.3, 2.3.1, BUB 1.4.7, MāUKB 3.39-40, BhGB 5.26-29 etc. – cf. 
Rambachan 1991: pp. 112-3; notes 65-73, pp. 157-8).     
351 tatastatparipākeṇa nididhyāsananiṣṭhatā / yogaśāstraṃ tu saṃpūrṇamupakṣīṇaṃ bhavediha //, 
GD, introductory verse 17. 
352 Pañcapādikā 1958: Navamavarṇakam, p. 352. 
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Though in the tradition of Advaita this triple process (of śravaṇa, manana 
and nididhyāsana) stands for the principal proximate aid to liberation, the individual 
role of each of these three constituents in realising brahma-jñāna is described 
differently by the interpreters. Śaṃkara holds that although listening to the 
scriptures precedes the other two, viz. reflection and contemplation, right 
perception (samyagdarśana) of the unity of the self is only possible when they are 
all unified, and not through the help of mere hearing (which is the first step).353 The 
post-Śaṃkara Advaitins like Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāśātmayati and their followers 
hold different views in this regard. Vācaspati Miśra and his followers in the 
Bhāmatī tradition hold that only contemplation is the proximate cause (sākṣāt-
kāraṇa) of realising brahman, reflection being the cause of contemplation and 
hearing the cause of reflection, so that all three processes are the causes of brahma-
jñāna, but in relatively distal fashion.354 In the Vivaraṇa tradition, however, 
Prakāśātmayati and others accept hearing about the Vedāntic teaching to be the 
primary cause of brahma-jñāna, and consider the other two processes, viz. 
reflection and contemplation as subsidiary (aṅga) to the former (aṅgī).355 
When, following the above-mentioned, threefold mental discipline towards 
acquisition of the knowledge of brahman (brahma-jñāna), the mind gets rid of its 
impurities even further, the direct (aparokṣa), non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) 
knowledge of the identity between the individual self (jīva) and the supreme self 
                                                 
353  Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 10, BUB 2.4.5, p. 304.  
Śaṃkara himself did not offer a detailed discussion regarding these three aids, though the later 
Vedāntins took it up (See Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.4, pp. 100-55 and Rambachan 1991: Footnote 
60, p. 157). 
354 See Bhāmatī on jijñāsādhikaraṇa of the BS (cf. Pañcapādikā 1958: bhūmikā, p. 124) and 
Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī on BS 3.4.26, p. 898.  
355 For details, see Pañcapādikā 1958: Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, prathamavarṇakam, pp. 29-30, p. 33, p. 
38,  pp. 410-3: 172-8. 
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(brahman) arises therein through the Upaniṣadic dictum ‘tattvamasi.’ To quote MS 
in verse 18; ‘Then, when the mind gets rinsed of impurities, knowledge of the 
Upaniṣadic great saying (e.g. ‘tattvamasi’) arises. From the scriptural authority (the 
Upaniṣadic great saying) itself, is born the non-conceptual, direct awareness of the 
fundamental unity of being.’356 
Following Padmapāda, Sureśvara,357 Prakāśtmayati,358 Sarvajñātmamuni, 
Vidyāraṇya359 etc., MS holds verbal testimony (śabda-pramāṇa) to be the cause of 
immediate knowledge of brahman/ātman, which is technically known as 
śabdāparokṣa-vāda in Advaita.360 In the VK, MS holds that the Upaniṣadic great 
saying (‘tattvamasi’) only  gives rise to the immediate knowledge of reality  if it is 
freed from the four impediments, viz. longing for enjoyment of the objects of 
senses (viṣaya-bhoga-vāsanā), impossibility in respect of the means of knowledge 
(pramāṇagatāsaṃbhāvanā), impossibility regarding the object of knowledge 
(prameyagatāsaṃbhāvanā), and contradictory ideas (viparīta-bhāvanā). Again, in 
his SB, MS says that when nescience and all misery brought into existence by it (i.e. 
                                                 
356 kṣīṇadoṣe tataścitte vākyāttattvamatirbhavet / sākṣātkāro nirvikalpaḥ śabdādevopajāyate //, GD, 
introductory verse 18. 
357 For Sureśvra, as in the case of ‘daśamastvamasi’(It is a popular example where by hearing it the 
person immediately realises that he is the tenth), immediate knowledge of ‘I am the tenth’ brings 
forth from the verbal knowledge rather than from the senses, immediate knowledge of the unity of 
being springs from the knowledge of the Upaniṣadic  great sayings (BṛVāSB 208). 
358 For Prakāśtmayati’s view in this context, refer to Pañcapādikā 1958:  Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, 
prathamavarṇakam, pp. 403-10: 172-5, 6; dvitīyavarṇakam, p. 452: 196-1. 
359 Reference to the popular example of ‘I am the tenth’ in terms of immediate knowledge is given 
by Vidyārāṇya in his PD (Pañcadaśī 2008: PD 7. 23 ff., 7. 57 ff.; p. 117 ff.). 
360 On the other hand, Vācaspati and his followers consider the mind or the inner organ as the source 
or instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the knowledge about the unity of being. This view is known as 
śabda-parokṣa-vāda, that is, verbal testimony causes the mediate knowledge of brahman/ātman (See 
Brahmasūtra 2000: Bhāmatī on BS 1.1.1, pp. 55-8).  
MS in his VK rejects this view by saying that happiness, misery etc. are perceived by the witnessing-
self and they cannot be viewed by the mind. Thus, the mind or intellect gives rise to the direct 
perception of reality through gaining the modal cognition or cognition of partless mental 
modification (akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna), of which verbal testimony is the instrumental cause, not the 
intellect or mind (For the discussion on śabda-pramāṇa and śabdāparokṣa-vāda, also see Karmarkar 
1962: pp. 166-7; Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 3, part 1, pp. 171-2). 
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nescience) are removed through the partless modification of intellect (akhaṇḍākāra-
vṛtti)361 produced by the Upaniṣadic text, one remains as supreme bliss, having 
attained his aim.362 Thus, with the dawn of knowledge of reality (tattvamasi), 
nescience (avidyā), i.e. the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the world or that 
which causes reciprocal superimposition (adhyāsa)363 of self and not-self, is 
eradicated. Thus, in verse 19, MS says, ‘When knowledge of reality dawns, 
ignorance is eradicated. Then, as the veil (concealment) of ignorance is dispelled, 
doubt and error (as the projection of ignorance) get dispersed.’364 
The concept of ignorance/nescience/illusion (avidyā/ajñāna/māyā) plays an 
important role in Advaita metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical orders. In order to 
emphasise the fact that nescience is not merely negative, it is said that it appears 
positive (bhāvarūpa). Ignorance (ajñāna) has two aspects. Whereas in its negative 
aspect (āvaraṇa) it conceals365 the reality and is called nescience (avidyā), in its 
positive aspect it projects (vikṣepa) the plurality of the world on the reality and is 
called illusion (māyā). We find explicit reference to these two-fold powers of 
ignorance and their effects in Śaṃkara,366 Vācaspati,367 Sarvajñātman,368 
Vidyāraṇya369 and MS.370 Ignorance hides the true nature of an object by concealing 
                                                 
361 This mental modification (vṛtti) is called partless (akhaṇḍākārā) when the implication is ultimate 
reality, brahman. It annihilates every other vṛtti, leading to and leaving the direct knowledge of 
reality before destroying itself too.   
362 Siddhāntabindu 1986:  p. 153. 
363 Since superimposition is produced by beginningless nescience, it (superimposition) is also termed 
nescience (For details, see Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.1, p. 6 ff.). 
364 avidyāvinivṛttistu tattvajñānodaye bhavet / tata āvaraṇe kṣīṇe kṣīyete bhramasaṃśayau //, GD, 
introductory verse 19. 
365 The fact is supported by the BhG also; ‘…ignorance obscures insight- that is why people get 
confused’ (BhG 5.15). 
366 Cidghanānanda 1995: Vākyasūdhā 13 ff. and Ānandagiri’s elucidation on them, p. 347 ff. 
367 Projective power of ignorance has been referred to by Vācaspati etc. in the BS (Brahmasūtra 
2000: Bhāmatī on BS 2.2.2, p. 492). 
368 Veezhinathan 1985: SŚ 1.20-1.21, pp. 159-60. 
369 Details on the power of concealment of nescience in terms of brahman are given in his PD 
(Swāhānanda 2005: PD 7.44 ff., p. 250 ff.; PD 7.90, 7.92, pp. 272-3). 
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in two ways – by showing non-existence of an object (asattāpādaka) and its 
resultant non-perception (abhānāpādaka). While the former is located in the 
consciousness limited by the mind (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanyaniṣṭha), the 
latter is located in the consciousness limited by object (viṣayāvacchinna-
caitanyaniṣṭha). By immediate knowledge (aparokṣa-vṛtti), both these types of 
concealment are destroyed. Thus, we have a cognition such as ‘there is a pot’ 
(ghaṭaḥ asti) ‘the pot is perceivable’ (ghaṭaḥ bhāti) etc. On the other hand, by 
mediate knowledge (parokṣa-vṛtti) the former (asattāpādaka) alone is destroyed. 
Thus, we have inferential knowledge, in the form ‘there is a fire’ (vahniḥ asti), 
rather than in the form ‘fire is being perceived’ (vahniḥ bhāti) etc. Thus, in verse 
19, MS holds that when knowledge of reality dawns, nescience gets obliterated, 
together with its two-fold powers of concealment and projection. 
MS now shows how the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna) leads the 
aspirant to undertake the other means that are conducive to reaching liberation 
proper. With the emergence of the knowledge of reality, the results of unripe or 
accumulated actions (anārabdha/sañcita-karma) -- i.e. actions performed either in 
this life or a past one, but which have not yet begun to produce their fruits --371 get 
eradicated completely. The effects of actions-yet-to-come (āgāmin/kriyamāṇa-
karma), i.e. actions that are being done in the present life, to fructify in the normal 
course of events,372 are restrained (verse 20).373 However, the latent tendencies 
                                                                                                                                               
370 Refer to MS’s elucidation on Sarvajñātman’s SŚ 1.20-1.21 in his SŚSS (Giri 2007: Pt. 1, pp. 51-4). 
For details on MS’s treatment of the power of concealment of ignorance, see Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 
587. Again, while commenting on the first verse of the Bhāgavata, MS mentions two aspects of 
ignorance, i.e. concealment and projection, and the subdivision of projection respectively. He also 
mentions how these two-fold powers of nescience delude the individual-self from realising the 
supreme reality brahman together with suggesting the ways for their termination (Bhāgavata 1815 
Śakābda: p. 5). 
371 For the reference to Śaṃkara, see Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 42, p. 10.  
372 Refer to Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 41, p. 10 for Śaṃkara’s reference.  
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(vāsanā) do not get obliterated, due to the distractions offered by accumulated past 
or ripened actions (prārabdha-karma), i.e. those that were performed in the past 
life, and whose fruits are still working with the creation of the present physical 
body.374 In general, Advaita holds that, for a knower of brahman, prārabdha-karma 
continues until the fall of the present body (videha-mukti), while the accumulated or 
stored up (sañcita) actions are destroyed and actions-yet-to-come (agāmin) are 
restrained. Śaṃkara also holds that sañcita and āgāmin karma-s are destroyed by 
the firm conviction that ‘I am brahman only’ (brahmaivāhamasmīti), and 
prārabdha-karma-s are destroyed only when their results are experienced.375 MS 
even goes to the extent of saying that despite the grace of the Lord, prārabdha-
karma-s do not get destroyed. They only terminate when the result produced by 
them are experienced by the person concerned.376 
The consequences of prārabdha-karma may not be terminated in one life, 
paving the way for engaging in the cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra). Therefore, 
one has to undergo different stages to control the body, senses and mind to achieve 
the cessation of suffering caused by it; that is, to keep latent tendencies or 
predispositions under control. This is mentioned in the verses 21 and 22. To quote 
MS; ‘But, due to the distraction resulting from accumulated past actions, past 
impression (vāsanā) does not get destroyed; it ceases completely through restraint, 
which has the maximum strength.’377 
                                                                                                                                               
373 GD, introductory verse 20. 
374 See Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 43, p. 10 for Śaṃkara’s refernce. 
375 Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 43-4, pp. 10-11. 
376 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 892-3 (Also see Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 19). 
377 prārabdhakarmavikṣepādvāsanā tu na naśyati / sā sarvato balavatā saṃyamenopaśāmyati //, GD, 
introductory verse 21. 
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Next to the means of constant dwelling on the supreme reality 
(nididhyāsana), comes complete absorption in meditation on that reality (samādhi). 
However, following the line of Yoga philosophy of Patañjali, MS delineates the 
means of liberation in order to serve his purpose. Thus, verse 22 says, ‘Restraint 
(saṃyama) consists of the three, i.e., fixation of the mind on a particular object, 
meditation, and absorption.378 The five disciplines, viz. yama etc., being precedent 
to them, become conducive to these three’379 
The eight-fold limbs of Yoga are the path of austerity for an aspirant to 
control his mind. Having undergone these stages, the seeker is on the path to 
become liberated in this life (jīvanmukta). The eight-fold limbs are: yama 
(restraints), observances (niyama), āsana (postures), prāṇāyāma (control of breath), 
pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the senses from their objects), dhāraṇā (fixing one’s 
attention), dhyāna (meditation), and samādhi (unifying concentration).380 While the 
first five limbs are called external aids (bahiraṅga-sādhana) to the goal of Yoga, 
the latter three are called the internal aids (antaraṅga-sādhana) to it.381 Thus, all the 
eight limbs prepare the aspirant towards attaining emancipation, i.e. the unitary 
knowledge of brahman-ātman.382 
                                                 
378 Dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi together on the same object are called saṃyama, though Vyāsa 
mentions it to be the technical term for the Yoga scripture (See YS 3.4 and Vyāsabhāṣya on it; 
Yogasūtra 1963: p. 106).  
379 saṃyamo dhāraṇā dhyānaṃ samādhiriti yat trikam / yamādipañcakaṃ pūrvaṃ 
tadarthamupayujyate //, GD, introductory verse 22. 
380 ‘Restraints, observances, postures, control of breath, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, 
fixing one’s attention, meditation, and unifying concentration are the eightfold limbs to attaining 
Yoga’ (yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyama-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā dhyānasamādhayo’aṣṭāvaṅgāni) 
[Mukerji 2000: YS 2.29, p.206].   
381 It is noteworthy that, though both the external and internal spiritual disciplines mentioned in the 
eight-limbed yoga are meant for saṃprajñāta-yoga, asaṃprajñāta-yoga takes place even in the 
absence of the internal disciplines. So the internal disciplines, viz. dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi 
become external as far as asaṃprajñāta-yoga or nīrbīja-yoga is concerned (See Vyāsabhāṣya on YS 
3.1, 3.7-8; Yogasūtra 1963: pp. 104, 107). 
382 Yājñavalkya also in his Yogiyājñvalkya 1.43 thus mentions that yoga is the union of the individual 
and the supreme-self (cf. Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 2, p. 59). 
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Having thus established all the limbs to be followed for attaining absorption 
(samādhi), MS now mentions the means conducive to speed up its attainment. Here 
lies the utility of absolute self-surrender to God (īśvara-praṇidhāna). Through this 
special devotion to God, He (God) favours the devotee with grace towards fulfilling 
his (devotee’s) wish. The result obtained thus makes samādhi’s attainment 
imminent.383 Mind is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of inclination (pravṛtti), 
whereas actions are the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of it.384 In the preliminary 
stage of asaṃprajñāta-yoga, there remains inclination after the destruction of 
actions, though in the final stage it also gets eradicated. Thus following observance 
of yoga in the form of action (kriyā-yoga), of which īśvara-praṇidhāna is a step, 
impurities or rather modifications of the mind arising out of worldly objects and 
afflicted by predispositions (vāsanā) are annihilated.385 Śaṃkara also says that mind 
is that which makes choices, considering pros and cons of a subject 
(‘saṃkalpavikalpātmakaṃ manaḥ’).386 MS, however, couples the practice of Yoga 
intimately with bhakti, in the next verse, ‘Mental absorption gets accomplished fast 
through absolute devotion to God. Then follows abolition of the modifications of 
the mind and predispositions.’387 
 Latent desires or past impressions cause mental impressions like anger, 
jealousy etc, which stand in the way of dissolution of the mind.388 Though this is the 
same as yogic ‘citta-vṛtti-nirodha’ (YS 1.2),389 its value in Vedānta is different, 
                                                 
383 Also see YS 1.23 and Vyāsabhāṣya on it (Yogasūtra 1963: p. 23). 
384 See Chatterjee Sastri 1989:  p. 79. 
385 Yogasūtra 1963: YS 2.2 and Vyāsabhāṣya on it, p. 52. 
386 Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 28 p. 7. 
387 īśvarapraṇidhānāttu samādhiḥ siddhyati drutam / tato bhavenmanonāśo vāsanākṣaya eva ca //,  
GD, introductory verse 23. 
388 See Tiwari 1977: p. 99. 
389 Mukerji 2000: p. 6. 
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because Vedānta accepts only a provisional status of individuality, but by including 
the dissolution of mind as a function of renunciation, merges it finally in the 
Universal self.390 The knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna), along with elimination of 
mental modifications (mano-nāśa) and predispositions (vāsanā-kṣaya), takes the 
aspirant to final emancipation in this very life. The seeker remains in this world in 
human form (jīvanmukta) as long as the consequences of the prārabdha-karma 
continue, as attested by Vidyārāṇya too in Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha (VPS) 1.1.391 
Thus, MS says in verse 24, ‘Knowledge of reality, annihilation of the mind and 
destruction of past impressions: when these three are practised together, liberation 
in this life becomes firm.’392 
These three spiritual techniques, viz. the knowledge of the reality, 
dissolution of the mind, and annihilation of past impressions, are not isolated from 
each other, but together constitute a comprehensive spiritual discipline.393 In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that a modern scholar who has studied these three 
spiritual techniques as detailed by MS leaves room for further research.394 In his 
comments on BhG 6.32, MS holds that even in the presence of the knowledge of 
reality (tattva-jñāna), some aspirants cannot enjoy the bliss of jīvanmukti because of 
the absence of mano-nāśa and vāsanā-kṣaya, thereby contradicting Śaṃkara. If the 
knowledge of reality in question is viewed as the immediate knowledge of the unity 
of brahman and the individual self (aparokṣa-brahmātma-jñāna), which is obtained 
                                                 
390 See Tiwari 1977: p. 98. 
391 Cf. Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnote 12, p. 6. 
392 tattvajñānaṃ manonāśo vāsanākṣaya ityapi / yugapattritayābhyāsājjīvanmuktirdṛḍhā bhavet //, 
GD, introductory verse 24. 
393 See Tiwari 1977: pp. 101-2.  
It should be noted in this context that these threefold means, i.e. knowledge of the reality (tattva-
jñāna), extinguishing the mind (mano-nāśa), and destroying mental impressions (vāsanā-kṣaya) to 
attain jīvanmukti is explicitly mentioned by Vidyāraṇya in his JMV (See Fort 1998: pp. 101-2 and 
Mokṣadānanda 2006: JMV 2-3, pp. 75-275).  
394 See Viśvarūpānanda 1997: pp. 84-8. 
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at the cessation of nescience, then it can be said that as per Śaṃkara’s own 
comments on BU 1.4.7, 1.4.10 and BS 4.1.2 and 4.1.12-13, a further need to 
undergo mano-nāśa and vāsanā-kṣaya in order to experience the bliss of jīvanmukti 
cannot be supported. The arguments put forth by MS in favour of the utility of 
mano-nāśa and vāsanā-kṣaya for the knowers of nirguṇa-brahman for enjoying the 
bliss of jīvanmukti do not find much support in the mainstream Advaita textual 
sources, but may be explained as being due to MS’s predilection for the YV. 
In short, MS’s position is that in spite of being in this world in liberated 
form, and acquiring the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñana), the aspirant cannot 
enjoy the ecstatic situation due to the presence of prārabdha-karma. Then he 
accepts renunciation through knowledge (vidvat-saṃnyāsa).395 To quote MS, verse 
25, ‘As effort is needed for accomplishing that part (among tattva-jñāna, mano-
nāśa, and vāsanā-kṣaya) which is not still mastered, renunciation through 
knowledge is talked about in the Vedas.’396 
Having expounded the different limbs of yoga mentioned above as the 
means of attaining and experiencing liberation while living, MS talks about its final 
limb, i.e. samādhi, together with its stages of accomplishment, in verses 26 and 27. 
After the attainment of conscious unifying concentration or absorption 
                                                 
395 Saṃnyāsa is of two types: mukhya and gauṇa. Again, whereas mukhya-saṃnyāsa is of two kinds: 
renunciation preceded by a sense of detachment from the world (vividiṣā-saṃnyāsa) and 
renunciation proper which is preceded by the dawn of knowledge of reality (vidvat-saṃnyāsa), 
gauṇa-saṃnyāsa is of three folds according to the qualities of serenity (sattva), activity (rajas), and 
inertia (tamas) [cf. Brahma 1986: Footnote, p. 5; also see BhG 18.5]. 
396 vidvat-saṃnyāsa-kathanam etad arthaṃ śrutau kṛtam / prāgasiddho ya evāṃśo yatnaḥ syāttasya 
sādhane //, GD, introductory verse 25. 
Though in the Vedas, the knower of the reality only takes to saṃnyāsa, a distinction is made here 
between vidvat-saṃnyāsa (renunciation through knowledge) and vividiṣā-saṃnyāsa (renunciation 
through detachment) [For details, refer to Mokṣadānanda 2006: JMV 1, introductory verse 12 therein 
etc., pp. 1-74].  
Vidyāraṇya also mentions how vividiṣā-saṃnyāsa and vidvat-saṃnyāsa help to attaining videha-
mukti and jīvanmukti respectively. Besides, he classifies the saṃnyāsin-s into kuṭīcaka, bahūdaka, 
haṃsa, paramahaṃsa etc. (See Mokṣadānanda 2006: JMV 1, introductory verses 2-10, pp. 1-3). 
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(savikalpaka-samādhi), there occurs supra-conscious unifying concentration or 
absorption (nirvikalpaka-samādhi) in the mind in three successive stages, (i) where 
the aspirant awakens from it to empirical experience by himself, (ii) where he is 
roused by others, and (iii) where there is no arousal at all (being ever absorbed in 
the reality).397 Though all the modifications of the mind are restrained in the 
preliminary stages of asaṃprajñāta-yoga, the impressions left behind by those 
modifications still remain there. In the final stage, because of constant practice, they 
are also removed, and the aspirant gets merged in that supreme reality.398 Thus, in 
order to concentrate the mind on the eternal object or the supreme reality by 
restraining it (i.e. the mind) from the external objects, the yogic practices are of 
utmost importance.399 
 
3.1.6. Verses 28-29: The characteristics of the living liberated (jīvanmukta) 
After undergoing the various steps of attaining liberation explained above,400 the 
seeker thus becomes liberated in this life (jīvanmukta). Having said so, MS 
                                                 
397 See GD, introductory verses 26-7. 
398 ‘Nothing is known in this stage’ (na kiñcit saṃprajñāyate asmin). Nirvikalpaka-samādhi takes 
place when the mind rests on the absolute consciousness like the flame of a lamp placed in a 
windless place (See BhG 6.19 and Pañcadaśī 2008: PD 1.55, p. 27). 
For details of how savikalpaka-samādhi gradually leads to nirvikalpaka-samādhi, also see YS 1.18, 
3.9, 3.11, 3.12 etc. (Mukerji 2000: pp. 45, 257, 261, 263). 
399 Thus MS’s unstinted admission of yogic practices prescribed by Patañjali makes his gloss a 
distinctive one. But it is important to note that, though Śaṃkara refutes the Yoga and its discipline as 
a direct means to brahmajñāna, in his commentary on BS 2.1.2 he candidly admits that the doctrines 
of Pātañjala Yoga that are not opposed to the teaching of the Upaniṣads are acceptable to the 
Advaitins (Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 439). Moreover, many minor Upaniṣads like the Sāmānyavedānta, 
Mahā, Tejobindu, Varāha, Annapurṇā, Muktikā etc. and many post-Śaṃkara works like the YV (800 
CE), and the JMV, PD of Vidyāraṇya (14th century CE), the GD of MS (16th century CE) etc. lay 
great emphasis on Sāṃkhya ideas and Yoga practices incommensurate with Advaitic notion. This 
kind of development in Advaita can be regarded as the Yogic Advaita (See Fort 1998: pp. 84-125).    
400 After presenting the various steps of emancipation as set forth by MS in the introduction to his 
commentary on the BhG, it can be inferred that he mentions eighteen factors that constitute the 
means to liberation on the basis of eighteen principal teachings of the eighteen chaptered BhG 
(though not presented in chronological order) are as follows: 
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emphasises the role of devotion (bhakti) for the aspirant who is liberated while 
living (jīvanmukta). The path of devotion (bhakti-mārga) consists of worshipping 
the qualified brahman (Viṣṇu) with love (prema) and surrender (prapatti). MS 
describes the liberated soul (jīvanmukta) not only as an expounder of Vedānta 
(brahmavādin-s), beyond the three qualities (guṇātīta), endowed with steady 
knowledge (sthita-prajña), ever engrossed in the self (ātma-rati), but also as one 
who is a devotee of Lord Viṣṇu (viṣṇu-bhakta), with immense devotion (parā-
bhakti) to both the deity and the teacher. Such a person is indeed one who has 
accomplished everything that needs to be accomplished (kṛta-kṛtya), so that no 
scriptural injunctions are applicable to him, and being devoid of all desire, anger 
and jealousy, he is beyond the pale of caste and life stage (ativarṇāśramin).401 Thus, 
in verses 28 and 29, MS says, ‘He who is such a Brahmin is the best of the 
expounders of Vedānta. He is also called one beyond qualities, a man with firm 
wisdom, and a devotee of Viṣṇu,’402 ‘(He is) also one beyond caste and life- stage, a 
                                                                                                                                               
1. Performance of niṣkāma-karma after discarding kāmya and niṣiddha-karmas, 2. Discriminating 
knowledge (viveka) between the eternal and transient, 3. Indifference (vairāgya) to the objects of 
enjoyment in this world and beyond, 4. Six properties (ṣaṭsampatti), 5. Resolute desire for liberation 
(mokṣecchā), 6. Taking refuge in the preceptor (guru-śaraṇa-prāpti), 7. Listening to the Vedāntic 
teaching (vedānta-vākya-śravaṇa), 8. Understanding through reasoning (manana), 9. Constant 
dwelling (nididhyāsana), 10. Dawn of knowledge of the reality (tattva-jñānodaya), 11. Destruction 
of prārabdha-karma, 12. Fixation of mind on a particular object (dhāraṇā), 13. Meditation (dhyāna), 
14. Conceptual absorption (savikalpa-samādhi), 15. The first step (prathama -bhūmi) of non-
conceptual absorption (nirvikalpa-samādhi), 16. The second stage (dvitīya-bhūmi) of non-conceptual 
absorption, 17. The third stage (tṛtīya-bhūmi) of non-conceptual absorption, and 18. Annihilation of 
mind (mano-nāśa) and waning of past impression (vāsanā-kṣaya) [cf. Sanātanadeva 2005: 
Upodghāta, pp. 3-4 and Agrawal 2005: Vol. 1, footnote 9, p. 5; also see the introduction to the GD 
on BhG 3 for better clarification --- Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 134-5). 
401 MS’s emphasis on Patañjali’s Yoga in this context becomes more explicit if we notice below the 
characteristics of a jīvānmukta, as attested by the system, with MS’s own enumeration. 
During the practice of yoga the seeker gradually achieves the highest stage of knowledge (prānta-
bhūmi-prajñā) and becomes liberated in this life (jīvanmukta) or proficient (kuśala) being endowed 
with the discriminatory knowledge (viveka-khyāti) [See Yogasūtra 1963: YS 2.27, Vyāsabhāṣya on it, 
pp. 86-8; and Bhattacharya  and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 1978-83: Vol. 2, p. 51]. 
402 evambhūto brāhmaṇaḥ syādvariṣṭho brahmavādinām / guṇātītaḥ sthitaprajño viṣṇubhaktaśca 
kathyate //, GD, introductory verse 28. 
 
 
 124
liberated self in this life, and an absorber (only) in the self. Since all is 
accomplished (in him), even the scriptures withdraw from him.’403  
Śaṃkara says that those who have developed the sense of realisation of 
brahman in all beings through the teaching of a realised spiritual guide (sadguru) 
and the Vedāntic texts are called jīvanmukta. Just as one having the firm conviction 
of the form, ‘I am the body’, ‘I am a man’, ‘I am a Brahmin’, ‘I am a śūdra’ etc. is 
in bondage, so also one who has the firm conviction of the form of immediate 
knowledge, ‘I am the unattached, of the form of existence-consciousness-bliss and 
effulgence, and am the inner guide of all (sarvāntaryāmin), of the form of all-
pervasive space’, is a jīvanmukta.404 MS’s assertion that a jīvanmukta possesses the 
characteristic of being a devotee of Lord Viṣṇu is therefore noteworthy. While 
Śaṃkara views the sthita-prajña purely in an Advaitic light, both Vidyāraṇya and 
MS impart significance to yogic discipline as well.405 Also noteworthy is the fact 
that in mainstream Advaita, a sthita-prajña, a jñanin, may exhibit bhakti because of 
residual vāsanā, but not inevitably so. For MS, a jñanin having no residual vasanā 
after undergoing mano-nāśa and vāsanā-kṣaya is necessarily devoted to Lord 
Viṣṇu. 
 
3.1.7. Verses 30-40: The importance of devotion to God (bhagavadbhakti) in 
attaining the final emancipation (videha-mukti) 
Having mentioned the necessity of yogic practices and that of devotion to God 
(bhagavadbhakti) for a jīvanmukta, MS now puts forward the claim that devotion is 
                                                 
403 ativarṇāśramī jīvanmukta ātmaratistathā / etasya kṛtakṛtyatvāt śāstramasmānnivartate //, GD, 
introductory verse 29.  
404 Cidghanānanda 1995: Tattvabodha 37-8 p. 10. 
405 See Fort 1998: pp. 124 -5. 
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a key factor also for the final emancipation, i.e. videha-mukti (liberation at the time 
of leaving one’s physical body). MS says that along with the knowledge of reality 
(tattva-jñana), devotion to God in all circumstances, with body, mind and speech, 
becomes useful for attaining videha-mukti, and that devotion must thus be adopted 
in all stages of the quest for liberation.406 A Śruti text (ŚU 6.23) highlighting bhakti 
is the first full quotation in his versified introduction: ‘Only in a man who has 
deepest love for God, and who shows the same love toward his teacher as toward 
God, do these points declared by the Noble One shine forth.’ MS reiterates that 
devotion practised in the preceding stage (stages in nirvikalpaka-samādhi referred 
to in verse 27) is to be brought to the higher (later) stage. Otherwise, the 
accomplishment of success (in one’s sādhanā) becomes very unlikely because of 
the abundance of hindrances.407 Thus, devotion must be followed in all the stages of 
the quest for liberation. 
Even though bhakti is held by MS as practicable at this higher stage, it is 
quite noticeable how MS posits bhakti again at the stage of nirvikalpaka-samādhi.408 
MS continues to quote the BhG texts (BhG 6.44-45) according to which, through 
past habit itself, one is moved forward in the way of achieving liberation, attaining 
the highest goal after many births. However, although spiritual achievements may 
be made without effort in some cases, due to past impressions, the grace of God 
obtained through the perfection of practising disciplines in past lives (prāksiddha-
sādhanābhyāsa) is hard to make out (durjñeya).409 Here, MS hints that in order to 
receive the grace of God, one needs to continue spiritual discipline (sādhana). 
                                                 
406 GD, introductory verse 31. 
407 GD, introductory verses 30 and 32. 
408 See Das 2008. 
409 GD, introductory verses 33-5. 
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Thus, MS reiterates that after each stage of this spiritual journey is 
accomplished, devotion to God is prescribed for attaining the subsequent stages; for 
without it, these later stages cannot be accomplished. In the state of jīvanmukti, MS 
holds, no result of devotion can be imagined. Just as the qualities of non-enmity etc. 
to others are natural to the jīvanmukta-s, so too is the worship of Lord Hari. At this 
stage, MS quotes the BP (BP 1.7.10) according to which, even for the sages who are 
self-immersed and freed from all bondages, devotion to God becomes spontaneous 
in the state of jīvanmukti. This indeed is the greatness of Lord Hari,410 that even as 
they are liberated while living, they are inclined to worship the Lord. Following the 
text of the BhG itself (BhG 7.17), MS says further that among all devotees, one who 
is guided by single minded devotion to God is considered the supreme, which is 
referred to in verse 39; ‘Following the sentence of the Lord that of them (i.e. 
devotees) those who are wise, endowed with steady resoluteness and single pointed 
devotion are said to have excelled, it is said that one who is endowed with loving 
devotion is the best.’411 
All these considerations of MS regarding bhakti in the present context 
become again explicit when we look at his view on it as a means of self-realisation 
in his famous work AdS. MS holds that the way of devotion is superior to that of 
knowledge, as the former gives rise to the realisation of reality more quickly than 
the latter, and that there is also no difference in the degree of liberation achieved 
through either of them.412 In his SŚSS too, MS echoes the view that devotion to the 
                                                 
410 GD, introductory verses 36-8. 
411 teṣāṃ  jñānī nityayukta ekabhaktirviśiṣyate / ityādivacanāt premabhakto’yaṃ mukhya ucyate //, 
GD, introductory verse 39. 
412 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 897 (Also see Sharma 1967: p. 132). 
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Lord is natural for a man of steady knowledge (sthita-prajña).413 Further, one of the 
commentators of MS meticulously supports the characteristics of a jīvanmukta, as 
set forth by MS above. While commenting on MS’s eulogy to Lord Kṛṣṇa in the 
AdS, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī observes that even in the state of jīvanmukti, MS’s 
remembrance of Lord Kṛṣṇa is caused by his past dispositions of worshipping the 
Lord.414 It is clear that MS has always been understood as holding that a self-less 
bhagavadbhakta is the highest jñānin and a jivanmukta is spontaneously devoted to 
Lord Hari. 
Having thus stated the above points with regard to the specific features of 
the BhG, MS expresses his attitude in verse 40 by saying, ‘The Lord has divulged 
all this in the scripture Gītā. So my mind is very much keen to explain it.’415 This 
again emulates Śaṃkara’s words in his upodghāṭa, where he says that the Lord has 
imparted the twofold Vedic law of righteousness to Arjuna, who is submerged in 
the vast ocean of grief (śoka) and delusion (moha). These Vedic laws thus taught by 
the Lord, Śaṃkara adds, have been compiled by the venerable Vedavyāsa in seven 
hundred verses under the name Gītā.416 
 
3.1.8. Verses 41-46: The Bhagavadgītā as the means to attainment of liberation 
(mokṣa) 
While setting forth the attainment of liberation (mokṣa) as the purpose of the BhG at 
the beginning of the introduction, MS points out the means of attaining it as well as 
                                                 
413 See Giri 2007: Pt. 1, Sārasṃgraha on SŚ 1.3, p. 20. 
414 Advaitasiddhi 2005: 2.7, Gaūḍabrahmānandī- Laghucandrikā, p. 750 (Also see Mishra 2009: pp. 
212-3). 
415 etat sarvaṃ bhagavatā gītāśāstre prakāśitam / ato vyākhyātum etanme mana utsahate bhṛśam //, 
GD, introductory verse 40. 
416 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 5.  
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the factors that may act as hindrances to it. We can summarise MS’s view in the 
following way. Performance of duties without desire for results (niṣkāma-karma) is 
said to be the root cause of liberation (verse 40). Sorrow (duḥkha) and delusion 
(moha), arising due to the performance of forbidden actions through deviation from 
one’s own duty (svadharma), are the hindrances to it. As these hindrances are 
natural to mankind, they bind people in the series of suffering, paving the way for 
the continuation of the cycle of birth-death (janma-maraṇa-cakra), which all living 
beings want to overcome, because suffering is abhorrent to them.417 In the 
concluding verses of the introduction, MS says that the Lord has explained this 
scripture (Gītāśāstra) to instruct those who are eager to obtain the highest end of 
human life (puruṣārtha), and wish to know how to achieve the arduous task of 
eradicating sorrow, delusion etc. which cause beginningless transmigration. To 
quote him, ‘In order to enlighten a person who intensely desires to get rid of the 
cause of suffering (i.e. grief, delusion etc.) and eager to attain the end in human life, 
the Lord has uttered this revered scripture.’418 
MS, like other commentators on the BhG, makes Arjuna the representative 
of the entirety of human beings for whom the text is meant. And thus, the deluded 
mass, represented by Arjuna, is the eligible person (adhikārin) for studying the 
BhG. Śaṃkara too says that in order to facilitate the well-being of the common 
people, the Lord imparted in the BhG two Vedic laws (of action and renunciation 
respectively) to Arjuna, who is submerged in the ocean of sorrow and delusion.419 
Again, Rāmānuja echoed the same view in accordance with his doctrinal teaching. 
                                                 
417 See GD, introductory verses 40-45. 
418 evamākāṅkṣayāviṣṭaṃ puruṣārthonmukhaṃ naram / bubodhayiṣurāhedaṃ 
bhagavāñśāstramuttamam //, GD, introductory verse 46. 
419 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchāṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 5. 
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He holds that the Lord, the highest person (puruṣottama), master of all gods 
(sarveśvareśvara), assumed the human form to help the world and made Arjuna the 
warrior from the chariot (rathī), and himself the charioteer (sārathi).420 
In continuation of the summary of the teaching of the BhG, as found both in 
the introductory verses in MS’s commentary on it and the text of the BhG itself, it 
can be said that the foremost idea derived from the teaching of the BhG is a 
synthesis of different ways of realising God, i.e. knowledge (jñāna), devotion 
(bhakti), and action (karma).421 It has been a debated issue from time immemorial in 
Indian philosophical discussion whether the way of knowledge (jñāna-mārga) or 
the way of action (karma-mārga) or a combination of both (jñāna-karma-
samuccaya-mārga) is conducive to liberation. The Gītā explores all alternatives, 
prescribing the acceptance of the way of knowledge and performance of actions, 
without desire for its results.422 This view can be found in the Upaniṣads too.423 In 
due course, in line with the Vedāntic views, complete relinquishment of action and 
acceptance of renunciation through knowledge (karmatyāgī-saṃnyāsa / 
jñānamūlaka-saṃnyāsa-mārga) and performance without desire (jñānayukta-
karma/jñānamūlaka-karma-mārga), two philosophical ideas, viz. ‘sāṃkhya-mārga’ 
and ‘yoga-mārga’ came to be originated. The BhG aims at exploring the latter. In 
the colophon of each chapter in the BhG it has been described as being included in 
                                                 
420 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, p. 11. 
421 As per the modern Psychology, man has three principal faculties -- intellect, will and emotion. 
Intellect provokes him into enquiry (knowledge - jñāna), will to action (karma) and emotion to 
devotion (bhakti). The distinction among these aspects of the mind is made possible only mentally, 
not in the reality. These entire mental aspects stand synthesised towards man’s complete being 
which is in a way called ‘yoga’. BhG teaches a unique synthesis of all these mental phenomena (See 
Sharma 1976: p. 33).  
422  See discussion above on GD introductory verses 6-7. 
423 ‘Just performing works in this world, you should desire to live your hundred years.’ (ĪU 2), 
‘Knowledge and ignorance -- a man who knows them both together, passes beyond death by 
ignorance, and by knowledge attains immortality’ (ĪU 11). 
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the Yogaśāstra in the Upaniṣads etc.424 In keeping with his devotional outlook, as 
found in the introduction to MS’s BhG commentary, MS has upheld the importance 
of devotion (bhakti) in the final chapter as well. MS holds that, though devotion is a 
means for attaining success in both the ways of action and knowledge, it is the fruit 
(phala) of them too, being the highest teaching of Lord Kṛṣṇa.425 
In short, both the invocation and the subject-matter of the versified 
introduction to MS’s BhG commentary suggest that MS wants to convey through it 
his Advaitic teaching to the highest mendicants of Śaṃkara’s order,426 of which he 
was also a member; though the strong presence of devotion to the Lord 
(bhagavadbhakti) makes him accept, to some extent, the attitude of the theistic 
Vedānta as well. And thus, the traditional fourfold requisites for studying a text, 
known as anubandha-catuṣṭaya, are properly maintained in his introduction 
(upodghāta) to the BhG commentary, in conformity with the principles of Advaita, 
and with an apparent mild deviation from it for accommodating his own 
philosophical stance.   
 
 
 
                                                 
424 For example, ‘Thus, the first chapter entitled ‘Yoga of despondency of Arjuna’ in the Upaniṣads 
in the Bhagavadgītā in the knowledge of brahman in the science of Yoga in a dialogical form 
between Śrīkṛṣṇa and Arjuna’  (iti śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu brahmavidyāyāṃ yogaśāstre 
śrīkrṣṇārjunasaṃvāde arjunaviṣādoyoga nāma prathamo’dhyāyaḥ, Bhagavadgītā 1999: Colophon of 
BhG 1, p. 29).  
The import of colophon of each chapter of the BhG is understood by some scholars in the following 
way.  The BhG is compared with other Upaniṣads, and as the Upaniṣads deal with the knowledge of 
brahman (brahmavidyā), the BhG too on being included in the path of yoga (yoga-mārga) in the 
Upaniṣads is described as ‘brahmavidyāyāṃ yogaśāstre’ etc. This Yoga scripture BhG has eighteen 
chapters and each chapter deals with different yoga-s. So is the name of each chapter there (See 
Ghoṣa 1994: p. 10).  
425 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, 18.66, p. 755 (Also see Nelson 1988:  p.77). 
426 See Nelson 1988: pp. 84-5.  
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 4 
Realities (tattva-s): the Supreme Self (brahman), the 
Individual Self (jīva), and the Universe (jagat) 
 
As stated before, the BhG, along with the BS and the Upaniṣads, is considered a 
sourcebook of the Vedānta philosophy. Mutual references among these works are 
also conspicuous. For example, the BS often refers to the BhG as a Smṛti text, while 
BhG 13.4 mentions that the theory of ‘the field’ (kṣetra) and ‘the knower of the 
field’ (kṣetrajña) has been determined by the arguments in the Brahmasūtra. The 
BhG also contains versus that appear also in some key Upaniṣadic texts (e.g. KU 
1.2.18-19) with minor variations.427  
The preceding chapter discussed how MS summarizes his commentary on 
the BhG in his versified introduction. In this chapter and the next, we will follow 
the GD’s treatment of important philosophical doctrines of Vedānta, including the 
supreme self (paramātman) or brahman, individual self (jīvātman), universe (jagat) 
and liberation (mokṣa), as also how the means (sādhana) to its attainment forms the 
basis of philosophical discussion in the BhG. In the process, we hope to give a 
coherent account of the philosophical teaching of the BhG along with MS’s 
understanding of it. 
In the SB, MS writes that the perceiver is the pure self, or brahman, together 
with its variations (caused by limiting adjunct) in the forms of God (īśvara), the 
individual self (jīva), and the witnessing self (sākṣin), while the perceived consists 
                                                 
427 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: Introduction, p. xix. 
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of nescience and its products or the empirical existence (jagat-prapañca). MS adds 
that only these two categories are accepted by the Vedāntins (Advaitins), and that 
all the categories accepted by other schools are included in these two.428 This sharp 
contrast of the seer and the seen, the perceiver and the perceived, is a key feature of 
much of Advaita dialectic. This can be understood in the sense that just as the 
individual self is nothing over and above brahman, the universe too lacks existence 
independent of brahman, owing to its being an illusory appearance of brahman. 
These three ontological entities of Vedānta, viz. paramātman or brahman, jīvātman, 
and jagat are not only the interrelated categories for the Advaitins, but also the 
distinctly acknowledged metaphysical entities described in the BhG, to which we 
now turn our attention in order to elucidate MS’s view about these three categories. 
 
4.1. The supreme self (brahman) 
It is pertinent to begin with a brief account of brahman in the words of Śaṃkara, in 
order to appreciate MS’s position. Śaṃkara holds that brahman is of the nature of 
truth, knowledge, and bliss.429 It is, by nature, auspiciousness,430 eternal, pure, and 
free. It is bereft of any attribute (nirguṇa or nirviśeṣa) and one without a second 
(advitīya). It is devoid of all sorts of limiting-adjuncts and modifications like birth, 
age and death. No connection with action in the sense of doership (kartṛtva) and 
enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) can be thought of for brahman, as it is non-dual. It cannot 
be an object of logical insight and is without fear (abhaya). It is all-pervasive, like 
space, yet it dwells in the hearts of all beings. Notwithstanding this, it appears to the 
ignorant (avidyācchanna) to be possessed of name and form, on account of which it 
                                                 
428 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 89 and 93. 
429 Śrīśāṃkragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, TUB, 2.1, line 15, p. 696. 
430 Śrīśāṃkragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, PUB, 6.3, line 18, p. 297. 
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is regarded as the qualified entity, i.e. God. The scriptures provide two descriptions 
of brahman, e.g. (i) one with the characteristics of name, form and other attributes, 
and (ii) one without any of those characteristics. Though really formless, brahman 
assumes forms with its magical power, in order to grace devotees. While it is 
nirguṇa, it seems to create the empirical world in the sense of being its material 
cause that is transformed into the world, just as milk is transformed into curd. Such 
transformation is, however, only apparent in the case of brahman. The creation of 
the world is not meant to serve any purpose of brahman, as it is ever contented by 
nature. Possessed with immeasurable power, it creates the world out of its own 
divine play (līlā). Whereas nirguṇa brahman appears with limiting adjunct (i.e. as 
God) to the ignorant and so becomes for them the object of worship (upāsya), the 
enlightened one (avidyā-nirmukta) realises its transcendental nature without any 
kind of limiting adjunct, and attains it with knowledge alone, thereby identifying 
himself with brahman. 
Thus, Śaṃkara’s theory of the supreme-self establishes the core identity of 
brahman with the individual self and with the world, as he asserts outright that there 
is nothing whatsoever apart from brahman. The individual self is a reflection of the 
supreme self in the internal organ, like the semblance of the sun in water. It is only 
the supreme-self that, in spite of remaining immutable, appears as the individual 
self with transient features owing to an association with limiting adjuncts. The fact 
that brahman is, by nature, free from sin and other flaws shows the transcendental 
nature of the individual self. While the awareness of difference between the 
individual self and brahman arises due to the latter’s association with the limiting 
adjuncts, the notions of the worshipped (upāsya) [i.e. brahman] and the worshipper 
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(upāsaka) [i.e. the individual self] comes into being.  There are also innumerable 
references in Śaṃkara’s writing to scriptural passages describing the creation out of 
brahman of the elements of the universe, starting with space.431 
In Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic version of Vedānta, there is only one eternal 
reality, i.e. brahman, all other realities subsisting in it. The theoretical basis of the 
Advaita philosophy is based on the axiom that brahman, in spite of being 
attributeless and non-dual, appears with attributes due to association with nescience 
(ajñāna) and other limiting adjuncts forms. The following presents a brief account 
of brahman with attributes, the Lord, as described by MS in the GD.    
 
4.1.1. A note on ‘Lord’ (bhagavān) as admitted by Madhusūdana in the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
In the BhG, the term ‘Lord’ (bhagavān) bears the same connotation as the supreme 
self or Lord Kṛṣṇa or Vāsudeva. While explaining the term ‘Lord’ when it first 
occurs in BhG 2.2, MS quotes the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VuP): ‘Of the fullness of the 
presence of divine glory (aiśvarya), righteousness (dharma), fame (yaśas), 
auspiciousness (śrī), detachment (vairāgya) and liberation (mokṣa); these six 
(qualities) are technically known as bhaga (VuP 6.5.74).’432 Here, the word 
‘liberation’ means its cause, viz. knowledge (jñāna) and the Lord (bhagavān) is he, 
in whom all these qualities are eternally present, without any kind of obstruction. 
Quoting further from the same source, MS says that all these meanings of the term 
                                                 
431 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB, 1.3.19, line 10, p. 307; 1.2.8, line 1, p. 236; 1.2.14, line 20, p. 462; 
1.1.11, lines 8-9, p. 176; 1.1.20, line 3, p. 196; 3.3.12, line 12, p. 767 (cf. Caṭṭopādhyāya 1972: p. 
279); 2.1.32, lines 6-9, p. 480; 2.1.33, line 6, p. 480, line 1, p. 481; 3.2.32, line 1, p. 725; 2.3.50, line 
1, p. 625; 2.3.18, lines 3-4, p. 604; 1.3.19, lines 6-7, p. 303; 1.2.4, lines 4-5, p. 234; 2.3.7, line 24, p. 
586. 
432 aiśvaryasya samagrasya dharmasya yaśasaḥ śriyaḥ / vairāgyasyātha mokṣasya ṣaṇṇām bhaga 
itīṅganā // 
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bhagavān show that it is applicable to Lord Vāsudeva only. ‘The Lord is one who 
knows the origin (utpatti) and destruction (vināśa), prosperity and paucity, and 
knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā) of creatures (VuP 6.5.78)’433 
It may also be noted that while quoting VuP 6.5.74, MS maintains that the 
expression ‘in full’ (samagra) is connected with each of the six qualities mentioned 
in this verse. The term ‘liberation’ (mokṣa) indicates its cause, viz. knowledge 
(jñāna), while iṅganā means the technical name or appellation (saṃjñā). He is the 
Lord (bhagavān), in whom all these divine qualities (aiśvaryādi)434 are present 
eternally and without any obstruction, i.e. uninterruptedly (nityam apratibandhena). 
MS emphasizes that the suffix -vān added to bhaga is used in the sense of 
everlasting possession.435 Baccā Jhā explains that the word samagra has to be 
understood as qualifying each of the six qualities mentioned in the VuP verse, but 
taken together, not in isolation. He does this by raising the objection that the word 
bhagavān is used even in the cases where great sages are addressed, even though 
such people may not be characterised simultaneously by the fullness of all six 
qualities. If the word bhagavān can be so employed, then the word bhagavān will 
not serve the purpose of expressing the supreme excellence that characterises the 
Lord. Baccā Jhā holds that MS uses the expression nityam apratibandhena in order 
to avert this objection. None of these qualities, when characterising the great sages, 
can be regarded as eternal, since in such cases, these qualities are produced 
                                                 
433 utpattiṃ ca vināśaṃ ca bhūtānāmāgatiṃ gatim / vetti vidyāmavidyāṃ ca sa vācyo bhagavāniti // 
Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 31-2. There is a clear indication in VuP 6.5.76 that 
the term bhagavān can only mean Vāsudeva as the supreme brahman, and nobody else. Curiously, 
this verse is not quoted by MS, perhaps inadvertently (Dvivedī 1975: Vol. 1, footnote 1, p. 75 and 
Sanātanadeva 2005: Footnotes 1-2, p. 42). 
434 E.g. divine glory, righteousness, fame, auspiciousness, detachment and liberation. 
435 samagrasyeti pratyekam sambandhaḥ. mokṣasyeti tatsādhanasya jñānasya. iṅganā saṃjñā. 
etādṛśam samagram aiśvaryādikam nityam apratibandhena yatra vartate sa bhagavān (Bhagavadgītā 
1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 32). 
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(utpanna). Furthermore, in such cases, such qualities may also be obstructed. But in 
the case of the Lord, such qualities are eternal (nitya) and not subject to any 
obstruction (apratibandha). However, Baccā Jhā also says that the word ādi 
employed in the expression samagram aiśvaryādikam cannot be applied to 
righteousness (dharma), because in the case of the Lord, dharma cannot be a 
property that is produced. This is based on the standard Mīmāṃsā position that 
dharma is always something that is produced. On reflection, Baccā Jhā explains that 
the word dharma means the absence of all demerits (samagra-pāpma-nivṛtti), which 
is indeed a characteristic of the Lord. Alternatively, dharma may also indicate the 
activities that produce merit (puṇya-janaka-kriyā). Since the Lord, at the beginning 
of each new creation (sṛṣṭi), instructs people to perform meritorious deeds 
(sampradāya-pravartana), dharma, when understood in this sense, may very well 
be present in the Lord.436 Furthermore, the word ‘full’ (samagra) cannot be related 
with ‘liberation’ (mokṣa), because in the Advaita Vedānta, liberation is of the nature 
of eternal-pure-non-dual-brahman (nitya-śuddha-brahma-svarūpa), and cannot 
admit of degrees. In order to justify the application of samagra in the context of 
‘liberation’, MS says that the term ‘liberation’ denotes here ‘knowledge,’ the cause 
of liberation.437 
 
4.1.2. The Lord as the supreme self in Bhagavadgītā and Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
It needs to be mentioned at the outset that by the time MS wrote the GD, the 
essential nature of brahman as existence, consciousness, and bliss had been 
                                                 
436 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, pp. 1-2 (Also refer to Sanātanadeva 2005: Footnote 2, 
p. 41).   
437 See Sanātanadeva 2005: Footnote 2, p. 41 (Sometimes, a word is used figuratively to indicate the 
cause of the entity denoted by that word. This is known as ‘kāraṇe karyopācāraḥ’).  
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discussed thoroughly by the earlier Advaitins. In order to defend himself against the 
fierce attack of the then Vaiṣṇava schools, such as that of Madhva, MS had to 
determine cautiously to what extent ‘existence’ and ‘consciousness’ are distinctive 
as the essential nature of brahman, and whether ‘bliss’ could be mentioned along 
with them. Thus, the SB states that brahman is all-pervasive, non-dual and of the 
nature of supreme bliss and consciousness.438 However, in the AdS, MS justifies at 
length that in spite of being marked (upalakṣita) by all these characteristics, 
brahman is in fact unconditioned or unqualified in nature.439 Let us now proceed to 
discuss in brief how the BhG depicts brahman and how MS describes it accordingly 
in his GD. 
The second group of six chapters of the BhG (dvitīya-ṣaṭka, i.e. chapters 7-
12) is said to mainly deal with the reality of the supreme self (paramātman) or 
brahman. MS holds that ‘the supreme self’ is the referent of the term ‘that’ (tat) in 
the Upaniṣadic mahā-vākya ‘That thou art’, further specifying that it is of the nature 
of supreme-bliss (paramānanda). While chapter seven of the text (jñāna-vijñāna-
yoga) imparts the knowledge of the supreme self in all its facets, the eighth chapter 
(akṣara-brahma-yoga) deals with meditation on the imperishable brahman, the 
ninth articulates the greatness of the supreme self, i.e. the greatest knowledge (rāja-
vidyā), the tenth describes the manifestation of divine powers (vibhūti) of the Lord, 
the eleventh gives a detailed account of the universal form (viśva-rūpa) of the Lord, 
and the twelfth discusses unceasing devotional meditation (bhakti-yoga) on the 
supreme self as the means of attaining it. 
                                                 
438 Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 82 (For details, see Gupta 2006: p. 66). 
439 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp, 750 ff.; 768 ff. (Also see Gupta 2006: pp. 71-3 for a detailed account). 
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According to MS’s commentary, the BhG (BhG 10.12-13 etc.) unequivocally 
equates Lord Kṛṣṇa with the brahman of the Upaniṣads. BhG 7.7 asserts that Lord 
Kṛṣṇa is the absolute metaphysical reality, as there is nothing whatsoever that 
transcends him. BhG 11.43 also declares him to be unequalled, the mightiest in all 
the three worlds.440 The depiction of his divine power and universal form of the 
Lord, in chapters ten and eleven, clearly portray Lord Kṛṣṇa as the supreme 
brahman, but endowed with determinations or attributes (saviśeṣa/saguṇa). If it is 
asked as to how Kṛṣṇa, the son of a man named Vasudeva, can be equated with the 
Lord, in terms of the Upaniṣadic brahman with attributes, BhG 4.6-8 resolves it by 
drawing on the concept of divine descent or incarnation (avatāra). Here the Lord 
says that although unborn and imperishable, he is born out of his own power or 
innate māyā (ātma-māyā). All these views have been explained in a thoroughgoing 
manner in the GD. 
While explaining the concept of the divine incarnation of the Lord, MS 
quotes Śaṃkara’s introduction to the BhG commentary and Ānandagiri’s sub-
commentary, to the effect that in spite of being birthless (aja), changeless (avyaya), 
the Lord of all creatures, eternal, pure, conscious and free by nature (nitya-śuddha-
buddha-mukta-svabhāva), the Lord appears as if he is embodied (dehavān iva) 
through his magical power (māyā). With no purpose of his own to serve, the Lord 
appears for the sake of showering grace on creatures in bondage. MS holds that 
Śaṃkara’s comments mean that the eternal causal limiting adjunct (kāraṇopādhi) of 
brahman, which is named as māyā, and which possesses numerous powers, is the 
body (deha) of the Lord. MS here refers to a different view (that is also stated later 
                                                 
440 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 197-8. 
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by Nīlakaṇṭha) which holds that in the case of supreme Lord, there cannot be any 
relation of a body and its possessor (deha-dehi-bhāva). The supreme self, Lord 
Vāsudeva, is eternal, omnipresent (vibhu), a mass of existence-conscious-bliss 
(saccidānanda-ghana), full (paripūrṇa), and unconditioned (nirguṇa), and is 
himself his body. He does not have either a material (bhautika) or an illusory 
(māyika) body. MS, however, does not pass any judgment about this second 
interpretation, but merely seeks to substantiate his view by quoting BS 2.3.9 and 
2.3.17 along with the Śruti texts (Śāṇḍilya Upaniṣad 2.1.3, BU 4.5.14 and CU 
7.4.21). MS asserts that despite there being really no such relation of a body and the 
embodied in the case of the Lord, such a relation appears to pertain to the Lord as 
mere māyā. MS expresses his devotional outlook in this connection with the support 
of the BP texts: ‘Know that Kṛṣṇa is the self of all beings. In spite of that, he 
appears here as an embodied being, through māyā, for the benefit of the world’ (BP 
10.14.55) and ‘Oh what good luck, oh what good luck, for the cowherd Nanda and 
the inhabitants of Vraja, whom the eternal brahman, of the nature of fullness and 
supreme bliss, has befriended!’ (BP 10.14.32). Having said this, MS indicates in an 
indirect manner the view of others like Rāmānuja etc., who admit the actuality of 
this relation (of a body and its holder) in respect of the Lord, but desists from 
criticising them, on the grounds that it would be a futile exercise.441  
Ānandagiri makes Śaṃkara’s view explicit, saying that in the case of Lord, 
the fact of his being born is merely an apparent truth (prātibhāsika-satya), and not 
the transcendental or absolute one (pāramārthika-satya).442 While explaining BhG 
                                                 
441 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 188-90 (For Rāmānuja’s view, refer to 
Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, pp. 5-6; Rāmānujabhāṣyam, pp. 79, 91, 
366-8 etc.). 
442 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānandagirivyākhyā, pp. 186-90. 
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4.5, MS maintains that from the empirical point of view, acceptance of bodies for 
the Lord is like admitting the rising of the sun, which in fact neither rises nor sets, 
but is ever present.443 One may now wonder if by ‘acceptance of bodies for the 
Lord’ is meant by MS that the body of the Lord is ever present, being māyā itself. 
MS justifies, through the theory of divine incarnation, the Advaita view regarding 
the unqualified nature of brahman which, due to māyā, appears to be qualified in 
nature. By referring to the views of Śaṃkara, Ānandagiri, and an unnamed author 
whose view has been referred to also by Nīlakaṇtha, and also with the textual 
support of the BP, MS not only remains rooted in his own non-dualistic stance, but 
also ensures that his view regarding the Lord is not at odds with those who (like 
Nīlakaṇtha) are not antagonistic to the propagation of the spirit of devotion within 
the parameters of a non-dualistic ontology. Viśvanātha Cakravartin (18th century 
CE), who follows the tradition of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, refers to this view of MS 
along with those of Śrīdhara Svāmin and Rāmānuja in this context in his 
commentary on the BhG, which is called the Sārārthavarṣiṇī.444 This is an 
indication of a broad level of acceptability for MS’s resolution of this issue for the 
dualistic devotional Vedāntin authors, though it is not quite in conformity with that 
of Rāmānuja, as MS himself has indicated.  
 
4.1.3. The nature of the supreme self 
After describing his two primordial natures (prakṛti-s), inferior (aparā) and 
superior (parā), which include both insentient and sentient beings (BhG 7.4-7.5), 
the Lord expresses his supremacy over these, saying that he is the creator and 
                                                 
443 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 185-6. 
444 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārārthavarṣiṇī, p. 120. 
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destroyer of the entire cosmos, as all beings have their source in these two prakṛti-s 
(BhG 7.6 and 10.8). MS says in this connection that the Lord, in association with 
his limiting adjuncts in the form of the ‘field’ (kṣetra) and the ‘knower of the field’ 
(kṣetrajña), is omniscient (sarvajña), the Lord of all (sarveśvara), omnipotent 
(ananta-śakti), endowed with nescience as limiting adjunct (māyopādhi-upahita), 
the cause of origination (prabhava) and destruction (pralaya) of this entire world 
consisting of all products, whether dynamic or static. This view is also echoed in 
the BS, which says ‘That (is Brahman) from which (are derived) the birth etc. of all 
this.’ Śaṃkara comments that in this aphorism, brahman is the source of creation, 
sustenance and dissolution of the universe, as the same order is also found in the 
Śruti text; ‘That from which these beings are born…’ (TU 33.1.1).445 MS further 
adds that just as in the case of dream objects the individual self is the cause of its 
creation and destruction, so the Lord himself, being the basis (āśraya) and object 
(viṣaya) of nescience, is both the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) and seer (draṣṭā) 
of this illusory world-appearance.446 In his SB too, MS maintains that brahman, 
being qualified by omniscience etc. becomes the material and efficient cause of the 
universe.447 The GD asserts that this brahman is called Vāsudeva, and is the cause 
of origination as the material and efficient cause of the universe, and that the 
sustenance and destruction of this universe also proceed from him.448 
We saw that MS refers to ‘the knower of the field’ (kṣetrajña) as a limiting 
adjunct (upādhi) of the Lord. Baccā Jhā explains that kṣetrajña is said to be in the 
nature of its limiting adjunct when considered from the standpoint of the jīva, i.e. 
                                                 
445 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.2, p. 85 (Also see Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 199). 
446 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 348-9. 
447 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 76-7 
448 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam and Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 447. 
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consciousness associated with the jīva (jīvopahita-caitanya).449 He also explicates 
MS’s stance about brahman as the material (upādāna) cause and efficient (nimitta) 
cause of the world by analogy with the spider, which is both the material and 
efficient cause of the web it weaves.450  
One may question how brahman, which is pure consciousness, can be the 
material cause of an unconscious world, as an effect and its material cause have to 
be homogeneous. Moreover, a material cause must undergo some transformation 
when the effect is produced, but brahman is said to be immutable. In answer, it is 
said that brahman is by nature ever conscious and is the substratum of the entire 
cosmos, which is by nature inert, as the material cause that undergoes 
transformation is inert nescience (avidyā). The cosmos is also an illusory 
appearance or apparent transformation (vivarta) superimposed due to nescience on 
brahman, and not a real transformation (pariṇāma) of brahman.451 
Another verse, BhG 18.61, says that the Lord resides in the heart of all 
beings, revolving them through his power (māyā), as if they were mounted on a 
machine. MS, following Śaṃkara, says that here the term ‘Lord’ (īśvara) means one 
who is capable of ruling (īś), and he is none other than Lord Nārāyaṇa, the internal 
ruler of all (sarvāntaryāmin). In support of his views, MS quotes the Śruti texts, 
‘This self (ātman), who is present within but is different from the earth, whom the 
earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from 
within, he is the inner controller, the immortal (BU 3.7.3)’, ‘The entire creation, 
whatever is seen or heard, Nārāyaṇa exists by pervading all that from within and 
                                                 
449 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, p. 131.  
450 The reference is also found in Śaṃkara’s comments on BS 2.4.27 (Brahmasūtra 2000: pp. 428-9) 
and VS by Sadānanda (Nikhilananda 1997: VS 2.55-56, pp. 40-42). 
451 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, p. 137.  
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without’ (Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad 9.5).452 MS adds that though the Lord is all-
pervasive, he resides in the heart or the internal organ of all beings, just as, despite 
being the ruler of seven continents, Lord Rāmacandra manifested himself in 
Uttarakośala.453 Śaṃkara, too, while explaining the above-mentioned BU text, refers 
to the Lord as Nārāyaṇa, who restrains and governs the earth.454 
The above-mentioned statements in the BhG point to the immanence of the 
supreme self as the inner controller (antaryāmin) of all beings.455 This supreme 
being is variously described as being characterized by parā and aparā prakṛti (BhG 
7), kṣetrajña and kṣetra (BhG 13), kṣara (mutable or transient) and akṣara 
(immutable or intransient) puruṣa (BhG 15). However, at the end of the fifteenth 
chapter called puruṣottama-yoga, the Lord declares that he is beyond akṣara and 
kṣara puruṣa, and is known as the supreme person (puruṣottama). He who knows 
him as this supreme person knows all that is to be known (BhG 15.18-19). Thus, the 
Lord who is immanent in all beings as the inner controller is also the transcendent 
supreme being or the supreme person (puruṣottama) [BhG 15.18]. 
MS highlights this, holding that God, who has been thus described as distinct 
from kṣara and akṣara, is the supreme person (purṣottama). He holds that the 
supreme God (parameśvara) is most excellent (utkṛṣṭatama), the immutable seed of 
everything (sarva-kāraṇa), superior to māyā, the unmanifest (avyākṛta), and even 
brahman, as has been stated previously in ‘…I am the foundation of brahman…’ 
(BhG 14.27) and ‘…that supreme domain of mine…’ (BhG 15.6); and also in the 
Śruti passages like ‘That person, indeed, …farther than the farthest, imperishable’ 
                                                 
452 Translation from Gambhirananda 2000a: p. 982. 
453 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 748. 
454 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 10, p. 432. 
455 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 199-200. 
 
 
 144
(MuU 2.1.2) and ‘He is the highest person’ (CU 8.12.3). MS does not fail to express 
his personal devotion to this Lord when he says that it is well known in the world 
[in common speech] that Lord Hari alone is stated in poems as the supreme person. 
MS summarises his views in two verses, the first of which may be translated in the 
following manner: 
The glory of Nārāyaṇa, the supreme person, whose body is made up only of existence, 
consciousness, and bliss (saccit-sukhaika-vapuṣa); and who, behaving like a human being 
out of compassion, taught Pārtha his (Nārāyaṇa’s) own divinity by advising him about the 
supreme realities, is beyond measure in magnitude.456  
 
While explaining the Upaniṣadic texts cited above by MS, Śaṃkara adopts 
his usual non-dualistic approach that helps us place his position on a par with that of 
MS. While commenting on MuU 2.1.2, Śaṃkara says that the other indestructible, 
called the unmanifest, is higher than all changes (vikāra), and that the person, the 
unconditioned, is superior to the high unmanifest.457 While commenting on CU 
8.12.3, he says that just as a rope, which appears as a snake due to delusion before 
the discriminatory knowledge between rope and snake arises, but fuses into its own 
form as rope once it is viewed in bright light, so also, compared to a person that is 
destructible (kṣara-puruṣa) and indestructible (akṣara-puruṣa), the person who is 
established in his own nature is the highest person (uttama-puruṣa). Śaṃkara  adds 
further that the BhG too explains the ‘highest person’ in the same way.458  
Viśvanātha Cakravartin, the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava author, quotes from the GD 
on BhG 15.19-20 (where MS eulogises Lord Kṛṣṇa) and notes that both Śrīdhara 
                                                 
456 kāruṇyato naravad ācarataḥ parārthān pārthāya bodhitavato nijam īśvaratvam. 
saccitsukhaikavapuṣaḥ puruṣottamasya nārāyaṇasya mahimā na hi mānameti (Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 629-30). 
457 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, p. 344 (The order in this edition as MuU 2.2 is the same as 
MuU  2.1.2) [Also see Panoli 2008: Vol. III, MuUB, 2.1.2, p. 153]. 
458 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 9, p. 540 (Also see Panoli 2008: Vol. IV, CUB, 8.12.3, pp. 
903-4). 
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Svāmin and MS have described the supremacy of Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is equated with 
the Advaitic unconditioned brahman per se. Viśvanātha explicitly salutes and notes 
his agreement with these two Advaitic interpreters of the BhG, saying that there can 
be no objection against their explanation of verses BhG 15.16-18 (which eulogise 
Lord Kṛṣṇa).459 
Thus, by describing the Lord as puruṣottama, as distinct from kṣara and 
akṣara puruṣa, MS, following the lead of Śaṃkara, hints at the unconditioned 
nature of brahman in spite of its apparent conditioned nature. Yet his overflowing 
devotion to the qualified reality as described above is certainly a distinctive mark of 
his own commentary, which is held in high esteem by the later commentators of the 
BhG, who prefer to adopt the dualistic devotional approach. Further, the nature of 
the supreme self is explicated by the Lord himself when he says; ‘For I am the 
foundation of brahman, of the immortal and intransient, of the sempiternal Law, 
and of perfect bliss’ (BhG 14.27). Though there seem to be two separate entities 
expressed by the terms ‘I’ and ‘brahman’ in the present context, since brahman 
cannot be its own ground, MS, following Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic doctrine, 
distinguishes between two aspects of brahman, i.e. unconditioned and conditioned, 
in order to explain the expressions ‘I’ and ‘brahman’ respectively. He holds that the 
unconditioned (nirvikalpaka) Vāsudeva is the implied meaning (lakṣyārtha) of the 
term ‘that’ (tat) (employed in the sentence ‘That thou art’) and is the supreme 
reality in the nature of unconditioned and attributeless existence, consciousness and 
bliss. This is the base/ground (pratiṣṭhā) of brahman, who is conditioned 
                                                 
459
 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārārthavarṣiṇī, p. 404. 
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(sopādhika), the cause of origin, sustenance and dissolution of the world, and is the 
expressed meaning (vācyārtha) of the term ‘that’ (tat) [in ‘That thou art’]. As Lord 
Vāsudeva is by nature natural, bereft of imaginary attributes (kalpita-rūpa-rahita), 
one meditating on the unconditioned brahman becomes eligible for becoming 
brahman. Lord Vāsudeva is the basis of brahman, who is indestructible (vināśa-
rahita), bereft of transformations (vipariṇāma-rahita), without decay (apakṣaya-
rahita), happiness (sukha) in the nature of supreme bliss (paramānanda-rūpa) that 
transcends space and time, and he is also attainable through merit (dharma), which 
is characterised as steadiness in knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā).460 
In order to substantiate the point under discussion, MS quotes the BP verses, 
and subsequently conveys their import in his own way. In one of the relevant 
verses,  Brahmā tells Lord Kṛṣṇa:  ‘You are the only self, immortal, the ancient one, 
the truth, self-effulgent, infinite and without beginning, eternal, imperishable, 
immense bliss, pure, complete, non-dual, free, and bereft of any limitation (BP 
10.14.23).’ Accordingly, MS holds that Lord Kṛṣṇa is the brahman, the self devoid 
of all limiting adjuncts or limitations (sarvopādhi-śūnya). In another verse, Śuka 
also says to king Parīkṣit without any eulogy: ‘The essential substance of all beings 
rests in the conditioned brahman, and of that again, Lord Kṛṣṇa is the essence, so 
what can there be beyond him?’ (BP 10.14.50). MS goes on to say that all effects 
have their essential nature, the supreme reality in the form of being located in the 
conditioned (sopādhika) brahman, which assumes the form (ākāra) of the effects, 
for no effect can have more reality than that of its cause. As the conditioned 
brahman is imagined on the unconditioned brahman, and as what is imaginary 
                                                 
460 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 606-7. 
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cannot have any other reality than what belongs to its own substratum (adhiṣṭhāna), 
Lord Kṛṣṇa is by nature the absolute truth, the unconditioned (nirupādhika) 
brahman, the basis of all imaginary creations, the supreme reality that is the 
culminating point of all the characteristics of brahman mentioned above. MS in his 
usual manner concludes the discussion of this point by eulogising the supreme 
brahman equated with Lord Kṛṣṇa in the following terms: ‘I salute that ineffable 
light, the son of Nanda, who takes away the bondage of his supplicants, who is the 
supreme brahman in a human form as the essence of all that is the quintessence of 
loveliness.’461 
The idea that Lord Viṣṇu should be equated with brahman is upheld by MS 
in clear terms also in the first benedictory verse of the AdS: ‘Viṣṇu, who is the 
substratum of the illusory world of duality such as the notions of the cogniser 
(pramātṛtva) etc., who is of the nature of truth, consciousness and bliss, who is to be 
apprehended through the impartite knowledge arising from the mahāvākya-s like 
‘tattvamasi’ etc. which are like the crown of the Śruti, surpasses on his own, after 
shaking off the bondage (of the primordial nescience-mūlāvidyā) and being bereft 
of all mental constructions, i.e. visible objects imagined through nescience (vikalpa) 
as if having attained liberation, which is by nature the supreme bliss only.’462 While 
commenting on it, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī refers to Viṣṇu to be jīva, when 
understood in the sense of pervasiveness.463 In another context in the AdS, while 
resolving the apparent contradiction among the Śruti texts that arises from the fact 
that they cannot describe both the qualified and unqualified brahman as possessing 
                                                 
461
 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 607-8. 
462māyākalpitamātṛtāmukhamṛṣādvaitaprapañcāśrayaḥ satyajñānasukhātmakaḥ 
śrutiśikhotthākhaṇḍadhīgocaraḥ / mithyābandhavidhūnanena paramānandaīkatānātmakaṃ mokṣaṃ 
prāpta iva svayaṃ vijayate viṣṇurvikalpojjhitaḥ // (Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 1-2).  
463Advaitasiddhi 2005: Gauḍabrahmānandī (Laghucandrikā), p. 2 (Also see Nair 1990: p. 35). 
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the absolute reality, MS maintains that while the Śruti texts conveying the qualified 
brahman possess empirical truth, those of conveying the unqualified brahman enjoy 
absolute truth, thereby affirming the fact that Śruti talks about the dual aspects of 
brahman, qualified and unqualified,464 which also finds support from Śaṃkara’s 
explanation of BS 1.1.11.465 
In the present context, we may take note of Śaṃkara’s understanding of the 
two above-mentioned terms ‘I’ and ‘brahman’ as used in BhG 14.27, in order to 
compare how MS effectively emphasises the devotional aspect. According to 
Śaṃkara, ‘I’ here means the indwelling self (pratyag-ātmā) that is the abode of 
brahman, the supreme self, which is of the nature of immortality (amṛtatva) etc., 
and that the indwelling self is determined to be the supreme self by right knowledge 
(samyag-jñāna). This fact, Śaṃkara asserts, has already been stated in the 
immediately preceding verse ‘He who attends on me unstrayingly with the 
discipline of the yoga of devotion and thus transcends the guṇas is fit to become 
brahman’ (BhG 14.26). Thus, for Śaṃkara, the expression ‘right knowledge’ is the 
culmination of unswerving adherence to the discipline of the yoga of devotion 
(avyabhicāri-bhakti-yoga) [referred to in BhG 14.26]. Śaṃkara maintains that since 
the power and its possessor are non-different, the power of God through which 
brahman shows his grace to his devotees is the same as brahman. Alternatively, 
Śaṃkara says, ‘I’ and ‘brahman’ refer to the unconditioned and conditioned 
brahman respectively, where the former is the ground of the latter.466 
                                                 
464 Advaitasiddhi 2005: Advaitasiddhi text and Gauḍabrahmānandī thereon, p. 720 (Also see Gupta 
2006: p. 68). 
465 Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 136. 
466 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 606-8 (Also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: pp. 
992-3). 
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Śrīdhara Svāmin mentions that the referent of the word ‘I’ (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa) 
is the foundation (pratiṣṭhā) or image (pratimā) of brahman.  In other words, ‘I’ 
(i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa) refers to the brahman amalgamated (ghanībhūtaṃ 
brahmaivāham), just as the solar orbit (sūryamaṇḍala) is light amalgamated 
(ghanībhūta-prakāśa).467 The idea is that, just as the sun is both the form of light and 
also the basis of light, Lord Kṛṣṇa, being himself brahman, is also the basis of 
brahman. The interpretation of these two terms (viz. ‘I’ and ‘brahman’) proposed 
by MS is similar. Viśvanātha, in the course of explaining the point in question and 
in order to highlight the role of devotion in this context, refers to the respective 
BhG interpretations of Śrīdhara Svāmin and MS. Apart from Śrīdhara’s 
interpretation of the BhG, Viśvanātha also refers to Śrīdhara’s commentary on VuP 
6.7.76 to the effect that Lord Viṣṇu is the shelter or basis of the omniscient self or 
supreme brahman. While referring to MS, Viśvanātha says that MS explains the 
context by saying that the referent of ‘I’ (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa) alone is the basis or 
culmination (paryāpti) or complete fullness (paripūrṇatā) of brahman.  Viśvanātha 
also cites MS’s verse eulogising Lord Kṛṣṇa as the son of Nanda etc.468 
Thus, it can be concluded that the GD stresses the personalistic brahman, 
who, being endowed with characteristics (saviśeṣa), is known as Kṛṣṇa, Vāsudeva, 
Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu etc., although, in accordance with Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic 
interpretation, MS also identifies the supreme self with the supreme reality. In 
summary, MS admits brahman as having dual ontological status (with attributes 
(saviśeṣa or saguṇa) and without (nirviśeṣa or nirguṇa)) and this is what is 
indicated by the term ‘that,’ which occurs in the sentence ‘tattvamasi’. 
                                                 
467 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 606-7. 
468 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): pp. 387-8. 
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4.2. The individual self (jīvātman) as indicated in the Bhagavadgītā and the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
We have seen that MS divides the BhG into three parts, viz. karma, bhakti, and 
jñana-kāṇḍa-s,469 corresponding respectively to ‘thou’, ‘that’ and ‘art’ of the 
Upaniṣadic mahā-vākya ‘That thou art’.470 We have also seen that the terms ‘thou’ 
and ‘that’ are understood to be personified by the two principal characters of the 
text, Arjuna (as the representative of the individual selves or all human beings in 
general) and Lord Kṛṣṇa (the supreme self) respectively. According to MS’s 
division, the first six chapters of the text are concerned with explicating the 
meaning of ‘thou’, chapters 7-12 are concerned with ‘that’, and the remainder with 
‘art’, though not understood in the strict sense of absolute identity.  
The referent of the term ‘thou’ is understood in terms of Arjuna’s character 
as depicted in the BhG, in which he represents the individual self (jīvātman) after 
being instructed by the supreme self (paramātman), represented by Lord Kṛsṇa. 
Arjuna is bewildered by grief and delusion due to the lack of discriminative 
knowledge between body and self, and thus he must be instructed about the various 
means of self-realisation, viz. karma-yoga, bhakti-yoga and jñāna-yoga, which are 
to be followed by the individual self throughout its quest for liberation. Though the 
term ‘individual self’ is used in the BhG in the sense of self or supreme-self or 
brahman,471 there are also other words that have been used to denote the individual 
                                                 
469 We have mentioned earlier that, though this division implies considerable originality of thought, 
it is not to be viewed firmly. The ideas of karma, bhakti and jñāna are scattered throughout the text, 
though the said division corresponds to the respective ideas strongly. However, despite lack of 
agreement regarding the subject-matter of each six chapters of the text it has been a practice among 
many traditional commentators to consider it having three sections that consist of six chapters each. 
470  GD, introductory verses 4-6. 
471 Śaṃkara in his commentary on the BS says that when brahman, that is, consciousness is accepted 
as the seer in its primary sense, usage of the word ‘self’ in the sense of individual-self is justified 
(Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 1.1.6, p. 173). 
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self, namely puruṣa, brahma, akṣara, kṣetrajña, parā-prakṛti etc. Though all these 
words convey different meanings in different contexts and are sometimes 
interpreted differently by various commentators, they usually denote the individual 
self in the context in which they are used.472  
After this brief note on jīvātman, as depicted in the BhG, let us now discuss 
MS’s philosophical view regarding this ontological entity.   
 
4.2.1. The nature of the individual self (jīvātman) 
The second chapter of the BhG primarily deals with the exposition of the individual 
self. The imparting of self-knowledge as a philosophical teaching by the Lord to 
Arjuna begins from the eleventh verse onwards. In order to ascertain the nature of 
the true knowledge of the self that was imparted to Arjuna, MS, an astute 
dialectician, ascertains the eternal nature of the self first by applying the technical 
terminology of the Navya-nyāya (i.e. the Neo-logic). That the self is not the 
counter-correlative (pratiyogin) of an antecedent non-existence (prāgābhāva),473 he 
says, is attested by the Lord’s statement, ‘Never was there a time when I did not 
exist, or you, or these kings’ (BhG 2.12). That the self is not a counter-correlative of 
non-existence caused by destruction (pradhvaṃsābhāva) is proved by the other part 
of the Lord’s statement; ‘Nor shall any of us cease to exist hereafter’ (BhG 2.12). 
                                                 
472 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 207-8. 
473 According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the non-existence of an effect (like a pot) before its 
production is called prior non-existence or antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva) of that effect, 
while the pot is the counter-correlative (pratiyogin) of that non-existence. The self is not a counter-
correlative of its prior non-existence, as it is always existent. It is not a counter-correlative of its 
non-existence caused by its destruction (pradhaṃsābhāva) as well, as it cannot be destroyed (See 
Virupakshananda 1994: TS 1.9, p. 35). However, while the Naiyāyikas accept non-existence due to 
destruction to be indestructible, the Vedāntins term it destructible, as for them, with the destruction 
of the substratum of destruction, (e.g. the pieces of a jar), non-existence due to destruction is also 
destroyed. The knowledge of brahman, the substratum of all imaginary creations, destroys all 
imaginary creations imposed on it. As the destruction of an imaginary thing is deemed to be the 
same as its substratum, this destruction (as non-existence) is also not eternal (See Mādhavānanda 
1997: VP 6, pp. 137-8).  
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Thus, the self, being associated with existence (sattā) in all three times (kālatraya), 
is eternal (nitya), and also distinct from the body, which is impermanent (anitya).474  
Śaṃkara, living as he did before the Navya-nyāya evolved, does not employ 
heavily technical logical terminology, but he makes his non-dualist stance clear 
when he says that BhG 2.12 means that in spite of the destruction of the body, the 
individual self exists in all three times, since the self is eternal in nature. The term 
‘we’ in the verse stands for the multiplicity of the bodies, not for the multiplicity of 
selves.475 With the support of various Śruti texts, Śaṃkara points out the eternal 
nature of the individual self in his commentary on the BS in a more explicit manner. 
In his opinion, it is to be understood that the individual self (jīva) is eternal, 
birthless, and changeless; it is the unchanging brahman itself appearing as the 
individual self, therefore, the individual self is none but brahman. It is only the 
supreme brahman itself, which in spite of being unchangeable, appears as the 
individual-self, by becoming associated with limiting adjuncts.476 Thus, by denying 
multiple selves and affirming it only of the bodies in the above BhG verse, Śaṃkara 
denies the theory of the Sāṃkhyas that the individual selves are many in number 
(bahu-puruṣa-vāda).477   
The BhG repeatedly asserts the indestructible character (avināśitva) of the 
individual self as compared to the destructible character (vināśitva) of the physical 
body. Therefore, while explaining the text of BhG 2.16 in terms of distinguishing 
the real (sat) [i.e. self or brahman] from the unreal (asat) [i.e. the whole creation 
consisting of duality (dvaitaprapañca) that is superimposed on the former] MS says 
                                                 
474 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 47. 
475 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 47. 
476 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 2.3.17-18, pp. 602, 604 (Also see Swaminathan 2005: p. 17-8). 
477 See Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 80. 
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that the unreal, which is delimited (paricchinna) by time (kāla), space (deśa) and 
other objects of experience (vastu),478 has no being (bhāva) or absolute reality 
(pāramārthikatva) that belongs only to what is free from the three limitations of 
unreal, and is not also limited by what has the reality not less (anyūna) than itself 
(svānyūna-sattāka-tādṛśa-pariccheda-śūnya).479 In his opinion, a pot (ghaṭa) is an 
example of something unreal, since it is subject to origination and destruction, as it 
is a counter-correlative (pratiyogin) of its prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) and 
annihilative non-existence (pradhvāṃsābhāva), as it does not exist before its 
production and after its destruction. Thus it is delimited by time and space. MS here 
refers the reader to his AdS for a more detailed discussion.480  
Though MS, like Śaṃkara, has thus tried to establish the nature of ‘real’ and 
‘unreal’ in order to show the reality of the self with neo-logical argumentation, 
                                                 
478 By ‘objective limitation’ (vastu-pariccheda) MS means the three kinds of difference (bheda), i.e. 
homogeneous difference (sajātīya-bheda) like a tree is different from another tree, heterogeneous 
difference (vijātīya-bheda) like a tree is different from a stone, and internal difference (svagata-
bheda) like a tree is different from its leaves, flowers etc. By ‘objective limitation’ MS also means 
the dualistic Vedānta (Dvaita Vedānta) view that difference is fivefold, i.e. the difference between 
God and individuals, between individuals and the world, between different individuals, between God 
and the world and between the world and world in its various forms  (Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 54).  
That the self or brahman is bereft of svajātīya, vījātīya, and svagata bheda-s is also mentioned by 
Vidyārāṇya in his PD (Pañcadaśī 2008: PD 2.20-21, p. 38). 
479 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 54.  
Brahman, the absolute reality, is devoid (śūnya) of limitations of time, space and objects, as the 
reality of these three limitations is not equal to or greater, but surely lesser, than that of brahman, i.e. 
the absolute reality possesses not less reality than that of the empirical world. All these limitations, 
having lesser reality than brahman and being superimpositions on the latter, do not affect its (i.e. 
brahman’s) absolute reality, and are subsequently sublated by its knowledge. Thus, according to MS, 
that which is limited by time, space and other objects of experience is transitory (vyabhicārī), and 
that which is present somewhere in sometime and remains absent elsewhere in another time is unreal 
(asat). So, all worldly objects are unreal. On the other hand, that which is present in all time and in 
all places, i.e. the supreme reality, brahman, is the real. In this way, it is established that reality 
(vastu) is brahman which is without a second (advaya) and is existence, consciousness and bliss 
(saccidānanda); and by unreality (avastu) one should understand nescience and all other insentient 
beings (ajñānādisakala-jaḍa-samūha) [See Gambhirananda 2000a: Footnote 2, pp. 97-8 and 
Nikhilananda 1997: VS 2. 33, p. 20].  
480 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 54 and 59. 
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Dhanapati Sūri has termed MS’s explanation erroneous.481 He holds that in this 
interpretation, the sentence ‘There is no becoming of what did not already exist, 
there is no unbecoming of what does exist…’ (BhG 2.16) has been virtually reduced 
to two inferences, in each of which the probans (hetu, the middle term in a 
syllogism on the basis of which something is inferred) and the probandum (sādhya, 
the major term in a syllogism or that which is to be proved in the syllogism) have 
become virtually identical, which is a logical defect in the eyes of all logicians. 
Dhanapati holds that MS’s explanation could be admitted if it is corrected in 
accordance with the view of Śaṃkara, but does not propose how it could be 
amended in this fashion. 
Veṅkaṭanātha finds further faults with the explanation of MS on this verse, 
i.e. BhG 2.16. MS holds that the word asat is applicable to things having three types 
of limitation, i.e. the limitation of space, time, and matter (deśa-kāla-vastu-
pariccheda). Veṅkaṭanātha points out that though worldly objects like pot etc. are 
also characterised by the three types of limitation, they are not said to be asat.482  He 
also maintains that the term that the Advaitins use in describing things like pots etc. 
is mithyā. Thus, the interpretation offered by MS in this context is not strictly in 
accordance with the philosophical usage of the Advaita Vedāntins.483 
Further, in the context of BhG 2.17, MS says that what is delimited by time, 
space and objects (deśa-kāla-vastu-paricchinna) is perishable (vināśi); and the 
opposite, i.e. that which is devoid of spatial, temporal and objective limitations 
                                                 
481 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, p. 56. 
482 The term asat is applicable to what is totally fictional, e.g. a sky-flower, which can never be an 
object of our experience. Thus, even illusory objects, which are subject to sublation, are not called 
asat, but something that is neither sat nor asat. While asat means non-existent, mithyā means 
mistaken cognition. 
483 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Brahmānandagiri, p. 107. 
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(deśa-kāla-vastu-pariccheda-śūnya) is imperishable (avināśi). MS further adds that 
the self, being free from all limitations, is imperishable; and it acts as the 
substratum of the sense world, which in itself is devoid of reality and self-
effulgence (sattā-sphūrti-śūnya). Just as an illusory snake (sarpa) or a streak of 
water (dhārā) appear on a rope (rajju) that acts as the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) of 
the illusory snake etc., the imperishable self that is by nature one (eka), all-
pervasive (vibhu) and eternal self-effulgence (nitya-sadrūpa-sphuraṇa) acts as the 
substratum of the world (which is bereft of reality and self-effulgence), which 
accounts for the fact that the world is experienced by us as something that exists 
and is also revealed.484 While explaining BhG 2.18, where destructible bodies are 
spoken of as belonging to the eternal, imperishable, and incomprehensible 
embodied self (dehāśrita ātmā), MS reiterates the Vedāntic view that the self 
(śarīrī), the conscious reality (sphuraṇa-rūpa-sat), is indestructible (and one), while 
the bodies (śarīra) that are destructible are superimposed (adhyasta) on the self due 
to ignorance. He reiterates that here, by the use of the plural number in the context 
of ‘body’, are meant all bodies, cosmic (samaṣṭi), including the gross cosmic body 
(virāṭ), subtle cosmic body (hiraṇyagarbha or sūtra), and unmanifest (avyākṛta)  
and individual (vyaṣṭi), in the form of gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma), and causal 
(kāraṇa) bodies. In order to substantiate his view, MS quotes the Śruti text ‘the 
torso (ātman) is bliss; and the bottom on which it rests is the brahman’ (TU 2.5), 
and holds that brahman is the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) of all five sheaths (pañca-
koṣa) of individual bodies, i.e. physical (annamaya), vital (prāṇamaya), mental 
                                                 
484 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 60.  
Just as a snake or a streak of water which does not have reality and effulgence on its own and 
appears to be a self-effulgent reality after being superimposed on a rope as its ground, this world of 
existence lacking its own reality and self-effulgence appears to be real after being superimposed on 
the self, i.e. the real, consciousness.  
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(manomaya), conscious (vijñānamaya), and blissful (ānandamaya). The point is that 
these sheaths are illusory, but their ground or substratum, i.e. brahman is real.485 
Following Śaṃkara, MS explicates the self-effulgent nature of the self. MS 
explains that, though the self by nature is self-effulgent consciousness (svaprakāśa-
jñāna-svarūpa), it is called the witnessing-self (sākṣī) when conditioned by 
nescience (avidyopahita), and is said to be the knower or cognisor (pramātā or 
pramātṛ-caitanya) when associated with the mind with its modifications (vṛtti-mad-
antaḥkaraṇopahita).486 Baccā Jhā in this context mentions the Vedāntic theory that 
the witnessing self is one (ekasākṣi-vāda); according to this view, though the 
witnessing self, due to the multiplicity of the mind, gives rise to the multiplicity of 
the individual witnessing self (jīva-sākṣī), it is one in the case of God (īśvara-
sākṣī).487 MS also shows the distinction (viveka) between the witnessing self and the 
knower. The knower, through the external organs like eyes etc. that are employed 
as instruments (karaṇa), coupled with the modifications of the mind, illuminates the 
external objects like pot etc., because the consciousness of brahman is reflected in 
the various modifications of the mind  that is transparent (svaccha), and that 
assumes the forms of these objects. The same illuminating consciousness (bhāsaka-
caitanya) becomes a knower while depending on the mental modifications in order 
to perceive an external object, and a witnessing self while not depending on the 
mental modifications in order to perceive the mind and its modifications like 
happiness, sorrow etc. MS mentions here that he has explained this point 
elaborately in his AdS and SB.488  
                                                 
485 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 62. 
486 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 63-4. 
487 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, p. 17. 
488 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 64. 
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The eternality of the self, as stated in the BhG, is established by yet another 
argument in the GD. The self is eternal, being bereft of the alternatives of having a 
beginning (ādi or pūrva) and an end (anta or uttara), and is not something that can 
be produced (anutpādya). It cannot also be ephemeral like space and time. MS 
quotes the BS to show the Vedāntic view that unlike space and time, which are 
delimited by earth, and hence, are produced, the self, being devoid of origination 
and of any limitations, is not non-eternal. This has been explained in the aphorism 
‘But (space is a product), for separateness persists wherever there is an effect, as it 
is seen in the world’ (BS 2.3.7).489 Śaṃkara also explains this BS text with the 
support of various Śruti texts that declare space to be a product of brahman.490 
As regards the immutability of the self, MS says that any action consists in 
being associated with any one of the possible outcomes of action (kriyā), viz. 
production (utpatti), acquisition (āpti), transformation (vikṛti) and change of 
condition (saṃskṛti). The self, being ever in the same state, is immutable (sanātana) 
and cannot be the locus of any of these results of action.491 In the same vein, 
Śaṃkara says in the introduction to his commentary on the Īśopaniṣad (ĪU) that the 
self in its true nature, being eternal, pure, one, bodiless, all-pervasive etc., cannot 
have any genuine association with karma (action or rituals) since it is not produced, 
transformed or attained; and is not also a doer or an enjoyer.492 
While explaining the text, ‘I have known many past births, and so have you, 
Arjuna. I remember them all, while you do not, enemy-burner’ (BhG 4.5), MS 
states the Vedāntic views regarding the nature of the individual self.  The phrase 
                                                 
489 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 78. 
490 Also see Brahamasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 2.3.7, pp. 584-6 for a detailed elucidation on it, and 
Gambhirananda 2000a: Footnote 1, p. 113 in order to understand the cryptic idea expressed here. 
491 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 78-9. 
492 Śrīśaṃkarāgranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, ĪUB, pp. 5-6 (Also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: pp. 843-4). 
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‘and yours’ (tava ca) in this verse, he holds, suggests that either there are other 
individual selves (aneka-jīva) or there is but a sole individual self (eka-jīva).493 By 
addressing Arjuna as ‘Arjuna’ in the verse, which is the name of a tree as well, 
Kṛṣṇa implies that Arjuna’s power of understanding, like a tree that is covered by 
its bark, remains covered by ignorance. The expression ‘enemy burner’ 
(paraṃtapa) implies that Arjuna, who is subject to the illusory awareness of 
difference (bheda-dṛṣṭi), is set to kill others whom he wrongly considers to be his 
foes. Thus, these two words of address to Arjuna convey two aspects of nescience, 
i.e. covering (āvaraṇa) and projecting (vikṣepa).494 MS holds that while Arjuna, 
being an ignorant individual whose power of intellect is imperfect due to 
obstruction, does not know even his own births; the omniscient and omnipotent God 
knows them all (i.e. births of his own as well as those of Arjuna and of others).495 
Baccā Jhā adds that addressing Arjuna as ‘Arjuna’ indicates the covering power 
(āvaraṇa-śakti) of nescience, while the word paraṃtapa indicates his tendency to 
kill enemies etc., which is not possible without the power of projection (vikṣepa-
śakti) possessed by nescience, which accounts for its being followed by action.496  
Śaṃkara also remarks in this connection that Arjuna, with his cognitive 
power (jñāna-śakti) obscured by impressions of his past good (dharma) and bad 
actions (adharma), does not know his past births, but the omniscient and 
                                                 
493 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 186. 
This theory, known as eka-jīvavāda within Advaita, holds that there is but one individual-self and 
one material body. Individual self is both the material and efficient cause of the world. Individual 
self is one because the limiting adjunct (upādhi) of it is the collective nescience (samaṣṭi ajñāna), not 
the individual effect (vyaṣṭi kārya) of nescience like the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) etc. (Also see 
Gupta 2006: pp. 87-98ff. for MS’s treatment on the subject in his AdS, SB etc.; Mādhavānanda 1997: 
VP 7, pp. 178-83 ff., Grimes 2009: p. 157 to have a general idea of this problem). 
494 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 186 (Also see chapter 3.1.5 supra for elaborate 
discussion of the dual power of māyā). 
495 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 186. 
496 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, p. 95. 
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omnipotent God, being eternally pure, intelligent, free (nitya-śuddha-buddha-
mukta) and endowed with unobscured cognitive power (anāvaraṇa-jñāna-śakti), 
knows them all.497 Thus, for both MS and Śaṃkara, the distinction between the 
individual self and the supreme Lord lies in terms of their respective capacity for 
understanding and power. Such a distinction between the individual self and the 
supreme Lord is explained in terms of the distinction between their limiting 
adjuncts, which do not affect the nature of the ultimate reality, which is pure 
consciousness (śuddha-caitanya), one, without a second, eternal and immutable. 
In short, MS’s position can be summarized as one where the individual self 
(jīva), delimited by individual limiting adjuncts (vyaṣṭi upādhi) such as the internal 
organ (antaḥkaraṇa), cannot have omniscience (sarvajñatva), whereas God (īśvara), 
possessing illusion (māyā) [i.e. the ultimate cause of everything, subtle and gross 
alike] as his limiting adjunct, is endowed with the knowledge of past, present and 
future entities and events, and therefore is omniscient. Here, the following objection 
has been anticipated and answered. 
The eternal God, being bereft of merit and demerit of past actions, cannot 
have birth. But BhG 4.5 says that both the Lord and individual self have several 
births, which is clearly inadmissible.498 While explaining the verse ‘Although indeed 
I am unborn and imperishable, although I am the lord of the creatures, I do resort to 
nature, which is mine, and take on birth by my own wizardry’ (BhG 4.6), Śaṃkara 
and MS both reply to this objection as follows. Although the Lord is the unborn 
(janma-rahita) and immutable self (avyayātmā), who is the possessor of 
undiminishing power of knowledge (akṣīṇa-jñāna-śakti) and the master of all 
                                                 
497 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 186. 
498  Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 186. 
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creatures from Brahmā down to a bunch of grass, he only appears to be endowed 
with a body, but does not possess one in the real sense. This is by virtue of his 
power of becoming (māyā), i.e. prakṛti, that consists of three constituents; viz. 
sattva, rajas and tamas, and belongs to him as Viṣṇu. It is on account of this that 
one is deluded and does not know that one’s very self is none but Vāsudeva. MS 
reiterates Śaṃkara’s view in this connection.499  
 
4.2.2. The relation of the individual self to the supreme self 
Having thus mentioned the ontological status of brahman and jīva, a brief note 
pertaining to their relation may be relevant in order to see what the BhG has to say 
about it, and how the Advaitic commentators interpret it. The BhG apparently talks 
about jīva (represented by Arjuna, the seeker after enlightenment and a dedicated 
pupil) and brahman (represented by Lord Kṛṣṇa, the goal of enlightenment and the 
teacher) as two distinct entities. Yet the Advaitins hold them to be non-different, by 
either saying that the former is essentially the same as the latter (since the former is 
nothing but the latter as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts in the form of body 
and internal-organ (antaḥkaraṇa) produced by nescience) or by saying that the 
former is nothing but the reflection of the latter in the internal organs etc.500 Both of 
these views are found in BS 2.3.43-51. Śaṃkara himself, with the support of the 
Upaṇiṣadic texts, claims in his BSB that the individual self is eternal, unborn, 
unchangeable, and that it is non-different from the unchanging brahman. It is 
nothing but the unchanging supreme brahman, which, being associated with 
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 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 186-9 and Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 4.6, 
p. 186 ff. 
500 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 214-5. 
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limiting adjuncts, appears to exist as an individual self.501 A few examples from the 
BhG verses will suffice to substantiate the point under discussion. 
In BhG 15.7, the Lord says that the individual selves are his integral parts: 
‘A particle of myself, as the eternal individual soul in the order of souls.’ While 
explaining this verse, MS states the objection of the opponents against the statement 
in a previous verse, ‘on reaching which they do not return’ (BhG 15.6) and answers 
it. Against the objection that every action of going has the act of coming back 
(nivartana) at the end, so that reaching the state of Viṣṇu must also be followed by 
the act of returning back to this world, MS says that the goer, i.e. the individual self 
(jīva), and the destination (gantavya), i.e. brahman, are non-different (abhinna). 
The use of the term ‘reaching’ in this verse is figurative (aupacārika), so there is no 
logical necessity of a return. Since brahman becomes mediate (vyavahita) [from the 
individual self] due to nescience (ajñāna) and the individual self identifies itself 
with brahman at the dawn of knowledge, describing this knowledge as ‘the 
attainment of brahman’ (brahma-prāpti) is purely figurative (vyapadeśa).502 
In support of his view, MS now puts forward in the GD the different 
Vedāntic theories regarding the relation between the individual self and the 
supreme self. He holds that the jīva may be regarded as the reflection (pratibimba) 
of brahman. Just as the sun reflected in water (jala-pratibimbita-sūrya) merges with 
the sun itself on removal of the water and does not return to water, similarly, on 
account of upādhi, the jīva appears to be different from brahman, and, on cessation 
of upādhi, it does not return to its former stage. Alternatively, the jīva may be 
conceived of as a part of brahman. Like the space confined in a pot (ghaṭākāśa), 
                                                 
501 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB 2.3.17-18, pp. 602-4. 
502 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 618-9. 
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which merges with the cosmic space (mahākāśa) on the destruction of the pot, upon 
the removal of the limiting factor of the intellect (buddhyavachinna), the formerly 
limited jīva does not return to its previous state. The individual self, when identified 
with its unconditioned essential nature (nirupādhi-svarūpa, i.e. brahman), on 
removal of the individual self’s limiting adjuncts (upādhi), realizes identity with 
brahman, and does not return any more to its former state.503 In the same vein, in 
the SB as well, following Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśtman and Vācaspati 
Miśra, MS discusses elaborately the different Vedāntic theories concerning the 
relation between jīva and brahman.504 Also, in the AdS, quoting the Śruti text, ‘One 
quarter of him are all creatures, three quarters the immortal in heaven’ (CU 3.12.6) 
and BhG 15.7, which affirm brahman as having jīva as a part of brahman, MS holds 
that these authoritative texts prove the basic identity of brahman and jīva. He 
maintains that jīva cannot be a part of brahman in the sense of a limited portion, for 
brahman is beginningless and partless. Since there cannot be any genuine part in 
brahman (niṣpradeśa-brahma), MS asserts that the so-called different parts of 
brahman must be admitted to be based on imaginary distinctions.505  
Śaṃkara faces an objection that the partless (niravayava) supreme self 
cannot have any component part (avayava), and if it has component parts, then it is 
likely to be destroyed once those parts get disintegrated, and responds by pointing 
out that the so-called portions of brahman delimited by the limiting adjuncts of 
nescience are admitted as merely imaginary entities. He adds that this view has 
been explained in detail in the chapter on kṣetra (BhG 13.2).506 MS too replies to the 
                                                 
503 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 619. 
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 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 42-50 (Also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: pp. 1012-14). 
505 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 846 (Also refer to Gupta 2006: p. 80 ff.). 
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same objections by saying that, though the supreme self is essentially partless, it is 
imagined through nescience in the world [i.e. domain of embodied beings (jīva-
loka)] as something that has parts due to reflection, delimitation etc.507  
As has been noted before, the Lord has categorically asserted that the 
sentient beings (jīva-s) belong to his superior primordial nature (parā-prakṛti), as 
contrasted to his inferior primordial nature (aparā-prakṛti) consisting of insentient 
beings (jaḍa). The Lord also says he is the creator and destroyer of the entire 
universe made of these two prakṛti-s (BhG 7.4-6). Regarding the parā-prakṛti of the 
Lord which takes the form of the individual selves (jīva-bhūta), MS holds, in 
consonance with Śaṃkara, that it is (i) conscious by nature (cetanātmikā), (ii)  
characterised as the knower of the field (kṣetrajña), (iii) entirely pure (viśuddha) 
and (iv) identified with the Lord (mamātmābhūta), who upholds together this entire 
material world. In support of his view, MS quotes the Śruti text, ‘I establish the 
distinctions of name and appearance by entering these three deities with this living 
self’ (CU 6.3.2). The world cannot be held together without the presence of the 
conscious self.508 Śaṃkara’s explanation of the Śruti text lends support to MS, as 
Śaṃkara says that the deity here stands for the absolute (sat), which is the origin of 
fire, water and food, which manifests itself in distinct names and forms through the 
individual self, which in turn is of the nature of consciousness, non-different from 
the supreme self.509 
In another context, the Lord says, ‘The lord of all creatures is inside their 
hearts and with his wizardry he revolves all the creatures as if mounted on a water 
                                                 
507 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 619. 
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wheel’ (BhG 18.61). As explained before, this verse apparently suggests that the 
Lord resides in the hearts of all beings (sarveṣāṃ prāṇinām), and thus affirms the 
immanence of the supreme self in the individual self, thereby indicating some sort 
of difference between them.510 The explicit mention of identity between the 
individual self and the supreme self is, however, found in the Lord’s own assertion 
in chapter 13 (i.e. Kṣetra-kṣetrajña-vibhāga-yoga) of the BhG; ‘Know, Bhārata, that 
I too am such a guide, but to all the fields; this knowledge of guide and field I deem 
knowledge indeed’ (BhG 13.2). Though by kṣetra is meant the physical body 
(śarīra), kṣetrajña means the knower of the physical body in BhG 13.1, and the 
fuller implication of these two terms is brought out in MS’s explanation of BhG 
13.2, which conveys the identity between the individual self viewed as kṣetrajña; 
residing in the body, and the supreme self, denoted by the word māṃ, that has been 
employed in BhG 13.2. 
According to MS, this verse expresses the view that the knower of the field 
is by nature self-effulgent, consciousness, eternal and all-pervasive, on whom the 
empirical ideas of agentship (kartṛtva), enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) etc. are 
superimposed through nescience. It is to be known as ultimately non-different from 
the Lord, who is by nature transcendental (asaṃsārī) and non-dual brahman in the 
form of bliss (advitīya-brahmānanda-rūpa).511 Thus, the field is something illusory 
or unreal that is imagined through nescience, and the knower of the field is the 
absolute truth (paramārtha-satya), which is the substratum of that illusory idea. 
This fact is really the knowledge of reality, which leads to liberation; and it is of the 
nature of revelation (prakāśa), which is opposed to nescience. MS says here that the 
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511 Thus, the empirical conditioned individual self and the Lord in the nature of pure consciousness 
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‘commentator’ (i.e. Śaṃkara) has discussed in detail the position that a difference 
between the individual self and God, which is felt from an empirical point of view, 
is imagined due to nescience, the individual self and God being identical from the 
ultimate point of view.512   
It is to be noted that Śaṃkara has established with elaborate arguments 
based on scriptural passages and the doctrine of avidyā the view that the supreme 
self, though undifferentiated, gets diversified into many kṣetrajña-s because of the 
limiting adjuncts in the form of various kṣetra-s or bodies and antaḥkaraṇa-s (i.e. 
the internal organs) that are the products of nescience. Once the limiting adjuncts 
are sublated or removed, the kṣetrajña-s or jīva-s become identified (i.e. non-
different) from the non-dual supreme self.513 Śrīdhara maintains that, though the 
kṣetrajña during its transmigratory nature is considered as jīva, in reality, only the 
supreme lord, who is all-pervading, is present in all bodies (kṣetra-s) as kṣetrajña, 
since the nature of the supreme lord is the same as that referred to as the conscious 
part (cidaṃśa) which is indicated by the Upaniṣadic sentence ‘That thou art’.514            
Rāmānuja, however, holds that while the Lord is the self of the knower 
(jīvātmā) present in all bodies in the form of gods, men etc.; he is also to be 
admitted as the body (kṣetra) as well. Just as the body, being the distinguishing 
attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of its knower (i.e. the self), remains inseparable (apṛthaksiddha) 
from the latter on account of the principle of grammatical co-ordination 
(sāmānādhikaraṇya); so also both the body and its knower, being the distinguishing 
attributes (viśeṣaṇa) forming the body of the Lord, remain inseparable from the 
Lord, their inseparability being known by virtue of the terms expressing them being 
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grammatically co-ordinated. It is attested in the text (BhG 15.16-18) that the 
supreme brahman, Vāsudeva, is different from the body and its knower, who (i.e. 
its knower) is both bound (baddha) and free (mukta), and is also denoted by the 
words kṣara and akṣara.515 
Thus, we find that the verse in question regarding the relation of the knower 
of the field to the supreme-self has been explained by MS, in unanimity with 
Śaṃkara and Śrīdhara, and in direct opposition to Rāmānuja. While the former 
three commentators, admitting the doctrine of avidyā, claim that it expresses the 
identity of the individual self and the supreme reality brahman; Rāmānuja thinks 
that it expresses the design of immanence of the supreme self in all sentient beings 
and the cosmic matter as the indwelling self (pratyagātmā), thereby having an 
organic relation with them (i.e. sentient beings and the cosmic matter).516 It may be 
noted that BS 2.3.43 which declares the jīva-s to be parts of brahman, seems to 
convey both the difference and non-difference between jīva and brahman; since a 
‘part’ (aṃśa) is normally viewed as some sort of qualified substance (viśiṣṭa 
dravya), which is compatible with the view of Rāmānuja.517 However, while 
explaining this aphorism, Śaṃkara reiterates his view that the individual is only 
apparently a part of God, as the partless brahman cannot have any part in the literal 
sense of this term, though he accepts that both the difference and non-difference 
between jīva and brahman are acknowledged in this text.518   
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4.3. The universe (jagat) 
Along with the two other entities, viz. brahman and jīva, the cosmos (jagat) also 
has a distinct role to play not only in the Vedānta but also in Indian philosophical 
discussion at large. We have seen earlier that the Lord univocally declares that he is 
the creator and destroyer of this cosmic universe, and that all beings have their 
origin in his two primordial natures, i.e. the insentient or lower (aparā prakṛti) and 
the sentient or superior (parā prakṛti) [BhG 7.4-6]. With this idea in view, let us 
discuss how the various commentators interpret how this important entity has been 
presented in the BhG. 
 
4.3.1. The origin and ontological status of the universe 
The BhG asserts in key places that the entire universe is created by the Lord, but 
elsewhere also says that the Lord does not in fact create anything. It is the creative 
power of nature (prakṛti) that gives rise involuntarily to the whole aggregate of 
beings, ‘Resting on my own nature, I create, again and again, this entire aggregate 
of creatures involuntarily by the force of nature’ (BhG 9.8). MS argues that the 
Lord does not create this world for his own enjoyment, as he is the pure 
consciousness in the form of cosmic witness. Otherwise, he would be an empirical 
entity, which would bar him from being God. He does not create this universe for 
anybody else, because there could be no other conscious entity but the Lord, who 
resides in every living being as the individual consciousness (jīva-s). Nor can the 
creation be for any insentient being, which can never be an enjoyer, and creation is 
supposed to facilitate the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. Nor can it be accepted 
that creation is meant for liberation, since there is in fact no real bondage, and since 
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creation is opposed to liberation.519 MS holds further that just as the dreamer 
projects a dream-world (svāpna-prapañca), or a magician projects various 
creations; the Lord creates the world or the aggregate of elements through mere 
imagination. And thus, the view that the entire process of creation is nothing but a 
false appearance is held by MS in an unambiguous manner, when he says that the 
untenability (anupapatti) regarding the possibility of creation compels one to regard 
it as unreal. Hence, the thesis that the world is illusory does not run counter 
(pratikūla) to the Advaita Vedāntins.520 In this way, MS establishes his claim that 
the world that is supposed to be created can never have the status of brahman, 
which is the ever-existent reality. 
In another context, the Lord asserts that prakṛti, which is described as the 
large brahman (mahat brahma) is his womb (yoni), where he plants the seed and 
from which all beings originate (BhG 14.3). MS explains that during the time of 
creation, the Lord, in order to bring the knower of the field (kṣetrajña, i.e. jīva) 
[which remains merged with the Lord at the time of dissolution] into contact with 
nescience, desire, the results of past actions, and with the field (kṣetra) [i.e. the 
object to be enjoyed as the body-organs complex], deposits the seed (garbha) in the 
form of modification of māyā by ejecting ‘semen’ that is otherwise called 
semblance of consciousness (cidābhāsa). It thus gives rise to the state of creation of 
space, air, fire, water, earth etc. MS continues that from this so-called insemination 
                                                 
519 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 417. With this, the view of the Sāṃkhyas is also 
refuted, which proclaims creation to be meant for the enjoyment of the puruṣa and for the attainment 
of emancipation (Also see Brahma 1986: p. 728). 
520 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 417-8. 
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(garbhādhāna) originate all beings from the hiraṇyagarbha downwards, though 
without this process of insemination initiated by the Lord, no creation takes place.521  
Śaṃkara and Śrīdhara too interpret this verse (BhG 14.3) in a similar 
manner.522 The BhG does not mention clearly the process of evolution of the 
products of prakṛti, but merely enumerates its evolutes (in BhG 7.4. 13.5 etc.). MS 
has explained both the views of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta in this regard with an 
assertion that the latter is the better one.523 Again, we find that BhG 14 describes in 
detail the nature of prakṛti as consisting of three guṇa-s (triguṇātmikā), i.e. sattva, 
rajas, and tamas. The fact that prakṛti is the same as māyā of the Lord is asserted by 
the BhG throughout (BhG 4.6, 7.14, 18.61 etc.)524, which has also been interpreted 
in a non-dualistic manner by MS. In his PB, MS refers to the different theories of 
creation as held by various schools of Indian philosophy and asserts that both the 
non-dualist and dualist Vedāntins (i.e. the Vaiṣṇavas) agree with the view that the 
supreme Lord, the one without a second, is the creator of the world.525  
With regard to the ontological status of the universe as set forth in the BhG, 
we may mention that, though the description of glories of the Lord in BhG 10 and 
elsewhere establishes the reality of the cosmos, it is held in BhG 7.7, 9.4 etc. that 
the subsistence of the cosmos depends on the supreme self or Lord. Further, in 
another important context, the Lord says in the BhG that the entire universe is 
pervaded by him in an unmanifest form, though he does not exist in it (BhG 9.4). 
MS has explained this verse in the following way. He holds that just as due to 
ignorance a rope is imagined as a snake or a line of water, and the existence and 
                                                 
521 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 589. 
522 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam and Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 588-9. 
523 For details, see Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 344-6 and 541-2. 
524 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 218-9. 
525 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 1977: p. 10. 
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manifestation of the snake or line of water depend on that of the rope, similarly this 
world consisting of all visible elements and their effects are imagined through 
ignorance about the Lord, but are pervaded by the Lord, his supreme reality being 
the substratum of this world and accounting for the existence and manifestation of 
the latter. Against the doubt that Vāsudeva, the Lord, being a limited human being, 
cannot pervade the entire universe, as it is opposed to common experience, MS 
argues526 that, though all the mundane elements etc. and their products are pervaded 
by the unmanifest form of the Lord which transcends our senses and is of the form 
of self-effulgence, non-duality, consciousness and eternal bliss (svaprakāśādvaya-
caitanya-sadānanda-rūpa), he does not at all subsist in these illusory elements, as 
there can be no genuine relation between the imagined (reality) and the non-
imagined (illusory).527  
In his BhGB, Śaṃkara declares clearly in this connection that the Lord is the 
inmost core even of space (ākāśasya api antaratamaḥ).528 In the same tune, as noted 
before, in his BSB too, Śaṃkara maintains that space also originates like fire etc. 
and that (in order to avoid contradicting the Upaniṣads) it is established that space is 
a product of brahman.529 Thus, the Upaniṣadic passages describing the origin of the 
world clearly imply that, though brahman is by nature bereft of any form by nature 
(avyakta-svarūpa), all entities, both sentient and insentient, nevertheless subsist in 
brahman, which is their self and inner-controller, though they are not aware of its 
                                                 
526 MS bases himself on Śaṃkara’s explanation on the BS: ‘…whenever there is a superimposition of 
one thing on another, the locus is not affected by the merits and demerits of the thing superimposed’ 
(BSB, introduction). See Brahmasūtra 2000:  p. 40. 
527 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 413-4. 
528 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 414. 
529 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 2.3.6-7, pp. 582 and 588.  
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existence. In short, the universe does not exist apart from brahman, though 
brahman is not dependent on the universe for its existence.530 
Thus, in an important verse in the BhG, the Lord asserts: ‘In water I am the 
taste, Kaunteya, in sun and moon the light, in all the Vedas the syllable OṂ, in 
space the sound’ (BhG 7.8), which equates the supreme-self with the cosmos. While 
the comments of Śaṃkara and MS in this regard equate brahman with the cosmic 
universe,531 Śaṃkara’s explanation on the Upaniṣadic texts; ‘Brahman, you see, is 
this whole world…’ (CU 3.14.1) conveys that this cosmic universe, being in various 
names and forms and the object of perception etc., has brahman as its source. 
Śaṃkara further adds that, since the cosmic universe is the greatest of all, it is 
known as brahman.532 
Having noted thus the nature of the supreme self and that of the cosmos 
according to the BhG, we may now ask whether these two ontological entities are 
stated to be related in the BhG, and if the answer is yes, then how? The clear-cut 
answer from the Advaitins would be that, though from the empirical point of view 
the universe exists, from the viewpoint of the supreme reality it has no independent 
existence; since it is non-different from brahman. The cosmos appears to be 
existent due to our ignorance of the sole reality, brahman, there being no other 
reality than brahman.  
Accordingly, in his AdRR MS, vehemently refutes the dualist Naiyāyika 
view that the world is real, where in the introductory verses MS pays obeisance to 
brahman, who by its very nature is existence, consciousness, and bliss, and has 
                                                 
530 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 97and 199. 
531 For details, refer to Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam and Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 
351-2.  
532 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 9, p. 173. 
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assumed the human form (of Lord Kṛṣṇa). He asserts that his aim in undertaking 
this venture is to establish the gem of non-duality by rebutting the dualist opponents 
who pose as logicians, but put forward defective arguments.533 As has been noted 
before, in order to establish the supreme non-dual reality, i.e. brahman, MS has 
given elaborate arguments in his AdS for showing the unreality of empirical 
objects.534 In the same vein, in his AdRR, MS, having quoted Śaṃkara, Sureśvara 
and Sarvajñātman, maintains that there cannot be any genuine association between 
brahman (sat), the only existent reality, and empirical existence (anṛta or mithyā), 
because, while the former is bereft of any association (asaṅga), one without second 
(advitīya), conscious (cinmātra), and transcendentally real (paramārtha satya), the 
latter, like a dream, is imagination that is based on nescience.535 In accordance with 
the true import of non-dualism, MS asserts that, though both brahman and 
nescience are generally regarded as the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the 
universe, brahman, being unchangeable, is the non-evolving cause through false 
appearance (vivarta) due to nescience, while nescience is the evolving cause 
(pariṇāmī kāraṇa) of the universe. He thereby affirms that brahman is neither the 
material cause nor the efficient/instrumental cause of the universe in the proper 
senses of these terms.536 Further, in a more firm tone, MS asserts in his SB that from 
nescience, as associated with the reflection of pure consciousness, proceeds the 
empirical existence, of which God (īśvara)537 is the creator.538  In Śaṃkara’s 
commentary on BS 2.3.13 it is attested that God, as the locus of the elements of 
                                                 
533 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: Introductory verses 1-2, p. 1. 
534 Advaitasiddhi 2005: AdS 1.3-8, pp. 48-232. 
535 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 5 (Also see Gupta 2006: p. 83). 
536 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 757 ff. (Also see Gupta 2006: p. 102 ff.). 
537 īśvara itself, according to Advaita, is conditioned by nescience. 
538 Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 89 ff. (Also see Gupta 2006: p. 102 ff.). 
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space etc., creates the products of these elements.539 All these statements are in 
agreement with Śaṃkara’s unambiguous assertion in BSB 3.2.32 that, due to the 
fact that when brahman is known everything else is known, the independent 
existence of anything else other than brahman cannot be thought of.540 
Having thus noted above in brief the nature of the three important entities 
discussed in the Vedānta philosophy, i.e. brahman, jīva, and jagat, which are also 
the cornerstones of the philosophic teaching of the BhG, as admitted by Śaṃkara 
and MS, and as reflected in their works and those of other commentators of the 
BhG, we may assert firmly that in performing the task of establishing the non-dual 
Vedāntic stance, MS is on a par with Śaṃkara. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
539 Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 595 (Also see Nair 1990: p. 85). 
540 Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 725 (Also see Śaṃkara’s comments on BS 2.3.5, pp. 580-1 in the same 
edition). 
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5 
 
Liberation (mokṣa) and the Means (sādhana) of Attaining 
It  
 
 
 
In the two preceding chapters, we have discussed at some length the summary of 
the BhG as presented by MS in his introduction to the GD, and the three principal 
Vedāntic metaphysical realities, i.e. brahman, jīva, and jagat. As the final goal of 
any śāstra is to ensure its followers liberation or emancipation (mokṣa/mukti) from 
suffering, the BhG too holds liberation to be its ultimate goal. In the present 
chapter, the nature of liberation as held by the Advaita Vedānta and the process of 
attaining it will be discussed.     
             At the outset, the following observation of Sanjukta Gupta about the 
concept of liberation admitted in the Advaita Vedānta in general and by MS in 
particular may be pertinent: 
In Advaita-vedānta, liberation is not the resultant state that jīva should attain. According to 
this school, liberation (mukti/mokṣa) is an ever-accomplished fact; it is nothing but 
Brahman itself. It is the revelation of absolute bliss. Absolute cessation of misery, which 
precedes liberation, implies the blissfulness of liberation, and jīva aspires to achieve it for 
that bliss. Vedāntic mokṣa is thus not mere cessation of misery. It is absolute bliss. 
Madhusūdana maintains that liberation is in fact identical with one’s own real self, ātman, 
which is integral, all-blissful, non-dual consciousness. It is pure and non-dual 
consciousness.541  
   
               In consonance with Gupta’s observation mentioned above, the present 
chapter of the thesis is devoted to the explication of the concept of liberation and 
the means of attaining it, as propounded by the BhG and as explained by MS in his 
GD. 
                                                 
541 Gupta 2006: p. 114. 
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5.1. The nature of liberation as upheld by Bhagavadgītā and Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
At the outset, it may be mentioned that for Śaṃkara, ‘Liberation is the state of 
identity with brahman [by the individual self]’ (‘brahmabhāvaśca mokṣaḥ’, BSB on 
BS 1.1.4).542 The BhG states that liberation is the supreme goal of human life 
(parama-puruṣārtha), but it does not give the details of its nature. This idea is 
envisaged there in different contexts. In some verses (BhG 4.31, 5.24, 8.24, 13.30, 
18.50 etc.), it is described as reaching brahman; or in some verses (BhG 4.9; 7.23; 
8.7, 15, 16; 9.25, 28, 34; 10.10; 11.55; 12.4; 18.55, 65, 68 etc.) as reaching Lord 
Kṛṣṇa, that is, being fit to become brahman or being fit to become non-different 
from Lord Kṛṣṇa. The BhG describes various means for attaining this liberation (i) 
through knowledge (BhG 4.9 etc.), (ii) through action (BhG 5.2-6 etc.), (iii) through 
a combination of knowledge and renunciation of action (BhG 9.28, 12.12 etc.), (iv) 
through devotion (BhG 8.22 etc.), or (v) through the grace of the Lord (BhG 18.56, 
62 etc.).543 
              As regards the nature of liberation, the BhG describes it as a state beyond 
death, a release from the sickness and suppression of birth, a dwelling from where 
no one comes back. It is the supreme end, a state of the greatest accomplishment. 
That a jñānin or a bhakta is viewed as equally capable of reaching this state 
according to the BhG is clear from its various verses. While it asserts that it is only 
through devotion to Lord Kṛṣṇa that he can be reached (BhG 11.54, 18.55 etc.), it is 
also uttered by the Lord himself that the jñānin is his own self (BhG 7.18 etc.). 
Again, in one context, it is said that the devotee, having attained identity with the 
                                                 
542 Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 128. 
543 Cf. Mainkar 1969: p. 43. 
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Lord, goes beyond birth and death (BhG 14.2). Thus, the BhG unequivocally asserts 
that a jñānin or a bhakta becomes fit for liberation.544  
             In another context, the BhG holds liberation to be the supreme domain of 
the Lord, on reaching which there can be no return to any earlier stage (BhG 15.6 
etc.). As to the practice of jñāna-yoga, it is said that the enlightened being, having 
been freed from the bondage of rebirth, reaches the state beyond any affliction 
(BhG 2.51 etc.). Further, it is said that on account of their sins being washed away 
by knowledge, the seekers of liberation attain the state of no return (BhG 5.17 etc.). 
Regarding the practice of bhakti-yoga, it is uttered by the Lord himself that on 
reaching him, the seeker attains the highest perfection and does not return to the 
state of rebirth, which is the impermanent abode of suffering (BhG 8.15 etc.). The 
Lord also says that, though all states, including the world of Lord Brahmā, are such 
that those who them have to be reborn, once the Lord is reached there is no question 
of rebirth (BhG 8.16 etc.). It is held that by the observance of bhakti-yoga, the 
seeker attains the Lord alone (BhG 18.65 etc.). Through devotion, the devotee 
knows the Lord in reality, and consequently, enters him forthwith (BhG 18.55 etc.). 
So, all these passages of the BhG show that the supreme goal to be reached is to 
attain the Lord, the supreme self, since the individual self, united with the supreme 
self, overcomes bondage.  
             Besides, there are a few statements in the BhG which imply that jīva, on 
being enlightened, reaches the status of brahman, i.e. merges with brahman. Such a 
state is known as brahma-bhāva or brāhmī-sthiti (BhG 2.72 etc.). The BhG also 
declares that one who is steadfast in knowledge (sthita-prajña) arrives at this state, 
                                                 
544 See Mainkar 1969: p. 43. 
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i.e. brāhmī-sthiti (BhG 2.54, 55 etc.). Attainment of the status of brahman or 
becoming brahman (brahma-bhūyāya) by the seeker is also indicated in BhG 5.24-
26, 14.26, 18.53 etc.545 Together with the above-mentioned verses in the BhG; the 
verses 13.3, 12, 18; 14.19; 8.23-26; 13.12 etc. of the BhG may also be looked into in 
this connection.546 
             Having thus shown above the specific verses in the BhG where the idea of 
‘liberation’ has been defined in its various nuances, let us discuss below in brief 
how MS explicates this idea in his GD in particular and in other works in general.  
             As explained before, MS mentions in the versified introduction to his GD 
that indicating the path for the attainment of the highest good or salvation is the 
purpose (prayojana) served by the BhG śāstra, and that this highest good is the 
supreme abode of Lord Viṣṇu, being of the nature of sccidānanda. We have also 
seen that MS has explained in the GD the various means of attaining this highest 
good (paraṃ niḥśreyasa) or the highest goal (parama-purāṣārtha) with an emphasis 
on the principal means of action, devotion, and knowledge, which are interwoven in 
the BhG itself together with other ways subsidiary to such principal means.  
                 In connection with becoming fit for reaching brahman or Lord Kṛṣṇa being 
described as obtaining liberation, MS explains in BhG 4 that those who know and 
perform all the twelve sacrifices referred to in this chapter reach the eternal reality, 
brahman, i.e. they go beyond the cycle of birth and death or transmigration 
(saṃsāra) through the purification of the mind and attainment of knowledge.547 
Śaṃkara had also held in this connection that the aspirants for liberation reach 
brahman in course of time, through different stages (kramamukti), i.e. after 
                                                 
545 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 257-9. 
546 See Mainkar 1969: p. 43 ff. 
547 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā on BhG 4.31, pp. 228-9. 
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attaining knowledge that follows after the purification of the mind etc.548 While 
explaining the Lord’s assertion (BhG 5.24) that a yogin, who is satisfied within, 
attains oneness with brahman, which is final emancipation (nirvāṇa), MS, following 
Śaṃkara, maintains that brahman, by virtue of its nature of supreme bliss, is itself 
the final emancipation, owing to its being the cessation of world-duality, which is 
imaginary (since the cessation of whatever is imaginary is the same as the 
substratum on which that thing is imagined). As that brahman is the substratum of 
false world-appearance, the yogin (as described before) attains the ever-attained 
(i.e. brahman) with the dissipation of the veil of ignorance that is the cause of 
world-appearance, while he (i.e. that yogin) is indeed eternally one with brahman. 
In support of this claim, MS quotes the Śruti text: ‘Brahman he is, and to brahman 
he goes’ (BU 4.4.6) and the BS text: ‘Kāśakṛtsna thinks (the statement about the 
identity in the beginning of the text is in order) because of the existence of the 
supreme Self as the individual self’ (BS 1.4.22). While explaining the above Śruti 
text, Śaṃkara says that the expression ‘to become absorbed in brahman’ is a 
figurative one, meant for one who holds a different view from that of the 
Upaniṣads, which convey the undifferentiated character of the self (as jīva by nature 
is brahman eternally).549 Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic stand is also found in the 
explanation of the BS text cited above where he maintains, with the support of 
various Śruti and Smṛti texts, that this statement (of the teacher Kāśakṛtsna) of non-
difference is right because of the subsistence of the very supreme self in the form of 
the individual self.550  
                                                 
548 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, on BhG 4.31, p. 229. 
549 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 10, p. 623. 
550 Brahmasūtra 2000: p. 416 ff. 
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              In the same vein, while explaining BhG 5.26, MS asserts clearly that those 
who have direct realisation of the self are presented with brahman as final 
emancipation (brahmanirvāṇa) whether they are alive or dead, since liberation is 
eternal and cannot be sought for in future owing to its not being an object of 
aspiration or an end to be arrived at (sādhyatvābhāva).551 Śrīdhara emphasises the 
point by saying that the liberated merge in brahman not only after death but also 
while they are alive.552 
             While explaining the contention of the Lord that the knowers of brahman 
attain brahman while departing from this world by the path of deities [i.e. the path 
of fire, flame, the day, the bright fortnight, and the six months of the sun’s northern 
course (BhG 8.24)], MS, in agreement with Śaṃkara, maintains that meditation on 
the saguṇa-brahman helps the seeker reach gradually the nirguṇa-brahman. With 
the support of the BS text ‘Bādari thinks that the souls are led to the conditioned 
Brahman, for it (alone) can reasonably be the goal’ (BS 4.3.7), he holds that the 
worshippers of the conditioned or qualified brahman, by departing by the path of 
deities (deva-yāna-mārga), attain brahman having delimitation by effects 
functioning as limiting adjuncts, since unconditioned brahman is attained in 
gradually reached liberation (karma-mokṣa)  that can be obtained through the 
realisation of the conditioned brahman.553 
             Śaṃkara’s stance in this connection becomes explicit when he asserts, 
quoting BU 4.4.6, that there is neither going nor returning for those who are 
established in right knowledge (samyag-darśana-niṣṭha), as they are immediately 
                                                 
551 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 276. 
552 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, p. 276. 
553 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 405. 
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liberated (sadyo-mukti-bhājana). The vital breaths of such aspirants merge in 
brahman alone, and they become brahman indeed.554 Again, Śaṃkara explains the 
above BS text cited by MS by saying that for the conditioned brahman (kārya-
brahman), there is the destination to be reached, as it has a place. But in respect of 
supreme brahman, the question of goer, destination etc. does not arise, owing to its 
being all-pervading and the indwelling self of the goers.555  
               In another verse, the Lord says that when the seeker sees the diversities of 
created beings as being rooted in one brahman and as being emanated from that 
brahman, he becomes identified with brahman (BhG 13.30). MS, in line with 
Śaṃkara, states that this identification is attained by one who follows the 
instructions of the scriptures and the teachers, ponders over the fact that the 
separateness of all the material existence, whether movable or immovable, is 
imagined on the self which is existence by nature (sadrūpa). These imaginary 
objects are nothing but the self, because they are superimposed on the self and do 
not have any reality other than their substratum. He realizes that the manifestation 
or divergence of created beings is like a dream, arising from the non-dual self due 
to illusion. Due to the non-perception of the difference existing between two objects 
belonging to the same class (sajātīya bheda) and that of belonging to different 
classes (vijātīya bheda), he becomes brahman indeed, which is devoid of all evils. 
MS substantiates himself with the support of the Śruti text: ‘When in the self of a 
                                                 
554 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 404-5. 
555  Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 4.3.7, p. 994. 
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discerning man, his very self has become all beings, what bewilderment, what 
sorrow can there be, regarding that self of him who sees his oneness’ (ĪU 7).556 
             While explaining the said Śruti text, Śaṃkara maintains in his inimitable 
manner that there cannot occur any delusion or sorrow for one to whom all beings 
have become the very self because of realising the reality of the supreme self 
(paramārthātmadarśanādātmaivābhūt). Sorrow and delusion occur to one who does 
not know the seed of various desires and their respective actions, but not to the one 
who has realised the oneness of the pure self. Śaṃkara also asserts that here (i.e. in 
the case of a perceiver of the self), by indicating the unfeasibility of sorrow and 
delusion (i.e. the effects of ignorance), the total annihilation of the empirical 
existence (saṃsāra) together with its cause (i.e. ignorance) has been shown.557 The 
idea embedded here, that sorrow and delusion are due to ignorance (avidyā), which 
is the root cause of saṃsāra, has been indicated in the beginning of Śaṃkara’s BhG 
commentary as well. In order to explain the bewildered nature of Arjuna, Śaṃkara 
holds that the text starting from BhG 1.2 and ending with BhG 2.9 is meant to show 
the root cause of the defects in the form of sorrow and delusion, which shape the 
transmigratory life (saṃsāra) of all living creatures. He also maintains that the 
cessation of sorrow and delusion is possible only by the knowledge of the self, 
preceded by the renunciation of all actions, and not by any other means.558 Thus, in 
his commentaries on the Upaniṣad and on the BhG, Śaṃkara finds fitting 
circumstances to mention that effects of ignorance like grief and delusion, which 
                                                 
556 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 580-1 (lower case ‘w’ used in ‘what 
bewilderment’ in stead of upper case ‘W’ in ‘What bewilderment’ in translation of ĪU 7). 
557 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, p. 14. 
558 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 39-40. 
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characterise the beings subject to transmigration, are done away with the attainment 
of the true knowledge of the self.559 
               As indicated before, according to the BhG, obtaining liberation is also the 
same as reaching Lord Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa. In one such verse (BhG 4.9), the Lord 
asserts that one who knows his (i.e. Lord’s) divine birth and actions in reality is not 
reborn after giving up his body, and attains him (i.e. the Lord). MS explains this 
verse by holding that the seeker reaches here Lord Vāsudeva, who is of the nature 
of the amalgamation of existence, knowledge, and bliss (saccidānanda-ghana), 
thereby becoming free from transmigration.560 
              Thus, bearing in mind the non-dualistic notion about liberation that it is 
ever accomplished and is the supreme reality brahman itself, as pointed out and 
revealed by the above discussion, a bit of additional discussion of it is continued 
below in order to explicate  the nature of liberation as admitted by MS.  
               In his AdS too, in response to the objection that for the self, being bereft of 
any attachment to sensual objects (nirviṣayatva), there would be no revelation of 
bliss at the time of self-realisation (mokṣa), and that thus no one would identify this 
bliss with mokṣa, MS maintains that the revelation is itself bliss, and it is not the 
revelation of bliss.561 Again, in his AdRR, MS says that liberation, being the ultimate 
end of human life (carama-puruṣārtha), implies the cessation of misery. At the time 
of liberation, though there is the impossibility of temporary happiness (anitya-
sukha), there is the possibility of eternal happiness (nitya-sukha). MS further adds 
                                                 
559 See Panoli 2006: Footnote 1, p. 51. 
560 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 192. 
561 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 301-3. 
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that though the aspirants after liberation aim to achieve the cessation of misery in 
the popular sense (laukika-duḥkhābhāva), they desire for attaining the bliss of 
brahman (brahmānanda) that is entailed by the cessation of misery.562 However, the 
most conspicuous discussion on liberation (mokṣa) is found in his VKL. In 
connection with establishing his own view on the nature of liberation and the means 
of attaining it, after refuting rival views, MS maintains that the followers of the 
Upaniṣads (aupaniṣada-s), graced by Lord Nārāyaṇa, the Lord of the Blue-
mountain (nīlācala-nāyaka), hold liberation to be precisely the same as the self, 
which is in the form of unsurpassed bliss and consciousness (niratiśayānanda-
bodha-rūpa). It is further characterised by the cessation of beginningless nescience 
(anādyavidyā-nivṛttyupalakṣita). He also states that, though liberation does not need 
any means for its attainment, the idea of the means of its attainment is spoken of 
only metaphorically. Again, MS categorically asserts that liberation (or salvation) is 
indistinguishable from one’s own self, which is said to be the cessation of 
nescience, and is also known as the mere complete bliss and non-dual 
consciousness and existence (akhaṇḍānandādvitīya-caitanya-sanmātra). Thus, he 
adds, here lies the zenith of all the ends of human life (sarva-pumartha-viśrānti).563  
              Thus, the above note on the nature of liberation, as held by MS in his 
different works, substantiates the view that he remains faithful to the general non-
dualistic stand while explaining the nature of this philosophical concept (i.e. 
liberation), besides showing his inclination towards the qualified supreme reality.  
 
                                                 
562 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 23. 
563 Karmarkar 1962: pp. 10-11, 54 (Also see Gupta 2006: p. 114 ff. for details). 
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5.2. Various means of liberation and their relative importance as held by 
Śaṃkara and Madhusūdana in relation to the Bhagavadgītā  
Having thus noted briefly in the preceding section as to how MS views the nature of 
liberation, we examine the means that he prescribes for its attainment to see 
whether, if at all, MS differs in this regard from his great predecessor Śaṃkara.  
              It may be pointed out again that, while mentioning the various steps of 
attaining liberation (mukti-sādhana-parvan) in the versified introduction to his GD, 
MS has emphatically stated that devotion to God (bhagavadbhakti) plays an integral 
part in this process. We have also seen that MS has mentioned there that all the 
three paths of attaining liberation, viz. karma, bhakti, and jñāna are upheld 
respectively in the BhG in accordance with its (i.e. BhG’s) subject-matter. It is to be 
noted that at the beginning of his BhR, MS, with the support of the BP, asserts 
emphatically that it is the well-known fact that there are four kinds of yoga as the 
means of attaining the end of human life, i.e. the yoga of action, eight-limbed-yoga, 
yoga of knowledge, and the yoga of devotion.  
             He also maintains that the eight-limbed yoga is to be included in the yoga of 
knowledge.564 While giving a sketch of the contents of each chapter of the BhG, at 
the beginning of his commentary on the third chapter of the BhG, MS holds that 
what has been introduced in the first chapter of the BhG as the entire meaning of it 
(BhG) has been aphoristically stated in its second chapter. There is, he holds, 
initially resoluteness in disinterested actions (niṣkāma-karma-niṣṭhā); then follows 
purification of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa-śuddhi); from this takes place the 
renunciation of all actions (sarva-karma-saṃnyāsa) preceded by the fourfold aids to 
                                                 
564 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: MS’s comments on BhR 1.1, p. 2. 
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liberation (sādhana-catuṣṭaya); then arises steadfastness in devotion to God 
(bhagavadbhakti-niṣṭhā) coupled with the reflection (vicāra) on the Vedāntic 
sentences; from this follows steadfastness in the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna-
niṣṭhā); the result of which is embodied liberation (jīvanmukti) reached through the 
cessation of nescience, which continues until the fructification of accumulated past 
actions (prārabdha-karma); and after that, follows disembodied liberation (videha-
mukti).565 Śaṃkara also, as mentioned earlier, says in the introduction to his 
commentary on the BhG that the Vedic law of actions (pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa-dharma), 
when performed with a sense of dedication to God (īśvarārpaṇa-buddhi) and 
without expectation of fruits (phalābhisandhi-varjita), purifies the mind, which 
becomes the means of attaining the steadiness of knowledge, and causes the rising 
of knowledge that leads to liberation.566 In the preface to his commentary on the 
second chapter of the BhG, Śaṃkara mentions that it is the established view in the 
BhG that liberation is attained through the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna) only, 
and not by combining it with action (jñāna-karma-samuccaya). In his words, ‘It is 
therefore the definite conclusion in the Gītā-śāstra that liberation is attained 
through the knowledge of reality only, and not through its combination with action. 
That such indeed is the teaching (of the Gītā), we will show separately in the 
relevant parts (of the Gītā).’567 At the beginning of his commentary on BhG 3, 
Śaṃkara declares outright that ‘It is the established conclusion of the Gītā and all 
the Upaniṣads that liberation can be attained only through knowledge.’568 Again, 
                                                 
565 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 134. 
566 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, p. 7. 
567 tasmādgītāsu kevalādeva tattvajñānānmokṣaprāptiḥ na karmasamuccitāditi niścito’rthaḥ 
(Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 45). 
568 tasmātkevalādeva jñānānmokṣa ityeṣo’rtho niścito gītāṣu sarvopaniṣatsu ca (Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 139). 
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while commenting on BhG 8.22, Śaṃkara says that the highest person is to be 
attained by exclusive devotion characterised by knowledge that has, for its object, 
the self (as is stated in BhG 7.17 etc.).569 At one place in his commentary on BhG 
18.66 too, Śaṃkara, citing a number of verses (BhG 2.19, 21; 3.3, 26, 28; 5.8, 13, 
6.3; 7.18; 9.21, 22; 10.10; 12.6-11 etc.), mentions that all actions have for their 
basis nescience and desire (avidyā-kāma-bīja). So, while action is meant for the 
ignorant, the steadfastness in knowledge preceded by the renunciation of all actions 
(sarva-karma-saṃnyāsa-pūrvikā-jñānaniṣṭhā) is undertaken by the enlightened. It 
affirms Śaṃkara’s distinction of two types of aspirants, viz. mendicants 
(parivrājaka-s) and householders (gṛhastha-s). While the former are entitled to 
embrace the path of knowledge after renouncing all actions, the latter need to 
undertake prescribed actions in order to gain mental purity (śattva-śuddhi); thus 
facilitating the path of knowledge.570 
              Thus, the above-mentioned portions chosen at random from the BhG 
commentary of MS and also that of Śaṃkara indicate that both these commentators, 
despite keeping the non-dualistic stance that the sole and ultimate means of 
liberation is knowledge (i.e. the realisation of identity of jīva and brahman) intact, 
admit the utility of all the three principal means of liberation (i.e. action, devotion, 
and knowledge)571 and those of the means subsidiary to them; thereby viewing 
karma-yoga and bhakti-yoga as the aids to jñāna-yoga. Again, though both of them 
accept the efficacy of dedication to God in the process of reaching liberation, MS’s 
explicit emphasis on devotion to God (as it is held by him that devotion to God, 
                                                 
569 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 402. 
570 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 761-2. 
571 As we have seen, both Śaṃkara and MS support the view that performance of disinterested 
actions with a sense of allegiance to God purifies the mind, which then becomes suitable for 
acquiring knowledge that leads to liberation.  
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together with the knowledge of the Upaniṣadic great sentences, gives rise to the 
knowledge of reality; and that this knowledge of the reality leads to liberation) 
indicates a slight shift in philosophical views.  
              Furthermore, at the very beginning of the introduction to his GD (i.e. in 
introductory verse 1 of the GD) MS directly asserts that he will follow the lead of 
Śaṃkara throughout. In his commentary on BhG 3.2, MS states that he is 
interpreting the text of the BhG only after studying Śaṃkara’s commentary, though 
he is only explaining what the Lord intends in the BhG and not what Śaṃkara reads 
into it. In the third concluding verse of his GD, MS writes that, though Śaṃkara has 
explained the BhG word for word, MS himself is explicating again it for the 
purification of his own understanding572etc. These passages may be chosen at 
random as the yardstick for measuring how far MS remains loyal to Śaṃkara in 
explaining the import of the BhG verses. Thus, our aim here is to find out the extent 
to which MS follows this ‘yardstick’ while explaining the means of liberation, 
which forms a vital theme of the BhG. While both Śaṃkara and MS have many 
points in common, we will mainly focus on those points where the latter seems to 
say something novel. And in this connection, in order to highlight the differences 
between MS and Śaṃkara, a review in some detail of MS’s attempt to put some 
devotional and yogic colour in the GD may not be out of place. 
 
5.2.1. The path of Yoga (yoga-mārga) 
As noted before, the utility of the eight-limbed yoga (aṣṭāṅga-yoga) or Pātañjala 
Yoga has been mentioned by MS himself in his BhR, where he places this eight-
                                                 
572 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 141 and 775. 
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limbed yoga along the three other yoga-s (i.e. karma, jñāna, and bhakti yoga-s) as 
the means of attaining the supreme goal of human life. By asserting that aṣṭāṅga-
yoga is included in jñāna-yoga, MS shows its utility in an emphatic manner. On the 
other hand, in spite of his assertion under BhG 6.29 that the followers of Śaṃkara 
do not find it necessary to adopt Pātañjala Yoga for realising brahman, MS’s 
exhaustive discussion of Pātañjala Yoga in BhG 6 and a few other places, including 
the versified introduction to the GD, indicates that he holds this spiritual means to 
be extremely helpful for those who seek liberation through the means of psychical 
control, thereby positing it to be an important requirement for practising jñāna-
yoga, which is otherwise known as dhyāna-yoga or samādhi-yoga. Besides, in 
consonance with the non-dualistic view that deep meditation on one’s self together 
with its identity with the supreme self leads to the knowledge of the supreme reality 
brahman/ātman, MS has referred to the yogic practices mentioned in the YV,573 
thereby indicating his support for yoga and its practice as admitted by the followers 
of Advaita for realising the true nature of the self. Thus, in order to show how some 
verses of the BhG may possibly be explained with reference to the doctrines of 
Yoga as well as that of Vedānta, MS has made use of the YS (the GD on BhG 4.27, 
5.22, 6.2, 6.35, 9.14 etc.), YV (the GD on BhG 3.18, 6.35, 6.36 etc.), Yogabhāṣya of 
Vyāsa (on BhG 5.22, 6.15 etc.), and the Gauḍapādakārikā (the GD on BhG 5.22, 
6.23, 6.26 etc.) as the authorities in his discussion of Yoga.574   
             While describing the different stages of such a knower of brahman, who is 
contented only in the self (ātma-saṃtuṣṭa), and who is beyond the performance or 
non-performance of actions on account of his lacking any personal interest in any 
                                                 
573 See Gupta 2006: p. 116. 
574 See Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 52. 
 
 
 189
object, as stated by the Lord in BhG 3.17-18, MS maintains that liberation or the 
highest good (niḥśreysa) cannot be attained through action; for, not being a product 
of action, liberation is eternally attained. Liberation is not a product of knowledge 
either, as it is of the nature of the self (ātma-rūpa) and eternally achieved (nitya-
prāpta). Thus, non-achievement (aprāpti) of it is only apparent, and is due solely to 
the ignorance (ajñāna) about the self. Such ignorance is eradicated by the 
knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna), and on eradication of ignorance by the 
knowledge of reality, the knower of the self (ātma-vid) is left with nothing that has 
to be achieved either through action or through knowledge. MS thus holds that, for 
the knower of the self, there remains no purpose (prayojana) in performing action 
or abstaining from it.  
                  In this connection, MS quotes the seven stages of knowledge (jñāna-
bhūmi) discussed in the YV, and shows how these stages of a liberated person 
correspond to those that are admitted in the Advaita Vedānta. The stages 
enumerated in the YV (i.e. YV 3.118.5-6) are: good resolve (śubhecchā), reflection 
(vicāraṇā), suitability of the mind (tanu-mānasā), union with reality (sattvāpatti), 
non-immediacy (asaṃsakti), absence of objects (padārthābhāvanī), and reaching 
the state of witness consciousness (turīya turyaga).  
              MS now explains that the first three among these seven stages (i.e. 
śubhecchā, vicāraṇā, and tanu-mānasā) correspond to the desire to be liberated 
(mokṣecchā), which is preceded by discrimination between eternal and transient etc. 
(nityānitya-vastu-vivekādi) and terminates in its fruit; viz. reflection on the 
Upaniṣadic sentences in the form of listening to and reflecting on it (śravaṇa-
manana) after approaching a competent teacher; and capability of the mind to grasp 
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subtle entities (sūkṣma-vastu) with one-pointed concentration through undergoing 
contemplation (nididhyāsana) respectively. These three phases, being of the nature 
of the means to liberation (sādhana-rūpa), MS asserts, are regarded as the waking 
state (jāgratāvasthā) by yogin-s; for in these stages, the world appears to them with 
a sense of differentiation. That is, to the seeker of truth, the awareness of a 
pluralistic world characterising a waking state is not still done away with in these 
stages.  
              Thus, in order to accommodate the three yogic stages of the YV mentioned 
above within his own Advaitic parameters, MS puts forward the fourfold 
preliminary practices in Vedānta (sādhana-catuṣṭaya) [that are also mentioned in 
Śaṃkara’s comments on BS 1.1.1 etc.] as also another set of triple proximate 
processes conducive to liberation that consists of śravaṇa, manana, and 
nididhyāsana (that are also stated in Śaṃkara’s comments on BS 1.1.4, BU 2.3.4 
etc.).575 
             The fourth stage called the union with the reality (sattvāpatti), which is 
revealed to the seeker as a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) realisation of the identity 
of brahman and the self (brahmātmaikya-sākṣātkāra), emerges from listening to the 
Upaniṣadic sentences. This stage, according to MS, is known as the dreaming state 
(svapnāvasthā), as the entire world appears to the aspirant to be as untrue as a 
dream. Thus, the person who has reached up to the fourth stage is called the knower 
of brahman (brahma-vid). 
                                                 
575 For a detailed account of sādhana-catuṣṭaya; śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, refer to chapter 
3.5 supra. 
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              The last three stages (i.e. asaṃsakti, padārthābhāvanī, turīya), MS 
maintains, are the stages varying in degree (avāntara-bheda) of liberation in an 
embodied state (jīvanmukti). In the fifth stage, the aspirant, through the practice of 
conceptual absorption (savikalpa-samādhi, i.e. unifying concentration in which the 
subject-object relationship persists), attains the state of non-conceptual absorption 
(nirvikalpa-samādhi, i.e. unifying concentration in which the subject-object 
relationship ceases) where the mind gets withdrawn, leading to asaṃsakti (non-
immediacy) or the state of dreamless-sleep (suṣuptyavasthā), from which  the yogin 
arises (vyutthāna) voluntarily (svayameva). Such a yogin, MS adds, is a superior 
type among the knowers of brahman (brahma-vidvara). The sixth stage, known as 
the absence of objects (padārthābhāvanī), is the state of deep dreamless sleep 
(gāḍha-suṣuptyavasthā), which arises as a result of constant practice of the 
preceding absorptions and lasts for a longer period, and from which the yogin 
awakens not by himself, but with the efforts of others. He is even more superior 
among the knowers of brahman (brahma-vidvarīyān), thereby indicating a still 
higher stage in the process of attaining disembodied liberation (videha-mukti). In 
the seventh and last stage called the state of transcendental self (turīyāvasthā), the 
yogin awakens neither by himself nor with the efforts of others, and possesses no 
sense of diversity whatsoever (sarvathā bheda-darśanābhāva). He remains 
completely self-absorbed in a ‘perfect mass of supreme bliss’ (paripūrṇa-
paramānanda-ghana). The yogin thus gives up all efforts of his own, and all his 
bodily functions (daihika-vyavahāra) are taken care of by others, while the supreme 
Lord (parameśvara) directs his life breath (prāṇa-vāyu). Thus, one who reaches this 
stage is said to have excelled all the other knowers of brahman (brahma-
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vidvariṣṭha). With the support of the BP and the Śruti texts, MS asserts that in this 
stage, the yogin (jīvanmukta) is not aware of his own physical body; and such a state 
leads to final emancipation on casting off physical body (videha-mukti), preceded 
by the total exhaustion of his prārabdha-karma (accumulated past actions). MS 
concludes that in the first three stages, which have not been able to produce the 
knowledge of the reality, the seeker still remains unenlightened (ajña) and need not 
do any work. So, for the jīvanmukta, possessed with the knowledge of the reality (in 
the course of adhering to the rest of the stages), there cannot be any possibility of 
undertaking any action. 
             While commenting on BhG 6.43 ff., which assert the utility of knowledge 
and yogic accomplishment of earlier births in attaining liberation in later births (in 
due course of efforts for liberation), MS acknowledges these seven stages of the YV 
in words almost similar to the passages quoted earlier.576 In a word, in  the 
abovementioned seven mental places of a liberated one admitted in the YV, the first 
three stages (śubhecchā, vicāraṇā, and tanu-mānasā) constitute the nature of the 
means to the fourth stage, the fourth stage (sattvāpatti) indicates enlightenment, and 
the last three stages (asaṃsakti, padārthābhāvanī, turīya) describe the state of 
liberation while living (jīvanmukti); though Śaṃkara, while commenting on these 
BhG verses, places no such emphasis on the yogic practices while providing his 
non-dualistic interpretation. Thus, as mentioned earlier, in sharp contrast with 
Śaṃkara, the commentary of MS on BhG 6 and many verses in BhG 2, 4, 5 etc. 
contains an elaborate account of the eightfold Yoga prescribed by Patañjali, and 
                                                 
576 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 157-8, 318-20.  
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also frequent reference to the YV, thereby admitting their utility in the Advaitic 
means of liberation. 
              In this connection, it may be pointed out that Dhanapati Sūri finds faults 
with MS’s attempt to make use of the YV. In his comment on BhG 3.18, MS says 
that even after undergoing the first three stages of knowledge of the YV, the seeker 
fails to become fully enlightened, and that he needs to proceed further. Dhanapati 
alleges that MS has, by this assertion, indicated the irrelevancy of the sevenfold 
stages of the YV. However, he has not put forward any argument to substantiate this 
claim.577 Further, while commenting on BhG 6.29, in order to substantiate the view 
that self-realisation is possible by both the ways, viz. Yoga (i.e. the restraint of the 
modifications of the mind) and knowledge (i.e. the discrimination of the all-
pervasive consciousness from the insentient matter), MS quotes from the YV, which 
refers to the two ways for the elimination of the mind (cittanāśa, i.e. separation of 
the witness from its limiting adjunct, viz. mind). MS adds that whereas the first way 
is followed by the followers of Patañjali, the second one is upheld by the followers 
of the Śaṃkara Vedānta. MS asserts that, since on having the knowledge of the 
substratum (i.e. all-pervasive consciousness) the non-perception of the mind and the 
objects (that are merely superimposed on that substratum) becomes easily feasible, 
Śaṃkara has nowhere talked about the necessity of Yoga for the knowers of 
brahman. In his opinion, since deliberation on the Upaniṣadic sentences causes 
removal of defilements of the mind, the mendicants of the highest order (parama-
haṃsa-s) approach the teachers in order to deliberate on the Upaniṣadic sentences, 
                                                 
577 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, p. 158. 
 
 
 194
instead of practising Yoga for attaining self-realisation.578 In consonance with the 
objections raised by Nīlakaṇṭha,579 Dhanapati has taken exception to MS in this 
matter as well. He has pointed out that MS’s assertion that Śaṃkara has nowhere 
advocated the utility of Yoga cannot be accepted, and that neither can his view  that, 
for the Advaitins, yogic practice is not of much use for the attainment of self-
realisation, since the purpose thereof is served by the deliberation on the Upaniṣadic 
sentences. In his commentary on BS 1.1.1, Śaṃkara himself mentions that the 
deliberation on brahman needs to be followed by the observance of the fourfold 
preliminary practices (which are undertaken by the adhikārin in accordance with 
the Śruti text: ‘You see, Maitreyī — it is one’s self (ātman) which one should see 
and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate’ BU 2.4.5), which lends 
support to the utility of yogic practice.580 To speak of the necessity of listening to the 
Vedāntic scriptures towards self-realisation validates the need of the meditative 
yogic practice for the restraint of the mind (citta-nirodha), just as there is the need 
of karma-yoga for the purification of the mind. Dhanapati again rebuts MS by 
saying that his attempt to cite the YV in this connection is far from satisfactory, as 
the citation from the YV in question conveys the twofold means of Yoga and 
knowledge as the means of annihilation of the mind (citta-nāśa), and not as the 
means of direct realisation of the witnessing self (sākṣi-sākṣātkāra), as is claimed 
by MS. Further, giving several references to the Upaniṣadic passages and the view 
of Śaṃkara on those passages, Dhanapati claims that in such passages, the 
                                                 
578 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 335-6.  
579 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā, pp. 319-20. 
580 It should be noted that both these sets of the means of liberation, e.g. sādhana-catuṣṭaya; and 
śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana have been considerably dealt with  by MS in his GD, including 
the VK, AdS etc. (Specially, the latter set gets prominence in these two works). 
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observance of the meditative yogic process (dhyāna-yoga) is also admitted as one of 
the causes of the knowledge of reality.581       
              Besides the above traditional opinion of Dhanapati Sūri about the usage of 
Yoga by Śaṃkara, MS etc. in the tradition of Advaita, some modern scholars also 
have discussed this problem. While explaining the above-mentioned seven stages of 
knowledge of the YV as a means of self-realisation, Sanjukta Gupta points out that 
here, too, MS has judiciously maintained his support for the theistic consideration 
along with the Advaitic yoga practice, especially when he reiterates that even in the 
final stage of this sevenfold schema, the jīvanmukta is supported by the Lord 
himself.582 Andrew O. Fort, in course of dealing with the idea of jīvanmukti in 
scholastic Advaita, having pointed out the emphasis on the Sāṃkya ideas and the 
Yoga practices that is found not only in many lesser known Upaniṣads but also in 
many post-Śaṃkara works like the YV, JMV, PD etc., has also discussed the attitude 
of the GD towards yogic practices as a case of what he calls the Yogic Advaita. 
Based on the topics dealt with in the GD, ranging from MS’s frequent references in 
the GD to the JMV (e.g. the GD on BhG 6.36 etc.), to the YV, Pātañjala Yoga etc.,583 
Fort opines that these are all distinctive of the Yogic Advaita, and are far from the 
views held by the Advaita Vedāntins at large that may be found in MS’s magnum 
opus AdS.584 In the same tone, Gupta Gombrich also alleges that since, according to 
the Advaita Vedānta, the mind too ceases at the time of obtaining liberation, MS’s 
attempt at explaining the grades of spiritual development of the devotees with 
                                                 
581 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, p. 317 ff. 
582 See Gupta 2006: p. 117. 
583 Compare YV 3.118.5-6 (Yogavāsiṣṭha 2008: p. 402) and Mokṣadānanda 2006: p. 284 ff. 
584 See Fort 2013: pp. 65-8, 122-5, and 84-125 ff.  
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reference to the YV does not hold good.585 Again, many contemporary writers, on 
the basis of various works of Śaṃkara, have talked about Śaṃkara’s views on Yoga 
as a means of attaining liberation, thereby exploring the role of this means of 
salvation as admitted in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta. However, in the present 
context, we refrain from going into its detail,586 as we must turn our attention to the 
path of devotion or bhakti-yoga as another important means of attaining liberation 
in the BhG, which perhaps attracts more consideration, so far as MS’s philosophical 
stand is concerned. 
              In the remainder of this chapter, we propose to evaluate critically MS’s 
attempt to accommodate bhakti in his own non-dualistic philosophical consideration 
with special reference to his GD in particular and the greater Advaitic tradition of 
Śaṃkara in general. A brief account of the path of knowledge versus the path of 
devotion as held by MS, and MS versus Śaṃkara on the BhG will also be presented 
in this connection. In doing so, important verses of the BhG expressing devotional 
dimension will be viewed. 
 
5.2.2. A critical estimate on the accommodation of bhakti in the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
MS has made a distinctive attempt at accommodating devotion to the Lord 
(bhagavadbhakti) in the metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta in his commentary on the 
BhG, our aim in this section is to make a critical assessment of this attempt of MS, 
                                                 
585 Gupta Gombrich 1991: pp. 239-40. 
586 Interested readers may refer to Nakamura 1979, Raja 1990, Halbfass 1992: pp. 205-42, Rukmani 
1993: pp. 395-404, Sundaresan 1998, Mishra 2001-02, Fort 2013: pp. 45-6 etc. as some of the 
examples of the views of modern scholars on this issue.  
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taking into account both his works and other traditional works of the Advaita 
Vedānta, and other well-known texts dealing with devotion; thereby bringing out 
his special contribution to the non-dualistic philosophy of Śaṃkara’s school, of 
which he is regarded as one of the last pioneering figures.  
           This section is subdivided into i) a prelude to bhakti and bhakti-yoga, ii) the 
nature and constituents of bhakti-yoga, iii) and the complete surrender to the Lord. 
 
5.2.2.1. A prelude to bhakti and bhakti-yoga in the Bhagavadgītā and the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
Though Śaṃkara, MS, and many other commentators of the BhG have accorded a 
significant place to bhakti in the schema of attaining liberation, Rāmanuja maintains 
that the Lord has promulgated (in the BhG) bhakti-yoga, as  aided by karma and 
jñāna-yoga-s and upheld by Vedānta, as the means of attaining the supreme end of 
human life (parama-puruṣārtha), i.e. salvation or liberation (mokṣa), thereby 
professing bhakti-yoga as the principal means of liberation in relation to the other 
two means, e.g. karma-yoga and jñāna-yoga. That bhakti-yoga is the most 
significant part of the means of liberation in the BhG is explicitly uttered by the 
Lord himself when he says that he is attained by exclusive devotion only, and not 
by any other means: ‘Thus, as I am and as you have seen me, I cannot be seen with 
the aid of the Vedas, austerities, gifts and sacrifices’ (BhG 11.53);‘Only through 
exclusive bhakti can I be seen thus, Arjuna, and known as I really am, and entered 
into, enemy-tamer’ (BhG 11.54). Though the notion of devotion is understood in 
some verses of the first group of six chapters in the BhG in connection with 
performance of disinterested actions with a sense of dedication to God etc., and also 
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in the observance of jñāna-yoga in the third group of six chapters sporadically, the 
detailed discussion of bhakti as a means of reaching the supreme self occurs only in 
the intermediate six chapters of the text.587  
            In the introduction to his GD, MS clearly mentions that devotion is 
absolutely necessary for removing the obstacles in the path of self-realisation, and 
also that devotion can be classified into three types: mixed with rites and duties 
(karma-miśrā), pure (śuddhā) and mixed with knowledge (jñāna-miśrā). In addtion, 
devotion to the Lord is a necessary feature of the jīvanmukta-s.588 In the course of 
his commentary on BhG 13.10, MS explains devotion to be love (prīti) for Lord 
Vāsudeva, the supreme lord, arising from the knowledge that he is the most 
excellent among all (bhagavati vāsudeve parameśvare bhaktiḥ sarvotkṛṣṭatva-jñāna-
pūrvikā-prītiḥ). He holds that it is unwavering (avyabhicāriī), as it cannot be 
obstructed by any adverse cause at all, and that it causes knowledge. MS 
substantiates this with the support of a testimony: ‘As long as love for me, the Lord 
Vāsudeva, does not arise (in oneself), he cannot be free from the association with 
the body.’589 Again, in his BhR, he distinguishes between brahma-vidyā and bhakti. 
He maintains that while the conceptual cognition of the Lord (savikalpaka-vṛtti) by 
the melted mind wherein his form (bhagavadākāra) is reflected is known as bhakti, 
the modal change in the form of non-dual brahman bereft of attributes 
(nirvikalpaka-vṛtti), when the mind is not melted, is called brahma-vidyā.590  
                                                 
587 The term bhakti along with its other similar forms like bhakta, abhakta, ekabhakti, bhaktimat and 
the root word bhaj arises nearly forty two times in the text (BhG 4.3; 6.31, 47; 7.16, 17, 21, 23, 28; 
8.10, 22; 9.13, 14, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34; 10.8, 10; 11.54, 55; 12.1, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20; 13.10, 18; 
14.26; 15.19; 18.54, 55, 65, 67, 68) [cf. Mainkar 1969: Footnote 1, p. 12]. Also see Srinivasa Chari 
2005: p. 240. 
588 GD, introductory verses 7 and 39. 
589 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 548 (Also see Mishra 2009: p. 192). 
590 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.1.19, p. 15 (Also see Mishra 2009: p. 224, Kar 
2006: p. 232). 
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     In this connection, Śaṃkara holds that ‘devotion is worshipping the Lord’ 
(bhajanaṃ bhaktiḥ) with single-minded concentration (ananya-yoga) in an 
unswerving conviction that there is nothing higher than Lord Vāsudeva, and hence 
he alone is our refuge. He also maintains that ‘This devotion (being the means to 
knowledge) is also (known as) knowledge’ (sā ca jñānam).591 While explaining BhG 
8.10 too, Śaṃkara holds that ‘devotion’ means worshipping the Lord. On the other 
hand, Śaṃkara sometimes defines bhakti as jñāna. In his opinion, the word bhakti 
employed in BhG 8.22 means ‘devotion characterised by the knowledge of the self’ 
(jñāna-lakṣaṇā-ātmaviṣayā-bhaktiḥ), as has been stated in BhG 7.17, while in BhG 
12.20 it means ‘devotion characterised by the knowledge of the highest reality’ 
(paramārtha-jñāna-lakṣaṇā-bhakti);592 in BhG 18.54 it means ‘devotion as 
worshipping the Lord (bhajana), which is characterised by the highest knowledge 
(uttamā-jñāna-lakṣaṇā-bhakti), as has been stated in BhG 7.16; in BhG 18.55 it 
means ‘devotion characterised by the steadfastness of knowledge’ (jñānaniṣṭhā-
lakṣaṇā-bhakti).593 The view that devotion is characterised by knowledge is 
admitted by MS as well in his commentary on BhG 18.54-55 etc. Again, according 
to the Nighaṇṭu (i.e. the Vedic concordance), the terms sevā (service), bhakti 
(devotion), upāsti (prayer) etc. yield the same meaning.594  
             Thus, these two explanations of what devotion means for MS show him not 
only as a devotee, as admitted by the dualists, but also as an ardent devotee who 
upholds the non-dualistic view, i.e. jñānī-bhakta.   
                                                 
591 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 548 (Also see his comments on BhG 14.26, p. 
606). 
592 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 389, 402 and 518. 
593 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 741. 
594 Cf. Maitra 2006: p. 210. 
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              Furthermore, throughout his BhG commentary MS refers to the instances 
of several devotees, viz. Vrajavāsins, Uddhava, Sanaka, Nārada, Pṛthu, Śukadeva 
(the GD on BhG 7.16 etc.), Śrīdāma (the GD on BhG 7.25, 9.26 etc.), Ajāmila (the 
GD on BhG 9.30, 9.31 etc.), Prahlāda (the GD on BhG 7.16, 9.31, 18.66 etc.), 
Dhruva, Gajendra (the GD on BhG 7.16, 9.31 etc.), Ambarīṣa (the GD on BhG 
18.66 etc.), gopī-s (the GD on BhG 7.16, 18.66 etc.) etc., who are spoken of quite 
often in the BP, but are seldom mentioned by the supporters of non-dualistic 
Vedānta. For a thorough account of those devotees and their experiences, MS refers 
the reader in the GD on BhG 7.16, 18.65, 18.66 etc. to his BhR. Further, in a typical 
manner, MS conveys his devotional yearning in versified form, at the beginning and 
end of some of the chapters of his BhG commentary (e.g. invocatory verses in the 
GD on BhG 7, 13; concluding verses in the GD on BhG 9-12, 14, 15 etc.).595 
              After this short account of bhakti and its significance in the eyes of MS and 
Śaṃkara, we may discuss the definition of bhakti along with its nature, forms etc. as 
given by MS in his BhR. While stating the general characteristics of bhakti, MS 
maintains that ‘bhakti is the incessant flow of the modification of the mind (of the 
devotee) directed towards the Lord of all (sarveśvara) when it (i.e., the mind of the 
devotee) melts by the spiritual discipline related to the Lord (which is observed by 
the devotee).’596 While giving his own exposition on it, MS, with the support of the 
BP texts (i.e., BP 7.1.31, 3.29.11-12), says that here, the ‘spiritual discipline related 
to the Lord’ (bhagavaddharma) means the hearing of the greatness and other virtues 
of the Lord, and not necessarily the performance of a religious practice. MS 
maintains that in the Advaita tradition, modification of the mind (vṛtti) always 
                                                 
595 References are to the edition of Bhagavadgītā 1999 (Also see Nelson 1988: p. 78). 
596 drutasya bhagavaddharmmāddhārāvāhikatāṃ gatā / sarvveśe manaso vṛttirbhaktirityabhidhīyate 
// (BhR 1.3). 
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means the mind’s assuming the form of the object of that modification. 
Accordingly, bhakti is held by the learned as a mental state assuming the form of 
the Lord by the mind when it (i.e. the mind) melts and posseses an incessant flow 
like the stream of the Ganges that arises as the instinctive reaction to the stimuli 
such as desire (kāma), anger (krodha) etc. as a result of hearing the virtuous 
qualities of the Lord (bhagavadguṇa-śravaṇa). Such are the characteristics of the 
unqualified bhakti-yoga (nirguṇa-bhakti-yoga).597 Further, in connection with 
explaining the unqualified nature of devotion, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, quoting the 
same BP texts (i.e. BP 3.29.11-12) as MS, maintains in his commentary on the SB 
of MS that nirguṇa-bhakti is the highest means of attaining liberation.598 
              Besides the above definition of bhakti admitted by MS and corroborated by 
the BP, there are two authoritative works on bhakti later than the BP, giving, for the 
first time, a systematic exposition of bhakti in an aphoristic manner, and taking 
Lord Vāsudeva as the object of supreme love (parānurakti). These works are the 
Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra (ŚBhS) and Nāradabhaktisūtra (NBhS). While indicating the 
essential nature (svarūpa) of bhakti, these two works speak almost in the same tone. 
It is said in the ŚBhS that ‘It (bhakti) is the highest love for God’ (sā 
parā’nuraktirīśvare, ŚBhS 1.1.2), and that ‘It (bhakti) is the principal means, as 
others (i.e. the means of jñāna, yoga etc.) depend on it’ (sā mukhyetarā’pekṣitatvāt, 
ŚBhS 1.2.1). In this connection, the NBhS holds that ‘It (i.e. bhakti) is indeed of the 
nature of supreme love (of God)’ [sā tasmin paramapremarūpā, NBhS 2], ‘Some are 
of the opinion that knowledge alone is the means of attaining it (bhakti)’ [tasyāḥ 
                                                 
597 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.3 and the author’s annotation thereon, pp. 18-20 
(Also see Gupta 2006: p. 120, Nelson 1986: pp. 260-1, Kar 2006: p. 232). 
598 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nyāyaratnāvalī, pp. 364-5. 
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jñānameva sādhanamityeke, NBhS 28], and that ‘Others hold that they (i.e. the 
means of knowledge and that of bhakti) are interdependent’ 
(anyonyāśrayatvamityanye, NBhS 29)599-- a statement which also finds support in 
the BhG: ‘Having become brahman, serene of spirit, he does not grieve, he does not 
crave: equable to all creatures, he achieves the ultimate bhakti of me’ (BhG 
18.54).600  
              Thus, MS’s understanding of bhakti as love for the Lord in terms of his 
knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of the Lord in reality) can be backed up with the 
views of these two bhaktisūtra-s and the BhG itself. Let us discuss below the role 
that this spiritual discipline (i.e. bhakti-yoga) plays in the attainment of liberation as 
admitted in the BhG in particular and in the Advaita Vedānta in general.  
             Towards the end of BhG 6 (i.e. BhG 6.46) [which mainly deals with Yoga 
as a means of liberation and paves the way for devotion as another means of 
liberation that has been discussed primarily in BhG 7-12], the Lord extols the yogin 
by saying that he (i.e. the yogin) excels ascetics (tapasvin-s), men of knowledge 
(jñānin-s), and even men of action (karmin-s); and again that among all the yogin-s, 
one who worships the Lord with his inner-self absorbed in the Lord and with faith 
(śraddhā), is the greatest (BhG 6.47). Thus, the BhG corroborates the view that 
among the aspirants for liberation, the devotees are always held in the highest 
esteem. MS explains in this connection that the Lord, who is worshipped as Lord 
Nārāyaṇa, the Lord of all lords, may be treated by the devotees as either qualified 
(saguṇa) or as non-qualified (nirguṇa).601   
                                                 
599 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: pp. 4 and 59; Pariśiṣṭam 2.2, Nāradabhaktisūtram, pp. 75-6. 
600 See Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 535. 
601
 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 339. 
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              The BhG says that four kinds of people of virtuous deeds (sukṛtin-s) [viz. 
the suffering (ārta-s), the seekers for knowledge (jijñāsu-s), the seekers for 
prosperity (arthārthin-s), and the wise (jñānin-s)], the wise who are in constant 
union with the Lord and hold single-minded devotion to him excel, and so, are dear 
to him (i.e. the Lord) [BhG 7.16-17]. While explaining these verses, MS finds the 
paths of knowledge and devotion to be parallel.  Thus, it is asserted by MS that a 
devotee desiring nothing in return for his love for the Lord is wise. MS maintains 
that among the above-mentioned four types of people of virtuous deeds, the wise, 
who are the knower of reality by virtue of being free from all desires, excel; as they 
are always engrossed in and solely devoted to the Lord, who is non-different from 
their indwelling selves. So, he is endowed with single-pointed devotion (eka-bhakti) 
to God, because he does not have any other object of attachment (anurakti-viṣaya). 
The idea is that, since the Lord, the supreme self, who is non-different from the 
indwelling self, is extremely dear, i.e. an object of unconditioned love (nirupādhi-
premāspada) to the wise; the wise too are very much dear to the supreme Lord. MS 
also says that a wise is he who is ever characterised by the knowledge that consists 
of the direct realisation of the nature of the Lord (bhagavattattva-sākṣātkāra-jñāna), 
who has overcome the realm of māyā, and all whose desires have ceased. Thus, the 
devotee possessing disinterested love (niṣkāma-prema-bhakta) is none but the wise. 
Again, he refers the reader to his BhR where he has elaborately dealt with devotion 
[that by its very nature is love for the Lord (bhagavadanurakti-rūpa)], along with 
the varieties of devotion as well as of the devotees.602   
                                                 
602 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 362-3 and Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali 
Era: BhR 1 and 2. 
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              Thus, among the four types of people of virtuous deeds, MS has 
characterised the first three types [i.e. (i) the suffering (e.g. the Vrajavāsins, the 
princes imprisoned by Jarāsandha, Draupadī, Gajendra), (ii) the seekers for 
knowledge (e.g. Mucukunda, king Janaka, Śrutadeva, Uddhava), and (iii) the 
seekers for prosperity (e.g. Sugrīva, Vibhīṣaṇa, Upamanyu, Dhruva)] as those 
devotees who possess desire (sakāma), and who have also overcome the realm of 
māyā through worshipping the Lord; while the fourth type, viz. the wise (jñānin-s) 
are those devotees who are devoid of desire for the fruit of their actions (niṣkāma), 
and have thus overcome the realm of māyā. MS also holds that Sanaka, Nārada, 
Prahlāda, Pṛthu, Śukadeva etc. may be cited as examples of such devotees who have 
no interest for the fruit of their actions, and are also endowed with knowledge 
(niṣkāma-bhakta-jñānī), while the gopī-s, Akrūra, Yudhiṣṭhira etc. are the examples 
of the devotees characterised by lack of self-interest and pure love (niṣkāma-
śuddha-prema-bhakta).  
 However, Vallabhācārya, an exponent of the Śuddhādvaita Vedānta or 
Puṣṭimārga (according to which puṣṭi or the grace of the Lord, after being 
occasioned by devotion, causes liberation), disagrees with MS.603 With the support 
of the BP texts (i.e. BP 11.12.6-8), Vallabhācārya maintains in this connection that, 
though all the devotees mentioned by MS such as Gajendra, Śaunaka, Dhruva, Śuka 
etc. are admitted as those who have performed virtuous deeds in their past lives. 
The gopī-s, the devotees of the Puṣṭimārga etc., in spite of lacking merit (puṇya) 
earned by virtuous deeds performed either in an earlier life or in the present life, 
                                                 
603 See Sharma 1976: p. 378. 
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attained supernatural desire and love only through the grace of Lord 
(bhagavatsvarūpānugraha-balena-eva-alaukika-kāma-sneha-vantaḥ).604  
            At the beginning of chapter twelve of the BhG, in response to Arjuna’s 
question regarding the relative superiority of meditation on the supreme self as 
compared to meditation on the imperishable, the Lord declares the former to be 
more effective than the latter. According to him, the followers of the former, who 
meditate on the supreme self, being imbued with supreme faith and steadfastness in 
him, are considered to be the most adept among all yogin-s (BhG 12.1-2). MS 
maintains in this connection that the devotees who absorb their minds in Lord 
Vāsudeva, and consider him as (i) the supreme God (parameśvara), (ii) brahman 
with attributes (saguṇa brahman), (iii) the sole refuge (ananya-śaraṇa), regard him 
as an object of unbounded love. Accordingly, they constantly meditate on the Lord, 
who is (i) the Lord of all lords of Yoga (sarva-yogeśvarāṇāmīśvara), (ii) all-
knowing (sarvajña), and (iii) the abode of all auspicious qualities (samasta-
kalyāṇa-guṇa-nilaya) that also has a form (sākāra). Such devotees always remain 
absorbed (nityayukta) in him with utmost faith.605  
              In the eleventh chapter of the BhG, after showing his universal forms to 
Arjuna, the Lord says that by no means other than exclusive devotion is he seen in 
his full forms, known in reality and attained (BhG 11.53-54). MS explains these two 
verses in the following manner. He says that, according to the scriptures, the Lord 
is known only through exclusive devotion, which is nothing but being established in 
him in the form of unbounded love (niratiśaya-prīti) for him. Not only is he known 
                                                 
604 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Tattvadīpikā of Vallabhācārya on BhG 7.16, p. 38. 
605 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 501-2. 
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through unswerving devotion consistent with the scriptures; on the maturity of 
śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana etc. on the Upaniṣadic sayings, the Lord is also 
directly realised in his true being by the devotee. Moreover, with the removal of 
nescience and its products as a result of direct realisation of the Lord’s true nature, 
he is also attained in his true nature by the devotee.606 Thus, in the verse BhG 11.54, 
the statement of the Lord that he is ‘seen in his full forms’, ‘known in reality’, and 
‘attained’, refers to three different stages of bhakti-yoga, where exclusive devotion 
(ananyā bhakti) subsists uniformly.607  
             Śaṃkara makes this point more explicit when he says that ‘exclusive 
devotion’ in this context means that devotion which never turns to any other object 
but the Lord, and that by which is comprehended nothing else but Lord Vāsudeva 
by all senses,608 thereby implying that there exists nothing in reality that is other 
than the supreme self.609 
             The teaching of bhakti-yoga in all its dimensions is found again in a 
nutshell in the following utterance of the Lord: ‘Only he comes to me, Pāṇḍava, 
who acts for me, who holds me as the highest, who is devoted to me without self-
interest and without any animosity against any creature’ (BhG 11.55). MS, in the 
light of Śaṃkara’s commentary, explains this statement in the following way. He 
maintains that one who performs actions sanctioned by the scriptures for the sake of 
the Lord alone, to whom the Lord alone is accepted as the supreme object to be 
attained (parama prāptavya), who is bereft of longing for external objects (bāhya-
                                                 
606 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 496-7. 
607 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 241. 
608 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 496-7. 
609 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 120. 
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vastu-spṛhā-śūnya), and who does not have animosity (vidveṣa) towards anybody, 
including those who harm (apakārī) him, attains the Lord in identity (abheda) with 
his own being. Thus, MS, following Śaṃkara, regards this verse as expressing the 
essence of teaching of the BhG (Gītāśāstrasya sārabhūtam artham), thereby 
extolling bhakti-yoga as a means of attaining the Lord i.e. liberation.610 Śrīdhara, 
too, holds that this verse expresses the supreme secret as well as the essence of all 
scriptures (sarva-śāstra-sāraṃ paramaṃ rahasyam).611 
             Again, after mentioning the relative merits of the two types of meditation, 
viz. (i) that on the supreme self with devotion, (ii) and that on the imperishable, the 
Lord clearly affirms the superiority of those who undertake the former, as it is the 
easier way for attaining emancipation, as compared to the arduous way of 
worshipping the formless reality (BhG 12.6-7). This verse, in the view of MS, is 
extremely important. He explains that those who have dispelled all obstacles 
through meditation on the brahman with attributes, attain the knowledge of reality 
(tattva-jñāna), even without having instruction of a teacher and undergoing all 
hardships of the recurring practice of śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana etc., as a 
result of self-revelation of the Upaniṣadic texts coupled with the grace of the Lord. 
Thus, with the eradication of nescience and its products, he attains the final 
emancipation (parama-kaivalya), the result of worshipping the unqualified 
brahman, after the enjoyment of divine glory (aiśvarya) in the world of Brahmā 
(brahma-loka). In support of his view, MS quotes the Śruti text: ‘He…beholds the 
fort-dwelling person far beyond this entire mass of living beings’ (PU 5.5). 
Therefore, even without the hardships mentioned earlier, the knowers of the 
                                                 
610 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 497; Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 497-8. 
611 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, p. 497. 
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qualified brahman reach the fruit of meditation on the unqualified brahman with the 
grace of the Lord.612 
             Śaṃkara’s explanation on the above Śruti text makes this point more 
explicit. He says that one who knows the syllable OṂ with three modes (mātrā), 
sees through meditation the person called the supreme self that has entered into all 
bodies, and that is far beyond hiraṇyagarbha, which is the mass of living beings.613 
             The magnanimity of the Lord towards his devotees is again revealed when 
he says that even those who are unable to observe practicing contemplation reach 
the Lord by performing actions as service to him (BhG 12.10). MS holds that with 
the performance of actions like hearing and chanting of the Lord’s name (śravaṇa-
kīrtanādi), known as the bhāgavata-dharma,614 the devotee attains perfection that is 
typified as non-different from brahman, due to purification of the mind and 
emergence of knowledge. 
             In the concluding verse of the twelfth chapter of the BhG, which is mainly 
concerned with devotion as the means of attaining the supreme self, the Lord says 
that those following this path are exceedingly dear to him (BhG 12.20). MS’s 
explanation of this verse shows a blending of the path of knowledge with that of 
devotion. He maintains that, though by practising the elixir of law (dharmāmṛta) 
with extreme faith, one becomes very dear to the supreme God, Lord Viṣṇu, and 
though it (i.e. the elixir of law) becomes inherent in him, even so, it should be 
undertaken by one who (i) desires emancipation, (ii) wishes to know the reality of 
the self, and (iii) wants to attain the highest state of Lord Viṣṇu. Thus, in the case of 
                                                 
612 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 506-7. 
613 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, pp. 286-7 (Also see Panoli 2008: Vol. III, pp. 70-1).  
614 Religious practices related to Viṣṇu, which has been discussed in the foregoing discussion (i.e. on 
BhG 9.14 etc.). 
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one who aspires after the unqualified brahman on account of having perfection in 
meditation on the qualified brahman, there is the direct realisation of the reality put 
forth in the Upaniṣadic texts, as a result of recurring practices of śravaṇa, manana, 
nididhyāsana etc. The claim that, since the Upaniṣadic great sayings like ‘That thou 
art’ leads to liberation, one should seek out the meaning of the term ‘that’ (tat) [in 
‘That thou art’], is thus established in the six intermediate chapters of the BhG.615  
              Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic interpretation is noteworthy here, where he 
maintains that those devotees who are renunciates and who also take resort to 
devotion characterised by the knowledge of the highest reality (paramārtha-jñāna-
lakṣaṇā-bhakti) are dear to the Lord.616  
              While all the above-mentioned verses of the BhG state bhakti-yoga to be 
the sole means of attaining the supreme self or the supreme goal (i.e. liberation), the 
Lord advises Arjuna in the BhG to worship him for transcending this transient 
world of unhappiness (BhG 9.33). In a more succinct way, the Lord advises Arjuna 
in the following verse: ‘May your thoughts be toward me, your love toward me, 
your sacrifice toward me, your homage toward me, and you shall come to me, 
having thus yoked yourself to me as your highest goal’ (BhG 9.34). Again, the same 
statement is found in the concluding chapter of the BhG as the final teaching of the 
Lord to Arjuna: ‘May your thoughts be toward me, your love toward me, your 
sacrifice toward me, your homage toward me, and you shall come to me; I promise 
you truly, for you are dear to me’ (BhG 18.65).617 All these assertions thus affirm 
the truth that bhakti-yoga is viewed in the BhG as a significant (and also the instant) 
                                                 
615 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 509, 518-9. 
616 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 518. 
617 Translation is not from Buitenen in toto.  
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means of attaining the supreme reality.618 This view which will receive further 
support as we proceed, following MS in greater detail.  
 
5.2.2.2. The nature and constituents of bhakti-yoga 
We have thus shown above the utmost importance of devotion involved in bhakti-
yoga as the means of attaining the supreme self, the nature and components of that 
means are indicated by the BhG in one of its important verses, viz. BhG 9.34 just 
cited before, which mentions the characteristics of bhakti-yoga as having manana 
with bhakti, yajña with bhakti, and namaskāra with bhakti. While ‘reflection’ 
(manana) is used in the sense of meditation (dhyāna), worshipping (upāsanā), 
contemplation (nididhyāsana) etc., yajana means worshipping God, and namaskāra 
means prostrating oneself before the Lord. All these elements indicate bhakti, their 
combination leading to the formation of the bhakti-yoga propounded in the BhG. 
This view may also find support in the Nighaṇṭu (i.e. the Vedic concordance), 
where the terms sevā, bhakti, upāsti etc. mean the same thing.619 While explaining 
the verse, MS says, in agreement with Śaṃkara,  that a person who has fixed his 
mind on the Lord (manmanā) with devotion (madbhakta) and adoration (madyājin), 
having saluted him through body, mind, and speech (namaskāra), and who has also 
accepted God as the supreme end (matparāyaṇa), having taken sole refuge in him 
(madeka-śaraṇa), after uniting his own mind with the Lord, surely reaches the Lord 
or the supreme self, who is by nature self-effulgent (svaprakāśa), supreme bliss-
concentrate (paramānanda-ghana), bereft of all disturbances (sarvopadrava-śūnya) 
                                                 
618 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 241. 
619 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 107, 243-5. 
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and untouched by fear (abhaya). Śaṃkara makes his non-dualistic stance explicit 
when by the supreme self he means here the self of all beings as well as the 
supreme goal.620  
             In BhG 9.14, the basic features of bhakti-yoga are mentioned clearly: 
‘There are those who, always yoked to devotion, adore me and glorify me, while 
exerting themselves with fortitude, and pay homage to me’ (BhG 9.14). Thus, the 
verse enumerates three significant approaches of worship, e.g. kīrtana, yatanta, and 
namaskāra, which are explained by MS in the following way. He maintains that 
having approached a teacher who is always established in brahman (brahma-
niṣṭha), and reflecting on the Upaniṣadic texts, the devotee sings the praise of the 
Lord’s nature (kīrtana) which is presented by the entire Upaniṣadic lore as the 
nature of brahman. Even when not sitting with the teacher, he also utters the 
praṇava and recites the Upaniṣadic texts. Thus, with the accomplishment of 
śravaṇa-manana etc. and also of śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat (meaning yatanta), 
they pay obeisance (namskāra) with their body, mind and speech (kāya-mano-
vākya) to Lord Vāsudeva, the repository of all auspicious qualities, the desired Lord 
(iṣṭa-devatā) of all and the master (guru).621  
              As the verse under consideration uses the conjunction ‘and’ (ca) in the 
word ‘namasyantaśca’, MS holds that by this usage of ca is to be understood 
‘listening to the glory of Lord Viṣṇu etc.’ (śravaṇādi) which go along with singing 
his laudation (vandana-sahacarita), as stated in the verse of the BP enumerating the 
nine forms of devotion (navavidhā-bhakti): ‘Listening to the glory of Viṣṇu, singing 
the praise of him, contemplating him, offering obeisance to his feet, worshipping 
                                                 
620 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 441. 
621 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 424. 
 
 
 212
him with offerings, singing his laudation, feeling dependence on him as a servant, 
making friendship with him, and surrendering oneself completely to him’ (BP 
7.5.23).622 Again, the use of the word ‘me’ (mām) repeated in the verse, MS holds, 
indicates the qualified aspect of Lord Viṣṇu; by the phrase ‘always yoked to 
devotion’ (bhaktyā nitya-yuktā) in the same verse is indicated the abundance of all 
the spiritual disciplines and the absence of obstacles towards attaining the Lord. MS 
now substantiates his stance regarding the role of devotion with the support of the 
Śruti: ‘Only in a man who has the deepest love for God, and who shows the same 
love toward his teacher as toward God, do these points declared by the Noble One 
shine forth’ (ŚU 6.23) and that of the YS of Patañjali (YS 1.29). MS goes on to 
explain that in this way, having adopted the means of śama, dama etc., and also that 
of śravaṇa and manana, being free from all the obstacles to spiritual progress as a 
consequence of conveying love and salutation to the supreme Lord and the supreme 
teacher, and having fulfilled all the spiritual means of self-realisation, the noble-
minded ones (mahātman-s) worship the Lord by meditating constantly on him. MS 
maintains that this meditation is the ultimate stage of self-realisation, i.e. profound 
and constant meditation (nididhyāsana). Thus emerges the knowledge of direct 
realisation of the reality in the form of ‘I am brahman’ arising from the Upaniṣadic 
utterances like ‘That thou art’; which leads to, instead of mediate liberation (krama-
mukti), the immediate liberation (sākṣānmokṣa) of the aspirant.623  
              So, by viewing this means of worshipping the Lord (bhagavadupāsanā) as 
a fulfilment of all other spiritual disciplines and also admitting it as a cause of 
                                                 
622 śravaṇaṃ kīrtanaṃ viṣṇoḥ smaraṇaṃ pādasevanaṃ / arcaṇaṃ vandanaṃ dāsyaṃ 
sakhyamātmanivedanam // 
623 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 424-5. 
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eliminating all obstacles in the way of attaining the Lord, MS validates the 
supremacy of devotion over any other means of liberation.  
             It is unclear whether the commentary currently available on the ŚU is really 
made by Śaṃkara, but it is nevertheless quite consistent with his non-dualistic 
approach. Thus, while explaining ŚU 6.23 that has been quoted by MS, this 
commentary  says that the best qualified person (uttamādhikārin) is one who has 
profound loving devotion, i.e. unadulterated (nirūpacarita) loving devotion 
characterised as steady faith (acañcalā śraddhā) to God who is the supreme Lord, 
and who is by nature impartite (akhaṇḍa) supreme light (parajyotiḥ) identical with 
existence-consciousness-bliss (saccidānanda), and who has the same loving 
devotion to his teacher who is the knower of brahman as towards God [as without 
the grace of the teacher it is hard to reach the knowledge of reality (brahmavidyā)], 
and who has thus speeded up (tvarānvita) the process. To such a person are revealed 
these points declared by the noble one.624  
              It may be pointed out in this connection that, though Śaṃkara has given a 
very precise explanation on this verse in conformity with his own doctrinal 
considerations, MS’s detailed explanation on the same corroborates his devotional 
penchant. Dhanapati, however, remarks here that the views of MS may be accepted 
here in so far as he is not opposed to Śaṃkara, thereby hinting at a difference 
between the approaches of Śaṃkara and MS.625   
               MS’s explanation of BhG 9.14 is quite similar to Rāmānuja’s elucidation 
of the same verse. Rāmānuja says that the devotees of the Lord, having remembered 
his various names which indicate the particular specific traits of the Lord, by 
                                                 
624 Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 2065 Vikram Saṃvad: ŚUB 6.23, pp. 249-50.  
625 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, pp. 424-5. 
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uttering the names such as Śrīrāma, Nārāyaṇa, Kṛṣṇa and Vāsudeva, with every part 
of their  bodies thrilled  (pulakāñcita-sarvāṅga) and voice faltering with joy (harṣa-
gadgada-kaṇṭha), undertake utmost endeavours to serve the Lord by engaging in 
different activities such as worship of God (arcanā), building temples with gardens 
therein and worshipping the Lord by prostrating on the ground with a whole-
hearted desire to have eternal union (nityayoga) with him.626 
              In this connection, reference to the SB of MS may be pertinent for 
substantiating his position. As noted earlier, MS in his SB has accepted two 
categories (padārtha-s), e.g. the seer (dṛk) and the seen (dṛṣya). While the former is 
the same as the non-dual self, the latter comprises nescience together with its 
effects, i.e. the empirical existence. MS adds further that because of difference 
made by the limiting adjunct (upādhi), the seer is represented as God (īśvara), the 
individual self (jīva), and the witnessing self (sākṣin). According to MS, God is 
brahman associated with nescience (avidyā), which has three constituents, viz. 
sattva, rajas, and tamas, each of which periodically predominates over the other 
two. In accordance with such prevalence, God is known as Viṣṇu, Brahmā and 
Rudra respectively. Besides, there are numerous incarnations, both male and 
female, which appear through the sport of the Lord (līlā) for gracing his devotees. 
Though MS has not proceeded with much detail on bhakti etc. in this connection, 
his commentators such as Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī etc. have 
elaborately discussed this issue. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha holds that in accordance with the 
two senses of bhakti as means (sādhana-bhakti) and as a goal (sādhya-bhakti), there 
are two kinds of devotee: i) one who is a spiritual aspirant (sādhaka), ii) one who 
                                                 
626 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 2, Rāmānujabhāṣyam, p. 159. 
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has already accomplished (siddha) his goal. Thus, he adds that, according to the 
etymological derivation of bhakti as bhajana, it means sādhya-bhakti or prema-
bhakti. With the support of Smṛti texts and that of one from the BP enumerating the 
nine-types of bhakti, he maintains that etymologically, sādhana-bhakti or the 
spiritual disciplines also means worshipping and serving the Lord, as also the 
modification of the inner organ assuming the form of the Lord. 627 It may be 
mentioned that Nārāyāṇa Tīrtha’s explanation in this connection with reference to 
the ninefold devotion has been found explicitly in BhR as well.628 Brahmānanda 
Sarasvatī, too, on the basis of various Smṛti texts etc. and some verses from the BP 
text listing out the nine types of bhakti, maintains that devotion causes satisfaction 
to the Lord who is being worshipped. Brahmānanda further says that Lord Viṣṇu is 
the self of all the beings, and while all the beings have natural love for themselves 
in the sense that ‘may I always be’, devotion to Lord Viṣṇu is quite normal. Again, 
Brahmānanda refers to Viṣṇu both as qualified and unqualified.629  
              Having mentioned in the preceding verse (i.e. BhG 9.14) the different 
physical, mental and religious activities as part of worshipping him, the Lord now 
mentions in BhG 9.15 the sacrificial act that consists of knowledge (jñāna-yajña) 
which is followed by other group of devotees by taking him either as one (eka), or 
separate (pṛthak), or  many (bahu) in meditation. MS interprets this verse by saying 
that being unable to practise the disciplines of śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana, the 
devotees, according to their qualitative differences [viz. the best (uttama), mediocre 
(madhyama), and the dull (manda)] worship the Lord through different forms of 
cognitive or intellectual sacrifices (jñāna-yajña). Those who, due to their 
                                                 
627 Siddhāntabindu 1989: pp. 348-66 and Nārāyaṇī thereon, pp. 367-8. 
628 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: Ṭīkā on BhR 1.1, pp. 84-5.  
629 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nyāratnāvalī, p. 359 ff.  
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indifference to other means of realisation, worship the Lord without having any 
sense of difference, are the best among these types of worshippers. Thus, this kind 
of worship is named as ahaṃgrahopāsanā, which has its support in the Śruti: ‘O 
venerable Deity, I am Thou indeed; Thou art indeed me’ (Varāha Upaniṣad 2.34).630 
Others who worship the Lord as a symbol (pratīkopāsanā)631 on the basis of a 
notion of difference between the worshipped and the worshipper, are the mediocre 
worshippers. He quotes in this context the Śruti text: ‘‘Brahman is the sun’- that is 
the rule of substitution’ (CU 3.19.1). Again, some others, who are unable to carry 
out these two types of worship, undertake the worship of some minor deities, or 
perform some rites prescribed by scriptures, actually worship thereby the Lord 
himself, who is multi-formed of all form (viśvato-mukha) and the self of all 
(sarvātmā). These worshippers are dull as compared to other devotees. MS 
reiterates that in order to worship the Lord through jñāna-yajña, one should look 
upon the lower form of worship as a step that leads to the subsequent upper step, 
that is, the men of dull competence lead to the mediocre ones, and then the best 
ones.  
              Though Śaṃkara regards this type of worship, i.e. jñānayajña, as an act 
performed by different kinds of devotees, he differs from MS in that he does not 
make any explicit classification of such devotees in this connection.632 Further, 
Śaṃkara explains the above-mentioned Śruti text (viz. CU 3.19.1) as meaning that, 
as the universe appears to be non-existent until its manifestation, and as that 
                                                 
630 Translation is from Gambhirananda 2000: p. 587. 
631 Brahma 1986: Footnote, pp. 738-9; Brahma 1988: Appendix, pp. 325-6 may also be referred to 
for the explanation of different kinds of upāsanā, viz. pratīka-upāsanā, sampat-upāsanā, samvarga-
upāsanā, and ahaṃgraha-upāsanā. 
632 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 425-6. 
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manifestation is only made possible by the sun, the sun is eulogised to be viewed as 
brahman.633       
              However, Dhanapati criticises MS, because he thinks that MS’s 
understanding of jñāna (i.e. the knowledge of identity between the Lord and the 
individual self) in question as ahaṃgrahopāsanā (i.e. worshipping oneself as 
equated with a deity) in a secondary sense demands critical consideration. He holds 
that since such a meaning may be conveyed even by admitting the primary sense of 
the word jñāna, there is no reason for admitting the secondary sense of that word, 
since between the primary and secondary sense of a word, it is always reasonable to 
accept the primary sense of a word if the situation permits it.634     
             Having kept the above discussion in mind, and with the support of a text 
from the BP where it is said by the Lord that, though bhakti-yoga is held to be 
manifold, it should be taken to be unitary in its essential nature and spirit (BP 
3.29.7);635 let us now give a brief account of how upāsanā (i.e. meditation on or 
worship of a personal deity) is understood in Śaṃkara’s own works.  
             Śaṃkara in the introduction to his commentary on the CU maintains that 
upāsanā consists of accepting a certain object or support as the basis of thought in 
accordance with the scriptures, in order to ensure the uniformity of the flow of 
mental modification, so that there should be nothing different that interrupts such a 
current of thought. Though upāsanā is not knowledge proper, it is nevertheless an 
aid to self-realisation, since it is a means for the purification of the mind.636 Again, 
though the Upaniṣadic text, ‘To suffer from a sickness is surely the highest 
                                                 
633 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 9, p. 197 (Also see Panoli 2008: Vol. IV, p. 325).  
634 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, p. 426. 
635 Bhāgavata 2064 Vikrama Saṃvad: p. 136. 
636 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 9, Introduction, CUB, p. 9.  
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austerity…a man who knows this wins the highest world…be placed on the fire 
when one is dead is surely the highest austerity…a man who knows this wins the 
highest world’ (BU 5.11), depicts sickness, death etc. as penance, and asserts the 
knowledge of this results in the attainment of the highest world, such upāsanā here 
does not relate either to the sacrifices or to brahman. Thus, there are number of 
Śruti texts such as ‘For this alone is the syllable that’s brahman…one knows this 
syllable, he obtains his very wish’ (KU 1.2.16), ‘This is the support that’s best…one 
knows this support, he rejoices in brahman’s world’ (KU 1.2.17), which talk about 
still higher types of upāsanā, i.e. upāsanā-s on brahman (brahmopāsanā). 
Śaṃkara’s elucidation of these Upaniṣadic passages makes the point all the more 
explicit. While explaining the first verse, Śaṃkara says that this syllable (i.e. oṃ) 
stands for both the lower and the higher brahman. He who worships this symbol 
(pratīka) as brahman attains whatever he desires, i.e. either the lower or higher 
brahman. While the higher brahman is known, the lower one is attained by the 
aspirant. On the second verse, Śaṃkara comments that the support (i.e. oṃ) is the 
best of all supports for the realization of brahman. Knowing this support, one 
rejoices in the higher brahman; and being identified with the lower brahman, the 
aspirant becomes suitable to be worshipped as brahman. In his comments on CU 
1.1.1 too, Śaṃkara maintains that it is understood in all the texts of Vedānta that the 
syllable oṃ as name and image of the supreme self is the best means of its 
worship.637  
            In his commentary on the BS as well, Śaṃkara talks at some length about 
worship of symbol. Though, while commenting on BS 4.1.4, ‘(The aspirant) is not 
                                                 
637 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, KUB 1.2.16-17, pp. 164-5; vol. 9, CUB 1.1.1, p. 10.  
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to identify (himself) with a symbol, for he cannot understand himself to be so’, 
Śaṃkara maintains that there cannot be any self identification through symbols, as 
one reaches brahman when the names etc. are left without their transformed states 
(as the names etc.). On the next aphorism: ‘The sun etc. are to be looked upon as 
brahman because of the consequent exaltation’ (BS 4.1.5), he comments that in this 
case brahman alone is thus worshipped, being superimposed on the symbol, just as 
much as Lord Viṣṇu is worshipped in the images etc. (being superimposed on 
them).638 Besides, upāsanā in general (BS 4.1.8-11) and its different kinds, e.g. 
apratīkāvalambanā, e.g. sampad and adhyāsa (BS 1.1.4), ahaṃgraha (BS 3.3.59); 
pratīkāvalambanā (BS 3.3.65-66); and both apratīkāvalambanā and 
pratīkāvalambanā (BS 4.3.16) have been dealt with by Śaṃkara in detail in his BSB 
on these aphorisms. 
              As the first line of the verse BhG 9.34 is repeated verbatim in BhG 18.65, 
MS’s explanation on the latter also throws some light on his outlook about 
devotion. In his explanation of BhG 9.14 MS explained the phrase ‘bow down to 
me’ (māṃ namaskuru) that also occurs in BhG 18.65 as worshipping the Lord 
through body, mind, and speech (kāyena vācā manasā), that is accompanied by 
other acts of devoutness as observed in the Vaiṣṇava religion (bhāgavata-
dharmāṇāmupalakṣaṇam) [such as worshipping him with offerings (arcana), 
singing his laudation (vandana) etc.], MS refers to the same BP verse that he quotes 
in his explanation of BhG 9.14, enumerating the nine types of devotion (navavidhā-
bhakti), whose offering to the Lord [according to Prahlāda speaking to his father 
Hiraṇyakaśipu], is construed to be the best study of Vedānta (BP 7.5.23-24). MS 
                                                 
638 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 4.1.4-5, pp. 940-43. 
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here refers the reader to his BhR for details, and emphasises that the devotees, after 
thus accomplishing all these acts of devoutness, will attain Lord Vāsudeva only 
after the knowledge of identity between brahman and the individual self 
(brahmātmaikatva-jñāna) is produced through the Upaniṣadic texts.639 
            Thus, in the BhR, MS’s view that the knowledge of the self is indispensable 
for developing bhakti has been explained in greater length. Following the lead of 
the BP, MS enumerates eleven stages in the evolution of bhakti, of which the 
fourth, called hari-guṇa-śruti is the practice of the nine types of devotion 
(navavidhā-bhakti) [enumerated in the BP verses just mentioned] according to one’s 
competence.640 It is also to be noted that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, while commenting on the 
SB of MS, quotes verbatim all these three kārikā-s of BhR (i.e. BhR 1.33-35) of MS 
enumerating all these stages of devotion.641 Again, as to the fact whether there is the 
possibility of eulogy (stuti), singing laudation (vandana) etc. in the case of the 
unqualified brahman, MS raises this question in his commentary on the SŚ, and 
replies to it in his own way. He holds that, while some scholars consider 
nididhyāsana as stuti of the unqualified brahman, and some hold the determination 
of its essential nature (tatsvarūpa-nirūpaṇa) to be stuti,642 MS -- following the  
assertion of Padmapādācārya in his Pañcapādikā: ‘Bliss, awareness of objects as 
well as eternity are the properties (of brahman)’ [ānando viṣayānubhavo nityatvaṃ 
ceti santi dharmāḥ] -- asserts that, since there can be no eulogy without assigning 
attributes (dharma), stuti in its primary sense of the description of merits is possible 
                                                 
639 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 751. 
640 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.32-35 and the author’s annotation thereon, pp. 
67, 82, 67-99 ff. 
641 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nārāyaṇī, p. 370. 
642 Here MS refers to another commentary on the same, namely the Anvayārthaprakāśikā by 
Rāmatīrtha (compare Giri 2007: Vol. 1, SŚSS of MS on SŚ 1.1, p. 10 and Saṃkṣepaśārīraka 1992: p. 
4, lines 7-8). 
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even in the case of the unqualified brahman, when the imaginary merits such as 
reality/existence (satyatva) etc. are taken into consideration.643  
                  Śaṃkara is more precise in his comments on the same verse of the BhG, 
where he says that by ‘bow down to me’ is meant ‘bow down to me alone’, and that 
by surrendering all the ends, means, and purposes (sarva-samarpita-sādhya-
sādhana-prayojana), the devotee attains the Lord only by bearing in mind that for 
anybody who has thus surrendered to the Lord, the fruit of liberation (mokṣa-phala) 
is certainly to follow. He thereby expresses his absolutist view.644  
 Further, with the support of Śaṃkara’s own explanation, we can 
substantiate the steps of navavidhā-bhakti of the BP as cited by MS above. Thus, 
the step of eulogy (stuti) and salutation (vandana) finds clear support in one passage 
in his comments on TU 1.1.1, where Śaṃkara maintains that one who is eager to 
attain the knowledge of brahman must offer obeisance (namaskāra) to Vāyu (who 
is here regarded as brahman) for removing the obstacles in the way of the 
knowledge of brahman. Regarding dāsya-bhakti, we find another passage in his 
comments on BU 3.8.9. Śaṃkara explains that, since service is an act, and 
sacrifices, gift, offering of oblations etc. are equally acts; the result of service is 
seen accruing from those to whom it is intended.645 Śaṃkara’s elucidation on the 
concluding mantra of the ĪU (i.e. ĪU 18) brings forth pādasevā and vandana-bhakti. 
In one point, the said elucidation goes on like praying to Agni to lead along the 
auspicious path to get rid of the southern solstice (dakṣiṇa-mārga) characterised by 
incessant going and returning. Thus, being dejected with this path (of incessant 
going and returning), the aspirant begs the Lord again to lead him along the 
                                                 
643 Giri 2007: Vol. 1, SŚSS of MS on SŚ 1.1, pp. 10-1 (Also see Mishra 2009: pp. 198-9). 
644 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 751. 
645 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, TUB 1.1.1, p. 616; Vol. 10, BUB 3.8.9, p. 449.  
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auspicious path, which is devoid of going and returning. But the aspirant is not able 
to render any service (paricaryā) to the Lord now, and so he only offers many 
words of adoration (namaskāra-vacanam) to the Lord with a view to serving him 
(i.e. the Lord) with adoration, that is, by bowing down to him (i.e. the Lord). Again, 
complete surrender of oneself to the Lord (ātma-nivedana) is echoed in Śaṃkara’s 
comments on MU 3.2.3 where it is said that aspiration after the self-realisation with 
the renunciation of every other thing is the only means of attaining the self.646 
              In addition to the above remarks of Śaṃkara, the view of one of the well-
known commentators of MS (i.e. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, 18th centuey CE) may be 
mentioned to show the admission of devotion as service (sevā-bhakti) to the Lord in 
the Advaita Vedānta. Thus, in his Bhakticandrikā, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha maintains, with 
the support of the BS text ‘That (is Brahman) from which (are derived) the birth etc. 
of this (universe)’ [BS 1.1.2], that brahman as the creator or God has to be served as 
a master (i.e. brahman needs to be served because of his being the creator, 
sustainer, and destroyer of this universe). Again, he asserts clearly that the 
knowledge of non-duality (i.e. the knowledge of identity between brahman and the 
individual self) is by no means an hindrance in the way of loving devotion.647 
              Apart from the primary sense of bhakti mentioned above, the ŚBhS also 
points out its secondary sense: ‘Since worshipping the Lord (bhajana) has been 
recapitulated by the word ‘loving devotion’ (bhakti), it (i.e. loving devotion) needs 
to be understood there in the secondary sense, as secondary devotion (gauṇī-bhakti) 
is the cause of primary devotion (parā-bhakti)’ [bhaktyā 
                                                 
646 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, ĪUB 18, pp 25-6; MUB 3.2.3, p. 381 (Also see Mishra 2009: 
pp. 104-5 for all these Upaniṣadic references).  
647 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Bhakticandrikā, pp. 23-4. 
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bhajonopasaṃhārādgauṇyā parāyai taddhetutvāt, ŚBhS 2.2.1]. While explaining this 
aphorism, Svapneśvara (ca. 15th century CE), having referred to the BhG as the 
work that talks about the highest or primary devotion (in BhG 7, BhG 9.13 etc.) and 
worshipping the Lord with devotion (in BhG 7.17, 9.14, 9.29 etc.), maintains that 
the word bhakti has been employed in this context in the sense of devotion to the 
Lord (bhagavadbhakti). Both bhakti and bhajana convey the same meaning (both of 
them being derived from the root bhaja). Svapneśvara continues by saying that, 
when singing the praise of the Lord (kīrtana) etc. (as referred to in BP 7.5.23) are 
said to be the means of acquiring devotion (bhakti), the word bhakti is used in a 
secondary sense, and not in the direct sense (śakyārtha), just as ‘clarified butter is 
called life itself’ (āyurvai ghṛtam, Taittirīya Saṃhitā 2.3.2) is a secondary usage, 648 
since by eating clarified butter, life becomes longer.. The devotional acts, like 
listening to the glories of the Lord etc., are deemed secondary, as they help the 
devotee to get rid of impurities, making him ready for obtaining the grace of the 
Lord and forming passionate love for the Lord, which results in acquiring the 
highest love for the Lord, which is the primary sense of the term ‘devotion’. Here, 
the devotee gets absorbed in the Lord, where all his empirical considerations 
disappear.649 In his commentary on the ŚBhS, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, after referring to the 
commentary of Svapneśvara and the BP verse enumerating the nine types of bhakti 
(i.e. BP 7.5.23), and drawing greatly upon MS’s BhR, also mentions that, just as a 
plough, being a means of livelihood as a help for producing crops, is said to be life 
itself in a secondary sense, so worshipping the Lord by way of listening to the glory 
                                                 
648 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Pariśiṣṭam 1, Svapneśvarabhāṣya, pp. 30-1 (Also see Harshananda 
2002: pp. 106-10). 
649 See Gupta 2006: p. 121. 
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of the Lord, singing the praise of him etc. (śravaṇa-kīrtanādi), being the means of 
attaining devotion, is said to be devotion in a secondary sense.650  
             Now, in view of the above-mentioned remarks of Svapneśvara and 
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha respectively, we may recall here that, while explaining BhG 9.14, 
18.65 etc., MS has substantiated his views with the support of the same BP text, in 
order to convey that all these nine types of bhakti lead to the attainment of the 
highest devotion (parā-bhakti), thereby admitting the former as a help for attaining 
the latter. Again, in his BhR, MS describes devotion to be the highest end of human 
life (parama-puruṣārtha), where he has employed the simile of plough, which has 
been adopted later by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha as well. With the support of the BP verses 
(i.e. BP 11.20.31-36) etc., MS holds that it is the unanimously accepted view of all 
systems (sarva-tantra-siddhānta) that bliss that is ever unmixed with misery is only 
the highest end of human life. Just as a plough is called life in a figurative sense, so 
the statement that declares righteousness (dharma), wealth (artha), desire (kāma), 
and liberation (mokṣa) as the four ends of human life is to be viewed figuratively 
[i.e. all these four are regarded as the ends of human life, since they are the means 
of attaining the highest end of human life, i.e. the highest devotion]. MS adds that, 
as the knowers of Vedānta hold liberation, which is by nature the supreme bliss, to 
be the end of human life, and not as the absence of misery, the path of devotion to 
the Lord (bhagavadbhakti-yoga) is also the highest end of human life, since it is 
pure bliss unmixed with misery.651  
                                                 
650 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Bhakticandrikā, pp. 116-7 ff. 
651 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: Author’s annotations 5, 6, 8 etc. on the benedictory 
verse, pp. 5-8 (Also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 875, Nelson 1986: pp. 244 and 246). 
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             The claim that bhakti-yoga is held by MS in his BhR to be the highest end 
of human life is also admitted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha in his Bhakticandrikā.652 Again, 
while commenting on the SB of MS, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha maintains that despite its 
being neither bliss nor the absence of suffering, there is no fault in accepting bhakti 
to be the end of human life, just as in the case of cessation of nescience, bliss is 
implied as the delimiting factor (avacchedaka).653 
              Regarding the classification of bhakti, we do not find any elaborate 
discussion of MS in his GD,  barring his remark in one of the introductory verses 
(i.e. no. 7) that bhakti is of three types-- mixed with rites and duties (karma-miśrā), 
pure (śuddhā) and mixed with knowledge (jñāna-miśrā). As we have already 
mentioned, MS may have been influenced by the theistic Vaiṣṇavas while making 
this classification, and for that, we find Viśvanātha Cakravartin, a later exponent of 
the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, mentioning this classification almost in the same manner 
in his own commentary on the BhG that is later than the GD.654 Besides, as noted 
before, MS has dealt with this subject in detail in his BhR. Therefore, a little more 
discussion on it may be pertinent.  
              It is assumed by some scholars that MS might have been aware of the 
treatment of bhakti in the Muktāphala of Vopadeva (13th century CE, and also the 
author of the Harilīlamṛta, a summary of the BP, on which MS has written a 
commentary) and its commentary by Hemādri, called the Kaivalyadīpikā.655 In this 
connection, the view of Adya Prasad Mishra, a modern scholar of repute on the 
subject, may be taken into consideration. Mishra maintains that, according to 
                                                 
652 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Bhakticandrikā on ŚBhS 2.2.23, p. 164 (Also see Mishra 2009: pp. 232-
3). 
653 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nārāyaṇī, pp. 367-8 ff.  
654 Bhagavadgītā (date not known): Sārārthavarṣiṇī, pp. 2, 206-7. 
655 See Gupta 2006: p. 120 and Mishra 2009: p. 78. 
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Vopadeva’s exposition of the BP, bhakti is twofold, i.e. vihitā and avihitā. Further, 
vihita-bhakti is of two types, i.e. mixed (miśrā) and pure (śuddhā). While the former 
is mixed with either karma or jñāna or both of them, the latter is mixed with neither 
karma nor jñāna nor both of them, thereby giving rise to the three types of miśra-
bhakti, e.g. karma-miśrā, karma-jñāna-miśrā, and jñāna-miśrā. While vihita-bhakti 
is of fourteen types [i.e. śuddhā, miśrā (jñāna-miśrā or nirguṇa, karma-jñāna-miśrā, 
karma-miśrā), karma-jñāna-miśrā (uttamā, madhyamā, adhamā), karma-miśrā 
(sāttvika, rājasika, tāmasika), sāttvika (karma-kṣayarthā, viṣṇu-prītyarthā, vidhi-
siddhyarthā), rājasika (viṣayārthā, yaśo’rthā, aiśvaryārthā), tāmasika (hiṃsārthā, 
dambhārthā, mātsaryārthā)], avihita-bhakti is of four types, i.e. kāmajā, dveṣajā, 
bhayajā, and snehajā, thereby making the total number of bhakti to become 
eighteen. Mishra reiterates the view that while Vopadeva and his commentator 
Hemādri enumerate eighteen types of bhakti,656 MS,657 Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, and the 
author of the Bhaktimīmāṃsā658 accept only the first fourteen types of bhakti, giving 
up avihita-bhakti all together.659 The reason why MS seems to have differed from 
Vopadeva lies, Mishra holds, in their understanding of the very nature of bhakti. 
For both Vopadeva and MS, the BP is authoritative, yet while the former considers 
bhakti to be the absorption of the mind to the Lord by any means whatsoever, the 
latter views the melting of the mind to be the essential constituent of bhakti.660 
              While rejecting dveṣajā and bhayajā bhakti in the group of avihita-bhakti, 
MS seems to be in agreement with the ŚBhS, where the author terms bhakti as 
                                                 
656 Muktaphala 1920: Chapter 5, Viṣṇubhaktiprakaraṇa with the commentary of Hemādri, pp. 64-72. 
657 See Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 2, pp. 101-41 ff.  
658 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Pariśiṣṭam 2.3, Bhaktimīmāṃsā 2.1.3-2.2.8, pp. 82-3. 
659 See Mishra 2009: pp. 28-9, 75-81. 
660 Muktaphala 1920: Chapter 5, Viṣṇubhaktiprakaraṇa, verse 1, p. 63 and Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 
1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.3 and author’s comments thereon, pp. 18-20 (Also see Mishra 2009: pp, 
230-1, 
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‘Devotion is by nature affection or attachment (rāga), because of its being opposed 
to aversion (dveṣa) and also being something to which the word ‘sentiment’ (rasa) 
is applied (dveṣapratipakṣabhāvādrasaśabdācca rāgaḥ, ŚBhS 1.1.6). While 
commenting on this aphorism, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha quotes from the VP and BP as the 
authority, and denies the authenticity of dveṣajā and bhayajā bhakti;661 thereby 
accepting the remaining two kinds of avihita-bhakti, i.e. kāmajā and snehajā.662 But 
it is interesting to note that, while commenting on the SB of MS, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha 
seems to be in complete agreement with Vopadeva in classifying bhakti into vihitā 
and avihitā together with their subsections, with the sole exception that he does not 
refer to śuddha-bhakti as one of the four types of vihita-bhakti. Again, though 
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha classifies vihita-bhakti into karma-miśrā, karma-jñāna-miśrā, and 
jñāna-miśrā (leaving out śuddha-bhakti from Vopadeva’s classification of it) both 
in his commentary on the ŚBhS (i.e. the Bhakticandrikā)663 and that on the SB of 
MS, he expresses a contrary view in the Bhakticandrikā, while he refers to śuddha 
type of vihita-bhakti in the same place of the SB in connection with explaining the 
various types of eligible aspirants adopting different types of vihita-bhakti.664  
             In order to give a probable explanation of this apparent contradiction, 
Mishra says that here, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, in line with MS, views 
śuddha/prema/nirguṇa-bhakti as similar to jñāna-miśra-bhakti at the ultimate stage. 
That is why we find that the verse of the BP quoted by MS while explaining the 
                                                 
661 Besides in BhR 2.29 etc., MS explains in his GD as to why they are not be treated as bhakti. In his 
comments on BhG 7.16, he mentions that despite the fact that Kaṃsa, Śiśupāla etc. thought of Kṛṣṇa 
constantly out of their horror and enmity to the Lord, they were not devotees due to their lack of 
love to him (See Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: p. 117 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 363). 
662 Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra 1998: Bhakticandrikā, p. 47 ff. 
663 Cf. Mishra 2009: p, 232. 
664 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nārāyaṇī, p. 368 ff.  
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unqualified nature of bhakti (i.e. nirguṇa or śuddha-bhakti) in his BhR has also been 
quoted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha in explaining jñāna-miśra-bhakti in the SB.665 
Furthermore, the idea becomes more explicit when Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, in the 
course of explaining the same verses in his commentary on the SB of MS, mentions 
that it is the nirguṇauna-bhakti that is the greatest means of attaining Lord Viṣṇu.666 
We have also seen that MS in numerous places of his GD regards śuddha-bhakta-s 
as jñānī-bhakta-s (e.g. BhG 7.16-17 etc.).667  
             Thus, we may conclude that MS’s tripartite classification of bhakti as 
karma-miśrā, śuddhā, and jñāna-miśrā in his GD is not in disagreement with that of 
Vopadeva, as the additional karma-jñāna-miśrā type of bhakti (of Vopadeva) may 
very well be interpreted in terms of karma-miśrā and jñāna-miśrā bhakti (of MS). 
What Vopadeva and later Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha etc. have meant by śuddha-bhakti has 
been termed clearly jñāna-miśra-bhakti by MS. The fact that the ŚBhS too had some 
influence on MS in this context is also conspicuous.   
              In the same way, as found earlier, for showing the need of sādhana-bhakti 
for attaining self-realisation, MS reiterates in his VKL that the grace of the Lord of 
the Blue Mountain is as useful as the Advaitic inner disciplines of śravaṇa (of 
which śama, dama etc. are also constituents), manana, nididhyāsana etc. for 
obtaining liberation through the cessation of nescience and its effects (i.e. all 
sufferings in the form of empirical existence).668Again, MS’s bold assertion 
elsewhere in the same work that there should be no divergent opinion in accepting 
the view that the devotee, getting his intuitive eyes (jñāna-cakṣu) purified through 
                                                 
665 Compare Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: p. 20 with Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nārāyaṇī, 
p. 369. 
666 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nyāratnāvalī, pp. 364-5.  
667 See Mishra 2009: pp, 232-3. 
668 Karmarkar 1962: pp. 10-5 ff. 
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the eye-salve in the form of devotion to the Lord of the Blue Mountain (bhagavato 
nīlācala-nāthasya bhajanāñjana-nirmalīkṛta-jñāna-cakṣuḥ), experiences the 
cessation of nescience by the means of perception, substantiates MS’s attempt to 
bring together the basic tenets of the Advaita Vedānta with his own view regarding 
devotion.669 The same idea is stated in no uncertain terms in his GD where he states 
that the jīvanmukta-s, being purified through the asceticism of knowledge (jñāna-
tapasā), develop a loving attitude, which is otherwise known as pleasure of love 
(rati) or love (prema), towards the Lord.670  
              Regarding the precise definition of bhakti given by MS both in his GD on 
BhG 4.10 and BhR, we find that for MS, devotion means the inmost passionate 
yearning for and attachment to Lord Vāsudeva, and that it is a mental 
modification.671 Though in the course of admitting the nine types of bhakti 
mentioned in the BP etc., MS talks about sādhana-bhakti, which is instrumental in 
causing bhakti proper [i.e. devotion as an object to be achieved by the devotee 
(sādhya-bhakti)], and which has considerable bearing on the theology of the 
Gauḍīya (i.e. Bengal) Vaiṣṇavism prevailing at his time, MS remains a diehard non-
dualist in his approach by aiming at obtaining the knowledge of identity of brahman 
and the individual self, rather than seeking sādhya-bhakti alone as a theist would 
do. Besides, the two important things derived from MS’s definition of bhakti in BhR 
1.3, viz. i) liquefaction or melting (dravībhāva) of the mind of the devotee due to 
observance of the spiritual discipline of the Lord (bhagavaddharma) like śravaṇa 
                                                 
669 Karmarkar 1962: p. 123. 
670 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 193. 
671 As noted earlier, in the GD on BhG 13.10, he holds in agreement with Śaṃkara that devotion is 
the love for the supreme lord Vāsudeva, that is preceded by the knowledge that Lord Vāsudeva is the 
most excellent (bhagavati Vāsudeve parameśvare bhaktiḥ sarvotkṛṣṭatva-jñāna-pūrvikā-prītiḥ); and 
in BhR 1.3, he states that devotion is a mental modification in the form of the Lord (bhagavadākāra-
citta-vṛtti) caused by the listening to the glories of the Lord etc. 
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etc., ii) bhakti consisting in a continuous flow of the mental modification of the 
mind that has assumed the form of the Lord — happen to be important elements in 
the rasa (i.e. the supreme delight) theology propagated by the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, 
and the bhakti-yoga initiated by Rāmānuja672 that was followed extensively by the 
later Vaiṣṇava theologians, are admitted by MS in his GD.673  
             As we have seen, the two famous bhakti-sūtra-s, i.e. the ŚBhS and NBhS 
also refer to bhakti as i) acts of bhakti (i.e. sādhana-bhakti) and ii) the knowledge of 
celestial love, which is the end to be attained by the devotee (i.e. sādhya-bhakti). 
Besides, as both the sects of Caitanya propagated by Rūpa Gosvāmin etc. (16th 
century CE) and of Vallabhācārya (1479 CE, the exponent of the Śuddhādvaita 
Vedānta school) drew heavily upon the BP, and, dealing extensively with the 
religious practices or sādhana-bhakti, developed the theory of rapturous bhakti, 
some scholars, such as Sanjukta Gupta, find an affinity between MS’s treatment of 
bhakti and that of these two schools. Further, Gupta thinks that MS’s method of 
exposition, especially his treatment of sentiment (rasa) and bhakti-rasa in 
particular, is nearer to that of Vallabha than to that of Caitanya.674     
              In another context, the Lord again says that, though he is the same (sama) 
to everybody, those who worship him with devotion live in him and he in them 
(BhG 9.29). MS’s non-dualistic approach is also explicit in his explanation of this 
statement. According to him, after the dedication of all actions to the Lord, the 
minds of the devotees have become very transparent due to prevalence of sattva 
therein and the removal of impurity of all rajas and tamas therefrom, and they exist 
                                                 
672 Cf. Gupta 2006: p. 125 (Also see Brahmasūtra 1989: Rāmānuja’s comments on BS 1.1.1, vol. 1, 
pp. 3-100; on BS 4.1.1, vol. 2, pp. 570-71).   
673 For details, see Gupta 2006: p. 125 ff. 
674 Gupta Gombrich 1991: p. 237. 
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in the Lord by virtue of acquiring the mental mode in his (i.e. the Lord’s) form on 
the basis of the Upaniṣadic authority. So, the Lord too exists in them after being 
reflected in their absolute pure (atisvaccha) mental mode (cittavṛtti).675 This is a 
view which has been prominently discussed in his BhR, which we will take up in 
the following section. 
 
5.2.2.3. Complete surrender of one’s self to the Lord (prapatti) as an aid to 
bhakti-yoga 
In conjunction with bhakti-yoga as a means of attaining liberation, the BhG talks 
about śaraṇāgati or prapatti (complete surrender of one’s self to the Lord) as an aid 
to that means. Having by nature a universal appeal, prapatti facilitates the removal 
of obstacles that may crop up in the path of bhakti-yoga. Prapatti forms the spirit of 
devotion necessary to obtain the grace of the Lord.676 We find a couple of verses in 
the BhG where the Lord advises Arjuna to surrender completely to him and also to 
take refuge in him, so that the Lord himself takes care of him. Here, Arjuna is the 
representative of his devotees.  
              Having thus shown the importance of bhakti-yoga as a means of attaining 
liberation throughout the text, in the concluding chapter of the BhG (i.e. BhG 18) 
the Lord again advises Arjuna to take shelter in him only after abandoning all sorts 
of righteousness and tells him that he will release him from all sins that he (i.e. 
Arjuna) might have committed. He thereby emphasizes the need of one’s total 
surrender to the Lord for attaining liberation. The pertinent verse reads: 
‘Abandoning all rites and duties, take refuge in me only. I will liberate you from all 
                                                 
675 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 437. 
676 Panigrahi 2006: p. 199 ff.  
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sins, do not grieve’ (BhG 18.66).677 MS’s detailed explanation of this verse is 
noteworthy, when compared with that of Śaṃkara. Some discussion of these two 
interpretations helps us in understanding the respective philosophical attitudes of 
these two eminent figures.   
             MS maintains that when the BP speaks of taking refuge in the Lord, the 
employment of the word ‘all’ indicates abandonment of rites and duties (dharma) 
without any exception -- irrespective of whether they are caste-duties (varṇa-
dharma) or  the duties of the stations of life (āśrama-dharma) or the duties of a 
general nature (sāmānya-dharma), or whether they are the duties that are being 
carried out (vidyamāna/kriyamāṇa) or those that are to be performed 
(avidyamāna/kariṣyamāṇa). Having abandoned all such rites and duties, the devotee 
should take refuge in the Lord, who is the one without second (advitīya), who 
superintends all our rites and duties, and who is the sole arbiter of their results 
(sarva-dharmāṇāmadhiṣṭhātāraṃ phaladātāraṃ ca). With the firm conviction that 
he will succeed through sheer grace of the Lord alone, the devotee should worship 
with incessant thinking (anukṣaṇa-bhāvanā) about Lord Vāsudeva, who is the 
embodiment of the amalgamation of supreme bliss and infinity (paramānanda-
ghana-mūrtimanantam). The idea is that he should constantly think of the Lord with 
an excessive love (prema-prakarṣa) that is preceded by the idea that the Lord is the 
highest reality and that there is nothing outside him. Such a mental modification is 
bereft of all ideas about the non-self, and is like a continuous flow of oil (taila-
dhārāvadavichhinna). 
                                                 
677 Translation is our own. 
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 MS says further that the phrase ‘abandoning all dharma-s’ (sarva-dharmān 
parityājya) in the verse does not enjoin renunciation of actions. Rather, what is 
directed here for all the stations of life [e.g. student (brahmacārin), house-holder 
(gṛhastha), forest-dweller (vānaprastha), and renunciate (saṃnyāsin)] is that they 
should surrender themselves completely to the Lord (bhagavadeka-śaraṇatā-mātra) 
after disregarding (anādara) actions, even if they are directed. MS holds that the 
phrase ‘abandoning all dharma-s’ does not mean abandoning all righteous and 
unrighteous actions, as this fact is already known from the scriptures endorsing 
renunciation (saṃnyāsa-śāstra) and the scriptures asserting prohibition (pratiṣedha-
śāstra) respectively.678 This phrase is also not to be treated simply as an expression 
that endorses renunciation (saṃnyāsa-vidhāyaka-vacana), as what is intended to be 
directed here is surrendering oneself completely to the Lord. Thus, it is to be taken 
as a mere reiteration, because the phrase in question is neither an injunctive 
sentence (vidhi-vākya) nor one that proclaims renunciation; while the acceptance of 
both these senses of it leads to a defect known as ‘sentential split’ (vākya-bheda).679 
Besides, having viewed it as the reiteration of ‘abandoning all righteousness and 
unrighteousness’, the assertion ‘complete surrender to the Lord’ has to be meant by 
the later phrase of the verse ‘seek me alone for refuge’(māmekaṃ śaraṇaṃ vraja); 
thereby asserting that here ‘renunciation of dharma’ is not intended to be meant by 
                                                 
678 While saṃnyāsa-śāstra talks about abandoning righteousness/actions that are enjoined by the 
scriptures, pratiṣedha-śāstra prohibits the performance of unrighteous actions, i.e. actions that are 
prohibited by the scriptures. 
679 In Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.46, Jaimini has stated that a sentence consists of words that combine to 
express a single meaning (arthaikatvadekaṃ vākyam) [Mīmāṃsādarśana 1984-86: Vol. 2, p. 521]. 
Hence, if a single sentence is interpreted in a manner that can yield two meanings, then in order to 
express these two meanings, the single sentence has to be reduced to two sentences, thus affecting its 
unity. This is known as the defect called ‘sentential split’ (vākyabheda). 
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the phrase  ‘abandoning all dharma-s’. BhG 18.66 has been admitted as the 
concluding statement of the BhG scripture as it maintains ‘surrender to the Lord’ to 
be its final teaching. Without this surrender to the Lord, even renunciation does not 
fructify [i.e. renunciation does not give rise to its result (i.e. liberation)].  
                  In this connection, Baccā Jhā’s observation on MS’s explanation on the 
expression ‘having abandoned’ (parityajya) may be mentioned. Baccā Jhā holds 
that MS explains the expression parityajya in such a circuitous way because of the 
fact that, in the previous chapters, the performance of prescribed action without any 
desire for fruits has been highly extolled; if they are now held to be something 
dispensable (i.e. something that should be totally abandoned), then it would lead to 
inconsistency. Further, Jhā explicates the expression madeka-śaraṇatā (i.e. taking 
refuge in the Lord only) in the context as the continuous flow of the modifications 
of the mind (nirantara-vṛtti-pravāha) in the form of non-dual pure consciousness 
(advitīya-śuddha-cid-rūpa) that arises after the removal of distraction (vikṣepa), 
which is again caused by renunciation of all actions by the internal organ, i.e. mind, 
that has already been purified by the performance of nitya-naimittika- karma-s.680 
             MS adds that, since Arjuna, being a kṣatriya, is not qualified for embracing 
renunciation, it is irrational for the Lord to advise him about renunciation. If it is 
held that the Lord is talking about renunciation in general by holding Arjuna as the 
representative, it does not seem appropriate to place the introductory and 
concluding statements: ‘…I shall tell it for your own good’ (BhG 18.64) and ‘…I 
will liberate you from all sins, do not grieve’ (BhG 18.66). Thus, in this context, 
only complete surrender to the Lord has been upheld by the Lord, with a sense of 
                                                 
680 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Gūḍhārthatattvālokaḥ, p. 160. 
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ignoring the duties of renunciation (saṃnyāsa-dharma). In connection with this, as 
also while explaining the Lord’s contention that he will absolve his devotees 
unconditionally of all sins (i.e. without the performance of any atonement for 
committing sins), provided the devotees totally surrender to him, MS refers to 
Śaṃkara, who, he says, has established this point in greater detail after refuting the 
rival views.  
              MS now gives concrete details of this concept of ‘surrender to the Lord’ 
(bhagavaccharaṇatva) embedded in the BhG by mentioning that depending on the 
ripeness of spiritual practice (sādhanābhyāsa), such surrender may be of three 
types: (i) I am his alone (tasyaivāham), (ii) He is mine alone (mamaivāsau), and (iii) 
He and myself are non-different (sa evāham). In the GD, MS has referred the reader 
to his BhR where the detailed treatment of all these types of surrender to the Lord 
has been made.681 In order to substantiate that all these three types of 
bhagavaccharaṇatā can be traced to different theistic Vaiṣṇavite sources, MS now 
quotes concrete examples of them from their respective sources. The first one, MS 
maintains, is of a placid form (mṛdu), as expressed in, ‘O Lord! Even if the sense of 
differentiation withers away, I am yours, and not you mine; as the wave belongs to 
the sea, and certainly not the sea to the wave’ (Viṣṇuṣaṭpadī 3, a stotra believed to 
have been composed by Śaṃkara).682 The second one is somewhat stronger 
(madhyama), as in, ‘O Lord Kṛṣṇa! It is not surprising that you are walking away by 
forcibly throwing aside my hands! But I will deem it your valour if you can go out 
my heart’ (Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛtam 3.96 of Bilvamaṅgala Ṭhākura or Līlāśuka, ca. 14th 
                                                 
681 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 2.60-70, pp. 132-6. 
682 satyapi bhedāpagame nātha tavāhaṃ na māmakīnastvam / sāmudro hi taraṅgaḥ kkacana samudro 
na tāraṅgaḥ // (Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 1, Ṣaṭpadīstotram, p. 379). 
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century CE).683 The third one is the most intense (adhimātram), as is spoken of by 
the king of death (Yama) to his messenger (dūta), ‘Go away from a distance from 
those who hold the firm conviction residing in their hearts that all these worldly 
phenomena and they themselves are non-different from Lord Vāsudeva, and that 
that supreme person, the supreme Lord, is one (i.e. identical)’ [VP 3.7.32].684 MS 
holds that devotees like Ambarīṣa, Prahlāda, gopī-s etc. may be placed under this 
third category.685 It may be noted in this connection that while commenting on the 
SB of MS, Brahmānanda Sarasvatī refers to the above-mentioned three types of 
surrender to the Lord along with the verse of the BhG in question (i.e. BhG 18.66), 
and elaborates them respectively. Brahmānanda holds that the result of devotion 
(bhakti) in the sense of loving devotion (prema) is surrendering oneself to the Lord 
(ātma-nivedana). By the first type of surrendering to the Lord as ‘I am his alone’ is 
meant remembrance of Lord Viṣṇu. The second type as ‘He is mine only’ brings 
forth from the cessation of difference in respect of other beings due to the 
abundance of love for the Lord (premātiśaya). Regarding the third and last type, 
‘He and I are non-different’, Brahmānanda adds, the sense that Lord Viṣṇu as 
existence, consciousness, and bliss is by nature loving devotion, while the idea of 
difference between the worshipped (sevya), worshipper (sevaka) etc. is 
obliterated.686         
                                                 
683 hastamutkṣiapya yāto’si balātkṛṣṇa kimadbhutam / hṛdayādyadi niryāsi pauruṣaṃ gaṇayāmi te // 
684 sakalamidamahaṃ ca vāsudevaḥ paramapumānparameśvaraḥ sa ekaḥ / iti matiracalā 
bhavtyananteh ṛdayagate vraja tānvihāya dūrāt // 
685 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 854. 
686 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nyāyaratnāvalī, pp. 365-6. 
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             MS asserts that the three types of steadfastness (niṣṭhā) in the form of goal 
(sādhya) and the means of its attainment (sādhana) have been spoken of in the BhG 
in clear terms. Among them, while the steadfastness in action (karma-niṣṭhā) as 
having its utility until the renunciation of all actions (sarva-karma-saṃnyāsa) has 
been expressed in the statement ‘He finds it by honouring, through the fulfilment of 
his own task, him who motivates the creatures to act, on whom all this is strung’ 
(BhG 18.46); the steadfastness in knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā), coupled with the 
perfection in listening to the Vedāntic scriptures etc. which are preceded by 
renunciation, is conveyed in the statement ‘Through this bhakti he recognises me 
for who I am and understands how great I really am, and by virtue of his true 
knowledge he enters me at once’ (BhG 18.55); the steadfastness in devotion to God 
(bhagavadbhakti-niṣṭhā), being the means to and result of both karma-niṣṭhā  and 
jñāna-niṣṭhā, has been expressed at the end in the statement ‘Abandoning all rites 
and duties, take refuge in me only. I will liberate you from all sins, do not grieve’ 
(BhG 18.66). However, the revered commentator Śaṃkara maintains that by 
tagging ‘renunciation of all actions’ (sarva-karma-saṃnyāsa) to the phrase 
‘relinquishing all dharma-s’, steadfastness in knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā) has been 
summed up in the phrase ‘seek me alone for refuge’ (in BhG 18.66). With much 
humility, MS now expresses his difference with Śaṃkara, when he describes 
himself as a pitiable (varāka) person who is unable to explain the intent of the Lord 
in this context. While MS has described the expression as conveying surrender to 
the Lord, Śaṃkara maintains that it expresses renunciation. Thus, in order to 
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express his view with mildness, MS has described himself as an insignificant 
person who is unable to grasp the intent of the Lord.687   
               As indicated by MS himself, while explaining the verse under discussion 
(i.e. BhG 18.66), Śaṃkara’s interpretation seems conspicuously different from that 
of MS. Unlike MS, Śaṃkara explains this verse by stating that after the 
renunciation of all dharma-s that comprise the performance of prescribed deeds as 
well as the performance of prohibited actions [so that the idea ‘freedom from all 
actions’ (naiṣkarmya) can be properly conveyed], one needs to take refuge in the 
Lord alone, conceived as the self of all, the same in all, dwelling in all beings, the 
Lord, indestructible, free from being conceived as a foetus in the womb, birth, old 
age, and death (garbha-janma-jarā-maraṇa-vivarjita). In so doing, the aspirant 
must have the conviction that he himself is verily the Lord and that there is nothing 
else except the Lord. Pointing out a few verses in the BhG conveying both the 
means of knowledge (BhG 13.12, 18.55 etc.) and action (BhG 2.47, 4.15 etc.) as the 
suitable means of attaining the supreme good or liberation (mokṣa), Śaṃkara, after 
anticipating the possible objections of the opponent as to which among them — 
knowledge, or action, or the combination of both -- should be the  means for its 
attainment, adds that only the knowledge of the self (ātma-jñāna) is the cause of the 
highest good (niḥśreyasa) because, after dispelling the sense of difference (bheda-
pratyaya), it culminates in liberation or emancipation (kaivalya). As the sense of 
difference, consisting in action, its agent, and its result (kriyā-kāraka-phala-bheda-
buddhi), is ever prevalent in the self due to nescience or ignorance (avidyā) which 
                                                 
687 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 752-5. 
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has been at work in time without beginning (anādi-kāla), and as the knowledge of 
the self dispels nescience that propels one to engage in action with the awareness of 
multiplicity, the way of knowledge (jñāna-mārga) is the only means of attaining 
liberation, ruling out the other two alternatives, viz. the means of action (karma-
mārga) and that of the combination of action and knowledge (jñāna-karma-
samuccaya-mārga). Though liberation, being an eternal entity (nitya-vastu) and not 
a product (akārya), is not produced either through action or through knowledge, 
knowledge alone is the means of attaining the highest good or liberation (ataḥ 
kevalameva jñānaṃ niḥśreysasādhanamiti), as knowledge dispels the darkness of 
ignorance (avidyā-tamo-nivartaka) and is seen to result in liberation, just as 
darkness and illusions such as apprehending a rope as a snake etc. are dispelled by 
the light of a lamp. Furthermore, knowledge requires no assistance for producing 
liberation as its fruit (mokṣa-phala). Knowledge dispels nescience, which is a pre-
condition of action, and that nescience or ignorance cannot be its own dispeller.688 
               Thus, Śaṃkara’s understanding of this verse as the attainment of the 
supreme self as identified with the individual-self after renouncing all sorts of 
action poses a sharp difference with that of MS, according to whom this means that 
the attainment of the qualified brahman is possible through utmost self-surrender. 
Further, it is interesting to note that though MS expresses a view different from that 
of Śaṃkara on BhG 18.66, he quotes from the latter’s work (i.e. the Viṣṇuṣaṭpadī), 
which is one of the many hymns said to have been composed by Śaṃkara in praise 
of Lord Viṣṇu, while indicating that Śaṃkara does not convey the inner meaning of 
the verse, which actually talks about total surrender to the Lord.  
                                                 
688 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 752 -7 ff. 
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 The view of Roger Marcaurelle is noteworthy in this connection.689 After 
considering the comments of both Śaṃkara and MS on BhG 18.66, he maintains 
that it is a sheer misunderstanding on the part of MS that prevents him from 
grasping the implicit hermeneutical import embedded in the comments of Śaṃkara 
on BhG 18.66. As noted above, MS finds fault with Śaṃkara’s interpretation of 
‘having renounced all dharma-s’ in the verse as ‘having renounced all right and 
wrong actions, i.e. all actions in a sense of physical renunciation as a prologue to 
the steadfastness in knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā)’, owing to the fact that physical 
renunciation cannot be prescribed to Arjuna, who is a kṣatriya by birth, and that the 
idea of surrendering to the Lord is intended here. On the other hand, ironically, 
Ānandagiri, while commenting on this verse in Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya, mentions 
that Lord Kṛṣṇa takes Arjuna as an incidental addressee for the steadfastness in 
knowledge through physical renunciation,690 an idea that fully contradicts MS as 
cited above. 
 Thus, Marcaurelle claims, after referring to excerpts from Śaṃkara’s 
comments on various verses in the BhG (e.g. BhG 4.23, 4.41, 9.2, 9.9, 18.12, 18.17, 
18.49, 18.66) that by ‘having renounced dharma and adharma’ in BhG 18.66, 
Śaṃkara means ‘freedom from embodiment and limitations of all actions’. Śaṃkara 
does not merely mean the physical abandonment of actions as a prelude to the 
steadfastness of knowledge, but a kind of renunciation that only liberates one from 
all the limitations of actions and their effects. Marcaurelle reiterates that in 
Śaṃkara’s opinion, even this kind of renunciation is made possible after obtaining 
immediate self-knowledge, leaving room for those who have not yet renounced 
                                                 
689 Marcaurelle 2002: pp. 198-202 ff.  
690 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Ānadagirivyākhyā, pp. 753-4. 
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physical actions for any reason whatsoever, a view that supports the case of Arjuna, 
who is still a seeker after liberation. In contrast, MS asserts a path to enlightenment, 
where physical renunciation is not in vogue. So, Marcaurelle holds that it is a 
paradox on MS’s part not to identify self-knowledge and liberation in a tradition 
where such identification is viewed favourably, even though MS has admitted the 
former as a minimum requirement for the latter in some places. 
              The manner in which MS explains the concept of complete surrender to the 
Lord (śaraṇāgati) was adopted earlier by Rāmaṇuja, who also supports the view 
that the devotees need not undertake any atonement in order to be cleansed of their 
sins, and that they need to seek the Lord alone for obtaining bhakti-yoga, thereby 
admitting śaraṇāgati as an aid (aṅga) to bhakti-yoga, which is the direct means for 
attaining liberation.691    
                   As mentioned earlier, the efficacy of loving devotion is stated by the Lord 
outright for the first time in the second group of six-chapters, when he holds that 
those who take refuge in him (prapadyante) alone can overcome his divine illusion 
(i.e. prakṛti) consisting of three primordial natures (BhG 7.14). This verse does not 
refer to prapatti as an aid to bhakti-yoga proper that leads to liberation. Instead, it 
advises one to seek the grace of the Lord (bhagavad-prasāda) through worshipping 
him in order to overcome māyā, which gets in the way of the true knowledge of the 
supreme self. MS’s explanation of this verse seems to be pertinent in the context 
under discussion. 
             On the one hand, MS gives a purely non-dualistic interpretation of the view 
that the aspirant overcomes easily the divine illusion of the Lord by taking refuge in 
                                                 
691 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 3, Rāmānujabhāṣyam, pp. 412-3 (Also see Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 
193). 
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the Lord who, in this context, is thus characterised in non-dual terms: He one who 
is bereft of all limiting adjuncts (sarvopādh-irahita), the integrated whole (akhaṇḍa) 
that is of the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss (cidānanda-svarūpa), 
who is the object of mental modification produced by the Upaniṣadic texts, which is 
(i) by nature non-conceptual or direct realisation (nirvikalpa-sākṣātkāra-rūpa), (ii) 
endowed  with the quality of having form of pure consciousness (śuddha-
cidākāratva-dharma-viśiṣṭa), (iii) produced from the maturity of contemplation 
(nididhyāna-paripāka-prasūta), and also opposed to all nescience and its effects 
(sarvājñāna-tatkārya-virodhī).  
 Alternatively, MS gives a pure devotional account in the following 
terms.692 Those who take refuge in the Lord Vāsudeva alone, having a form of 
supreme-bliss-concentrate (paramānanda-ghanamaya-mūrtimati), who is also 
beyond the world-appearance or creation (prapañca), and pass days in constant 
thinking of him, are not overpowered by any of the effects of māyā, since their 
minds are immersed in love (prema) for the Lord, who is the ocean of immense joy 
(mahānanda-samudra).  
 Śaṃkara’s comments also admit explicitly the efficacy of devotion. He 
maintains that those who, by abandoning all conventional laws of life, take shelter 
with the Lord alone, who is their very self and also the possessor of illusory power 
(māyāvin) as well, overcome this all-deceiving power, i.e. they become free from 
transmigratory bondage. Śrīdhara makes the point more explicit by interpreting that 
                                                 
692 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 360. 
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after showing unswerving devotion to the Lord and thus getting rid of this māyā 
(even though it is insurmountable), the devotee knows the Lord.693  
              Thus, we find that, MS, along with Śaṃkara and Śrīdhara, maintains that 
taking refuge in the Lord as expressed in BhG 7.14 is a definite way of overcoming 
the bondage of transmigration. Likewise, in another verse of the eighteenth adhyāya 
also, Arjuna is told to take refuge in Lord Kṛṣṇa with the whole of his being, since 
by the grace  of the Lord, he will find the eternal abode (śvāśvata-sthāna) of 
supreme peace (parā-śānti) [BhG 18.62]. MS’s non-dualistic-cum-devotional 
attitude is also conspicuous in his explanation on this verse. MS maintains that, in 
order to cross the ocean of empirical existence (saṃsāra-samudra), Arjuna should 
take refuge in the Lord in every way (i.e. by mind, speech, and action). By the grace 
of the Lord, which culminates in the knowledge of reality, Arjuna will attain 
supreme peace upon the cessation of nescience and its effects, and experience the 
eternal abode in the form of non-dual-self-effulgent-supreme-bliss (advitīya-
svaprakāśa-paramānandarūpa).  
              Śaṃkara’s interpretation of the word ‘eternal abode’ in the verse as the 
supreme abode of Lord Viṣṇu694 is of help in treating this verse as an indicator of 
bhakti-yoga. The Lord’s magnanimity to his devotee is also found in MS’s 
explanation of BhG 7.20, where the Lord has said that other devotees, devoid of 
true knowledge, resort to other deities. MS maintains that here, the intention of the 
all-merciful Lord is that all kinds of devotees (i.e. the suffering, the seekers for 
knowledge, the seekers for prosperity, and the wise) without any exception attain 
the most excellent of all results called emancipation, by taking refuge in him alone. 
                                                 
693 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 361; Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 358-61; 
Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 356-61. 
694 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 749. 
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While explaining another utterance of the Lord of the same type (i.e. BhG 7.26), 
MS, following Śaṃkara, says that, though the Lord is the seer of all (sarvadarśī), 
except his devotees favoured with his grace (anugraha), nobody whosever knows 
him, owing to being deluded by the magical power of the Lord, and consequently 
ignoring to worship him as a result of lacking the knowledge of his reality.695  
              In BhG 7.29, the Lord again says that devotees resort to him with a desire 
to overcome worldly sufferings, e.g. old age and death etc.; and consequently, 
knows him and all about the indwelling self and actions. MS explains this statement 
in the following manner. He holds that, being disgusted with the sorrows of this 
world and seeking to put an end to the numerous as well as unbearable worldly 
pains and sufferings like old age (jarā), death (maraṇa) etc., those who, by 
resorting to the Lord, perform activities that are prescribed by the scriptures, and 
are dedicated to him without having any desire for their fruits, get their mind 
purified, and, consequently, realise him as the cause of the universe, the owner of 
illusory power and the pure brahman [i.e. the implied meaning of the term ‘that’ 
(tat) in ‘That thou art’]. MS continues by saying that such devotees also can realise 
the self, which is revealed through body and is unlimited by limiting adjuncts, by 
virtue of being denoted by the term ‘thou’ (tvam). All the means of realising the 
entities that are indicated by ‘that’ and ‘thou’ respectively, viz. approaching a 
teacher, listening to and contemplating on his teaching, with a spirit of certainty in 
their result etc., are also known to them.696  
              Thus, MS quite elaborately gives justification for the dependence on the 
Lord, and interprets the Lord’s utterance under consideration from the non-dualistic 
                                                 
695 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 365-6, 371. 
696 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 373-4. 
 
 
 245
standpoint by showing that the aspirant, by taking refuge in the Lord, realises the 
individual self, the supreme self, and the means of identifying them as non-
different. 
              Dhanapati Sūri says in this connection that what is intended by the word 
‘action’ in the verse is not what MS means, viz. approaching a teacher, listening to 
the scriptures from him, etc. He maintains that in the verse: ‘….And the outpouring 
that brings about the origination of the being of the creatures is called act’ (BhG 
8.3), the word ‘act’ (karma) stands for Vedic rituals like the offering of oblation of 
rice cooked in milk (caru), cakes (puroḍāśa) etc. to the Lord, as is clear from 
Śaṃkara’s commentary on this verse: ‘…the sacrificial act consisting in offering 
cooked rice in milk, cakes etc. to the Lord is meant by the word ‘act’…’ MS 
himself has also interpreted the word karma employed in BhG 8.3 in the same 
manner: ‘…offering consisting in yāga, dāna, homa as laid down in the 
scriptures…is here meant by the word ‘action’…’ Hence, when MS explains the 
word karma employed in BhG 7.29 in a dissimilar manner, his explanation, 
Dhanapati holds, becomes inconsistent and opposed to the commentary of 
Śaṃkara.697   
              The Lord further says that in the case of those who serve him exclusively, 
seeking no other end but him, the Lord takes care of them (BhG 9.22). While 
explaining the verse, MS, like Śaṃkara, holds that those who are desireless 
(niṣkāma), and possess right knowledge of the reality (samyagdarśī), become 
dispassionate towards all kinds of enjoyment on account of being perceiver of non-
duality everywhere. They contemplate on their indwelling-self as the Lord 
                                                 
697 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 379-80; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 379; 
Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, p. 374. 
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Nārāyaṇa together with the idea that ‘I myself am the Lord Vāsudeva, the self of 
all, and no other object exists apart from him’. Such renouncers become instilled 
with the fourfold spiritual disciplines (sādhana-catuṣṭaya), seeing the Lord 
everywhere uninterruptedly.698 Thus, MS’s assertion in this connection is consistent 
with the doctrine of non-dualism and also with his devotional leanings.  
             Besides, there are innumerable references to dedication to the Lord in the 
AdRR of MS as well. In one such place, while giving advice, with the support of the 
BhG, MBh etc., to the devotee to propel him to the path of non-dualism to attain 
liberation, MS instructs the devotee to worship the Lord. When the devotee 
expresses his inability to follow this instruction due to his flitting mind affected by 
attachment to objects, MS directs him to give up these attachments and undergo the 
disciplines that cause the knowledge of the reality. Further, when the devotee 
requests MS to advise him in a more suitable way for attaining the knowledge of 
the reality, MS asks him to remember Lord Viṣṇu constantly, through which the 
devotee will be able to practise the required spiritual disciplines after getting his 
mind purified. When the devotee says that he is even unable to sing the praise of the 
Lord (bhagavannāmakīrtana), MS advises him to dedicate all actions being 
undertaken -- whether ordinary or Vedic -- to Lord Vāsudeva.699 Even in his MSṬ, 
in the case of Lord Hari (Hari-pakṣa) MS recommends in no uncertain term 
devotion to the Lord or rather surrendering by the devotee to him. While describing 
the Lord as ever-auspicious irrespective of the nature of his devotees, MS maintains 
that even when an inauspicious person, or one having bad conduct remembers the 
                                                 
698 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 431. 
699 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 41 ff. (It may be viewed as a dialogue between MS and a dualist 
like Śaṃkara Miśra).  
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name of the Lord, the Lord appears to him to be auspicious out of his (i.e. the 
Lord’s) immense affection to the devotees (ati-bhakta-vātsalya). Further, in order 
to lay stress upon his support for devotion, MS adds that the same view is 
applicable in the case of Lord Śiva (Hara-pakṣa) as well.700   
              In continuation of our discussion on śaraṇāgati as an aid to bhakti-yoga, it 
may be said that śaraṇāgati is admitted by Rāmānuja as an aid to bhakti-yoga that 
helps one to overcome the hindrances to the way of bhakti-yoga as stated in the 
BhG, thereby recognising its due importance. Though śaraṇāgati, which is 
otherwise known as prapatti (though they hold subtle theological differences)701 has 
been given a very important place in Rāmānuja’s philosophy, he does not view it as 
an alternative and immediate means of liberation in his commentary on the BhG. In 
his commentary on the BS (especially BS 3.2.34) called the Śrībhāṣya, however, 
Rāmānuja hints at admitting prapatti as an independent means of attaining 
liberation by maintaining that the supreme person to be attained needs to be himself 
the means of attaining him. With the support of the Śruti text (i.e. MU 3.2.3), 
Rāmānuja holds that there can be no other means but the Lord himself to attain 
                                                 
700 Śivamahimnaḥstotra 1996: Madhusūdanī on verse 24, p. 94. 
701 Though these two words have different textual lineages, by the time of Vedānta Deśika or 
Veṅkaṭanātha (13/14th century CE) they are taken to be synonyms. Likewise, in the 
Yatīndramatadīpikā of Śrīnivāsācārya – 17th century CE, śaraṇāgati is said to have six limbs: to 
conceive what is in conformity with the will of God, to reject what is against the will of God, to have 
faith that the Lord will save the self, to take the Lord only as the protector, not to have any sense of 
conceit (to the Lord), and to have complete or absolute surrender of onself to the Lord (ānukūlyasya 
saṃkalpaḥ prātikūlyasya varjanam / rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāso  goptṛtva varaṇaṃ tathā // 
kārpaṇyamātmanikṣepaḥ ṣaḍaṅgāni pracakṣate // (quoted in Bhattachara and Bhattacharya Śāstrī 
1978-73, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 269). Here, ‘the complete surrender of oneself to the Lord’ (ātmanikṣepa) is 
the whole (aṅgin) and the other five are parts (aṅga-s). The Lakṣmītantra, a Pāñcarāra text, mentions 
that ‘nyāsa’ which is synonymous with ‘nikṣepa’ has five components. Prapatti is thus synonymous 
with the five-limbed śaraṇāgati. It is also known as nyāsavidyā, tyāga, saṃnyāsa etc. (Gupta 2007: 
Lakṣmītantra 17.74 ff., 28.11 ff., pp. 94 ff., 150 ff.), Besides, some of the earliest Vaiṣaṇava Āgama-
s predating Vedānta Deśika refer śaraṇāgati to be the surrender to the Lord with utmost faith (mahā-
viśvāsa) that the Lord (i.e. the desired of the devotee) cannot be obtained with any other means but 
one’s surrender to him (with utmost faith). Thus, śaraṇāgati is a type of prapatti and later is being 
used interchangeably.   
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him.702 What Rāmānuja has implicitly admitted here is made explicit in another of 
his work called the Śaraṇāgati-gadya. Rāmānuja states there the view that 
śaraṇāgati is to be viewed as a different and direct means of liberation for those 
who are totally unable to undergo bhakti-yoga, with no other option left for them 
for attaining the Lord.703 Again, Vedānta Deśika, while commenting on Rāmānuja’s 
Gītābhāṣya, holds śaraṇāgati to be a separate and direct means of liberation for 
those unable to adopt the difficult path of bhakti-yoga, though the BhG does not 
mention this clearly.704  
 
5.2.2.4. Madhusūdana and Rāmānuja on bhakti-yoga 
Having kept the abovementioned facts in mind along with our reference to 
Rāmanuja provided sporadically throughout our work, we may now make an 
attempt to evaluate the extent to which MS finds affinity with him, a question which 
has also been raised and answered meticulously by a modern scholar named 
Sanjukta Gupta.705  
              At the outset, the influence of the BP, which has its origin probably in the 
southern part of India, is very much conspicuous among all sects of Vaiṣṇavism. 
The spontaneous fervent love for the Lord, with little philosophical speculation, of 
the Tamil poet-saints called the Āḷvārs (ca. 3rd quarter of 1st century CE) got 
expressed systematically in the BP and found later its methodical theological 
dimension in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta propagated by Rāmānuja. For Rāmānuja, 
                                                 
702 Brahmasūtra 1989: Vol. 2, p. 453. 
703 Cf. Srinivasa Chari 2005: pp. 246-7 (Also refer to Rāmānujācārya 1377 Bengali Era: 
Śrīśaraṇāgatigadya, pp. 1-31). 
704 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 3, Tātparyacandrikā on BhG 18.66, pp. 411-7 (Also see Srinivasa Chari 
2005: p. 247).  
705 See Gupta 2006: p. 125 ff. and Gupta Gombrich 1991: p. 234 ff.  
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brahman is non-dual but qualified in nature, possessing numerous transcendental, 
divine qualities -- a fact that we have pointed out at the beginning of the previous 
chapter in connection with explaining MS’s treatment of the very term ‘Lord’ 
(bhagavān) in the BhG. Besides, the famous verse of MS in both his AdS and GD 
that enumerates the divine qualities of Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is the highest reality to 
him: ‘I know no higher reality than Kṛṣṇa whose hands are adorned with a flute, 
whose complexion is like a fresh rain-cloud, who is clad in a yellow garment, 
whose lower lip is reddish like a bimba fruit, whose face is as beautiful as the full 
moon, and whose eyes are like lotuses’706 makes us think that Rāmānuja’s treatment 
of brahman finds its zenith in this couplet.707 
             Such a couplet, placed at a crucial place in MS’s AdS, seems to be at odds 
with the main thesis of this work, and the answer to the charge of incongruity due to 
this verse is given by one of the commentators of MS. Thus, in the second chapter 
of his AdS, after dealing with a section on the formlessness (nirākāratva) of 
brahman, MS, while taking up the next section on the fitness of brahman being 
knowledge or consciousness etc. (i.e. brahman does not have knowledge in the 
common sense of the term, as brahman by nature is pure knowledge), begins with 
this couplet, which is also found as the first concluding verse in his GD, in praising 
Lord Kṛṣṇa with a beautiful form. While commenting on this verse, Brahmānanda 
Sarasvatī emphasises the natural need of bhakti for obtaining mental purification 
etc. He points out that, though the numerous forms of the Lord are transitory and 
false, worshipping them is fairly possible in the empirical state, while its fruit is the 
                                                 
706 vaṃśīvibhūṣitakarānnavanīradābhāt pītāmbarādaruṇabimbaphalādharoṣṭhāt / 
pūrṇendusundaramukhādaravindanetrāt kṛṣṇātparaṃ kimapi tattvamahaṃ na jāne // (Advaitasiddhi 
2005: p. 750 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, 1st concluding verse, p. 775). 
707 Compare this couplet with the introduction to Rāmānuja’s commentary on the BhG 
(Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, pp. 5-6).  
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purification of the mind etc. He maintains this with the support of the following 
texts from the Śruti and Smṛti: ‘Only in a man who has the deepest love for God, 
and who shows the same love toward his teacher as toward God, do these points 
declared by the Noble One shine forth’ (ŚU 6.23), ‘Neither the righteousness 
attended with truth and benevolence nor the scholarship accompanied with penance 
completely cleanses oneself who is devoid of devotion to the Lord’. Brahmānanda 
adds that it is like a consequence of the service rendered to one’s preceptor. Even if 
the body of the preceptor is impermanent, services rendered to it yield certain 
results. In this way, worshipping the impermanent form of the Lord also produces 
the desired results. He adds, as noted before, in this context that MS, in spite of 
being a jīvanmukta, remembers Lord Kṛṣṇa because of his past dispositions of 
worshipping (pūrva-sañcita-bhajana-vāsanā) Lord Kṛṣṇa.708 But MS seems to be 
aware of this possible criticism, as in his BhR he states that it is not to be mistaken 
as pure dispositions, but a semblance of it (vāsanābhāsa), since in the softened state 
of mind, nothing can enter as a disposition.709 
              For Rāmānuja, devotion (bhakti) and meditation (dhyāna) may be used 
interchangeably. While commenting on BS 1.1.1, Rāmānuja, with the support of 
Śruti and Smṛti texts, maintains that meditation (dhyāna) is a continuous flow of 
remembrance (avichhinna-smṛti) like the flow of oil. He reiterates that it is known 
from all the Upaniṣads that the word ‘knowledge’ (vedana) prescribed as a means 
of attaining liberation is synonymous with the word ‘worship’ (upāsanā). Further, 
devotion (bhakti) is synonymous with constant remembrance, which thus becomes 
                                                 
708 Advaitasiddhi 2005: Gauḍabrahmānandī (Laghucandrikā), p. 750 [Also see Mishra 2009: pp. 
187-8].  
709 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.7 and the author’s elucidation thereon, p. 23 
(Also see Mishra 2006a: p. 126). 
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the same as meditation. Thus, for Rāmānuja, meditation is devotion, which is 
synonymous with worship.710 As Gupta holds, ‘Rāmānuja defines bhakti as the 
experiencing of love for the divine who possesses countless auspicious qualities. 
This experience of love is intensified by direct and lasting understanding of the true 
nature of god as revealed in deep meditation.’711 Besides, Rāmānuja, as pointed out 
earlier, maintains that dedicated service to the Lord coupled with love for him 
makes a devotee eligible for realising the true nature of the Lord by way of 
obtaining his grace. While complete surrender to the Lord for his mercy is called 
prapatti or śaraṇāgati, the devotee’s love for the Lord is known as parābhakti, 
which, when maintained with the realisation of true nature of the Lord through 
regimented meditation, becomes upāsanā both for Rāmānuja and MS. Though we 
do not find Rāmānuja explicitly using the expression ‘bhakti-rasa’, he certainly 
admits that the unswerving meditation on the Lord in accordance with the 
description of his exquisite beauties or transcendental qualities deepens the 
devotee’s love for the Lord.712   
              Turning to MS, we can see that his definition of bhakti as the incessant 
flow of the modification of the mind directed towards the Lord through spiritual 
disciplines (BhR 1.3) had affinity with Rāmānuja’s description of uninterrupted 
remembrance or meditation as bhakti. The utility of service to the Lord for 
obtaining his grace is also admitted by MS in no uncertain terms. Thus, MS’s bhakti 
experience as Advaitic vṛtti-jñāna (knowledge of the modification of the mind) 
bears similarity with Rāmānuja’s bhakti experience as yogic samādhi.  
                                                 
710 Brahmasūtra 1989: Vol. 1, pp. 55-61 (Also see Maitra 2006: p. 213). 
711 Gupta Gombrich 1991: p. 236. 
712 See Gupta Gombrich 1991: pp. 236-7. 
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              In this connection, it may be noted that, though MS himself was also a 
Vaiṣṇava, as is evidenced from the above discussion, he differs from the other 
dualistic Vaiṣṇavas like Madhva etc. In an important place in his SB, after pointing 
out a possible objection that in the non-dualistic notion of liberation, the bliss of 
brahman cannot be enjoyed due to the absence of agent, senses, and the means of 
manifesting it, MS refutes it by asserting that the self, being of the nature of self-
effulgent consciousness, does not need any means of manifestation. In this 
connection, MS refers to the popular axiom of the dualist Vaiṣṇavas that one can 
enjoy the taste of sugar only if he consumes it, and not by becoming identical with 
sugar. This can be understood as stating that, in like manner, one can enjoy the bliss 
of brahman only if he is different from brahman -- a view opposed to the non-
dualistic notion of liberation.713 
                 Thus, before giving a brief note in the next section of this chapter on MS’s 
significant contribution to the Advaita Vedānta (i.e. his admission of bhakti 
alongside the jñāna-mārga), one may make the claim based on the above discussion 
that the discipline of devotion, as found in the BhG, is the surest and easiest means 
of attaining the supreme-self that may be adopted by all kinds of devotees.714 If it is 
alleged that the notion of devotion is intelligible only in a dualistic system, then the 
non-dualistic version of devotion that has been presented in BhG itself [BhG 4.10, 
6.29, 7.23, 9.29, 11.55, 12.8, 14.26, 18.55 etc. may be cited in this context, where 
the devotee (i.e. the individual-self) and the Lord (i.e. the supreme-self) are 
considered to be being merged into each other].715 Again, bhakti is not understood as 
a distinct path of realisation; it is treated as a means for bringing an accord between 
                                                 
713 Siddhāntabindu 1986: pp. 145 ff.  
714 See Srinivasa Chari 2005: p. 132. 
715 Cf. Panigrahi 1994: p. 123. 
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karma and jñāna, by helping in acquiring jñāna and detachment (vairāgya), which 
facilitate the attainment of supreme reality.716 However, the views of other 
commentators like Rāmānuja (who maintains at the very beginning of his 
commentary on the BhG that bhakti-yoga, as aided by jñāna and karma-yoga-s, is 
the path of liberation) and Śrīdhara (who states towards the end of his commentary 
on the BhG that devotion to the Lord can by itself lead to liberation), are to be taken 
into consideration while assessing the view of MS regarding this important path of 
liberation.717   
 
5.3. Contribution of Madhusūdana to Vedānta discourse on bhakti-yoga and 
jñāna-yoga  
As pointed out in chapters one and two, the uniqueness of MS in the tradition of 
Advaita Vedānta is generally held to be his attempt at situating bhakti-mārga 
therein, which apparently contradicts the metaphysical foundation of the Advaita 
system, though we have shown above with textual support that the Advaita Vedānta 
does not find any difficulty in accommodating bhakti within its framework from the 
practical (vyāvahārika) point of view. MS’s remarkable contribution is that, in spite 
of being a die-hard follower of the Advaita tradition, he has made a bold step 
through his prolific writings to substantiate the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, while 
being an ardent devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa. In doing so he finds no contradiction, as is 
clear from his comments on the SŚ of Sarvajñātman.718 While an unambiguous 
                                                 
716 See Panigrahi 1994: p. 123. 
717 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, p.6 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Śrīdharīvyākhyā, p. 775. 
718 As noted, it is a versified summary of Śaṃkara’s comments on the BS. 
 
 
 254
indication of synthesising jñāna-mārga and bhakti-mārga is found at the very 
beginning of SŚ, where the author pays obeisance to the unqualified brahman called 
Lord Murāri, MS correspondingly salutes that brahman, who, as an offshoot of 
religious austerity of Nanda (i.e. adoptive father of Lord Kṛṣṇa), plays his divine 
flute for the delight of all at Vṛndāvana, with his beautiful face similar to the moon 
and his eyes like a lotus, who, as the real (satya), infinite, knowledge, and non-dual 
bliss (jñāna-ananta-advaya-sukha), has been realised by the great sages while 
attaining liberation, after approaching a teacher and attaining mystic trance or 
absorption (samādhi) on that brahman.719 Therefore, the unqualified brahman in 
Advaita has been termed by MS nothing but the qualified brahman, i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa, 
an object of devotion, and that nirguṇa-bhakti-mārga is not something new or alien 
to MS. Furthermore, at the beginning of his magnum opus AdS, MS pays salutation 
to Lord Viṣṇu as the undifferentiated brahman. Having established the falsity of the 
empirical world in the first chapter of the AdS, MS validates the non-dual reality, 
i.e. brahman. But it is interesting to note that, at the end of this chapter, MS 
eulogies Lord Hari in two verses as the undifferentiated brahman, who is also the 
only essence of the Śrutis. Again, MS goes further to compare himself with the all-
inclusive Lord Hari.720   
              And perhaps this is the reason why MS, following the lead of the BP that 
promulgates nirguṇa-bhakti extensively in terms of admitting Lord Kṛṣṇa as the 
unqualified brahman, admits bhakti-yoga as an independent goal, even to the extent 
of admitting it as the supreme goal of human life (parama-puruṣārtha) in his 
                                                 
719 Giri 2007: Pt. 1, Maṅgalācaraṇam, p. 3. 
720 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 1-2, 659 (Also see Nair 1990: p. 109). 
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BhR.721 In his comments on the BhG (e.g. BhG 6.47, 7.16, 9.1) as well, MS hints at 
describing bhakti-yoga as an independent path of liberation. At the beginning of his 
comments on BhG 9, MS asserts that the reality of the Lord (bhagavattattva) and 
devotion to him (bhakti) are the means of attaining immediate liberation 
(sākṣānmokṣa). While elucidating BhG 18.66, he states further that the steadfastness 
in devotion to the Lord (bhagavadbhakti-niṣṭhā) is not only the means (sādhana) of 
the steadfastness in action (karma-niṣṭhā) and steadfastness in knowledge (jñāna-
niṣṭhā), but also their result (phala), and that in agreement with other śāstra-s, the 
concluding teaching of the BhG is surrender to the Lord (īśvara-śaraṇatā).722  
                  As we have noted earlier, for both Śaṃkara and MS, karma and bhakti are 
considered in the BhG as a means subsidiary to jñāna, which ultimately leads to 
liberation. We have also noticed earlier that, for MS, the BhG propagates the view 
that the unqualified brahman could also be attained through loving devotion to the 
Lord.723 Thus, while pointing out jñāna-mārga and bhakti-mārga as independent and 
effective means of attaining liberation in his BhR as well as in the GD, MS 
maintains that they are not indistinguishable, and vary in terms of their nature, 
means, goal, and the persons entitled to both (adhikārin-s). According to him, i) 
while devotion is a conditional modification of the mind (savikalpaka-vṛtti), 
assuming the form of the Lord after it becomes flexible or melted (dravībhūta), the 
knowledge of brahman (brahmavidyā) is an unconditional modification of the mind 
when it is not flexible or melted, and has only the self without a second as its object; 
ii) while hearing of the compositions describing the exalted qualities of the Lord is 
the means of devotion, listening to the great sayings of Vedānta like ‘That thou art’ 
                                                 
721 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: BhR 1.1 and the author’s elucidation thereon, p. 1. 
722 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 339-40, 419, and 754-5.  
723 See Rajagopalan 2003: p. 258. 
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etc. is the means of brahma-vidyā; iii) while the fruit of devotion is the intense love 
for the Lord (bhagavad-viṣayaka-prema-prakarṣa), that of brahma-vidyā is the 
cessation of nescience, which is the primal cause of all evils; iv) while all beings are 
entitled to devotion, the mendicant of the highest order (parama-haṃsa-
parivrājaka), with the possession of the ‘fourfold means’(sādhana-catuṣṭaya) is 
eligible for brahma-vidyā. Further, MS asserts that for both devotion and brahma-
vidyā, the results of meritorious deeds (sukṛta) such as sacrifice, charity etc. are the 
same, just as in the case of heaven (svarga) and the desire for knowledge 
(vividiṣā),724 i.e. the inclination to undertake either the means of knowledge or that 
of devotion results from the performance of meritorious deeds prescribed in the 
Vedas. And in this way, both these means (i.e. devotion and knowledge) overlap 
each other, and that jñāna-yoga incorporates bhakti also.725 Further, while brahma-
vidyā is restricted to a few, that bhakti-yoga can be undertaken by everybody 
irrespective of caste, sex etc. is made clear again by MS in another context in his 
HLV. MS maintains that not only people of certain sex and age etc. is permitted to 
observe bhakti-yoga, as is the case with Agnihotra etc., but it is recommended for 
everyone (irrespective of sex, age etc.). With this utterance, the women-folk 
(strīkula), young (bāla), matured (prauḍha), and the aged (vayaṣka) people also are 
indicated by the sage (ṛṣi).726  
                                                 
724 MS, with the support of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Śruti texts, explains that just like meritorious 
deeds, (being conducive to the purification of mind), can be a means to more than one end, i.e. 
devotion and the knowledge of brahman, they can also be a means either for obtaining heaven or for 
acquiring the desire for knowledge (vividiṣā) [Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: Ṭīkā on 
BhR 1.1, p. 15].  
725 See Mishra 2006a: pp. 115 and 117. 
726 Harilīlāmṛtam 1933: p. 14 (Also see Mishra 2009: p. 228). 
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              On the basis of the theistic Upaniṣads, BP, BhG, and other theistic sources 
that posit bhakti as superior to jñāna, MS expresses the view (in his AdS) that the 
former leads to attainment of liberation more quickly than the latter, there being the 
same sort of achievement in both the cases.727 But it may be pointed out on the basis 
MS’s views on the difference between bhakti and brahma-jñāna that the former 
cannot be admitted as the direct means of liberation, since liberation results from 
the cessation of nescience which resides in brahman, and it is only through the 
knowledge of reality (i.e. brahman) that nescience is removed. Besides, bhakti, 
being determinate in nature (since it presupposes the distinction between worship, 
worshipped, and worshipper), cannot be related to brahman, which is bereft of 
distinctions, and hence, is also indeterminate or unqualified by nature. On the basis 
of various BhG texts (e.g. BhG 10.10, 13.18), MS maintains that one attains 
devotion as an end (sādhya-bhakti) through the observance of devotion as a means 
(sādhana-bhakti), and that liberation is achieved through the intuitive knowledge of 
brahman obtained from the Upaniṣadic texts. So, in the course of attaining 
liberation, one needs to pursue bhakti when he longs for intuitive knowledge that 
alone leads to liberation.728  
              In spite of the fact that MS admits both the means of knowledge and 
devotion as independently effective in attaining liberation, yet his penchant seems 
to be for devotion, as is found throughout the GD as well as BhR, especially in his 
bold assertion in one of the introductory verses in the GD (i.e. verse 37) that even 
for a jīvanmukta, bhakti remains spontaneous, besides his verbatim reproduction of 
a BP verse (i.e. BP 1.7.10) both in the GD (i.e. introductory verse 38) and in the 
                                                 
727 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 897 (Also see Sharma 1967: p. 132). 
728 See Mishra 2006a: pp. 115, 118-9. 
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BhR, which also conveys the same fact (i.e. spontaneity of devotion) for the self-
immersed sages (in the state of jīvanmukti).729 He also describes bhakti in the GD as 
a link between and subsisting in karma and jñāna (introductory verses 6-7). In this 
connection, as we have pointed out earlier, the views of both Śaṃkara and MS on 
treating devotion on a par with knowledge, or, at times, admitting devotion as the 
cause of knowledge, need to be taken into consideration, if one has to justify MS’s 
effort for amalgamating both the means, i.e. bhakti and jñāna-mārga-s. 
              Devotion as a means of liberation has been eulogised by Śaṃkara in no 
ambiguous terms in his VC, where he says that among all the means of salvation, 
devotion is supreme, and that contemplating on one’s own essential nature (sva-
svarūpa-anusandhāna) is called devotion. Again, devotion is also regarded by 
others as contemplating on the true nature of one’s own self (sva-ātmatattva-
anusandhāna).730 Thus, Śaṃkara’s definition of devotion as the knowledge of one’s 
own self (i.e. deliberation on the knowledge of self as distinct from that of non-self) 
in the present instance also lends support to MS’s act of equating jñānin (man of 
knowledge) with bhakta (devotee). Besides, for MS, a bhakta does not achieve any 
thing extra than what a jñānin does, for, as we have pointed out earlier, MS holds 
that even the grace of the Lord cannot exhaust the prārabdha-karma-s; they get 
exhausted only after being experienced by the aspirant.731  
 We also find the utility of devotion in the tradition echoed even by the 
staunch followers of Advaita like Brahmānanada Sarasvatī. While commenting on 
the SB of MS, Brahmānanada goes to the extent of saying that even for 
                                                 
729 Sāṃkhya Vedāntatīrtha 1404 Bengali Era: Ṭīkā on BhR 1.1, p. 17.  
730 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvaliḥ 1999: Vol. 3, VC 32-33a, p. 7 (Also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: p. 565).     
731 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 892-3 (Also see Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 19). 
 
 
 259
understanding the true import of the Upaniṣadic texts, one must have devotion.732 In 
spite of all these supports, and the clear indication by MS that he follows the bhakti-
mārga and treats nirguṇa-brahman as non-different from the saguṇa-brahman, i.e. 
Lord Kṛṣṇa, his idea of deity, as is described in his various works like the GD, BhR 
etc., remains transtheistic.733 Herein lies the significance of his attempt at 
integrating bhakti with the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, which is also found in the 
life and works of his great predecessor Śaṃkara. As one of the modern scholars 
points out, 
                It is a matter of fortunate circumstances that in the works of Sri Madhusudana Saraswathi 
we find monistic philosophy being synthesised with devotion, i.e., Advaita with bhakti. It is 
an unusual trend for Advaita, as it is commonly understood, but there is inherently nothing 
strange for Advaita to advocate bhakti. Bhakti or devotion was, indeed, a predominant 
emotion even in Sri Sankara’s life. Though ultimately Sri Sankara reduces bhakti to the 
level of a purificatory means, he was a great bhakta of Sri Bhagavan Krishna in his personal 
form (sic). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
732 Siddhāntabindu 1989: Nyāratnāvalī, p. 364. 
733 See Nelson 2007: p. 315. 
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6 
The Gūḍhārthadīpikā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the 
Commentarial Tradition of the Bhagavadgītā  
 
At the outset, it needs to be borne in mind that the BhG, being an important and 
popular philosophical and religious text sacred to all Hindus, has drawn the 
attention of almost all those who tried to find out some support in it for their own 
doctrines. A critical study of both the ancient and modern interpreters of the BhG 
makes one think that perhaps none of them can claim to represent faithfully the 
intention of the BhG in its entirety. Many of the commentators of the BhG also 
commented on the Upaniṣads and on the BS, and, in their opinion, all these sources 
express the same doctrine. Each one of these commentators has explained these 
texts from the particular standpoint adopted by him, and while some verses of the 
BhG may be easily interpreted in a manner that is consistent with such a standpoint, 
this need not be the case with some other verses of that work. It is thus only natural 
that the interpretation of the BhG by a commentator is likely to be criticised by 
another subsequent commentator belonging to a rival school of thought. The 
commentaries on the BhG by Śaṃkara and MS are no exceptions to such a general 
rule about the commentaries. But what is interesting to note here is that in some 
cases, even those commentators of the BhG who belong to the same school of 
thought have not been unanimous on all issues regarding the interpretation of this 
text. Thus, MS has respectfully disagreed with Śaṃkara in a few cases, while 
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Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri, Veṅkaṭanātha, and Dhanapati Sūri, all of whom belong to the 
Advaita school of Vedānta, have from time to time criticised the interpretation of 
MS and tried to show the superiority of the commentary of Śaṃkara on the BhG.      
             This chapter attempts to point out the points of agreement and disagreement 
between Śaṃkara and MS. We have also noted how the commentators posterior to 
MS have reacted to the GD.  
 
6.1. Modern scholars on the Bhagavadgītā commentary of Śaṃkarācārya and 
others  
While explaining the views of MS in his GD, we have explained and shown in 
detail how the other works of Śaṃkara and MS lend support to their respective 
understandings of the BhG. Most modern scholars seem not to hold Śaṃkara as an 
authentic interpreter of the BhG, especially when viewed in relation to his other 
works.  As a detailed discussion on it would be out of place, we will just mention 
the views of the scholars, and subsequently deal with a few verses of the BhG, with 
a view to judge Śaṃkara’s interpretation of those places. While doing so, references 
to the GD of MS will also be taken into consideration.  
              As Arvind Sharma points out, any attempt to classify the BhG as a 
representative of a particular tradition of thought is bound to distort its internal 
integrity. In his words:  
   Any attempt...to systemise it is bound to produce a twofold effect: (a) to shed more light 
on those verses which accord with the projected system and clarify them; and (b) to cast 
into greater darkness those which don’t and distort them. The attempt to systemise the Gita 
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could also produce another twofold effect: (a) over-interpretation of those verses which 
are in accord with one’s system, and (b) under-interpretation of those which are not.734 
 
                Nevertheless, the general agreement among scholars is that the Advaita 
commentators, beginning with Śaṃkara, need to force far more of their 
interpretations of the text in order to agree with their basic philosophical principles, 
as compared to those who allow for some degree of dualism within their system, or 
those who place a greater emphasis on the paths of action and devotion. 
            For example, T. G. Mainkar, in a critical study of important topics of the 
text as interpreted by Śaṃkara and other major commentators, has argued that 
Śaṃkara felt the necessity to present the teaching of the BhG as consistent with his 
non-dual philosophy, in accordance with which only knowledge can lead to 
salvation, and that his strategy for achieving this involved both the imposition of his 
own ideas upon the text and the neglect of those passages which could not be 
brought into line with his non-dualist approach.735 As Mainkar observes:  
 
Śaṁkara’s comments reverse the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā...Śaṁkara has laid quite an 
undue emphasis on Knowledge, even at the cost of Karman and Bhakti; and in order to 
achieve this, he has understood additional words, reversed the sense of the verses and 
finally changed the spirit of the poem. He is not a reliable interpreter of the Bhagavadgītā as 
the spirit of the poem is not faithfully reflected in his comments. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that he is the least faithful interpreter of the Bhagavadgītā.736  
 
Mainkar, however, considers the commentaries of Rāmānuja, Rāmakaṇṭha, or 
Ānandavardhana to be more faithful than that of Śaṃkara, while acknowledging 
that no commentator of the BhG has been absolutely faithful to the text.737  
                                                 
734 Sharma 1986: p. 106. 
735  Mainkar 1969: p. 59.  
736  Mainkar 1969: p. 65. 
737  Mainkar 1969:  Front flap. 
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             Likewise, P. M. Modi tries to demonstrate how Śaṃkara’s commentary on 
the BhG distorts the text,738 and Eliot Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen think that 
Śaṃkara used the BhG as a medium for promulgating his preconceived 
philosophical thought.739 Similar estimations are offered by G. A. Feuerstein and 
others,740 while others, such as S. S. Bhawe, attempt to show that Śaṃkara’s 
interpretation is compatible with the text of the BhG.741  
                 Similarly, S. M. Srinivasa Chari, while critically evaluating the 
commentaries by Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva on the BhG, remarks in the 
preface of his work: 
 
                My earlier books on the Upaniṣads and the Vedāntasūtra based on an objective evaluation 
of the comments of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva have attempted to show that the main 
tenets of Advaita Vedānta are not reflected in these two basic sourcebooks. The present 
work attempts to make a similar study of the Bhagavadgītā, with a view to determine the 
nature of the philosophical doctrines adumbrated in the verses of the Gītā.742 
 
 
Thus, Chari starts his work with an intention to show that Śaṃkara’s commentary 
on the BhG is less faithful than those of Rāmānuja and Madhva. 
               Further, against the criticism that Rāmānuja, being a proponent of the 
Vaiṣṇava cult, is much closer to the intention of the text of the BhG than that of 
Śaṃkara, A. G. Krishna Warrier points out that the BhG is an integrated work 
which represents both personal and impersonal notion of God. He also holds that 
devotion and knowledge get merged in the BhG as means and end, which truly 
justifies Śaṃkara’s position in his comments on the BhG.743 
                                                 
738  Modi 1951: pp. 229-30. 
739 Deutsch and Buitenen 1971: p. 213. 
740 Feuerstein 1974: p. 31. 
741 Bhawe 1952: pp. 73-92. 
742 Srinivasa Chari 2005: Preface, p. xv. 
743 Warrier 2002: Introduction, p. xv. 
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              Nevertheless, Śaṃkara’s influence on Sanskrit scholarship has been so 
great that R. C. Zaehner believed subsequent interpreters to be in thrall to his 
understanding of the text and to unduly ignore other traditional commentaries. As 
he writes, these interpreters  
              
             ‘...are conditioned by the most ancient and the most authoritative of the medieval 
commentaries, that of the founder of the extreme school of Vedāntic non-dualism, Śaṃkara. 
Meanwhile the commentaries of the ‘modified non-dualist’ Rāmānuja, so much nearer in 
spirit to the Gītā, and of the dualist Madhva and his successors had largely fallen into 
neglect.’744 
 
              Again, W. Douglas P. Hill, G. A. Feuerstein etc. maintain that it would be 
a mistake to imagine that these other great commentators always present a perfectly 
accurate interpretation of the BhG, the ‘true meaning’ of the text. Rāmānuja, for 
example, has been judged to overemphasise the devotional aspect of the BhG.745 On 
the other hand, K. T. Pandurangi highlights Madhva’s extensive references to the 
Smṛtis, and opines that Madhva’s extensive application of the historical point of 
view instead of mere textual analysis takes the BhG far away from its being an 
authority of a particular tradition.746 But criticism is made against Madhva by Hill 
etc. for being so extravagant in his approach that he loses the teaching of the text 
itself.747 Such being the views of the scholars, let us choose below a few verses of 
the BhG, with reference to the commentaries of Śaṃkara and MS. 
              The word māyā employed in the BhG texts has often been interpreted by 
Śaṃkara as consistent with his Advaitic doctrine of illusion. Sometime he equates it 
with prakṛti (e.g. on BhG 4.6, 7.14, 8.25, 18.61), which the BhG does not really 
                                                 
744 Zaehner 1969: p. 3. 
745 Hill 1928: p. 274 and Feuerstein 1974: p. 32. 
746  Bhagavadgītā 2007: Vol. 1, Introduction, p. xvii.  
747 ‘Madhva’s interpretations are so extravagant as to rob the commentary of much interest for the 
scholar’ (Hill 1928: p. 274).  
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convey. Like Śaṃkara, MS also makes a similar attempt to interpret these verses. 
The word bhakti uttered in various verses of the BhG (e.g. BhG 8.22, 9.14, 9. 26, 
9.29, 18.54, 18.55, 18.66) has been explained by Śaṃkara either as knowledge, or 
he just gives its prosaic meaning. This has also been pointed out by critics. As seen 
earlier, MS sometimes disagrees with Śaṃkara in explaining these verses, with a 
view to lend support to devotion. The concept of brahman has also been interpreted 
by Śaṃkara as the absolute reality that may be both qualified and unqualified, in 
accordance with his philosophical views, often ignoring the intent of the text (e.g. 
on BhG 4.24, 5.6, 14.27).748 As stated earlier, MS also follows Śaṃkara’s lead in 
explaining these verses.  
 
6.2. Śaṃkara’s commentary on the Bhagavadgītā and Gūḍhārthadīpikā of 
Madhusūana  
We have seen that in both the introductory and concluding verses of the GD, MS 
has ungrudgingly accepted the lead of Śaṃkara.749 Nevertheless, his disagreements 
with Śaṃkara are at times conspicuous in his commentary, though, as pointed out 
earlier, ‘disagreement’ needs to be viewed here in terms of their interpretation of 
the BhG text, and not of their understanding of the Advaita doctrine. We have 
already discussed their respective views on the important metaphysical entities 
admitted in the BhG, and also the nature of liberation and the means to its 
attainment. A few important examples will suffice to establish the point under 
discussion. And in this connection, we mention below in the next two sections the 
                                                 
748 See Mainkar 1969: pp. 6-11, 12-8, 19-25 ff. 
749 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 1 and 775. 
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places in the GD where MS has explicitly referred to the comments on the BhG, BS, 
and the Upaniṣads by Śaṃkara. 
              Besides the two references to Śaṃkara by MS in his GD in the 
introductory and concluding verses as cited above, we find as many as twenty seven 
places where MS has mentioned Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG. Thus, while 
explaining the eternality and indestructibility of the self in BhG 2.25, MS has 
quoted Śaṃkara’s comments on BhG 2.24 in order to substantiate his view. In 
support of explaining the sequence of birth and death of the eternal self (in a sense 
of the individual self) in BhG 2.27, MS has agreed with the comments of Śaṃkara 
on the same verse. MS maintains in BhG 2.41 that the knowledge of the self 
(sāṃkhya-buddhi) and that of the yoga (i.e. karma-yoga) are of the nature of 
certainty (vyavasāyātmikā) because they, being of the same kind and producing the 
same result, sublate all the contrary ideas and are brought forth from perfect Vedic 
sentences (i.e. the great sentences like ‘that thou art’ etc.); while the thoughts of 
those who do not have certainty about the self (avyavasāyin-s) get sublated. MS 
adds that this is the view that is held by Śaṃkara as well.750 In the course of 
explaining BhG 2.48: ‘Abandon self-interest, Dhanaṃjaya, and perform the acts 
while applying this single-mindedness. Remain equable in success and failure -- 
this equableness is called the application’, MS, in response to the objection as to 
how the sense of the word yoga that was previously explained as meaning action 
meant before can be reconciled with its present sense that ‘perform the acts while 
applying this single-mindedness’, maintains that here equanimity is called yoga. As 
                                                 
750 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 81 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 79-80; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 83 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 82; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 100 and 
Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 99-100. 
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‘equable in success and failure’ is meant as yoga in the word ‘single-mindedness’ 
(yogastha) in the verse, and not action; there remains no contradiction at all. MS 
continues by saying that, in Śaṃkara’s interpretation, the first half of the verse (i.e. 
perform the acts…single mindedness) is explained by the second half (i.e. remain 
equable in success and failure…application), the fallacy of repetition is absent here. 
In support of his view regarding the possibility of the continuity of such happiness, 
which is of the nature of euphoria that is due to the mental modification born of 
tamas (utphullatārūpā-tāmasī-cittavṛtti), MS has quoted Śaṃkara’s definition of the 
expression ‘without craving for pleasure’ (vigata-spṛha) that occurs in the verse 
BhG 2.56.751  
             In the GD on BhG 3.2, in relation to Arjuna’s question to the Lord as to 
which one among two incompatible things, viz. the steadfastness in knowledge 
(jñāna-niṣṭhā) and that in action (karma-niṣṭhā), is appropriate for the respective 
eligible persons, MS’s humble submission is that he need not elaborate this point as 
Śaṃkara has already refuted the views of the opponents in greater detail with the 
support of Śrutis, Smṛtis, and logic. It is worthwhile to point out MS’s respect for 
the Lord as well as for the great predecessor Śaṃkara, even though his allegiance to 
the latter is not unconditional. MS maintains that he is elucidating the text of the 
BhG after taking into consideration the views of the earlier commentator Śaṃkara, 
and that he is merely explaining the intention of the Lord to refine his own speech. 
This indicates that MS wants to explain what the Lord means in the BhG, and that 
he need not always agree with what Śaṃkara reads in it.752 While explaining the 
                                                 
751 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 108 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 100-8; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 117 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 116. 
752 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 141 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 134-41. 
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Lord’s intention in BhG 3.20 that Arjuna, being a kṣatriya, needs to undertake 
action, as he, unlike the Brahmins, is not eligible for saṃnyāsa; MS asserts that, in 
keeping with this intention of the Lord, Śaṃkara has ascertained that saṃnyāsa is 
meant for the Brahmins only, and not for others (e.g. MuUB on MuU 1.12, BUB on 
BU 1.4.11),753 though Sureśvara has made a ‘bold assertion’ by including in the list 
of persons eligible for saṃnyāsa the kṣatriya-s and vaiśya-s as well.754   
             In connection with the Lord’s assertion in BhG 4.6 that, though he is 
unborn and imperishable, he takes on birth out of his own free will (ātma-māyā), 
MS has defended his interpretation by referring to Śaṃkara’s explanation of it. In 
the course of explaining the expressions ‘inaction in action’ etc. in BhG 4.18, MS 
has remarked that, since Śaṃkara has explained elaborately the intention of the 
Lord expressed in this connection, he himself is desisting from further elucidation. 
Again, in support of his views on BhG 4.21, MS refers to Śaṃkara’s elucidation on 
the same verse. While defending his interpretation of BhG 4.24, MS has mentioned 
the view of Śaṃkara that meditation through superimposition for a particular result 
without abandoning the accessories like ladle etc. (i.e. sampad-upāsanā) is 
inappropriate for attaining the knowledge of brahman.755 
              Having referred to Śaṃkara’s comments on BhG 6.14: ‘Serene, fearless, 
faithful to his vow of chastity, and restraining his thinking, let him sit yoked, his 
thought on me, his intention focused on me’, MS states that it is the view of 
Śaṃkara that the yogin, having fixed his mind on the Lord and having accepted the 
                                                 
753 Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, pp. 336-8, vol. 10, pp. 143-6. 
754 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 160. 
755 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 188 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 
4-5; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 208 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 200-9; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, 
pp. 212-3 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 211-3; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 219 and 
Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 217-9. 
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Lord as the supreme, should think of the Lord alone as the highest object of worship 
(sarvārādhya), unlike some person who may passionately have his mind fixed on 
his wife, but accepts another, a king or a deity, as the highest goal to be achieved. 
MS, now compares himself with a berry (guñjā-phala) and Śaṃkara with gold, 
hinting at his disagreement in this context with Śaṃkara with explicit humility. MS 
maintains that, though both Śaṃkara and he have commented upon the BhG, yet his 
own elucidation can no way be compared with that of Śaṃkara in importance and 
value (just as though berry fruit may be placed with gold in the same scale for 
weighing the latter, it can never be the same in worth and quality with gold), 
thereby indicating that, though he may have offered a different explanation of this 
verse, it is too insignificant when compared with the explanation of Śaṃkara. Thus, 
the simile has been given by MS to justify the fact that, while Śaṃkara’s elucidation 
on the verse is closer to his non-dualistic stance, MS finds support in this verse for 
his devotional stance when he holds that the mind, being free from all modifications 
in the form of object, attains a stream of mental modifications about the Lord 
(madviṣayaka-dhārāvāhika-cittavṛtti).756 In the context of BhG 6.29, MS refers to 
Śaṃkara as giving only a lesser importance to the yogic path for the Advaitins, in 
the process of realising supreme reality.757 In his comments on BhG 6.34 as well, 
MS, in order to explain the nature of the mind, which is indeed fickle, turbulent, 
domineering, and tough as stated in this verse, has referred to Śaṃkara’s simile of 
tantu-nāga (a kind of shark; or according to MS, a kind of magical noose or a 
                                                 
756 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 298 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 298-9. 
757 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 319. 
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creature named Tāntanī living in big lakes in Gujarat etc.) that illustrates the nature 
of the mind in this context.758      
             Commenting on BhG 13.2, MS says that the actual relation between the 
individual-self (i.e. kṣetra in this context) and the supreme-self (kṣetrajña in this 
context) is one of identity only, referring to Śaṃkara, who has dealt with this point 
with sufficient argumentation. MS points out that he refrains from further 
elaboration here in order to not make the GD unduly voluminous. On BhG 13.12, 
MS says that no word in its primary sense (mukhya-vṛtti) can refer to brahman, 
which can only be indicated in the secondary sense of the words in scriptural 
citations, referring the reader to Śaṃkara for greater details.759   
             While explaining the meaning of the verse BhG 17.10, MS has referred to 
Śaṃkara’s comments on the same in support of his own view.760 In the same 
manner, while commenting on BhG 17.16, MS has validated his stance by referring 
to the views of Śaṃkara. Again, while explaining BhG 17.28, MS has sought 
support for his views with the help of Śaṃkara’s comments on this verse.761  
              To explain BhG 18.6: ‘It is my final judgement, Pārtha, that these acts are 
to be performed, but with the performer renouncing all self-interest in them and all 
their rewards’, MS maintains that the Lord’s firm intent in this verse is that between 
the two views, viz. whether actions are to be abandoned or not by those who are 
eligible for them, the second view is to be accepted. Actions such as sacrifice etc., 
                                                 
758 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 326. 
759 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 531-9 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 523-38; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 554 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 550-3. 
760 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 660 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 659-60. 
761 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 664; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 671 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 670-1.  
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even though they cause bondage when preceded by the desire for their result, are to 
be performed without a sense of attachment to them by the seeker after liberation, 
as performance of these actions purify one’s mind, and is thus conducive to 
knowledge. MS reiterates that the same view has been put forth by Śaṃkara in his 
comments on this verse of the BhG. But people of dull intellect fail to grasp it, as 
they lack expertise in it (i.e. Śaṃkara’s comments on the BhG).762  
                In the course of explaining BhG 18.12: ‘Now there are three kinds of 
fruits to an act: disagreeable, agreeable, and mixed; but such is the karman of the 
nonrenouncers hereafter, but never of the renouncers’, MS has declared Śaṃkara’s 
explanation of this verse as highly superior, beside referring to the latter’s 
comments on BS 3.1.8 in support of his own position. In support of his own 
comments on BhG 18.14 as well, MS has referred to Śaṃkara’s elucidation on this 
verse. Again, while commenting on BhG 18.37, MS mentions that in this 
connection he is holding the same view as that of Śaṃkara. As explained earlier in 
detail, MS in his comments on BhG 18.66 has expressed his disagreement with 
Śaṃkara (the reason of which is MS’s relative faithfulness to the path of devotion) 
in a more polite manner. In the course of his comments on BhG 18.67: ‘This is not 
to be revealed, ever, to one without austerities or devotion to me, nor to one who 
does not wish to listen or who disbelieves in me’, MS, in order to validate his 
preference for devotion, has pointed out that, in spite of alternative readings in this 
verse, viz. ‘a man of intellect’ (medhāvin) and ‘an ascetic’ (tapasvin), Śaṃkara has 
maintained that, in order to be eligible to know the secret teaching of the BhG, both 
these aspirants are to possess the qualities of having love for the Lord 
                                                 
762 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 682 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 681-2. 
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(bhagavadanurakti), love for the teacher (guru-bhakti), and service to them 
(śuśruṣā). Further, while commenting on BhG 18.75, MS has pointed out a different 
reading (pāṭha-bheda) in the verse (i.e. ‘imam’) as admitted by Śaṃkara. He, 
however, has justified Śaṃkara on the ground that the acceptance of this different 
reading does not change the overall meaning of the verse in any way.763  
              In addition to such cases, we may refer to the GD on a few other verses 
that may be relevant to this section.  
               Thus, while explaining BhG 2.29, ‘It is by a rare chance that a man does 
see him, It is a rarity too if another proclaims him, A rare chance that someone else 
will hear him, And even if hearing him no one knows him’, MS explains the 
expression ‘another proclaims him’ (anyaḥ vadati enam) in the verse as some one 
who is different from all ignorant people, and not the one who is different from all 
those who visualise the self, because the acceptance of the latter one would lead to a 
contradiction (vyāghāta). MS maintains that, if one knows the self, then he usually 
remains self-absorbed, and hence, does not talk about the self. Even if he talks 
about the self out of sheer compassion, that sort of person, like the Lord, is rare to 
find. But Śaṃkara means by the same expression simply someone who talks about 
the self. Again, MS’s explanation of the remaining expression in the verse also does 
not go all the way along the interpretation of Śaṃkara. In this connection, MS has 
pleaded with the learned for excusing him for his immodesty. Again, in his 
                                                 
763 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 691 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 690-2; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 695; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and 
Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 718-9; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 755 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, 
pp. 751-5; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 760-1 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 766; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 772 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 771-2. 
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comments on BhG 2.39: ‘This is the spirit according to theory; now hear how this 
spirit applies in practice, yoked with which you will cut away the bondage of the 
act’, MS seems to have deviated from the views of Śaṃkara. While Śaṃkara 
maintains that Arjuna was to get rid of bondage, which is caused by action, through 
attaining knowledge by the grace of the Lord, MS finds fault with this explanation 
of the predecessors (prācīna-vyākhyā), as he thinks that this explanation involves 
the fault of supplying an ellipsis (adhyāhāra-doṣa), as in this case ‘obtaining the 
grace of the Lord’ becomes an unnecessary addition, and also that in the expression 
‘bondage of the act’ (karma-bandhana) the term karma is redundant, as the term 
bandhana itself means the transmigratory bondage that is due to past action.764  
              Consider again, BhG 5.5: ‘The adepts of insight and the adepts of practice 
reach one and the same goal: he sees truly who sees that insight and practice are one 
and the same’ advocates that both the adepts of insight (sāṃkhya-s) and the adepts 
of practice (yogin-s) attain the same goal, i.e. ‘liberation’. While explaining the 
verse, both Śaṃkara and MS maintain that in order to obtain knowledge, the yogin-
s perform the rites and duties prescribed by scriptures without expecting any result 
(phala-abhisandhi-rahita) from them, and with a sense of dedication to the Lord 
(bhagavadarpaṇa-buddhi), for Śaṃkara, the yogin-s attain liberation through the 
knowledge of reality and renunciation of all actions, MS’s explanation of this verse 
suggests that MS is more concerned with physical renunciation for the yogin-s. MS 
maintains that the yogin-s, with their minds purified, attain liberation through the 
steadfastness in knowledge, which is obtained in this life or the next through 
                                                 
764 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 85-9; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 96-7 and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 96-8 (Also see Gambhirananda 
2000: Introduction, p. 18). 
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listening to scriptures (śravaṇa) etc., preceded by renunciation. Now, if this view of 
MS regarding the yogin-s is accepted, it would also apply to the sāṃkhya-s, who are 
also the renouncers established in knowledge -- a fact that does not seem to be 
acceptable to the other commentators of the BhG at large.765    
             Thus, a close study of all the references to Śaṃkara in the GD mentioned 
above indicates that, while writing the GD, MS had always before him the 
commentary on the BhG by Śaṃkara, and that it exerted immense influence on MS 
in establishing his own Advaitic interpretation in the GD. However, MS expressed 
his disagreement with Śaṃkara whenever the situation warranted it, i.e. mostly 
when he tried to lend his support to the path of devotion. However, as noted before, 
in so doing, MS might have occasionally admitted a different understanding of the 
text of the BhG from that of Śaṃkara, but he never disagreed with the latter’s 
exposition of the Advaita philosophy.766  
 
6.3. References to Śaṃkara’s other commentaries in the Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
Apart from the above references to the commentary on the BhG by Śaṃkara, we 
find in the GD on a number of verses of the BhG where MS has referred to 
                                                 
765 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 250 (Also see 
Marcaurelle 2000: pp. 196-7). 
766 In some cases (e.g. in the GD on BhG 2.29, 2.39, 5.5. 3.2, 6.14, 6.29, 18.66 ), MS consciously 
departs from the interpretation offered by Śaṃkara, since after offering his own interpretation of the 
verses concerned, he mentions the different interpretation offered by Śaṃkara. But inspite of such 
mionor differences, he fully subscribes to the Advaita doctrine propagated by Śaṃkara, which holds 
(i) that the ultimate reality is pure consciousness that is without a second entity and also bereft of 
internal distinctions; (ii) that the individual self (jīva) has no reality over and above the reality of this 
absolute reality (brahman), and (iii) that the world is indescribable in terms of reality and unreality 
(sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyatvam). It is a fact that, while Śaṃkara admits knowledge (jñāna) as the 
sole means of attaining liberation, MS admits devotion (bhakti) as the means that is easier to be 
adopted by many spiritual aspirants. We have already shown that the monistic outlook of Advaita 
Vedānta is not inconsistent with the adoption of devotion (bhakti) and worship (upāsanā) [See 
chapters 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.3 etc.].   
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Śaṃkara’s comments on the BS and on the Upaniṣads in support of his own 
position. In his comments on BhG 2.17, MS has referred to BSB on BS 1.1.4.767 
Again, the GD on BhG 2.18 refers to BSB in a general way;768 GD on BhG 3.34 
refers to BUB on BU 1.3.1; GD on BhG 4.34 refers to MUB on MU 1.2.12; GD on 
BhG 4.37 refers to BSB on BS 3.3.32; GD on BhG 8.24 refers to BSB on BS 4.3.2; 
and the GD on BhG 18.12 refers to BSB on BS 3.1.8 in an implicit manner.769  
 
6.4. Other commentators of the Bhagavadgītā referred to in the 
Gūḍhārthadīpikā  
Besides Śaṃkara, a number of commentators of the BhG have been referred to by 
MS either explicitly or implicitly. They have either been criticised or referred to by 
MS in order to justify his own position. Among these commentators, mention may 
be made of the following: 
              Rāmānuja (11th century CE): As noted earlier, while supporting his own 
view on the concept of divine incarnation as expressed in BhG 4.6, MS refers to 
Śaṃkara and his commentator Ānandagiri, who hold that though the Lord is unborn 
and imperishable, he appears through his magical power (māyā) as if he is 
embodied. MS also puts forth a different view, to whom there cannot be any 
relation of a body and its possessor (deha-dehi-bhāva) in the case of the supreme 
Lord. Lord Vāsudeva who is the supreme self, eternal, omnipresent, an amalgam of 
                                                 
767 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 61 and Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 1.1.4, p. 135. 
768 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 63. 
769 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 171 and Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 10, BUB 
on BU 1.3.1, pp. 34-43; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 232 and Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvali 1999: Vol. 8, MUB 
on MU 1.2.12, pp. 336-8; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 235 and Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 3.3.12, 
pp. 816-8; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 405 and Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 4.3.2, pp. 987-9; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 691 and Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 3.1.8, pp. 666-70.  
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existence-conscious-bliss, full, and unconditioned, is himself the body of the 
supreme Lord, who has neither any material or māyika (i.e. caused by māyā) body. 
Having said so about the supreme Lord, who, according to the Advaitins, is eternal, 
partless, unchanging, and supreme bliss, MS mentions the view of those who admit 
the actuality of the relation of a body and its possessor even in the case of the 
supreme Lord. Therefore, MS opines that those who hold this view do not even 
deserve to be refuted.  
              This criticism is clearly directed against the supporters of the ‘qualified 
non-dualism’ like Rāmānuja etc., who accept three things as ultimate and real 
(tattva-traya), i.e. matter (acit), souls (cit), and God (īśvara). Though all the three 
realities are equally actual, yet the first two are totally dependent on the third 
reality, i.e. God, since the first two realities constitute the body of God, and God is 
their soul. God again is the soul of all souls.770  
              In BhG 5.7, MS explains the expression sarva-bhūtātma-bhūtātmā 
(identifying himself with the selves of all creatures) as meaning someone whose 
self (ātmā) or essential nature (svarūpa) becomes identified with all beings (sarva-
bhūtātmā) and with the self (ātma-bhūta), i.e. one who sees all beings — sentient 
and insentient — as the self only. MS now finds faults with others whose 
explanation of this expression involves imperfect grammatical usage. He maintains 
that the explanation of the expression as whose self becomes the self of all beings 
(sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāmātmabhūta ātmā) can be obtained from the first part of the 
expression, i.e. sarva-bhūtātmā (one who is the self of all beings) only, and 
therefore, the remainder of the expression, viz.  ātma-bhūta (i.e. one who has 
                                                 
770 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 188-90 and Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, 
Rāmānujabhāṣyopodghātaḥ, pp. 5-6; Rāmānujabhāṣyam, pp. 79, 91, 366-8 etc. (Also see Sharma 
1976: p. 346). 
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become the self) becomes superfluous. MS, however, suggests that this redundancy 
can be avoided if the term sarvātmā is taken in the sense of insentient and sentient 
respectively, i.e. sarva is taken as insentient, and  ātmā as sentient. This criticism 
seems to be directed against Rāmānuja, who explains this expression as one whose 
self becomes the self of all embodied beings like gods etc.771    
                    The expression anādimat paraṃ brahma (beginningless supreme 
brahman) in BhG 13.12 has been explained by MS as meaning the beginningless 
supreme or all-surpassing brahman, which is in no way limited by anything, and 
which is the supreme self. MS also maintains that though the meaning can be had 
from mere use of the word anādi (beginningless) in the sense of an adjectival 
compound (bahuvrihi-samāsa) [i.e. that which has no beginning (ādi) is 
beginningless (anādi)], yet, in order to indicate superiority (atiśāyana) or constant 
connection (nitya-yoga), the possessive suffix matup (i.e. mat) has been used here 
(i.e. anādi+mat=anādimat).772 MS then mentions those commentators who prefer to 
explain this expression by splitting it in two other divisions, viz. anādi 
(beginningless) and matparaṃ brahma (brahman that is superior to me). MS 
maintains that, according to this explanation, by the term matparaṃ is meant the 
unqualified brahman [i.e. that which is superior (param) to me (mat), i.e. the 
qualified brahman is the unqualified brahman]. Now, in order to justify his claim 
that the expression under discussion conveys the unqualified brahman only and not 
the qualified brahman, MS describes the second interpretation as a 
                                                 
771 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 253-4 and Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, 
Rāmānujabhāṣyam, p. 435.  
772 It may be pointed out that if the word anādi (beginningless) is used in the expression, then it may 
indicate the unmanifest (pradhāna) of the Sāṃkhya school, which is also said to be beginningless in 
the process of evolution. So, in order to avoid this obscurity, the possessive suffix mat is added to 
the word anādi (See Gambhirananda 2000: Footnote 2, p. 722). 
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misinterpretation (apavyākhyā) of those according to whom the term matparam 
stands for the qualified brahman. He maintains that those who explain the 
expression as that brahman, of which Lord Vāsudeva [i.e. the referent of ‘I’ 
(aham)] is the supreme power, is erroneous; as in the context of the unqualified 
brahman, talking about its possession of prowess is incongruous.773  
              This view of MS can be explicated with the support of Śaṃkara’s 
explanation of BhG 13.12. Having interpreted the expression anādimat paraṃ 
brahma in the verse as the beginningless supreme brahman, Śaṃkara points out that 
some commentators explain the above expression anādimat paraṃ by splitting it up 
in a different manner into the two terms anādi and matparam. They, Śaṃkara says, 
argue that, if the meaning of a term can be obtained by treating that term as an 
adjectival compound, then the employment of the suffix (mat) after that term for 
obtaining that very meaning is not justified. Accordingly, the suffix mat employed 
in the term anādimat becomes superfluous, if both anādimat and anādi happen to 
convey the same meaning. They also justify themselves by maintaining that by 
matparam is meant that brahman of which Lord Vāsudeva is the supreme power. 
Now, Śaṃkara holds that this repetition could be avoided in the manner stated 
above only if the sense of being brahman that is qualified were intended here. But 
that is not so, as the sense of unqualified brahman is conveyed here. So, the 
possessive suffix and the adjectival compound convey here the same sense. The 
possessive suffix mat has been used here due to purely metrical reasons, i.e. for 
merely completing the verse.774    
                                                 
773Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 550-1.  
774 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, p. 551. 
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              Now, while commenting on the same verse, Rāmānuja explains the 
expression anādimat paraṃ brahma, according to his own philosophical stance.  
Rāmānuja, with copious references to the BhG and the Śrutis, maintains that, that 
which has no beginning (ādi) is beginningless (anādi). As this indwelling self 
(pratyagātman) [i.e. the individual self] does not have any origination, it is also 
bereft of any end (anta). By the term matparam, Rāmānuja means ‘having me for 
the supreme’ (ahaṃ paro yasya tanmatparam), i.e. the soul to which ‘I’ (i.e. the 
supreme being Vāsudeva) is the śeṣī (i.e. the Lord and Master), as is attested by the 
BhG: ‘This is my lower nature, but know that I have another, higher nature which 
comprises the order of souls: it is by the latter that this world is sustained, strong-
armed prince’ (BhG 7.5). By virtue of its being the body of the Lord and, the nature 
of the self finds its joy only in being dependent on the Lord. Thus, Rāmānuja did 
not find much difficulty in dealing with the grammatical inconsistency that 
apparently affects this verse, as for him the Lord possesses innumerable auspicious 
qualities.775 
              Though Śaṃkara and, subsequently, MS have not specifically mentioned 
the name of the opponent whose views they were referring to, it can be assumed 
that Śaṃkara was referring to some school of the Bhedābhedavādins, who 
disallowed attributes to brahman but admitted supreme power in it.776 We find that 
                                                 
775 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 3, Rāmānujabhāṣyam, p. 49 (Also refer to Bhavani 1995: p. 387, 
Sampatkumaran 1969: Footnote 660, p. 376). 
 This edition (i.e. Bhagavadgītā 2000) of the BhG counts this verse as BhG 13.13 instead of BhG 
13.12, as the verse BhG 13.1 that is printed in this edition is not generally taken by other 
commentators excepting Puruṣottamajī of the Śuddhādvaita school and Rāghavendra Yati and a few 
other commentators of the Dvaita school, and so is not available in general editions of the BhG. 
Though this verse BhG 13.1 is found in an edition containing Viśvanātha Cakravartin’s commentary, 
it is not clear whether Cakravartin has commented on this verse or he has started his commentary 
taking only the generally accepted 1st verse of this chapter) [See Bhagavadgītā 2001: Vol.3;  2007: 
Vol. 2; Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārārthavarṣiṇī, p. 344]. 
776 See Sampatkumaran 1969: Footnote 660, p. 376. 
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later, Rāmānuja too interpreted the term matparam in the manner against which 
both Śaṃkara and MS (subsequent to Rāmānuja) have raised objections.  
               Jaya Tīrtha (1370 CE, a commentator of Madhva’s Gītābhāṣya): 
Madhva in his commentary on the BhG explains the term anādimat in BhG 13.12 as 
‘being devoid of body that has a beginning’ (ādimaddehavarjitamityanādimat). 
While commenting on Madhva’s Gītābhāṣya on this verse of the BhG, Jayatīrtha, 
having dealt with elaborately the grammatical objection involved therein, agrees 
with what Śaṃkara and MS (subsequent to Jayatīrtha) hold in this connection.777  
               Ānandagiri (14th century CE, a commentator of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya): 
This writer is well known in the Advaita tradition as a dependable commentator of 
Śaṃkara’s works. MS has referred to him for establishing Śaṃkara’s position that 
in turn helps MS in supporting his own position. As discussed earlier, while 
establishing his own view on the concept of divine incarnation as enunciated in 
BhG 4.6, MS refers to Śaṃkara and explicates the master’s stance by referring to 
the view of Ānandagiri. Further, MS quotes the views of the commentators of 
Śaṃkara (such as Ānandagiri etc.) while justifying Śaṃkara’s adoption of a 
different reading in BhG 18.75.778  
               Śrīdhara Svāmin (14th century CE, a famous commentator of the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa and an adherent to Śaṃkara’s Advaita school): While 
explaining BhG 2.41: ‘This one spirit is defined here as singleness of purpose, scion 
of Kuru, whereas the spirits of those who are not purposeful are countless and…’, 
                                                 
777 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 3, Mādhvabhāṣyam and Prameyadīpikā thereon by Jaya Tīrtha, p. 50.  
778 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Compare Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 188 with 
Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyopakramaṇikā, pp. 4-5 and Ānandagirivyākhyā, pp. 186-90. Again, compare 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 772 with Śrīmacchaṃkarabhāṣyam, pp. 771-2 and Ānandagirivyākhyā, p. 
771.  
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MS, following Śaṃkara, maintains that, while the knowledge of the self (sāṃkhya-
buddhi) and that of the yoga (i.e. karma-yoga) are of the nature of certainty 
(vyāvasāyātmikā) as they negate all the contrary ideas and are brought about from 
the faultless sentences (i.e. the Upaniṣadic great sentences), the thoughts of those 
who lack conviction about the self (avyāvasāyin-s) are normally negated. MS adds 
that, on the other hand, there are some commentators of the BhG who hold that one 
would cross the transmigratory world only through worshipping the supreme Lord, 
and that this kind of one-sided view is the product of karma-yoga. In a bit of 
antagonistic attitude to this view of other commentators, MS proclaims the 
superiority of jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Vedas to their ritualistic portion. Again, Śrīdhara 
Svāmin, in his comments on this verse, holds clearly the opinion that has been 
called by MS ‘the view of others’. Thus, it is obvious that MS, being faithful to his 
own non-dualistic stance, was not ready to accept ungrudgingly the view of 
Śrīdhara that worship of the Lord, as brought about by karma-yoga, leads to the 
attainment of liberation. While explaining the expression sarvabhūtātmabhūtātmā 
(identifying himself with the selves of all creatures) in BhG 5.7, MS’s criticism 
directed against Rāmānuja that we have discussed earlier, is also pointed at 
Śrīdhara, who also, like Rāmānuja, explains the expression as meaning one whose 
self becomes the self of all beings. MS has also noted a different reading that 
Śrīdhara admits in BhG 6.27, though he has not expressed any opinion about it. 
Incidentally, it is the only place where MS refers by name to Śrīdhara. As discussed 
in connection with Rāmānuja, the antagonistic view held by both Śaṃkara and MS 
in course of explaining the expression anādimat paraṃ brahma (beginningless 
supreme brahman) in BhG 13.12, may also be aimed at Śrīdhara, since use of the 
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possessive suffix and the adjectival compound and explaining the term matparam to 
indicate the unqualified brahman (i.e. brahman that is considered superior to ‘I’ 
denoted by the qualified brahman is said to be the unqualified brahman ) that has 
been criticised by MS is also found in toto in Śrīdhara’s comments on the same 
verse.779 
              While explaining BhG 15.16: ‘In this world there are two Persons, the 
transient and the intransient. The transient comprises all creatures, the intransient 
called the One-on-the-Peak’, MS maintains that that whatever is mutable, i.e. 
subject to destruction in the form of entirety of effects, is called kṣara puruṣa 
(transient person), while the indestructible (vināśa-rahita), the seed of origin of the 
puruṣa called kṣara, the divine power of māyā, is called akṣara-puruṣa (intransient 
person). That which presents the unreality by covering the reality is called kūṭa, 
which also means deceit (vañcanā), illusion (māyā) etc. Thus, that which exists with 
the twin powers of concealment and projection is called kūṭastha.780 It is the limiting 
adjuncts of cause (kāraṇopādhi) in the form of divine power of māyā. Being endless 
(ananta) as the cause of this empirical existence, it is called akṣara. Having said so, 
MS now refutes the view of other commentators on this point, who take the word 
kṣara (transient) to mean the aggregate of insentient beings, and refer to the 
individual selves as akṣara (intransient) while employing the expression ‘the 
                                                 
779 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīdharīvyākhyā,  pp. 99-100; 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 253-4 and Śrīdharīvyākhyā, p. 254; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and 
Śrīdharīvyākhyā, p. 314; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīdharīvyākhyā,  pp. 550-2.  
780 In this context it can be noted that Vidyāraṇya in his PD classifies the absolute consciousness into 
four types, viz. kūṭastha-caitanya, brahma-caitanya, īśvara-caitanya, and jīva-caitanya; just as ether 
is differentiated into ether in a pot (ghaṭākāśa), the omnipresent ether (mahākāśa), ether in water 
(jalākāśa), and ether in a cloud (meghākāśa) (Pañcadaśī 2008: PD 6.18, p. 112). Thus, puruṣottama 
means the unqualified brahma caitanya, kūṭastha-caitanya implies the akṣara-puruṣa, and the kṣara-
puruṣa indicates īśvara (collective) and jīva (individualistic) pratibimba caitanya (reflected 
consciousness) respectively (For the views of Vivaraṇa-kāra and Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-kāra in this 
context, also see Vāsudevānanda 2006: pp. 1029-30). 
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intransient is called the immutable’ (kūṭastho’kṣara ucyate). MS points out that it is 
the knower of the field (kṣetrajña) that is spoken of (by the Lord himself) as the 
supreme person (puruṣottama) in this context (i.e. in BhG 15.17). MS, thus, 
reiterates that by the words kṣara and akṣara are meant the insentient in the form of 
both limiting adjuncts of cause (kāraṇopādhi) and effect (kāryopādhi). This is 
directed against Śrīdhara, who explains the verse in the way against which MS 
raises some objections. MS has also verbatim some words of Śrīdhara in the GD on 
BhG 17.10, in support of his own view. In course of explaining the term saṃnyāsin 
employed in BhG 18.12 in two senses — viz. primary and secondary, MS maintains 
that, one who is embodied and devoid of the knowledge of the supreme self, and yet 
undertakes actions without craving for their results, is a saṃnyāsin in a secondary 
sense; while the other one, who possesses the knowledge of the supreme self and 
being bereft of the sense of identification with the body, renounces all actions, is a 
saṃnyāsin in the primary sense. While renunciation of craving for results of actions 
is common in both the senses of the word (i.e. saṃnyāsin), the performer of action 
(karmin) is referred to by the word saṃnyāsin. This has the support of BhG 6.1: ‘He 
who performs the task set for him without interest in its fruit is the true renouncer 
and yogin, not the one who does not maintain the fire and fails to perform the rites.’ 
MS notes here that, some of the commentators also maintain this view with the 
support of this same BhG verse. It may be noted here that Śrīdhara has also offered 
a similar explanation.781 
 
                                                 
781 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā and Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 627-8; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā 
and Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 660; Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 691 and Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 691-2. 
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6.5. Gūḍhārthadīpikā referred to in other commentaries on the Bhagavadgītā  
In later commentarial literature on the BhG, we find explicit reference to the GD in 
some of the subsequent commentaries. Such cases are noted below. 
            Veṅkaṭanātha (16th century CE, a proponent of the Advaita school of 
Śaṃkara):  As we have discussed in chapter three in connection with explaining 
BhG 2.16 and 2.18, Veṅkaṭanātha, though an adherent to Śaṃkara’s Advaita 
Vedānta, finds flaws in many places in MS’s comments on the BhG. Besides these 
two instances, Veṅkaṭanātha also refers by name to MS while commenting on BhG 
1.27, 2.8, 2.11, 2.13, 2.31, 3.28, 4.10, 5.8, 8.1 etc., and repudiates the latter’s view 
with a number of arguments, while accepting in almost all cases the view of 
Śaṃkara. He thereby indicates his full support to the great master of the tradition, 
with an eye to critically assess the views of MS, who himself is a pioneer in the 
same tradition in his own right.782 
             Due to paucity of space, we note here only some of the major objections 
that have been raised by Veṅkaṭanātha in his commentary Brahmānandagiri against 
the interpretation of the BhG provided by MS. 
               (i) It has already been stated that according to MS, the BhG can be divided 
into three parts, each of them consisting of six chapters. MS also maintains that 
these three parts, when taken together, reveal the indented meaning of the ‘great 
sentence’ ‘That thou art’ (tattvamasi, CU 6.8.7). According to MS, the first part 
deals with karma, the third part deals with jñāna, while the second part deals with 
bhakti, which acts as a bridge between karma and jñāna. MS also says that the first 
part elucidates the nature of the meaning of ‘thou’ (tvam), the second part deals 
                                                 
782 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Brahmānandagiri, pp. 47-8, 69-70, 81-2, 95, 107-8, 118, 170, 322, 
378-9, 476-7; vol. 2, p. 68.  
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with the nature of the meaning of ‘that’ (tat), and the third part shows the identity of 
these two meanings. Veṅkaṭanātha remarks that such interpretations are 
unsatisfactory, as there is no clear statement in the BhG to this effect. 
              (ii) While explaining the phrase, ‘kṛpayā parayāviṣṭaḥ’ that occurs in BhG 
1.27, MS maintains that, here, the word ‘kṛpā’ stands for compassion that was by its 
very nature present (svatasiddha) in Arjuna. Veṅkaṭanātha holds that, in the context 
in question, the compassion spoken of here must have people like Bhīṣma etc. as its 
object, and hence, this not the spontaneous compassion that Arjuna might have for 
people who were poor, or helpless, or those who has sought for refuge (dīnanātha-
śaraṇāgati), since in that case, Arjuna would not even have come to the battlefield. 
Hence, kṛpā here stands for a temporary mental state caused by delusion (āgantukaḥ 
mohavikāraḥ). 
              (iii) While explaining the hemistich gatāsūnagatāsūṃiśca nānuśocanti 
paṇḍitaḥ in BhG 2.11, MS maintains that while gatāśūn stands for people who are 
dead, agatāśūn stands for the living relatives of those who are dead, and sorrow 
(śoka) for them is of the form -- ‘how can there people survive after the death of 
their dear ones?’ Veṅkaṭanātha points out that in view of the expression dṛṣṭvemaṃ 
svajanam etc. that occurs in BhG 1.28, the sorrow spoken of here is related to 
relatives of Arjuna who are still living, but are about to be killed in the war. Thus, 
the explanation given by MS is not satisfactory.  
              (iv) While explaining the hemistich dehino’smin yathā dehe kaumāraṃ 
yauvanaṃ jarā that occurs in BhG 2.13, MS says that the word dehin, which is used 
here in the singular number, is present for the single self that persists in the body 
through the phases of childhood, youth, and old age that characterise the latter. 
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Likewise, the single self (i.e. brahman), on account of its all-pervasiveness 
(vibhutva) is present in all the bodies, and hence, the distinction that Arjuna draws 
between one who is killed (vadhya) and one who kills (ghātaka) is illusory in 
nature. Veṅkaṭanātha points out that, the verse does not speak of all bodies, and 
moreover, MS has to supply the probans, viz. all-pervasiveness (vibhutva) through 
ellipsis (adhyāropa). Hence, the literal meaning of this verse should be accepted 
here.  
              (v) While explaining the expression antavanta ime dehāḥ etc. that occurs in 
BhG 2.18, MS maintains that, the word dehāḥ, which is in plural number, stands for 
all the three types of body admitted in Advaita metaphysics, viz. gross body 
(sthūla-śarīra), subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra), and ‘causal’ body (kāraṇa-śarīra) that 
are composed by five sheaths (pañca-koṣātmakaḥ). Veṅkaṭanātha rejects this 
interpretation on the ground that from the context it is evident that Arjuna’s grief 
was caused by the very thought of destroying the gross bodies of relatives like 
Bhīṣma etc. that are characterised by the physical or material sheath (annamaya-
koṣa), since the subtle body of a person characterised by the three other sheaths [ 
viz. vital sheath (prāṇamaya-koṣa), mental sheath (manomaya-koṣa), and 
consciousness sheath (vijñānamaya-koṣa)] as well as the ‘causal’ body 
characterised by the bliss sheath (ānandamaya-koṣa) persist till the liberation of that 
person, and hence, the question of Arjuna’s grief being caused by the thought about 
the future destruction of such bodies in the war does not arise in the first place.783 
              Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri (ca. 16th century CE, the famous commentator of the 
Mahābhārata and a supporter of Śaṃkara’s Advaita school): Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri, an 
                                                 
783 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Brahmānandagiri, pp. 18, 47-8, 81-2, 95, 118. 
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adherent to the Advaita Vedānta school, criticises any contrary position in his 
Śrīmadbhagavadgītārthaprakāśa, which is a commentary on the BhG, and is also a 
part of his commentary on the MBh, called the Bhāratabhāvadīpa. In addition to the 
introductory verses 2, 3, and 5 of this work which bear the substantial similarity 
with the introductory verses 3 and 4 of the GD,784 we find several places in his 
commentary on the BhG where Nīlakaṇṭha, along with the other commentators of 
the BhG like Śaṃkara,785 Śrīdhara786 etc., refers also to MS [e.g. BhG 2.20, 3.28 
(only place where MS is referred to by name by Nīlakaṇṭha), 4.18, 6.29, 10.6, 
10.21, 17.6, 18.10, 18.25].787  
              Vallabhācārya (17th century CE, the fifth grandson of the founder of 
the Śuddhādvaita school, Vallabhācārya):  As has been stated before, 
Vallabhacārya, who is a theistic Vedāntin, finds fault with MS’s comments on BhG 
7.14. The verse in question speaks about different kinds of worshippers, who have 
performed virtuous deeds, viz. the suffering, the seekers for knowledge, the seekers 
for prosperity, and the wise. MS, following the BP and the other Smṛtis, names 
Gajendra, Śaunaka, Dhruva, Śuka, gopī-s etc. as representative examples of such 
devotees. Vallabhacārya, while commenting on the same verse, states in accordance 
                                                 
784 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā (Caturdharī), pp. 2-5 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 2.  
785 In BhG 2.43-44, 67; 3.28; 4.1, 4.6, 4.11, 4.18, 22, 35; 5.7; 6.29, 7.25, 8.3, 9.4, 10.20, 13.13, 13.14, 
13.20, 13.22, 14.2, 17.1, 17.10, 17.25, 18.10, 18.18, 18.61 [Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā 
(Caturdharī), pp. 102-3, 126, 164, 182, 190, 194, 207, 214, 233, 253-4, 370, 379, 414, 455, 555, 558, 
568, 570, 588, 653, 660, 669, 688-9, 703, and 748].    
786 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā (Caturdharī), pp. 657 and 712; and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 657-8 and 712. 
787 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā (Caturdharī), pp. 70,164, 207, 317-8, 445-6, 455-6, 657, 
688, and 712; and Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 68, 164, 298, 318, 445-6, 455, 657, 
687-9, and 712.  
Besides, compare ‘anye tu’, p. 188;  comments on BhG 6.29, pp. 316-20; ‘mathitadugdhādītyanye’, 
p. 660; ‘atra kaścidāha’,  p. 691; ‘na niradhāri bhavateti’ (MS refers to Śrīdhara by ‘bhavat’ and 
Nīlakaṇṭha refers to Śrīdhara by ‘anye tu’ in turn,  p. 691) in Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā with pp. 316-20, pp. 185-90, p. 660, pp. 690-2 in Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Nīlakaṇṭhavyākhyā (Caturdharī). 
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with his doctrinal consideration and also with the support of the BP, that though 
other devotees such as Śaunaka, Dhruva, Śuka undertook virtuous deeds; the gopī-s, 
despite having performed no such virtuous deeds either in this life or in the past 
ones, could avail mystic yearning and love through the grace (puṣṭi or prasāda) of 
the Lord only.788 
                Puruṣottamajī (18th century CE, a proponent of the Śuddhādvaita 
school): As we have mentioned earlier, Puruṣottamajī, a follower of the 
Śuddhādvaita school of Vedānta, finds flaws in MS’s commentary on the BhG. In 
the introduction to his BhG commentary, which is called the Amṛtataraṅginī, 
Puruṣottamajī has expressed the view with the support of the Anugītā etc. that the 
BhG teaches śaraṇagamana, and not jñāna and saṃnyāsa, as has been claimed by 
Śaṃkara. Again, Puruṣottamajī, quoting the introductory verses 3-10 of the GD, 
holds that MS’s assertion about the tripartite division of the Vedas into karma, 
upāsanā, and jñāna correspond to each six chapters of the BhG respectively and 
establish the import of ‘tattvamasi’ is not supported by the text (i.e. the BhG) 
commented on. He says that, the term śaraṇa in BhG 18.66 needs to be admitted in 
its primary meaning as ‘house’, ‘protector’ etc. as cited in the Amarakoṣa 3.3.52, in 
stead of admitting it in its secondary meaning. It may be pointed out in this 
connection that, though Puruṣottamajī  has criticised Śaṃkara and MS, yet he has 
referred to Śrīdhara and Rāmānuja in support of his own position.789  
                Viśvanātha Cakravartin (18th century CE, an exponent of the Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavism): As noted earlier, there are many places in Viśvanātha Cakravartin’s 
commentary on the BhG, where the author reproduces verbatim from MS’s GD in 
                                                 
788 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 362-3 and Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 2, 
Tattvadīpikā of Vallabhācārya, p. 38. 
789 Bhagavadgītā 2000: Vol. 1, Puruṣottamajīkṛtā’mṛtataraṅgiṇyupodghātaḥ, p. 18. 
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support of his own position. Besides offering almost a similar classification of bhakti 
in the introduction as also in his commentary on BhG 7.16 [Whereas MS classifies it 
into karma-miśrā, jñāna-miśrā, and śuddhā, Viśvanātha classifies bhakti, in connection 
with describing the four types of people of virtuous deeds (BhG 7.16), into 
pradhānībhūtā -- karma-miśrā, jñāna-miśrā, and yoga-miśrā; and kevalā bhakti].790 
Viśvanātha refers by name to MS in BhG 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, 4.36, 7.7, 8.18, 9.15, 13.10, 
14.26, 14.27, 15.18 etc.791 Viśvanātha refers to MS in his commentary on BhG 4.6, 4.9 
along with Rāmānuja and Śrīdhara, while in the course of explaining BhG 14.26-27, 
15.18 he mentions MS along with Śrīdhara.  Viśvanātha has explored the possibility of 
showing that MS’s GD is not in extreme opposition to the views of Rāmānuja and 
Śrīdhara.      
                 The following commentators have referred to MS’s GD in an implicit 
manner in their respective commentaries on the BhG, as can be inferred from the 
almost verbatim reproduction of the passages of the GD in such works. 
              Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (18th century CE, a disciple of Viśvanātha 
Cakravartin, and an advocate of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism): Baladeva 
Vidyābhūṣaṇa, who is considered a systematic propounder of the Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavism through his comments on the Upaniṣads, BS, and the BhG, has referred 
to MS indirectly in his commentary on the BhG, which is named as the 
Gītābhūṣaṇa. In his comments on BhG 1.1, Baladeva cites MS’s definition of 
Kurukṣetra based on the Jabala Upaniṣad. In BhG 4.6, Baladeva uses MS’s 
comparison of the rising sun to the appearance of the Lord that has been provided in 
                                                 
790 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārāsthavarṣiṇī, pp. 2, 206-207 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, introductory verse 7, comments on BhG 7.16, pp. 3 and 362-3. 
791 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Sārāsthavarṣiṇī, pp. 120, 122, 123-124, 142-143, 199, 232, 253-
254, 352, 385, 387-388, and 404. 
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connection with the latter’s comments on BhG 4.5. While explaining the concept of 
māyā stated in BhG 7.14, Baladeva uses the same Upaniṣadic text (i.e. ŚU 4.10) as 
is used by MS in the same context, while the former’s elucidation on this verse is 
substantially similar to that of the latter.792  
              MS’s classification of bhakti into karma-miśrā, jñāna-miśrā, and śuddhā 
cited in one of the introductory verses of the GD is also admitted by Baladeva 
throughout his commentary on the BhG, in a modified form that is similar to the 
classification given by Viśvanātha (e.g. BhG 6.47, 8.10. 9.15, 12.1). Besides, as we 
have noted earlier, while explaining the four kinds of people of virtuous deeds 
(sukṛtin-s), viz. the suffering (ārta), the seekers for knowledge (jiñāsu), the seekers 
for prosperity (arthārthin-s), and the wise (jñānin-s) mentioned in BhG 7.16, MS 
characterises the first three types of people as those devotees who possess desire 
(sakāma), and the fourth type as those who have no interest for the fruit of their 
action (niṣkāma); while the latter are again classified into (i) those who are 
endowed with knowledge (niṣkāma-bhakta-jñānī), and (ii) those who possess 
disinterested and pure love (niṣkāma-śuddha-prema-bhakta). Unlike Viśvanātha, 
Baladeva reflects upon the elucidation of MS on this verse, yet he does not classify 
the devotees with the help of specific names; for he describes them differently as 
saniṣṭha (i.e. performers of niṣkama-karma-yoga, followed by jñana-yoga, aṣṭāṅga-
yoga, and finally bhakti-yoga), pariniṣṭha (i.e. those who engage in the devotional 
processes of hearing and chanting as their main sādhana), nirapekṣa or niṣkāma 
(i.e. those who perform only bhakti, and reject varṇāśrama-dharma), and devotees, 
who are attached to the performance of varṇāśrama-dharma (e.g. BhG 3.25, 7.30, 
                                                 
792 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 6, 121, and 204 and Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 9, 186, and 357. 
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9.27, 12.13-14, 18.64). It is to be noted that, though Baladeva in his comments on 
BhG 7.30 enumerates five types of devotees (in contrast to the four types found in 
BhG 7.16), it is in accordance with their doctrinal consideration, as the Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavism accepts bhakti as the fifth end of human life (pañcama-puruṣārtha), in 
addition to the generally accepted four types of puruṣārtha-s, i.e. dharma, artha, 
kāma, and mokṣa. But we can justify Baladeva while we see that the fourth type of 
devotees (i.e. jñānin in BhG 7.16) is nothing but a devotee with dispassion 
(niṣkāma-bhakta) according to MS. Further, in his comments on BhG 18.64, 
Baladeva talks about sādhya and sādhana types of bhakti for the niṣkāma devotees, 
which also finds resemblance with the view of MS, as we have said earlier.793  
           Dhanapati Sūri (1750-1850 CE, a proponent of the Advaita school of 
Śaṃkara):  As we have referred to in chapter one and discussed in several places in 
chapters three, four, and five, Dhanapati, who often refers to commentators like 
Śaṃkara,794 Ānandagiri,795 the other sub-commentators of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya,796 
Śrīdhara,797 Nīlakaṇṭha798 etc., refers to MS as many as one hundred and sixty times 
                                                 
793 Bhagavadgītā (date not found): Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 160-2, 226-7, 255, and 329; and Bhagavadgītā 
1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, introductory verse 7, p. 3 -- Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 207-8 and Bhagavadgītā 
1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 362-3 -- Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 100, 220, 265, 340-1, and 474; and 
Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 362-3.  
794 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā on BhG 2.11, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.17, 2.18, 2.20, 2.21, 
2.22, 2.24, 2.27, 2.28, 2.29, 2.41, 3.3, 3.5, 3.41, 4.4, 4.6, 4.13, 4.17, 4.20, 4.24, 5.7, 5.10, 5.14, 5.21, 
6.29, 6.38, 6.40, 8.6, 9.16, 9.21, 11.43, 13.23, 16.17, 18.6, and concluding verse 1. 
795 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā on BhG 1.2 and 2.15. 
796 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā on BhG 1.2, 1.7, 1.10, 1.18, 1.21, 1.35, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.7, 
2.8, and 2.14. 
797 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā on BhG 1.10, 2.5, 2.25, 2.41, 2.44, 2.48, 2.49, 2.72, 3.3, 
3.9, 3.15, 3.21, 3.29, 4.8, 4.10, 4.14, 4.16, 4.18, 4.20, 4.24, 4.30, 5.3, 5.4, 5.9, 5.11, 5.24, 6.1, 6.3, 
6.6, 6.7, 7.4, 8.15, 8.28, 9.18, 9.21, 9.32, 10.6, 10.12, 10.21, 10.32, 11.32, 11.40, 12.3, 13.3, 13.4, 
13.8, 13.12, 13.17, 13.18, 13.21, 13.24, 13.30, 14.3, 14.27, 15.7,  15.16, 17.10, 18.10, 18.13, 18.19, 
18.36, and 18.68 
798 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā on BhG 1.1, 2.2, 2.7, 2.10, 2.14, 2.20, 2.28, 2.29, 2.41, 
2.47, 2.66, 2.70, 2.72, 3.3, 3.20, 3.28, 3.29, 3.32, 4.1, 4.6, 4.8,4.10,  4.13,4.14, 4.16, 4.18, 4.21, 4.22, 
4.25. 4.26, 4.30, 4.31, 4.35, 5.3, 5.4, 5.7, 5.13, 5.15, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, 7.4, 7.25, 7.26, 7.29, 8.15, 9.1, 
9.2, 9.6, 9.15, 9.16, 9.21, 10.6, 10.21, 10.33, 11.32, 11.35, 11.40, 12.1, 12.13, 12.16, 12.17, 13.8, 
13.12, 13.17, 13.18, 13.21, 13.24, 13.28, 14.2, 14.27, 15.6, 16.8, 16.24,17.6, 17.10, 18.6, 18.10, 
18.17, and 18.23,18.34, 18.36, 18.55, and 18.68.    
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in his commentary on the BhG, which is called the Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā.799 Besides 
aiming at showing the appropriateness of Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG, 
Dhanapati refers to these other commentaries in order to show their inferiority, as 
they often fail to follow the lead of Śaṃkara’s Gītābhāṣya.  
           However, there are several occasions when Dhanapati refers to these 
commentators also in support of his own view. But we need to review at least some 
of the objections that Dhanapati, despite being a follower of Śaṃkara Vedānta, has 
raised in a great number against MS’s GD. As we have pointed out earlier, 
Dhanapati has criticised MS without naming him in a number of places, where the 
latter seems to deviate from or fail to grasp what the great commentator Śaṃkara 
wanted to convey. And in a recently published vernacular translation of MS’s GD, 
we find that the writer of the preface of that book has pointed out as many as twenty 
five verses, where Dhanapati objects to MS’s interpretation.800 Due to paucity of 
space, we note here only some of such objections. 
             (i) BhG 1.24 contains a statement of Sañjaya who tells Dhṛtarāṣṭra that after 
being requested by Arjuna, Lord Kṛṣṇa placed the chariot of Arjuna between the 
two large armies about to engage in the Kurukṣetra war. According to MS, 
Dhṛtarāṣtra hoped that after being requested by Arjuna, Lord Kṛṣṇa would adopt the 
principle of non-violence, and would dissuade Arjuna from participating in the war. 
In order to remove this wrong assumption, Sañjaya uttered this verse. Dhanapati 
Sūri rejects this view on the ground that Dhṛtarāṣtra already knew that the war was 
                                                 
799  For references, see footnote 188 supra. 
800 Sanātanadeva 2005: Bhūmikā, pp. 10-3 (BhG 2.7, 2.11, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, 
2.24, 2.39, 2.54, 2.67, 2.70, 3.3, 3.18, 3.28, 5.7, 6.19, 6.30, 7.21, 7.29, 8.20, 9.15, etc.). 
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about to begin, and hence, there was no reason for entertaining such a baseless 
hope. 
             (ii) BhG 1.45 starts with the words ‘yadi mām-apratīkāram’ etc., and 
according to  MS, Arjuna says this to Kṛṣṇa, anticipating the objection that even if 
Arjuna desists from war, other members of his family like Bhīma etc. would 
certainly take part in the war that would result in the death of his relatives. Arjuna 
says here that he would follow the principle of non-violence even if it results in his 
death. Dhanapati Sūri rejects this view on the ground that no answer of Śrīkṛṣṇa 
that is relevant to such an anticipated question is found in the BhG. 
               (iii) In course of explaining BhG 2.7, MS holds that, the word śreyaḥ that 
occurs in the second hemistich of this verse stands for the highest end of human life 
(parama-puruṣārtha), i.e. liberation (mokṣa). Dhanapati Sūri has pointed out that, in 
the first hemistich of this verse, Arjuna has described himself as extremely 
confused about his duty (dharma-saṃmūḍḥa-cetāḥ). Such a person is likely to 
enquire about dharma, and not about mokṣa. Accordingly, Dhanapati Sūri maintains 
that, here, the word śreyaḥ stands for what is beneficial (hitāvaha), and not mokṣa.  
              (iv) In view of the phrase ‘nāyaṃ hanti na hanyate’ that occurs in the 
second hemistich of BhG 2.19, MS introduces the next verse (i.e. BhG 2.20, which 
starts with the words ‘na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit’ etc.) with the remark that this 
verse explains why the self can be neither the agent (kartā) nor the object (karma) 
of the act of killing (hanana-kriyā). But strangely enough, while introducing BhG 
2.21, MS says that, the self cannot be the agent of the act of killing, where in BhG 
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2.21, it has been shown why it cannot be the object of the act of killing. Dhanapati 
Sūri has pointed out this obvious case of inconsistency. 
             (v) While explaining the first hemistich of BhG 2.22 (i.e.  ‘vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni 
yathā vihāya navāni gṛhṇāti naro’parāṇi’), MS maintains that, the word jīrṇa and 
nava occurring in this verse, which normally mean something old and something 
new respectively, should be understood here in the senses of inferior (nikṛṣṭa) and 
superior (utkṛṣṭa) respectively. Therefore, MS says that, since the Kurukṣetra war 
would help people like Bhīṣma  in obtaining better bodies in heaven after leaving 
their present and inferior bodies that have become old, it should be considered 
something desirable and helpful (upakāraka). Dhanapati Sūri points out that such an 
interpretation is incongruous with the context, and also involves ellipsis of the 
qualificand (viśesyādhyāhāra). Moreover, even young people, whose bodies have 
not become old, are killed in a war. Hence, the interpretation offered by MS is not 
tenable. 
             (vi) While explaining the second hemistich of BhG 2.24 (i.e. ‘nityaḥ 
sarvagataḥ sthāṇuracalo’yaṃ sanātanaḥ’), MS quoted the Śruti passages like 
‘ākāśavat sarvagataśca nityaḥ’ (CU 3.14.3), ‘vṛkṣa iva stabdho divi tiṣṭhatyekaḥ’ 
(ŚU 3.9) etc. for establishing that the self is eternal. Dhanapati Sūri points out that, 
MS himself has said in the introduction to the GD that the first six chapters 
explicate the nature of the individual self that is expressed by the word tvam, 
whereas the scriptural passages quoted by him describe the nature of brahman that 
is expressed by the word tat. That the present verse discusses the nature of the 
individual self that is embodied is evident from the earlier verses that contain 
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expressions like ‘gatāsūn agatāsūṃśca’, ‘dehino’smin’, ‘antavanta ime dehāḥ’, 
‘vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni’ etc. Hence, the interpretation of MS is not tenable.801  
             The works of modern scholars also lead one to consider afresh to what 
extent MS’s GD can be considered a reliable commentary on the BhG, or a reliable 
commentary that properly evaluates Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG. However, 
it may be pointed out that, in addition to some of the above-mentioned 
commentaries on the BhG, MS has also made use of various relevant sources of 
Sanskrit literature (both philosophical and non-philosophical). As pointed out 
earlier, MS had before him, along with the rich legacy of his own Advaitic 
tradition, various philosophical doctrines that he had to refer to frequently, either 
for supporting his own position or for showing their invalidity. Some of the 
important philosophical schools that MS refers to in his GD on the BhG are the 
Mīmāṃsā (on BhG 1.38, 18.7, 18.12, 18.18 etc.), Sāṃkhya (on BhG 2.7, 7.4, 18.7 
etc.), Cārvāka (on BhG 2.13, 13.6, 16.8, 16.11, 18.14, 18.22 etc.), Nyāya (on BhG 
2.13 ff., 13.6 etc.), Vaiśeṣika (on BhG 2.14 etc.), Yoga (on BhG 2, 4, 5, 6 etc.), 
Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vādins (on BhG 3.2, 4.18 etc.), Bauddha (on BhG 13.6, 
16.24, 17.5 etc.), Jaina (on BhG 17.5, 18.22 etc.), Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of 
Rāmānuja (on BhG 4.6 etc.), the Mādhva Vedānta (on BhG 18.21 etc.) etc.   
              As a vernacular translator has already listed in appendices of his work the 
sources made use of by MS in his GD,802 we refrain from repeating the same work.  
                                                 
801 Bhagavadgītā 1999: Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā, pp. 20, 29-30, 37, 69-70, 76-7, 78-9.  
802 Agrawal 2005: Vol. 2, Anubandha 2, pp. 915-52. 
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 In the concluding chapter which follows, we propose to make some 
evaluative statements about the text (i.e. the GD), its author (i.e. MS) and its place 
as a commentary on the BhG together with our key findings in the dissertation. 
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7 
Conclusion 
 
Devotion to a personal God, i.e. bhakti, has been a longstanding problem in Indian 
religious and philosophical thinking. Rudolf Otto’s Mysticism: East and West 
elucidates Śaṃkara’s attitude towards bhakti as follows:  
                Śaṅkara himself, in the lower level, is a thorough-going theist and that with ardor 
and                           holy zeal. His theology is here almost identical with that of later 
Rāmānuja (outlined above)   and his opposition to those who deny God and to their 
rival systems which oppose theism, is as great as that of his successor (Rāmānuja). 
Therefore, he takes it for granted that the man who is redeemed of God does not turn 
back, but on the path of gradual redemption finds its last in Brahma-nirvāṇa (sic.).  
 
However hyperbolic it may sound, Otto’s observation about Śaṃkara’s outlook on 
 devotion would be applicable more directly to MS in general, and his GD in 
particular -- a point that is of central importance in  our dissertation.    
             Keeping in mind the intellectual, institutional and literary contexts that we 
have tried to unearth in this dissertation, and the research questions that are stated 
in chapter 1.1; we put forward the following observations in bullet point and 
explain them subsequently: 
• The GD is a work belonging to the adhikaraṇa-prasthāna, and is an ideal 
example of proper exposition (vyākhyā). Moreover, MS, as compared with 
the earlier Advaitic commentators as well as with the general attitude of the 
Advaitic tradition, shows great distinctiveness in the GD in terms of 
interpretation and exposition of the BhG.  
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• MS never compromises Śaṃkara’s non-dual doctrinal standpoint, and he is 
faithful to the latter’s intent while differing in some level of detail.  
• While the works of MS like the AdS, AdRR etc. were not criticised by the 
later adherents to the Advaita Vedānta school, his GD was sometimes 
criticised by the later commentators who subscribed to the Advaita Vedānta. 
That the GD was criticised by the later non-Advaitic commentators is hardly 
surprising.  
• MS, as a great scholar of his time, held an independent approach while 
making use of source material in framing his own philosophical viewpoint. 
As a champion of both theism and non-dualism, MS was deeply influenced 
by contemporary philosophical and religious debates. An expert in the 
Navya-nyāya technique of logical argumentation, MS occupies a prime 
position in the history of the development of Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta 
philosophy.  
• Modern scholarship803 presumes that devotion to saguṇa-brahman [in this 
context, devotion to Lord Kṛṣṇa (kṛṣṇa-bhakti)] is irreconcilable with an 
Advaitic viewpoint, but MS made it his central objective to reconcile the 
two.  
Instead of putting emphasis on polemics (vāda), the GD aims at (i) stating the 
subject-matter (viṣaya) in an explicit manner; (ii) anticipating the doubts (saṃśaya-
s) that may be raised by any opponent; (iii) discussing the prima facie views, or the 
views to be refuted in the GD (pūrvapakṣa-s); (iv) establishing the views to be 
finally admitted (uttarapakṣa); (v) showing the purpose (prayojana) served by a 
                                                 
803 Sanjukta Gupta, Lance E. Nelson etc. may be named as representatives of modern scholarship.  
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particular topic, and (vi) pointing out the relevance (saṅgati) of the topic to the 
main theme of discussion. By so doing, the text meets all the criteria for being 
regarded as a topical text (adhikaraṇa-grantha) and is, moreover, a perfect example 
of exposition (vyākhyā).  
The features contributing to the distinctiveness of the GD as a commentary 
on the BhG may be summed up as: (i) dividing the BhG into three parts that deal 
with karma, bhakti and jñāna respectively, and linking up these three sections with 
the constituent words of the Upaniṣadic sentence ‘That thou art’ (tattvamasi), which 
is regarded as a great sentence (mahāvākya); (ii) hinting at the suggestive meaning 
(vyaṅgyārtha) of words, including even names or forms of address and the 
denotative meaning (śakyārtha) and implied meaning (lakṣyārtha) of words, which 
is quite consistent with the fact that the BhG, while being a text of great religious 
importance, is also a part of the MBh (i.e. the great epic of India), and thus also has 
a lot of poetic appeal (see chapter 1.7).  
We have seen in this study that, while MS sometimes expresses deep 
doctrinal differences with commentators of other traditions, he remains faithful to 
Śaṃkara’s comments, especially when it comes to dealing with philosophical 
principles (see chapters 6.2-6.4). There are as many as twenty seven places where 
MS explicitly refers to Śaṃkara’s comments in support of his own position. 
Even so, there are a few passages in which MS shows apparent disagreement 
with Śaṃkara in respect of the interpretation of the BhG text. For example, while 
dealing with the three means of attaining liberation (viz. karma, bhakti, and jñāna),  
MS, unlike Śaṃkara, has dealt extensively with Pātañjala Yoga (see chapters 3.1.5, 
5.2.1). He draws on the YV, YS, Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa and the Gauḍapādakārikā in 
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order to show that Yoga is an aid to the other three means (viz. karma, bhakti, and 
jñāna-yoga-s and that it is an important requirement to be fulfilled for practising 
jñāna-yoga/dhyāna-yoga/samādhi-yoga), though the ultimate means is considered 
to be jñāna. Despite holding that followers of Śaṃkara Vedānta do not find 
Pātañjala Yoga indispensable for obtaining self-realisation, he views yoga as a 
means of controlling the mind before self-realisation and of removing past vāsanā-s 
after the advent of tattva-jñana, thereby indicating the important place of yogic 
practices for one who aspires for liberation.  
We have also pointed out the views of commentators such as Nīlakaṇṭha and 
Dhanapati, as also those of modern scholars, who have either appreciated or 
criticized this position of MS. We have also shown, in support of MS’s stance, that 
there are ample occasions where Śaṃkara, too, both in his comments on the 
Upaniṣads and on the BS, has admitted the yogic path as conducive to liberation, 
albeit in a somewhat different tone. This demonstrates that the the fact that MS has 
described the yogic path in the course of mentioning the means of attaining 
liberation is not completely antagonistic to the views of Śaṃkara, but differs only in 
terms of emphasis. In this connection, the view of Fort (see chapter 2.4.3) that the 
GD of MS was influenced by the Yogic Advaita deserves careful consideration.  
While Śaṃkara puts emphasis on two mārga-s (i.e. karma and jñāna) stated 
in the BhG, MS talks about three mārga-s (karma, bhakti, and jñāna) as explicitly 
mentioned in the BhG as the means of attaining liberation. Most importantly, he 
regards the path of bhakti as both the means and the end of the paths of karma and 
jñāna (the GD on BhG 18.66). Though this declaration may appear to mark him as a 
dualist, his final view is in agreement with Śaṃkara. That is to say that knowledge 
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finally leads to the attainment of liberation. His declaration that it is the devotion to 
the Lord that produces knowledge, which culminates in liberation (the GD on BhG 
18.73 etc.) marks him as a pure non-dualist, to whom the path of devotion is as 
good as that of knowledge (see chapters 5.2.2.1-5.2.2.3, 5.3). The Advaita 
Vedāntins maintain, in consonance with the Upaniṣadic dictum ‘Only when a man 
knows him does he pass beyond death; there is no other path for getting there’ (ŚU 
6.15), that liberation is attained only through the knowledge of brahman, i.e. the 
ultimate reality, whereas the other Vedāntins, who do not subscribe to pure non-
dualism, put more emphasis on devotion (bhakti), a means that has received much 
importance in the BhG. MS, however, while admitting the importance of devotion, 
maintains that devotion easily leads to the knowledge of reality, thus paving the 
path of liberation. This shows how he can admit the importance of devotion without 
compromising his belief in pure non-dualism.  
The versified introduction to the GD, in conformity with the principles of 
Advaita Vedānta, delineates all the fourfold requisites (anubandha-catuṣṭaya) that 
are considered to be essential by any important text (of the Advaitic tradition). The 
basic philosophical stand of MS is reflected in these forty six introductory verses. 
MS fully supported the views of Śaṃkara regarding jagat, jīvātman, and 
paramātman, and also the view that the path of knowledge directly leads to 
liberation, thereby showing his unswerving affiliation to the fundamental doctrines 
of Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta (see chapters 3, 4, 5.2 etc.). 
As has been noted, the interpretations of the BhG by MS came under severe 
criticism by even some members of his own school (see chapter 6.5 and the 
discussion on the preceding chapters). While this is seen as being due to the 
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emphasis he has put on bhakti, it must be remembered that internal commentarial 
differences within the Advaita tradition are quite normal, going back to the 
divergence in views between the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa schools. As stated 
before, the critics of MS, who also belong to the same Advaita tradition, often 
claimed that Śaṃkara’s commentary on the BhG is more authentic, thereby 
expressing the opinion that as a commentary, the GD is not always reliable. It 
should be noted that other works of MS, such as the AdS and AdRR, were not 
criticised by the later Advaitins in this manner. 
Contemporary scholars such as Sanjukta Gupta point out804 that MS belonged 
to the post-Caitanya period, when religious mysticism permeated Bengal, and 
brought a simplification in the process of the origin of cognition that ultimately 
leads to the attainment of liberation. In the process of cognition, three components, 
namely cognition (jñāna), cognizer (jñātā), and the cognized (jñeya), 
respectively represent ‘that’, ‘are’, and ‘thou’ in the statement ‘That thou art,’ 
ending in the realization that they are one. Similarly, in the awareness of devotion, 
the mind is melted by the abiding passion of love for the qualified brahman (i.e. 
Lord Kṛṣṇa), the object of devotion. Gupta holds that MS thus implicitly accepts the 
qualified brahman (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa), also admitted by Rāmānuja as the ultimate 
reality and therefore MS erred in the eyes of the later Advaita thinkers. However, 
this may not be the only reason for Nīlakaṇṭha, Veṅkaṭanātha, Dhanapati etc. 
criticizing MS, because they take issue with him even in cases where the issue of 
devotion is not at all involved. A more plausible explanation may be that, in his 
quest for providing novel interpretations, MS may have at times come up with 
                                                 
804 Private correspondence, Sanjukta Gupta, 04.07.2013. 
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interpretations that appear somewhat far-fetched, and this was not acceptable to the 
later Advaitins.  
            Besides those belonging to the same tradition as MS, some of the later 
commentators of the BhG belonging to other traditions, such as Vallabhācārya, 
Puruṣottamajī, etc. of the Śuddhādvaita Vedānta school, found faults with MS’s 
exposition on the BhG (see chapters 5.2.2.1, 6.5). While Vallabhācārya in his 
comments on BhG 7.16 expressed disagreement with MS following his own 
philosophical consideration (i.e. the Puṣṭimārga) that admits the grace of the Lord 
(puṣṭi) to be the sole factor for attaining liberation, Puruṣottamajī, in the 
introduction to his BhG commentary, rejected, without giving reasons, MS’s 
attempt at making a tripartite division of the BhG corresponding to the tripartite 
division of the Vedas and his attempt to explain this division in terms of the three 
words of the Upaniṣadic great sentence ‘tattvamasi’ (see chapters 3.1.4, 6.5).  
            MS was a champion of both theism and monism. As a monk belonging to 
the order of the Śaṃkara tradition, the authorities followed by MS are invariably 
the texts of his tradition. In order to defend a prominent place for bhakti in the 
Advaitic tradition, he had also to resort to sources such as the BP, which explicitly 
emphasise devotion, though such texts were not typically cited by the Advaitins to 
establish a doctrine. It is evident from a close scrutiny of his works that, though MS 
was willing to accommodate the views of various post-Śaṃkara schools of Advaita 
Vedānta, it is the Vivaraṇa school to which MS’s allegiance is evident. This view is 
substantiated by the fact that, out of the five definitions of falsity given by MS, 
three are based on the Vivaraṇa school, and that he accepts the principal doctrines 
of this school, such as that brahman is both the substratum and object of nescience, 
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verbal testimony leads to the immediate knowledge of brahman, reflection theory 
explains the relation between brahman  and jīva etc. (see chapters 1.3-1.4).  
            As regards the influence of contemporary philosophical trends upon MS’s 
views, our conclusions are follows. MS was clearly influenced by Śrīdhara Svāmin 
(14th century CE, a celebrated commentator of the BP and the BhG, and an advocate 
of the Non-dualism of Śaṃkara) while writing the GD, as the latter is considered to 
be a proponent of nirguṇa-bhakti-mārga. However, he has not failed to differ from 
Śrīdhara (the GD on BhG 2.41, 13.12, 15.16)805 when the latter’s views appeared to 
be unconvincing [see chapter 6.4]. Besides the GD, MS’s HLV bears frequent 
references to Śrīdhara, and both the authors talk about nirguṇa-bhakti. Although 
Śrīdhara talks about the utility of devotion to the Lord as a means of liberation, he 
also distinguishes this from that of knowledge. In the concluding part of his 
commentary on the BhG, Śrīdhara, with the support of various Śruti and Smṛti 
texts, asserts that devotion to the Lord alone is the means of liberation, and that the 
knowledge of the self is an intermediate operation (avāntara-vyāpāra) of devotion 
to the Lord. That is, for him devotion to the Lord causes knowledge of the self that 
ultimately leads to liberation.806 This view is compatible with the spirit of Śaṃkara’s 
Advaita doctrine, and, of course, with that of MS.   
            In formulating his definition of bhakti, MS certainly followed the BP, but he 
might also have been influenced by Vopadeva, the author of the Muktāphala and its 
                                                 
805 MS frequently refers to Śrīdhara’s commentary on the BP as well in his Harilīlāviveka (i.e. 
commentary on the Harilīlāmṛtam by Vopadeva) [See Harilīlāmṛta 1933: Harilīlāmṛta, 
Daśamaskandhakathāsāraḥ, p. 32 etc.). 
806 See Bhagavadgīta 1999: Śrīdharīvyākhyā, pp. 773-5. 
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commentator Hemādri, as he quotes the author of the Muktāphala in his ĪPP807 (see 
chapter 5.2.2.2). 
            Neither MS nor any of the early exponents of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism 
belonging to the same period as MS refer to each other in their works. It is therefore 
difficult to prove for certain, based on the literary evidence, that MS was influenced 
by the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. However, as we have seeen above, Sanjukta Gupta 
points out that it is possible that the environment of religious mysticism that 
permeated India in the post-Caitanya period has influenced MS. The reference to 
the GD of MS by Viśvanātha Cakravartin and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (i.e. the two 
famous adherents to the Bengal Vaiṣṇavism of the 18th century CE), in support of 
their views in their respective commentaries on the BhG, indicates that the Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavas found certain explanations given by MS, a devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa, as 
worthy of consideration, in spite of their basic doctrinal differences. In these cases, 
MS has described Lord Śrīkṛṣṇa as the brahman Himself, which is very close to the 
doctrine of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism (see chapters 4.1.3, 6.5, appendix II etc.). All this, 
however, proves MS’s influence on later Caitanya thought, rather than the other 
way round.    
             Evidence of MS’s strong mastery of both the old and new Nyāya schools is 
found in the frequent quotations from the Nyāyakusumāñjali808 of Udayana (a 
logician from Mithilā around 1050/1054 CE) and the Tattvacintāmaṇi809 of Gaṅgeśa 
(13th century CE) in the AdS and AdRR. His independent frame of mind is 
demonstrated by the fact that he often rejects the positions of these famous 
                                                 
807 Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa 1921: p. 7. 
808 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 16, 405, 639 and Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: pp. 9, 26 (and Gupta 1966: 
Introduction,  pp. xvi-xvii). 
809 Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 18 (and Gupta 1966: Introduction,  p. xvii). 
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predecessors in order to establish his own views, and utilises the methods of the 
new school of logic to defend Advaita views. In the AdS, by exhibiting an 
independent outlook, he even sheds new light in interpreting the BS and BhG 
texts.810 
Regarding the exegesis of Advaita doctrine, MS was very much influenced 
by Maṇḍana Miśra, Sureśvarācārya,811 Prakāśātmayati,812 Vācaspati Miśra813 and 
Sarvajñātmamuni.814 While dealing with the dialectical tasks in the AdS and AdRR, 
which defended Advaita doctrine against the criticisms of the dualists, MS was also 
influenced by Śrīharṣa (12th century CE), Ānandabodha (12th century CE) and 
Citsukha (13th century CE).815  
               While harmonizing and making use of the views of his predecessors, MS 
adopts an independent stance in refuting the views of dualists such as the 
Naiyāyikas and Mādhva Vaiṣṇavites, who had put forward new arguments for 
rejecting the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. In order to determine the role that MS 
plays in the history of the development of Advaita Vedānta philosophy, we have 
looked not only at his approach to devotion, but also his views on avidyā, on the 
basis of which, MS could respond to both the dualist Vaiṣṇavas and realist 
Naiyāyikas posing a grave threat to the foundation of Advaita Vedānta (see chapters 
                                                 
810 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 17-8 (and Gupta 1966: Introduction, p. xvi), pp. 435 and 846 (and Gupta 
1966: Introduction, p. xvii). 
811  In the AdS (Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 467), the view of Sureśvara is elaborated (cf. Gupta 1966: 
Introduction, p. xvii). Sureśvara is also frequently quoted by him (Bhagavadgītā 1999: 
Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, p. 676). 
812 In the AdS (Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 486-7), MS has made use of Vivaraṇa-kāra’s doctrines (cf. 
Gupta 1966: Introduction, p. xvii). In his AdRR too, MS takes support from Vivaraṇa-kāra 
(Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa 1917: p. 27).  
813 Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 47, Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 585 (and Gupta 2006: p. 26). 
814  Bhagavadgītā 1999: Madhusūdanīvyākhyā, pp. 356, 676; Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 577, 
Siddhāntabindu 1986: p. 46 (and Gupta 1966: Introduction, p. xvii, Agrawal 2005: Pt. 1, bhūmikā, p. 
24). 
815 Advaitasiddhi 2005: pp. 364, 464; 316; 322 (and Gupta 1966: Introduction,  p. xviii). 
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1.2, 5.2.2.1-5.2.2.3, 5.3 etc.). To many Indian philosophers, Śaṃkara’s treatment of 
illusoriness or falsity, that is the hallmark of avidyā, appeared to be problematic. 
For the Advaitins, avidyā/māyā/ajñāna is without a beginning and is opposed to 
cognition of its object (i.e. it is destructible by cognition of its object), though 
positive in nature in the sense that it is not merely the absence of cognition 
(jñānābhāva) [anādi- bhavarūpatve sati jñānanivartyā],816 while the world, also the 
product of avidyā, tends to be illusory. This is the foremost objection raised by the 
opponents against the followers of the Advaita Vedānta school. Alhough an 
elaborate discussion of this issue is not possible here, it should be noted that even 
though Advaita philosophers like Maṇḍana Miśra and Surevśvarācārya, who were 
contemporaries of Śaṃkara,817 tried to defend the concepts of mithyātva and avidyā 
by refuting their opponents’ views, with the advent of Udayanācārya, the eminent 
Naiyāyika, a fresh attack against the Advaita Vedāntins was launched by applying 
logical arguments against the notions of avidyā and mithyātva. While the later 
Advaita writers like Śrīharṣa, Ānandabodha and Citsukha answered the objections 
of the Naiyāyikas by adopting the tools of logical argumentation developed by the 
Naiyāyikas themselves, the tenets of Advaita Vedānta could not be established 
beyond dispute (see chapters 1.2, 1.4 etc.).  
            With the advent of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, who revived the method of 
applying syllogistic reasoning and also the method of finding faults in defective 
reasoning with the help of technical terms for framing exact formulations of 
definition, a new era began in the history of the development of Nyāya philosophy, 
which is known as the era of neo-logic (Navya-nyāya). The Mādhva Vedāntins, 
                                                 
816 Advaitasiddhi 2005: p. 544. 
817 See chapter 1.3 for the discussion of their chronology.  
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who were staunch supporters of dualism, and were thus arch-enemies of the 
Advaita Vedāntins, adopted the techniques of Navya-nyāya effectively, while not 
accepting all of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s doctrines. Their arguments against Advaita 
doctrines became more technical with the adoption of such techniques, and works 
like the Nyāyasudhā of Jaya Tīrtha and the Nyāyāmṛta of Vyāsa Tīrtha became the 
biggest challenges for the Advaita Vedāntins. 
         To MS goes the credit for answering the subtle objections and arguments 
found in such works, by exhibiting equal or greater skill in dialectics in his AdS. 
Followers of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, such as Śaṃkara Miśra, had independently 
criticized the Advaita Vedānta in works like the Bhedaratna and MS responded to 
these in his AdRR. One of MS’s greatest achievements is that he was able to defend 
the Advaita Vedānta against the onslaught of such formidable opponents by 
utilising the techniques of refutations employed by those very opponents against the 
Advaitins.818 
The brief description that we have given of each of MS’s available works 
and their references throughout the dissertation (see chapters 1.2, 5.2.2.1-5.2.2.3, 
5.3 etc.) prove that all of his works highlight his leaning towards devotion, be it the 
AdS or AdRR or the SB, dealing with the fundamental tenets of Advaita Vedānta, or 
the BhR or MSṬ or BPPŚV or the HLV that primarily expound the nature of 
devotion. The same is the case with the GD. Thus, MS does not show any major 
shift in thinking in any of his works, excepting in one of his early works on 
devotion, called the BhR, where he regards bhakti as the supreme end of human life 
(parama-puruṣārtha). 
                                                 
818  For a detailed discussion of it, see Gupta 2006: pp. 2-3 and Bhattacharya 1986: Preface and the 
following chapters therein.  
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His definition of bhakti does not stem from the Pāñcarātra school either. In 
his ĪPP, MS refers to the names of Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkarṣaṇa and 
Vāsudeva in the sense of virāṭa, hiraṇyagarbha, īśvara and sākṣin (sarva-sākṣī-
paramānanda-ghana) respectively. No Bhāgavata school refers to them using these 
appellations, while the Pāñcarātras name them ahaṃkara, manas, jīva and īśvara 
respectively. This indicates that MS, in spite of being a great devotee of Lord 
Kṛṣṇa, was not a follower of the Pāñcarātra school, which was subjected to severe 
criticism by Śaṃkara himself in his BSB.819 While the BP had influenced the 
philosophical outlook of MS on devotion,820 his definition of bhakti differs 
significantly from those given by the exponents of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, who also 
held the BP in high esteem.  
To sum up, it can be said that for MS, Advaita Vedānta was the foundation 
on which he erected his philosophical and devotional edifice. While expressing his 
unconditional devotion to the Lord, he never adopted the manner in which other 
dualist Vedāntins view it, as is evident from his robust criticism of the followers of 
Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja (GD on BhG 4.6 etc.) and those of Dvaita 
Vedānta of Madhva (GD on BhG 18.21 etc.),821 and also the criticism of other Indian 
philosophical schools whenever their positions were found to be incompatible with 
his own non-dualistic position. His treatment of bhakti is not similar to the 
treatment of bhakti by other dualist schools, though, as we have mentioned (see 
chapters 5.2.2.2-5.2.2.3), Rāmānuja’s treatment of bhakti in terms of bhakti-yoga or 
upāsanā may have had some influence on MS’s own scheme. While the BP exerted 
                                                 
819 Brahmasūtra 2000: BSB on BS 2.2.42-2.2.45, pp. 532-5. 
820 Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa 1921: pp. 6-7 and Harilīlāmṛta 1933: p. Paramahaṃsapriyā, p. 69 (Also 
refer to Modi 1985: pp. 20-1). 
821 As we have noted earlier, in his SB too, MS criticizes Mādhva Vaiṣṇavas (See Siddhāntabindu 
1986: p. 145). 
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immense influence on the theological speculations of MS, he developed his 
Vaiṣṇava theology in consonance with his adherence to Śaṃkara’s non-dualistic 
philosophy, thereby adopting some of the Vaiṣṇava views that were contemporary 
with MS, i.e. the views of Caitanya prevalent in Bengal, where Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva is 
regarded as the supreme reality. 
MS’s treatment of bhakti as the modification of the mind in which the Lord 
is reflected, and which accordingly assumes his form (bhagavadākāra), is merely 
theoretical. As both Śaṃkara and MS often characterise bhakti as knowledge 
(jñāna) or bliss (ānanda) in their respective commentaries on the BhG, they view it 
as the very nature of brahman. Our discussion in the chapters dealing with the 
philosophical doctrines of the BhG, as explained in the GD, has substantiated, with 
the help of the arguments and citations from relevant textual sources, that there is 
enough room for bhakti in the tenets of Advaita.  
According to some scholars, the socio-cultural environment of the time of 
MS was suitable for devotional worship of saguṇa-brahman, and this view deserves 
serious consideration.822 While the situation during the time of Śaṃkara and his 
immediate followers, such as Padmapāda, Sureśvara etc., was perhaps conducive to 
intellectually dealing with nirguṇa brahman, Śaṃkara never denied the utility of 
devotion for ultimately attaining the realisation of nirguṇa brahman. Moreover, the 
criticism against Advaita that it cannot consistently talk about bhakti can be shown 
to be misplaced, if one remembers that for the Advaita Vedānta school, all these 
concepts of yoga, jñāna, mokṣa and bhakti, involving the notion of duality and 
differentiation, are to be viewed as fully operative in the realm of vyāvahārika. In 
                                                 
822
 Gupta 2006: pp. 4-5. 
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the pāramārthika realm, there does not exist any duality or differentiation, but this 
does not amount to a denial of the roles of bhakti, upāsanā and dhyāna in the path 
to liberation. 
Thus, the views of modern scholars such as Gupta, Nelson and Marcaurelle, 
who have questioned the plausibility of the attempt by MS for bringing devotion 
and yoga within the parameters of Advaita Vedānta, needs to be reconsidered, and 
we have made a humble attempt at doing the same in this dissertation (see chapters 
2.4.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2.2-5.2.2.3). The possibility that MS was successful to a large 
extent in such an attempt has been examined afresh here. The general perception 
that, though MS could not accord to bhakti the importance that a dualist could do, 
his attempt in this regard outshines the attempt by any other Advaitin, as is also 
evident from his influence on the works of his own disciples and commentators like 
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. Despite being an ardent follower of 
the Advaita Vedānta, the clear cut assertions of these two commentators that 
śuddha/prema/nirguṇa-bhakti is similar to jñānamiśra-bhakti, and that there is no 
inconsistency in accepting bhakti as the paramapuruṣārtha (as stated by Nārāyaṇa 
Tīrtha) and that nirguṇa-bhakti is the best means of attaining Lord Viṣṇu (as held 
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī), show their agreement with MS on such issues (see chapter 
5.2.2.2). As a modern scholar points out, ‘The school of Madhusūdana can better be 
called that of a monistic theism.’823 Herein lies the justification for Rudolf Otto’s 
observation quoted above. 
Finally, we conclude this thesis with the statement that an inclination to the 
Advaita Vedānta school is compatible with devotion, though it may not be of the 
                                                 
823 Nair 1990: p. 223. 
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same flavour as that of the dualist schools. The attitude of MS in this regard is best 
supported by an ancient text, the Avadhūtagītā, which states that even in order to 
have some leaning towards non-dualism, one needs the grace of God 
(īśvarānugrahādeva puṃsāmadvaitavāsanā)824 -- a fact that finds sufficient support 
in the BP as well, where in its various places (e.g. BP 1.7.10, 3.29.13 etc.)825 it is 
said that devotion is spontaneous even after obtaining liberation and at times, it 
appears to be superior to obtaining liberation to the devotees (i.e. a view that is 
echoed by MS  in his BhR in no uncertain terms). 
            We do hope that this study, which we have put together with due diligence 
and care, will engender some modifications in the general view that the Advaita 
Vedānta is totally antagonistic to devotion to a personal God. MS’s writings on 
bhakti and his acceptance of Lord Kṛṣṇa as nothing but the Advaitic nirguṇa 
brahman put a question mark not only on the position of MS as a staunch follower 
of Śaṃkara’s non-dual philosophy, but also on the entire Advaitic tradition. It is our 
sincere hope that a careful study of this dissertation and the works of MS in 
particular (along with the source material for understanding the principal tenets of 
Advaita school) will make the discerning readers accept the fact that the path of 
devotion has been an important component of the Advaita system of philosophy, 
which was forcefully stated and established by MS -- a fact that reinforces his 
influence upon the religio-philosophical views and the intellectual discourse and 
debates prevalent in India.  
 
 
                                                 
824 Avadhūtagītā (2014): Verse no. 1. 
825 Bhāgavata (2064 Vikrama Saṃvad): pp. 31, 137. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
 
Texts 
 
 AdRR           Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī  
 AdS              Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
ĀM                Ānandamandākinī of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
AU                Aitareya Upaniṣad 
BhG              Bhagavadgītā 
BP                Bhāgavata Purāṇa
BPĀŚTV      Bhāgavtapurāṇādyaślokatrayavyākhyā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
BPPŚV        Bhāgavatapurāṇaprathamaślokavyākhyā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
BS                Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa 
BU               Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 
BṛVā            Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya Vārtika of Sureśvara 
BṛVāSB Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya Vārtika, Sambandha                                                             
Bhāṣya 
CU               Chāndogya Upaniṣad 
GD              Gūḍhārthadīpikā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
GTL             Gūḍḥārthatattvāloka of Baccā Jhā        
HLV             Harilīlāvyākhyā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
ĪPP               Īśvarapratipattiprakāśa of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
ĪU                 Īśa Upaniṣad 
JMV             Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāraṇya 
KeU             Kena Upaniṣad 
KKN            Kṛṣṇakūtahalanāṭaka of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī  
KU              Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
MāU           Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
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MāUK       Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā 
MBh          Mahābhārata  
MSṬ           Mahimnastotraṭīkā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
MU            Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 
NBhS         Nāradabhaktisūtra 
PB             Prasthānabheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
PD             Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya 
ŚBhS          Śāṇḍilyabhaktisūtra  
ŚU             Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad 
SB             Siddhāntabindu of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
SK             Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa 
SŚ              Saṃkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman 
SŚSS          Sṃkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha of Madhusūdana Saravatī 
TU             Taittirīya Upaniṣad 
TS             Tarkasaṃgraha with the Dīpikā of Annaṃbhaṭṭa  
UŚ            Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṃkara 
VC            Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṃkara 
VKL          Vedāntakalpalatikā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
VP            Vedāntaparibhāṣā of Dharmarāja 
VPS          Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha of Vidyāraṇya  
VS             Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda 
VSN          Viṣṇusahasranāma 
VuP          Viṣṇu Purāṇa 
YV            Yogavāsiṣṭharāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki 
YS             Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali 
 
 ‘B’ added to the abbreviation of any text (as BS for Brahmasūtra) indicates the 
commentary of Śaṃkara on that text. Thus, BSB stands for the commentary of 
Śaṃkara on the Brahmasūtra. 
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Journals 
 
ABORI       Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 
ALB           Adyar Library Bulletin (Brahmavidyā) 
AP              Aryan Path 
AUS           Allahabad University Studies (Arts & Science) 
BITC          Bulletin of the Institute of Traditional Cultures (Madras) 
BRMIC      Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture 
BV              Bhāratīya Vidyā 
DP             Dilip  
JAAR         Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
JAOS         Journal of the American Oriental Society 
JBBRAS     Journal of the Bombay Branch of the  Royal Asiatic Society 
JIP             Journal of Indian Philosophy 
JIBS           Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 
JGJRI        Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 
JMSUB      Journal of the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda 
JMU          Journal of the Madras University 
JOI           Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda) 
JOR          Journal of Oriental Reserach (Madras)  
JRAS         Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Great Britain and Ireland)  
JRS           Journal of Religios Studies (Guru Gobind Singh Department of  
                 Religious  Studies, Punjab University) 
JSAL         Journal of South Asian Literature              
JUB          Journal of the University of Bombay    
JVS           Journal of Vaishnava Studies                  
IA             Indian Antiquary 
IC             Indian Culture 
IHQ          Indian Historical Quarterly 
IIJ             Indo-Iranian Journal 
IPA           Indian Philosophical Annual 
NIA           New Indian Antiquary (IA series 1938 ff.) 
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PB             Prabuddha Bharata 
PEW          Philosophy East and West 
PG            Pathway to God 
PO            Poona Orientalist 
PTOC       Proceedings and Transactions of Oriental Conference 
PTAIOC    Proceedings and Transactions of All India Oriental Conference 
QJMS       Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society 
RT            Religious Traditions (MacGill University and University of Sydney) 
SAHC       South Asian History and Culture 
VK            Vedanta Kesari 
VŚ            Voice of Śaṅkara 
WZKSO    Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Sūdostasiens  
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlӓndischen Gesellschaft
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Appendices 
 
Appendix-I 
A brief note on the historical background, formation, and teaching of the 
Bhagvadgītā 
The Vedānta philosophy is basically based on three canonical texts (prasthāna-trayī). 
‘prasthita’ means to get established in the knowledge of reality, and that by which it is 
accomplished is called prasthāna. These three prasthāna-s are (i) the Brahmasūtra-s by 
Bādarāyaṇa, a secondary text based on the Vedas, which is called nyāya-prasthāna or 
tarka-prasthāna, as it conveys the teaching of Vedānta in an argumentative way, (ii) the 
Upaniṣads, which are called the śruti-prasthāna, since they are part of the Vedas, which 
are śruti (heard and revealed), and (iii) the Bhagavadgītā, which is regarded as the smṛti-
prasthāna (the text which is remembered), because it is a part of the Mahābhārata (400 
BCE - 400 CE), which is a remembered text (smṛti).  
            The full name of the Gītā is ‘Śrīmadbhagavadgītā’ or ‘Bhagvadgītā’. The 
etymological derivation of ‘Bhagavadgītā’ is ‘bhagavat’ (divine or venerated) + ‘gītā’ (a 
name given to certain sacred compositions, often in a dialogical manner in versified form 
for the exposition of a particular philosophical or theosophical doctrine; e.g. Śivagītā, 
Rāmagītā etc.).826 On the other hand, ‘gītā’ is a feminine form of ‘gītam’ (song-neutral) 
                                                 
826 Apte 1965: p. 405.  
In the course of his discussion about the Gītā literature in relation to its goal ‘brahmavidyā’, Umesh 
Chandra Bhattacharjee finds several texts both in the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇic literature, which like 
the Bhagavadgītā, bear the general suffix ‘gītā’, have similarity in dialogical structure, and are select 
portions of sacred texts either propagating worship of sectarian deities or intending to impart 
‘brahmavidyā’, make use of the Upaniṣads directly or indirectly, and are also modelled upon the text Gītā  
in terms of their literary composition. Bhattacharjee mentions of the following as consisting of the 
Mahābhārata such as the Utathyagītā, Vāmadevagītā, Ṛṣabhagītā, Śampākagītā, Maṅkigītā, Bodhyagītā, 
Vicakhnugītā, Hārītagītā, Vṛtragītā, Parāśaragītā, Haṃsagītā, Anugītā, and Brāhmaṇagītā. Another set of 
Gītās, according to him, is found in different Purāṇic literature. These are the Īśvaragītā (the 
Kūrmapurāṇa), Vyāsagītā (the Kūrmapurāṇa),  Rāmagītā, Gaṇeśagītā (the Gaṇeṣapurāṇa), Śivagītā, 
Devīgītā (the Devībhāgavata), Kapilagītā (the Bhāgavatapūrāna), Aṣṭāvakragītā, Avadhūtagītā* (said to 
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equivalent to ‘giti’ (song-feminine) and means something that is sung,827 or more 
precisely, recited or taught. It qualifies the term ‘upaniṣad’ which is feminine in gender. 
So, it is called the Bhagavadgītā Upaniṣad.828 And, thus it means ‘the song sung by the 
divine’, i.e. in the present context ‘the song sung by Lord Kṛṣṇa, the highest God or an 
incarnation of the highest God’. It is to be noted that apart from Lord Kṛṣṇa, there are 
three other speakers in the text, viz. Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Sañjaya and Arjuna, it is considered to 
be the speech of the Lord, as the major part of it is uttered by him only.829  
     It appears as a dialogue (saṃvāda) between Arjuna and Lord Kṛṣṇa in the 
Bhīṣmaparva of the Mahābhārata covering eighteen chapters830 (twenty three to forty) 
                                                                                                                                                        
have been authored by Dattātreya), Avadhūtagītā (the Bhāgavatapūrāna), Sūryagītā, Yamagītā (the 
Viṣṇupurāṇa), Yamagītā (the Nṛsiṃhapurāṇa), Yamagītā (the Agnipurāṇa), Haṃsagītā (the 
Bhāgavatapurāṇa), Pāṇḍavagītā, Brahmagītā (the Skandapurāṇa), Brahmagītā (the Yogavāśiṣṭha), 
Siddhagītā (the Yogavāśiṣṭha); and Pitṛgītā, Agastyagītā, Rūdragītā (all three in the Varāhapurāṇa) 
[Bhattacharjee 1926: pp. 537-46, 761-71]. *Considered to be anterior to the BhG (cf. Sitaramiah 1965: p. 
241). 
Besides the Gītā-s given by Bhattacharjee, V. Raghavan in his search for greater Gītā literature finds more 
of them in different purāṇic and philosophical literature. These are: the Arjunagītā, Aśmakagītā, 
Ātmadarśanagītā, Uttaragītā (the Mahābhārata), Uddhavagītā (the Bhāgavata), Ṛbhugītā, Ailagītā (the 
Bhāgavata), Oṃkāragītā, Kapilagītā (the Padmapurāṇa), Dṛṣṭāntasārakapilagītā, Siddhāntasārakapilagītā 
(the Padmapurāṇa), Karmagītā, Kāvaṣeyagītā (the Brahmapurāṇa ?), Kāśīgītā (the 
Brahmavaivartapurāṇa), Kaulagītā, Garbhagītā (the Viṣṇupurāṇa), Gurugītā (the Viśvasāratantra), 
Gurugītā (the Skandapurāṇa), Gorakṣanāthagītā, Dattagorakṣagītā, Janmagītā, Jīvanmuktigītā* (ascribed 
to Dattātreya), Jñānagītā, Tattvagītā, Tattvasāragītā, Tulasīgītā, Devīgītā (the Kūrmapurāṇa), Dhīśagītā, 
Nāradagītā, Pitṛgītā (the Padmapurāṇa ?), Pṛthivīgītā, Praṇavagītā or Prapannagītā, Bodhānandagītā, the 
Bhavānīśaṃkaragītā (the Brahmavaivartapurāṇa), Bhikṣugītā (the Bhāgavata), Bhṛgugītā, Mṛtyuñjayagītā, 
Yamagītā (the Skandapurāṇa), the Yājñavalkyagītā, Yogagītā, Rāgigītā, Rāsagītā, Rudragītā (the 
Bhāgavata), Rudragītā (the Bṛhatbrahmasaṃhitā), Laghugītā, Vasiṣṭhagītā (the Yogavāsiṣṭha), Viratagītā, 
Vedāntagītā, Vaiṣṇavagītā, Śaṃkaragītā (the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa), Śāntigītā, Śivarāmagītā, 
Śivaśaṃkaragītā, Śivottaragītā (the Harivaṃsapurāṇa), Śivauttaragītā, Śiṣṭagītā, Śrutigītā (the Bhāgavata), 
Ṣaḍjagītā, Sadāśivagītā, Sanatkumāragītā, Siddhāntagītā (the Laghunārāyaṇopaniṣad), Sudarśanagītā (the 
Bṛhatbrahmasaṃhitā), Sūkṣmagītā, Sūtagītā (the Sūtasaṃhitā), Sūryagītā, Saumyagītā (the Padmapurāṇa), 
Haṃsagītā (the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa); and Veṇugītā, Gopīyugalagītā, Gopīkāgītā, Bhramaragītā (all 
four in the Bhāgavata) [Raghavan 1938: pp. 86-122]. *Considered to be anterior to the BhG (cf. Sitaramiah 
1965: p. 241). 
827 In the strictest sense of the term the book is not meant for singing only. It also suggests to be read as is 
found in BhG 18.70. 
828 Belvakkar 1925: p. 109. 
The Gītā bears ample influence of the Upaniṣads. Even some of its verses are similar to those of the 
Upaniṣads (For detailed references, see Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 551, Sastrigal 1990).  
829 Apte 1983: p. 1. 
830 Though we find the commentators often naming the chapters differently in colophons, we are 
mentioning them according to Sripad Krishna Belvalkar; 1. arjunaviṣādayoga (‘yoga’ added, 47 verses), 2. 
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and running to seven hundred verses both in anuṣṭubh831 (generally of thirty two 
syllables) and tṛṣṭubh (of forty four syllables usually) metre of that section (parvan). The 
                                                                                                                                                        
sāṃkhyayoga (72 verses), 3. karmayoga (43 verses), 4. brahmayajñapraśaṃsāyoga (‘yoga’ added, 42 
verses), 5. saṃnyāsayoga (29 verses), 6. dhyānayoga ( 47 verses), 7. jñānavijñānayoga (30 verses), 8. 
akṣarabrahmayoga (28 verses), 9. rājavidyārājaguhyayoga (34 verses), 10. vibhūtiyoga (42 verses), 11. 
viśvarūpadarśanayoga (‘yoga’ added, 55 verses), 12. bhaktiyoga (20 verses), 13. kṣetrakṣetrajñayoga (34 
verses), 14. guṇatrayavibhāgayoga (27 verses), 15. puruṣottamayoga (20 verses), 16. 
daivasurasaṃpadvibhāgayoga (24 verses), 17. śraddhātrayavibhāgayoga (28 verses), 18. 
mokṣasaṃnyāsayoga (78 verses) (total 700 verses) (Bhagavadgītā 1941b).  
Despite the fact that we are not sure whether the authors always write these colophons, or they are written 
by the scribes of manuscripts or by the editors, we are mentioning bellow some variations in the naming of 
the chapters by three major earlier commentators, viz.  Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and our author 
Madhusūdana.  
Śaṃkara- BhG 2 ‘sāṃkhyayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 2000);  BhG 3 ‘karmapraśaṃsāyoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 
1999); BhG 4 ‘jñānakarmasaṃnyāsayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999), ‘brahmayajñapraśaṃsāparanāmā 
jñānakarmasaṃnyāsayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 2000); BhG 5 ‘karmasaṃnyāsayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1999), 
‘prakṛtigarbha’ (Bhagavadgītā 2000); BhG 6 ‘ātmasaṃyamayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999), BhG 7 
‘jñānavijñānayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1999);   BhG 8 ‘brahmākṣaranirdeśa’(Bhagavadgītā 1999); BhG 11 
‘viśvarūpadarśanam’(Bhagavadgītā 1999); BhG 12 ‘bhaktiyoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999);  BhG 13 
‘prakṛtipuruṣavivekayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999),  ‘kṣetrakṣetrajñayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 2000);  BhG 14 
‘guṇatrayavibhāgayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999);  BhG 17 ‘śraddhātrayavibhāgayoga’  (Bhagavadgītā 2000);  
BhG 18 ‘mokṣasaṃnyāsayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1999).          
 Rāmānuja- BhG 2 ‘sāṃkhyayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 2000); BhG 3 ‘karmayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 2000);  BhG 5 
‘karmasaṃnyāsayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 2000), 
 Madhva- no special name is found. 
 Madhusūdana-  BhG 2 ‘sarvagītārthasūtraṇam’(Bhagavadgītā 1999); BhG 3 ‘karmayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 
1912), ‘jñānaniṣṭhāvarṇanam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999); BhG 4 ‘jñānakarmasaṃnyāsayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 
1999), ‘brahmārpaṇayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 2001);  BhG 5 ‘svasvarūpaparijñānam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1912) 
‘karmasaṃnyāsayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1999), ‘svarūpaparijñānaṃ’ (Bhagavadgītā 2001); BhG 6 
‘ātmasaṃyamayoga’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999),  ‘adhyātmayoga’   (Bhagavadgītā 2001); BhG 7 
‘adhikāribhedenajñeyadheyapratipādyatattvabrahmanirupaṇam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1912) 
‘jñānavijñānayoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1999), ‘adhikāribhedenajñānavijñānayoga 
jñeyadheyapratipādyatattvabrahmanirupaṇam’ (Bhagavadgītā 2001);  BhG 8 ‘akṣaraparabrahmayoga’ 
(Bhagavadgītā 1999),  ‘adhikāribhedenākṣaravivaraṇa’(Bhagavadgītā 2001); BhG 9 
‘adhikāribhedenarājavidyārājaguhyayoga’  (Bhagavadgītā 1912); BhG 10 
‘adhikāribhedenavibhūtiyoga’(Bhagavadgītā 1912);    BhG 11 
‘viśvarūpadarśananirūpanam’(Bhagavadgītā 1999); BhG 12 ‘bhaktiyogavivaraṇam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999); 
BhG 13 ‘prakṛtipuruṣavivekayogavivaraṇam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999), ‘kṣetrakṣetrajñaviveka’ (Bhagavadgītā 
2001); BhG 14 ‘guṇatrayavibhāgayogavivaraṇam’ (Bhagavadgītā 1999), ‘prakṛtiguṇatrayavibhāgayoga’  
(Bhagavadgītā 2001);  BhG 17 ‘śraddhātrayavibhāgayogavivaraṇam’  (Bhagavadgītā 2001); BhG 18 
‘saṃnyāsayogapratipādanam’ (Bhagavadgītā 2001).                                        
831 Arvind Sharma, in the course of a detailed discussion as to why the Mahābhārata is basically written in 
anuṣṭubh metre, finds that in spite of its common usage in the post-Vedic literature, this metre is hardly 
characterised in the entire Vedas.  In order to account for it, Sharma offers both the possible modern-
critical and traditional justifications. Modern scholars think that the sūta-s (bards-- a special caste having 
affinity with the warrior class) found this metre comfortable for recitation and oral composition. The 
traditional scriptural references substantiate that anuṣṭubh metre had a close association with the śudra-s 
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text starts there with the straightforward announcement by the bard Sañjaya that Bhīṣma, 
the supreme commander of the Kauravas, has fallen at the battle being fought between 
two rival family groups --- the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas (MBh 6.14.3). But the usual 
form of the available Gītā begins with a dialogue between Sañjaya and Dhṛtarāṣṭra, 
where the latter enquired of the former about the happenings of the war. In fact, the 
entire Gītā is the narration of Sañjaya to Dhṛtarāṣṭra (MBh 6.23.1).832 Before the great 
warriors of both sides were about to engage in war, they were making their presence felt 
by blowing conch-shells and showing their vigour and expertise. After seeing the 
relatives and friends on the opposite side, Arjuna (the hero of the Pāṇḍavas) became 
engulfed in sorrow and delusion and expressed his unwillingness to engage in war.833 
Kṛṣṇa, the supreme Lord, who played the role of charioteer of Arjuna, advised him to 
discharge his own social duty (svadharma), i.e. to engage in the battle, the duty of the 
warrior class Arjuna was born in. Having imparted to him the true knowledge of the self 
in a manner of conversation, the Lord provoked him to fight in view of winning over the 
injustice the opponent (i.e. the Kauravas) symbolised.834  
            One of the principal teachings of the Bhagavadgītā is that it does not ask the 
seekers to abstain from action, but to perform it towards good for all without having a 
desire for its fruit (niskāma-karma). It considers Lord Kṛṣṇa as the supreme puruṣa835 to 
whom the seekers are asked to surrender completely with utmost devotion. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                        
who were denied the Vedic studies. Thus, Sharma thinks that the Mahābhārata, being a post-Vedic Hindu 
religious literature, unveils one of the main causes of its composition (Sharma 2000: pp. 225-78).     
832 Mahābhārata 1947. 
833 T. M. P. Mahadevan rightly observed that the crisis Arjuna found is a common human state of affairs. It 
is the Lord who can rescue the human kind from it (Mahadevan 1976: p. 25). 
834 Some scholars like Heinrich Zimner etc. find the background of the Gītā as a war between two rival 
groups a paradox of its teaching. Zimner thinks that a combination of thought held by the aboriginal 
Indians and the Aryan Vedic invaders materialised in the text (Zimner 1951: p. 378). 
835 Malinar 2007: p. 207.  
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throughout the text, the Lord taught Arjuna the means of attaining liberation (mokṣa), the 
supreme goal of human kind, among whom the means of devotion is pre-eminent.  
            However, though the Gītā is held in high esteem among the academics and 
religious followers, there is a lot of controversy regarding its date, authorship, textual 
formation, philosophy, relation to the Mahābhārata, and the ultimate message it 
conveys.836 Several volumes have been written on these points both by the occidental and 
oriental scholars for the last couple of centuries, and we will just mention them in order 
to get a general outlook of the text.  
            There are divergent views regarding the period when the text was originally 
composed. Among those who tried to date the text in an authentic manner, K. T. Telang 
deserves special mention. After a prolonged argumentation, Telang places it before the 
Āpastamba’s Dharmasūtra and in the third century BCE.837 As Bühler mentions 
Āpastamba’s Dharmasūtra falling between the fourth and fifth centuries BCE,838 we can 
conclude that the Gītā must belong at least to the fifth century BCE. On the basis of 
internal evidences in the text, W. Douglas P. Hill places it in the 2nd century BCE.839 
Modern interpreters like Bal Gangadhar Tilak place it the 3rd century BCE.840 S. N. 
Dasgupta holds that some of the established views that the Gītā did not know the 
accepted doctrines of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the conception to identify Vāsudeva with 
Nārāyaṇa did not rise at the time of its composition, and the non-mention of the doctrine 
of personified forms (vyūha-s) in the text substantiate its origin in the pre-Buddhistic 
time.841 S. K. Belvalkar, in agreement with Telang, thinks that the Gītā was composed in 
                                                 
836 Khair 1981: p. 1. 
837 Telang 1908: pp. 30 and 34.  
838 Cf. Garbe (Utgikar 1918: pp. 29-30). 
839 Hill 1928: p. 18.  
840 See Patil 1959: p. 66. 
841 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 549. 
 
 
359 
 
the interval between the end of the Upaniṣadic period and the commencement of 
Buddhism. Thus it does not have the slightest allusion to Buddhism.842 On the other hand, 
K. N. Upadhyaya, though not finding any explicit mention of Buddhism in the Gītā, 
concludes with the support of early Buddhist texts such as the Dhammapada and the 
Nikāya-s that the Gītā bears ample indications of the influence of Buddhism, and that it 
also made use of Buddhist elements which suit its scheme.843 Going farther than 
Upadhyaya, T. G. Mainkar thinks that both the Brahmasūtra-s and the Bhagavadgītā are 
the product of post-Buddhist period, and the Gītā represents an age, when the concept of 
saṃnyāsa was being mistaken by the then Upaniṣadic, Sāṃkhya and Buddhist schools. 
Thus Mainkar holds that the Gītā borrowed clue from the rebellious Buddhism to modify 
the orthodox Hinduism. B. G. Tilak, a famous modern commentator on the Gītā, also 
finds parallelism between the Bhagvadgītā and the Pāli Buddhist works.844 Having found 
the influence of early Upaniṣads with the probable exception of the Maitrī and the early 
Buddhism in the Gītā, R. C. Zaehner dates it between the fifth and second centuries 
BCE.845 Dasgupta admits its high antiquity, keeping the view that the language of the text 
largely bears un-Pāṇinean (ca. 400 BCE) style.846 Richard Garbe holds that the genuine 
Gītā was composed at the beginning of the second century BCE and its revision took 
place later in the second century CE. The main argument he furnishes in support of his 
view is that Patañjali, the author of the Yogasūtra-s, who, according to him, also 
composed the Mahābhāṣya, seems to have been influenced by the technical original 
                                                 
842 Belvalkar also mentions the term ‘nirvāna’ as referred to in the Gītā to be a pre-Buddhistic technical 
term of ‘kāla’ philosophy (Belvalkar 1962: p. 156).  
843 Upadhyaya 1968: pp. 163-73.  
844 See Mainkar: 1977-78: p. 751.  
845 Zaehner 1969: p. 7. 
846  See Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 551. 
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sense of ‘yoga’ in the Gītā as ‘self-surrender’, ‘devotion’ etc.847 S. N. Dasgupta, having 
noticed the use of ‘yoga’ in the Gītā in multiple senses, also concludes that the author of 
the Gītā was not aware of the intent of ‘yoga’,  i.e. the cessation of mental modifications 
(cittavṛtti-nirodha), as held by Patañjali.848 However, more recent attempts tend to bring 
its chronology down in time. J. L. Brockington has made a strong argument to place the 
text in the first century CE.849 Thus, no unanimous view can be found with respect to its 
time. 
            Like the controversial nature of its date, the authorship of the text is also 
debatable. Though the traditional notion to ascribe authorship to Vyāsa is well known, 
discrepancies in textual formation give rise to theories about its multiple authorships. On 
the basis of previous authoritative references like the Vedas, Sāṃkhya-Yogas etc. to the 
text, P. C. Divanji concludes that, it is Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vedavyāsa who composed the 
Gītā.850 On the other hand, Gajanan Shripat Khair, after an extensive search for the 
conflicting factors in the text, assigns triple authorship to it,851 which was again 
questioned by Robert N. Minor. Minor thinks that like his predecessors such as Garbe, 
Otto etc., Khair also lacks objectivity.852 
            The textual formulation of the Gītā is also a matter of controversy. That it is not a 
part of the original Mahābhārata, and is rather an interpolation is held by many scholars 
like W. von Humboldt,853 E. W. Hopkins,854 Richard Garbe855 etc. Among different 
                                                 
847 Utgikar 1918: p. 33.  
848 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, pp. 443-51. 
849 Brockington 1998.  
850 Divanji1946: 299-309. 
851 Khair 1969.   
R. Motor Smith, however, not being satisfied with Khair’s approach, applies an elaborate statistical 
analysis of the text to find out its multiple authorships (Smith 1968: pp. 39-46).  
852 Khair 1982: pp. 29-42. 
853 ‘The interpolations and additions can with great probability be conjectured even if one be not in the 
position to single them out’ (Gareett 1846: p. 53). 
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recensions of the Mahābhārata, of which the Bhagavadgītā is a part, the Kashmiri 
recension deserves special mention. F. Otto Schrader in his The Kashmir Recension of 
the Bhagavadgītā856 claims that there are extra stanzas unknown to the common vulgate 
text of the Gītā.857 S. K. Belvalkar, however, after a thorough study of Schrader with 
reference to the vulgate text, proclaims all these variations to be of secondary nature, for 
they only justify some grammatical inaccuracies in the text. Belvalkar concludes that 
Schrader’s contention is based on nothing but the variations of individual manuscripts, 
and the Kashmiri recension can no way be prior to the known vulgate text of Śaṃkara, 
which is still the oldest and most reliable version of the Gītā.858 As a review of 
Schrader’s Kashmiri version of the Gītā, Franklin Edgerton declares it a sheer failure in 
formulating the authentic version of the Gītā. The vulgate text of the Gītā, according to 
Edgerton, carries more originality due to its satisfactory approach, as compared to the 
Kashmiri version of the Mahābhārata.859 Next to the Kashmiri recension, another old 
witness which could probably challenge the authenticity of vulgate text is the old 
Javanese version of the Mahābhārata, which cites only eighty and three/four stanzas of 
the Gītā (fifty six in the old Javanese paraphrase), and some extra verses as belonging to 
                                                                                                                                                        
854 ‘Now this epic has had inserted into it a little poem which in origin is evidently a late Upaniṣad. It is 
nevertheless one of the earliest of the poems set in the frame of the epic. But it is by no means a poem in 
its original form. Both the beginning and the end are later additions’ (Hopkins 1901: p. 145).  
‘This Divine Song (or Song of the Blessed One) is at present a Krishnaite version of an older Vishnuite 
poem, and this in turn was at first an unsectarian work, perhaps a late Upanishad’ (Hopkins 1895: p. 389). 
855 Utgikar 1918: pp. 1-35. 
856 Schrader 1930. 
857 ‘F. Otto Schrader…puts forth the view that these Kashmirian sources, with their ‘‘fourteen additional 
stanzas and four half-stanzas unknown to the Vulgate, as well as the 282 exclusively Kashmirian varietas 
lectiones’’, preserve a more authentic, and even an intrinsically superior text of the BG, which, he claims, 
was pre-Śaṁkara’ (quoted in Bhagavadgītā 1968: Editorial note, p. XVI).  
858 Belvalkar 1939: pp. 211-51.  
859 Edgerton 1932: p. 75. 
In reply to Edgerton’s criticism Schrader shows that the vulgate text of the Gītā cannot be an authentic 
version of the Kashmirian Mahabhārata. In support of his view, Schrader quotes the Bhāratamañjarī, a 
metrical paraphrase of the Mahābhārata by Kṣemarāja, which differs from the known vulgate version. 
Thus Schrader concludes that Kṣemarāja, while explaining the essence of the Mahābharata, followed the 
Kashmirian version of the Gītā, and not the vulgate text (Schrader 1935: p. 147).  
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the text. However, Belvalkar, after critically examining this version, opines that it is not 
of much help in formulating the current text of the Gītā.860 
            However, Dasgupta entertains the possibility that the text, being a work of the 
Bhāgavata school, was composed before the Mahābhārata in accordance with the 
Bhārata tale, on which the present Mahabhārata is said to be based, and during one of its 
later revision, the text of the Gītā was inserted therein.861 K. T. Telang too does not reject 
the possibility of such an insertion.862 On the other hand, scholars like G. A. Feuerstein 
etc. are of the opinion that to view the text of the Gītā as independent to the 
Mahabhārata is a fallacious approach.863 Feuerstein argues that ample references of the 
text are scattered throughout the epic. Moreover, its usage of language, expressions and 
thought are similar to those of the Epic Mahābhārata.    
            The attempt at maintaining the textual purity of the Gītā against all 
interpolations864 can be evidenced in the epic text Mahābhārata itself. In the forty third 
chapter of the Bhīṣmaparva, it has been said that there are seven hundred forty five 
verses in the Gītā of which Keśava or Lord Kṛṣṇa uttered six hundred and twenty verses, 
Arjuna fifty seven, Sañjaya sixty seven, and Dhṛtarāṣṭra one respectively.865 As the Gītā 
containing of seven hundred verses (Dhṛtarāṣṭra one, Sañjaya forty one, Arjuna eighty 
four, Lord Kṛṣṇa five hundred and seventy four) is written both in anuṣṭubh and triṣṭubh 
metre, Pandit R. M. Shastri holds that the evaluation of triṣṭubh verses in terms of 
                                                 
860 Bhagavdgītā 1968: Editorial note, pp. xxiv-xxxiv.    
861 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 552. 
862 Telang 1908: pp. 5-6. 
863 ‘… to isolate the Gītā and treat it as a distinct textual entity, independent of the main body of the epic, is 
a fallacious undertaking’ (Feuerstein 1974: p. 57). 
864 J. A. B. van Buitenen of course finds the Kashmiri transmission closer to the original version of the 
Mahābhārata, though it is difficult to find out the authentic version of the revised epic (Buitenen 1965: p. 
109). 
865 Dutt 2006: p. 115 and Bhagavadgītā 1968: Critical notes, p. 77.  
For details regarding the contradiction of verse number, see Schrader 1938: pp. 62-68. Again, for 
Belvalkar’s criticism of Schrder and others’ views, see Belvalkar 1939a, 1943.   
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anuṣṭubh verses leads us nearer to seven hundred and forty five verses and thus resolves 
the controversy.866 Recently, Sunil Kumar Bhattacharya has shed a new light on this age-
old problem concerning the formation and historical background of the Bhagavadgītā, 
and finds it appropriate that the original Bhagavadgītā has extra stanzas, that is, it has 
seven hundred forty five verses in eighteen chapters compared to the commonly 
available version of the Bhagavadgītā that has seven hundred verses in eighteen 
chapters.867 
            Though the Bhagavadgītā is considered to be one of the foundational sources of 
Hindu philosophy, it can not be treated as a system of philosophy proper due to its lack 
of tidy structure. It is more an ethico-religious text than a philosophical one.868 In order 
to show its popularity as a religio-philosophical poem, William von Humboldt says; ‘the 
most beautiful, perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known 
tongue’.869 However, the content of the text gives the fullest expression of the 
                                                 
866 Shastri 1936: pp. 67-82.  
As a review of Shastri’s stand regarding the computation of the Gītā text, S. N. Tadpatrikar finds him 
misleading and expresses his acceptance of the extra verses (Tadpatrikar 1937: pp. 357-60).   
Though the Poona critical edition of the Mahābhārata, thinking them as later insertions, does not place 
these five and half verses which indicate seven hundred and forty five verses of the text at the beginning of 
chapter forty three of the Bhīṣmaparva (Bhagavadgītā 1968: p. 77), we find them mentioned by 
Nīlakaṇṭha, the famous commentator of the Mahābhārata, that these verses are not cited in the gauḍa 
version (cited by Pandit R. M. Shastri, Shastri 1936: p. 67). However, they are available in many other 
editions like Dutt etc.  (Dutt 2006: p. 115).  
867 Bhattacharya 2014. 
868 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. vii.  
869 Quoted in Radhakrishnan 1999: p. 519.  
V. K. Rajwade, arguing against the point that it is one of the best philosophical poems of the world, quotes 
the authorities of poetics from both Sanskrit tradition and the European writers, and shows as to how the 
Gītā does not follow either of them violating grammatical norms and lacking poetical style (Rajwade 1917: 
pp. 325-38).  P. K. Gode having shown the comparisons or similes in the verses of the text opines that 
those comparisons are far from giving any literary creative pleasure but the introspection of the eternal 
problems the human kind faces (Gode 1920-21: pp. 135-42).  On the other hand, as a review of Rajwade’s 
contention B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma rejects him outright with the support of old Gītā commentators who 
have dealt the verses in minute detail. He says that the Bhagavadgītā, being a part of the great epic 
Mahābhārata, precedes all known grammatical rules, and possesses epical qualities of its own. Sarma also 
holds that no comparison with European poetics can be made with it as both of them are rooted in different 
backgrounds (Sarma 1930: pp. 284-99).  
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monotheistic idea of the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads, which is found in its different 
verses.870 Despite different views regarding the central teaching of the Gītā, Ratna 
Shivaram holds that there are two basic principles -- metaphysical and ethical, dealing 
with what God is, and what man should do respectively, run throughout the text.871 C. 
Kunhan Raja, having found out the implication of karma held by the Mīmāṃsākas in the 
Gītā view of karma, thinks that the latter reflects the former in doctrinal aspects.872 
Following Raja, Arvind Sharma holds that there is no natural basis to consider the Gītā 
to be a Vedāntic text only, as there are ample room for a Mīmāṃsic approach to this 
text.873 
            Against the views of Indian scholars who believe that the teaching of the Gītā is a 
means to liberation; and western scholars who think the text of having undergone at least 
two revisions -- thus resulting in inconsistencies and interpolations, rather than any 
particular philosophical system, P. M. Modi maintains that no single philosophical 
system was aimed at either in the whole text or in a particular chapter of it. The principal 
philosophical thesis of the Gītā, according to him, is the doctrine of ‘yoga’ or 
‘disinterested action’ (niṣkāma-karma). In the Gītā, some established philosophical 
views are represented as long as they support its purpose.874 S. N. Tadpatrikar concludes 
that the main teaching of the Gītā is to impart the truth of human life and all other 
approaches are subsidiary to this objective.875 Though the Bhagavadgītā does not refer to 
the Pāñcarātra tradition by name, scholars like Prabhakar Apte, T. G. Mainkar etc. hold 
that some of the points like acceptance of Lord Vāsudeva as the supreme divinity and 
                                                 
870 Yamunacharya 1945: pp. 119-24.   
871 Shivaram 1946: p. 23. 
872 Kunhan Raja 1946: pp. 9-22.  
873 Sinha 1995: pp. 186-95. 
874 Modi 1950-51: pp. 39-42. 
875 Tadpatrikar 1946: p. 36.  
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devotion to him as the means to liberation etc. show adherence to the latter by the 
former.876 M. K. Deshpande thinks, in spite of the presence of lofty philosophical thought 
in the Upaniṣads, they are not of much help to the common people in meeting the 
difficulties they face in everyday life, and so they need an optimistic philosophy of life 
which suits them and helps them to approach a personal God. Deshpande maintains that 
the Gītā helps people fulfil these needs in a greater way.877 On finding the implicit 
presence of Sāṃkhyite metaphysics throughout and its allegiance to the transcendental-
immanent theistic notion rather than to a pantheistic view with the declaration of  Lord 
Kṛṣṇa as the last resort, David White concludes that the text Gītā tries to synthesise 
proto-Sāṃkhya and the Upaniṣadic aspect of non-duality.878 However, S. N. Dasgupta 
thinks that the text belongs to the Bhāgavata-Pāñcarātra school, and the inner analysis of 
it shows that the Gītā accepts neither the established Sāṃkhya nor the Vedānta, but 
characterises a combination of an earlier school of Sāṃkhya and the Vedāntic ideas 
dissimilar to those of Śaṃkara.879 P. K. Gode in a detailed study of parallelism between 
the Gītā and the Bhaktisūtra-s of Nārada shows as to how the latter is influenced by the 
former in terms of doctrinal considerations, and concludes that the Gītā precedes the 
Śāṇḍilyasūtra-s, which again precede the Bhaktisūtra-s of Nārada.880 
            Following Jadunath Sinha, we can sum up its teaching by saying that ‘it 
advocates dualistic monism, preaches the cult of Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa, and enjoins works 
(karma-yoga), devotion (bhakti-yoga) and knowledge (jñāna-yoga) for the attainment of 
                                                 
876Apte 1972: pp. 200-3, Mainkar 1977-78: p. 752. 
877 Deshpande 1977-78: pp. 23-4. 
S. N. Dasgupta also thinks that, in spite of acceptance of many Upaniṣadic ideas, inclination towards 
personal God makes the Gītā prominently differ from the Upaniṣads (Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 530).    
878  White 1979: pp. 501-7. 
879 Dasgupta 2000-07: Vol. II, p. 550. 
880 Gode 1923: pp. 63-95. 
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God’.881 Nonetheless, in spite of all these controversies regarding the Gītā, we find its 
universal appeal to be pre-eminent. In the words of S. K. De: ‘While philosophers of 
diverse schools interpret it in accordance with their own conceptions, and critical 
scholars quarrel over the question of its consistency, its deep ethical and religious 
fervour lifts it above sectarian and scholastic considerations and supply nourishment to 
devout minds as a gospel of deliverance’.882 So, the divergent attitudes to the text give 
rise to its different interpretations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
881 Sinha 1999: p. 206 (italics supplied). 
882 De 1942-3: p. 21.  
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Appendix II 
A brief note on the probable place of origin of Madhusūdana and the influence of 
Caitanyite movement on him                                                                                                                             
 
In order to evaluate the view of a philosopher, it is helpful to know the socio cultural 
background in which that particular thinker was born and developed his speculations. 
Since making a detailed study on this point is out of the purview of this dissertation, we 
have just referred to MS’s time and place of birth based on the views of the majority of 
scholars. However, with the acceptance of a common view on his period of advent, as we 
have pointed out (in chapter 1.2), we must speculate on his place of origin, as scholars 
are not unanimous about this point too. It is commonly believed that MS hails from 
Bengal and was a junior contemporary of Śrīcaitanya (1486-1533 CE) as is evident both 
in numerous legends and the supports of the exponents of Gauḍīya or Bengal Vaiṣṇavism 
in later period. In support of this view, the following points have been considered by 
scholars such as i) the family lineage, ii) hagiographical details, iii) MS’s own reference 
to a disciple, viz. Baladeva Bhaṭṭācārya, [the surname, i.e. Bhaṭṭācārya, which this 
disciple carries, is a common surname in Bengal], iv) other factors like reference to the 
Lord of Blue Mountain (i.e. Nīlācala-nāyaka or Nīlācala-nātha ) etc. who is treated as 
Lord Jagannātha (a tutelary deity for many inhabitants of Bengal that time) of Puri,883 the 
place that belongs to the eastern part of India of which the then Bengal or Gauḍa was a 
part, v) support of intellectual or rather socio-religious (such as finding similarity with 
Caitanya tradition’s way of treating ecstatic devotion to Lord Kṛṣṇa) and institutional 
(such as efforts to preserve relics and memorials in MS’s birth place) milieu of his time,  
                                                 
883 We have discussed earlier that references to nos. iii and iv are cited in the SB of MS. 
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If his Bengali origin is accepted, then it should be probable that MS was influenced by 
the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism and that the socio-cultural movement initiated by the mystic 
saint Śrīcaitanya and later continued by his followers might have influenced MS’s 
thought. But while some of the later exponents of Gauḍīya or Bengal Vaiṣṇavism have 
made use of the comments of Madhusūdana’s Gītā in support of their respective 
positions in their comments on the Gītā, none of the earlier proponents of Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavism is referred to by MS in his work and vice versa. Besides, MS does not 
explicitly discuss the philosophical views of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas in any of his works. 
In one of the legends it goes that MS perplexed the famous logicians of 
Navadvīpa in Bengal, namely Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (1550 CE) and Gadādhara 
Bhaṭṭācārya (1604-1708 CE) during his visit there: ‘When Madhusūdana Vākpati 
(Sarasvatī) visited Navadvīpa, Tarkavāgīśa was trembling in fear and Gadādhara got 
confused’.884 Thus, despite their dissimilarities in principles with those of MS, the fact 
that the GD of MS is referred to by Viśvanātha Cakravartin and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, 
the two eminent advocates of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavism (in the 18th century CE), in their 
respective commentaries on the BhG, is noteworthy. On BhG 3.1, Viśvanātha, like MS, 
                                                 
884 navadvīpe samāyāte madhusūdanavākpatau / cakampe tarkavāgīśaḥ kātaro’bhūd gadādharaḥ // This 
incident relates to the fact that MS, having left home (i.e. Unasiyā village in Koṭālipāḍā, a suburb of 
Faridpur district in East Bengal or present Bangaldesh) in childhood, proceeded to Navadvīpa to study 
Nyāya and then to Benares to study Vedānta. It is during his visit to Navadvīpa much later from Banaras 
that the scholars of Nyāya in Navadvīpa got frightened of MS’s scholarship. To highlight this point with 
more subtlety, we could mention that Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa (a famous Naiyāyika from Bengal in 20th 
century CE) used to hold: ‘When Madhusūdana Paṇḍita visited (Navadvīpa) from Mathura Jagadīśa 
Tarkālaṅkāra (1500-1600 CE) became bashful and Gadādhara left his conceit’ (mathurāyāḥ samāyāte 
madhusūdanapaṇḍite / anīśo jagadīśo’bhūt na jagarjja gadādharaḥ //). However, D. C. Bhattacharya in his 
treatise on the history of learning neo-logic (Navya-nyāya) in Bengal, refers to one logician Madhusūdana 
Vācaspati, who, according to him, visited Navadvīpa from Mithilā and perplexed Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa 
and Gadādhara. The verse quoted by him reads as mithilātaḥ samāyate madhuṣudanagīspatau / cakampe 
nyāyavāgiśaḥ kātaro’bhūdgadhādharaḥ //, its source being an old manuscript in Baṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad. 
Bhattacharya also holds that our author MS precedes Gadādhara by one hundred years or so and that there 
is no proof that MS studied either in Navadvīpa or Mithilā, thereby professing that MS is different from 
Madhusūdana Vācaspati. All this account thus does not lead one to gaining any conclusive evidence of the 
place of origin of MS (Ghoṣa 1931: Advaitasiddhibhūmikā, pp. 92-96; Modi 1985: Introduction, p. 2; 
Bhattacharya 1952: p. 144). 
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explains the term ‘keśava’ as meaning ‘ka’ as ‘Brahmā’, ‘īśa’ as ‘Śiva’, and ‘va’ as 
‘controller of both of them’. Śrīcaitanya’s monastic teacher (dīkṣā-guru) Īśvara Purī too 
seems to belong to the order of daśanāmī-sampradāya initiated by Śaṃkara, as the title 
‘purī’ is one of the ten titles used for the saints belonging to this order. Some 
hagiographical sources claim that MS was a Gaudīya Vaiṣṇava first and accepted 
Advaitic monastic orders later, in order to preach bhakti to the followers of the latter 
tradition. Further, we find that the concept of jīvanmukti, a prominent component of 
Advaita doctrines, is also accepted by Baladeva in his commentary on BhG 2.69-71, in 
almost a similar manner. Baladeva maintains that, although controlling the senses 
appears to be hard while undergoing spiritual discipline, it becomes natural for a sthita-
prajña once he reaches his goal. Baladeva characterizes this person as one who is content 
with the bliss of his own self and unaffected by the results of prārabdha-karma-s, just as 
rivers cannot change the course of action of the ocean, though they mingle with it during 
the rainy season. The sthita-prajña maintains his body just for its bare necessity, without 
having any sense of possessiveness and egoism.885 Viśvanātha also quotes Gauḍapāda in 
his comments on BhG 6.20-23, while his comments on BhG 15.18 note MS’s explanation 
that eulogizes Lord Kṛṣṇa, with approbation. This is an admission that Viśvanātha has no 
objection to the non-dualistic interpretation of these verses equating Lord Kṛṣṇa as the 
supreme brahman.886 These points show that the exponents of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism are 
not always antithetical to the interpretations provided by MS, though they disagree with 
the basic principles of Advaita Vedānta. Again, though due to paucity of place we do not 
have enough scope to deal with them, we find that the commentaries on the BP by 
                                                 
885 Bhagavadgītā (date not known): Gītābhūṣaṇa, pp. 81-3. 
886 Bhagavadgītā (date not known): Sārārthavarṣīṇi, pp. 175 and 404. 
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Viśvanātha and Jīva Gosvāmin (16th century CE) are sometimes compatible with the 
teaching of Advaita Vedānta. 
There is a minor body of opinion that MS belonged to the south rather than 
Bengal. 887 In the case of authors who belong to any of the monastic orders in India, it is 
almost impossible to find definite data about their genealogy and place of birth because 
once they enter such a monastic order, they virtually obliterate all data pertaining to their 
pre-monastic life. While it is not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding 
the place of origin of MS with the currently available data, the view that MS hails from 
Bengal gets precedence while we take into consideration the nitty-gritty of his various 
works in the light of socio-religious scenario of Bengal and the observations of modern 
scholars in this regard. If his Bengali origin is proved convincingly, it will lead to better 
understanding of his philosophy, if one agrees with the scholars who describe him as 
belonging to the post-Caitanya period. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
887 The reasons for this view are that i) ‘Sarasvatī’ which is one of the ten titles for monks of the Śaṃkara 
school, known as daśanāmī-sampradayā, is generally assigned to the Śṛṅgerī Mutt in south India 
(Vāsudevānanda 2006: pp. 1198-9) and that some Śṛṅgerī records talk about one Madhusūdana Bhāratī 
Svāmī as occupying the place of pontiff there around the 13th century CE (Telang 1886: pp. 368, 373-4 and 
Siddhāntabindu 1989: Introduction, p. 8), ii) MS was mainly preoccupied with rebutting the views of the 
Mādhva and Rāmānuja schools that flourished in south India, where the former was the bitterest critic of  
Advaita Vedānta, and against whose works MS composed his magnum opus AdS, iii) Lord Kṛṣṇa, 
especially Lord Gopāla (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa as a child), for whom MS has great fascination, is worshipped 
mainly in Udupi Mutt in Karnataka established by the Mādhva school and in Guruvayur temple in Kerala, 
iv) there has been a tradition that there are a number of Brahmin families settled near Kaladi in Kerala, 
who are known as Gauḍa Sārasvata Brahmins and are believed to have been migrated to Kerala from 
Gauḍa-deśa (i.e. the then Bengal) many generations ago, and that Gauḍa Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, a fellow 
commentator of MS might have belonged to this Sārasvata Brahmin community (Rajagopalan 2003: pp. 
255-7), and v) the origin of  the BP and Vaiṣṇava devotional movement, to which MS had great 
attachment, is generally held to have been rooted in south India. 
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Appendix III 
A list of different readings of the Bhagvadgīta mentioned by Madhusūdana  
 
             Bhagavadgītā                                                    Madhusūdana 
 
          1.8, ‘saumadattistathaiva ca’                         ‘sindhurājastathaiva ca’ 
          1.46, ‘kṣemataram’                                           ‘priyataram’ 
          6.9,   ‘samabuddhirviśiṣyate’                            ‘samabuddhirvimucyate’  
          8.16, ‘ābrahmabhūvanāllokāḥ’                         ‘ābrahmabhavanāllokāḥ’ 
          9.21, ‘traidharma’                                             ‘trayīdharmam’ 
          11.8, ‘śakyase’                                                   ‘śakhyase’ 
          11.21, ‘amī hi tvāṃ surasaṅgā viśanti’             ‘amī hi tvāo’surasaṅgā viśanti’ 
          11.17, ‘durnirīkṣam’                                         ‘durnirīkṣyam’ 
          11.28, ‘vatrāṇyabhitojvalanti’                          ‘vaktrāṇyabhivijvalanti’ 
          11.37, ‘sadasattatparaṃ yat’                            ‘sadasattatparaṃ ca yat’ 
          11.40, ‘namaḥ purastāt’                                    ‘namaḥ puraḥ stāt’ 
          11.41, ‘tavedam’                                               ‘tavemam’ 
          13.20, ‘kāryakaraṇakartṛtve’                           ‘kāryakāraṇakartṛtve’ (Śaṃkara too) 
          14.23, ‘yo’vatiṣṭhati’                          ‘yo’vatiṣṭhate’ or ‘yonutiṣṭhati’ (Śaṃkara too) 
          14.25, ‘mānāpamānayostulyastulya’                ‘mānāvamānayostulyastulya’ 
          15.5,   ‘sukhaduḥkhasaṃjñaiḥ’                         ‘sukhaduḥkhasaṅgaiḥ’  
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Appendix IV 
 
Index of Bhagvadgītā verses where the Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
refers to other commentators of the Bhagavadgītā 
 
Śaṃkara (commentary on the BhG): Introductory verse 1 of the GD; BhG 2.25, 2.27, 
2.41, 2.48, 2.56, 3.2, 3.20, 3.34, 4.6, 4.18, 4.21, 4.24, 6.14, 6.29, 6.34, 13.2, 13.12, 17.10, 
17.16, 17.28, 18.6, 18.12, 18.14, 18.37, 18.66, 18.67, 18.75; concluding verse 3 of the 
GD.  
Śaṃkara (commentary on the BS and the Upaniṣads): BhG 2.17, 2.18, 3.34, 4.34, 4.37, 
8.24, 18.12. 
 
Ānandagiri: BhG 4.6, 18.75. 
 
Śrīdhara Svāmin: BhG 2.41, 5.7, 6.27 (only place where Śrīdhara is referred to by name 
by Madhusūdana), 13.12, 15.16, 17.10, 18.12.  
 
Rāmānuja: BhG 4.6, 5.7, 13.12. 
 
Madhva: BhG 18.21. 
 
Jaya Tīrtha: BhG 13.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
373 
 
Appendix V 
Index of Bhagvadgītā verses where other commentators of the Bhagavadgītā refer to 
the Gūḍhārthadīpikā  
Brahmānandagiri of Veṅkaṭanātha: BhG 1.27, 2.8, 2.11, 2.13, 2.16, 2.18, 2.31, 3.28, 
4.10, 5.8, 8.1. 
 
Śrīmadbhavadgītārthaprakāśa of Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri: Introductory verses 2, 3, 5; BhG 2.20, 
3.28 (only place where MS is referred to by name by Nīlakaṇṭha), 4.18, 6.29, 10.6, 
10.21, 17.6, 18.10, 18.25 
 
Tattvadīpikā of Vallabhācārya (fifth grand son of Vallabhācārya, the proponent of 
Śuddhādvaita school): BhG 7.16.  
 
Amṛtataraṅginī of Puruṣottamajī: Introduction. 
 
Sārārthavarṣiṇīṭikā of Viśvanātha Cakravartin: Introduction, BhG 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, 4.36, 7.7, 
7.16, 8.18, 9.15, 13.10, 14.26-27, 15.18. 
 
Gītābhūṣaṇa of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa: BhG 1.1, 4.6, 7.14, 7.16. 
 
Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā of Dhanapati Sūri: BhG 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.12, 1.15, 1.16, 1.18, 
1.21, 1.24, 1.25, 1.31, 1.32, 1.35, 1.36, 1.40, 1.41, 1.45, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2,7, 2.9, 
2.10, 2.11, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, 2.24, 2.27, 2.29, 2.31, 2.39, 
2.44, 2.54, 2.55, 2.56, 2.67, 2.70, 2.71, 2.72, 3.3, 3.9, 3.13, 3.18, 3.20, 3.24, 3,28, 3.30, 
4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7, 4.10, 4.13, 4.18, 4.20, 4.24, 4.26, 4.28, 4.33, 4.34, 4.41, 5.3, 5.7, 
5.9, 5.13, 5.15, 5.23, 6.5, 6.7, 6.19, 6.23, 6.29, 6.30, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7, 7.20, 7.21, 7.29, 8.5, 
8.6, 8.20, 8.24, 9.14, 9.15, 9.18, 9.21, 9.28, 9.32, 10.7, 10.12, 10.21, 11.40, 12.1, 12.13, 
13.3, 13.4, 13.8, 13.17, 13.18,  14.8, 14.9, 14.27, 15.1, 15.6, 15.7, 16.1, 16.3, 17.6, 17.16, 
17.20, 18.9, 18.17,  18.19, 18.21, 18.30, 18.34, 18.36, 18.55 (implicit indication). 
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Appendix VI 
 
A list of variants in different editions of the Gūḍhārthadīpikā 
 
 
  
Paṇsīkar edition              Lallurama Shastri edition                     Ānandaśrama edition 
 
 Page no. (Paṇsīkar edition)                
 
1,    ‘pratyakṣaram’                                  ‘pratipadam’                                   -------- 
2,    ‘tadrūpāṣṭādaśādhyāyairgītā’         ‘tadrūpāṣṭādaśādhyāyīgītā’            ----------- 
4,    ‘natvāgāmīni’                                    --------                                 ‘nacā’oogāmīni’ 
7,    ‘anādibhavasantānanirūḍham’   ‘anādibhavasantānani (rū) gūḍham’         -------- 
103, ‘kṛtāni karmāṇi jñānopayoginīm’   ‘kṛtāni jñānopayoginīm’                     ---------- 
130, ‘natu taccittaṃ vikartuṃ śaknuvanti’   ‘natu vikartuṃ śaknuvanti’              ------- 
132, ‘sūcayannupasaṃharati’         ‘stuvannupasaṃharati’                                --------- 
147, ‘śrutyeha vihito’                           ---------                                ‘śrutyā’bhi-dhiyate’ 
176, ‘tathāpyāpātasukhahetutvādupādeyaḥ’ ‘tathā’pyātataḥsukhahetutvādupādeyaḥ’ ----- 
178, ‘vijñānamaparokṣaṃ’             ‘vijñānamaparokṣaṃ tatphalaṃ 
                tayorjñānavijñānayoḥ’             tayorjñānavijñānayoḥ’                              ---------                                     
272,  ‘tatrāśeṣasaṃsāranidānam’     ‘tasyā viśeṣaḥ saṃsāranidānam’                     --------- 
275,‘kalpitābhāvasyādhiṣṭhānātmakatvāt’---            ‘kalpitabhāvasyādhiṣṭhānātmakatvāt’              
303, ‘nacātinidrāśīlasyātijāgrataśca’  ‘tathā’otinidrāśīlasyātijāgrataśca’            ---------- 
304, ‘sarvaśūnyatāmāpāditam’          ‘sarvavṛttiśūnyatāmāpāditam’                       --------- 
305, ‘anātmoparakte’                         ‘anātmānuparakte’                                      ----------- 
313, ‘savātapradīpavallayābhimukharūpam’    ‘savātapradīpavat                  
                                                                         layābhimukhyarūpam’                    -----------                    
322, ‘atastattvajñānamanonāśavāsanākṣayāṇāṃ                                             
          yathākramamabhyāsāya’             ‘atastattvajñānamanonāśavāsanākṣayāṇāṃa- 
                                                         kramamabhyāsāya’                           ------------ 
323, ‘karmāṇi sarvakāmatvaṃ’           ‘karmāṇyasarvakāmatvaṃ’                        ----------- 
323, ‘svasvadeśācārakuladharma-           ‘svasvadeśācārakuladharma-                                   
         svabhāvabhedatadgatāpaśabdastu’ svabhāvabhedatadgatāpaśabdasu’         ---------- 
327, ‘vāsanāparityāgārthaṃ ca                 ‘vāsanāparityāgārthaṃ ca vairāgyamiti 
          vairāgyeṇa ceti dvayamevoktam’      …dvayamevoktam’                             ----------- 
330, ‘kṛtakaratvātsarvāṇi’                            ‘kṛtakāryatvātsarvāṇi’                   --------- -- 
333, ‘śraddhāvitto, sarvakraturūpatvam’   ‘śraddhānvito, sarvasukṛtarūpatvam’  -------- 
346, ‘bhāvyate svato’                                  ‘dhāryate svato’                                      --------                             
349, ‘māyāpyahamebopādanam’                  ‘māyāvyahamevopādānam’                ---------- 
351, ‘madiva, mayā yat kalpate’                  ‘sadiva, māyāmayāya kalpate’            ----------                  
354, ‘tadākārarajastamovirahitam’            ‘tadakāraṇaṃ rajastamovirahitam’      ---------         
363, ‘rādhanaṃ pūjanamīhate’                  ‘rādhanamārādhanaṃ pūjanamīhate’   ---------   
369, ‘māmīśvaretvenābhimataṃ’                ‘māmanīśvaretvenābhimataṃ’              --------- 
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370, ‘nikhilalokaduḥkhavistārāya              ‘nikhilalokaduḥkhanistārāya 
             tayā’omadbhakto’                   tayā’omabhakto’                           ----------                                   
371, ‘manmāyāmohitaḥ’                             ‘tanmāyāmohitaḥ’                                  ---------                         
413, ‘paramārthasattāsadrūpeṇa’              ‘paramārthasatā sadrūpena’                 ------- -                     
424, ‘bādhaśaṅkāpanodakakutarkānusandhāna’  
                                                          ‘bādhaśaṅkāpanodakatarkānusandhāna’          --------  
425, ‘ca paramasādhanaṃ’                    ‘caramasādhanam’                                     --------                                        
460, ‘durdurūḍhavāda iti nirākaraṇena’  ‘durdurūḍhavādinirākaraṇena’        ---------               
507, ‘narasiṃhatvādirūpam’                       ‘narasiṃharāghavādirūpam’                   - -----                
517, ‘adveṣṭetyādinā’okṣaropāsakādīnāṃ    ‘adveṣṭetyādinā’okṣaropāsakādīnāṃ 
        saṃnyāsināṃ lakṣaṇabhūtam’      jīvamuktānāṃ saṃnyāsināṃ lakṣaṇabhūtam’  -----                                    
521, ‘kālindīpulinodare’                             ‘kālindīpulineṣu’                                         ----- 
524, ‘pāramarthikaṃ rūpamādāya       ‘pāramārthikaṃ                                     
        paramātmanaikyamāha’               tattvamasaṃsāriparamātmanaikyamāha’        ------ 
525, ‘saṃsāradharmamāvidyaka’      ‘saṃsāradharma-               ‘saṃsāradharmaṃ  
                                                        kṣetrajñamāvidyaka’            kṣetrajñamāvidyaka’ 
540, ‘dharmaśāstrapratipādyatvamuktam’   ‘yogaśāstrapratipādyatvamuktam’       ----- -               
541, ‘brahmasūtrāṇi ca tāni’                        ‘brahmasūtrāṇi tāni’                             -------                                        
548, ‘viṣayabhogalampaṭopadeśakānām’     ‘viṣayabhogalampaṭatopadeśakānām’  -------    
559, ‘tadatyantavyavahitameva’                  ‘tadatyavyavahitameva’                           ------                           
569, ‘dṛśyeṣu madhye’                                ‘dṛṣṭṛṣu madhye’                   ‘draṣṭṛṣu madhye’   
585, ‘padārthātmavastusvarūpam’            ‘paramārthātmavastusvarūpam’             -------              
637, ‘prājāpātyāḥ taṃ spṛdhire’                ‘prājāpātyāḥ paspṛdhire’                        --------                         
639, ‘sauhārdamavadhāraya’                  ‘hānāthamavadhārāya’                             -------                                
667, ‘ekavacanāvayavamekaṃ’               ‘ekavacanātrayavayavamekaṃ’                 --------   
670,    ‘śraddhānasyaiva’                         ‘śraddhānatayaiva’                                   -------- 
675,   ‘nityasya nityena nityavihitena’     ‘nityasya nityehitena’                                 --------                                                                                                    
770, ‘sarvapratibandhakaśūnyenātmajñānena’                                                         
                                                            ‘sarvapratibandhaśūnyenātmajñānena’       ---------- 
 
             
 
                                                               
*1, ‘oṃ namaḥ paramahaṃsāsvādita…śrīrāmacandrāyaya’                             
(Ānandāśrama edition lacks this invocatory verse).                                   
*498, ‘dṛśaḥ karmabhūtaṃ hi…bhaje tam’ (Lallurama Shastri and Ānandāśrama editions 
lack this saṃgraha śloka).  
*507, ‘paramakāruṇikaṃ…varāhādirūpaṃ vā’ (it is missing in Lallurama Shastri and 
Ānandāśrama editions).  
*519, ‘sambhavāttato…bhaje’oham’ (this saṃgraha śloka lacks in Lallurama Shastri and 
Ānandāśrama editions).  
 
 
 
 
 
Besides the above variants, there are number of typographical errors and minor different 
readings in the above-mentioned editions. 
